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ahmadmahmoud2020's avatar
ahmadmahmoud2020
Copper Contributor
Aug 16, 2026

Thousands of Sent Items moved to Deleted Items, no rules, no retention

Hello everyone,

I'm investigating a very unusual Exchange Online mailbox issue and would appreciate any insights from anyone who has seen something similar.

Environment

  • Exchange Online (Microsoft 365)
  • Mailbox: User mailbox
  • Outlook for Mac
  • Outlook for iOS
  • Outlook Web (OWA)

Incident Summary

On August 13, 2026, approximately 4,997 messages were moved from:

The activity occurred over roughly a 3-hour period.

Mailbox audit logs show thousands of:

 

Operation: MoveToDeletedItems

 

events.

Hourly breakdown:

01:00 - 2,046 events

02:00 - 1,540 events

03:00 - 1,408 events

Audit Findings

All sampled audit events show:

LogonType = 0 (Owner)

UserId = affected mailbox owner

Result = Succeeded

I sampled 5,000 records and all of them were:

LogonType = 0

 

No events were recorded as:

LogonType = 1 (Admin)

LogonType = 2 (Delegate)

Source and Destination Folders

Examples from mailbox audit records:

Folder : \Sent Items

Destination : \Deleted Items

Operation : MoveToDeletedItems

Message Trace Findings

Extended Message Trace was performed on one of the affected emails.

The trace confirmed:

CopiedToSentItems=True

DeleteAfterSubmit=False

which indicates:

  • The email was successfully sent.
  • The email was copied to Sent Items.
  • Exchange did not delete the message during transport.

So the message existed in Sent Items and was later moved to Deleted Items by a mailbox operation.

Rules Investigation

Checked:

Get-InboxRule -Mailbox <mailbox> -IncludeHidden

Findings:

  • No Inbox Rules targeting Sent Items.
  • No hidden Inbox Rules targeting Sent Items.
  • Only two legitimate rules that delete messages from specific Jira/Confluence senders.

Delegation Investigation

Mailbox permissions reviewed.

Known permissions exist, but mailbox audit logs show:

5000/5000 sampled events = LogonType 0

Therefore:

  • No evidence of delegate activity.
  • No evidence of administrative activity.

Retention / Compliance Investigation

Checked:

Get-Mailbox

Get-RetentionPolicy

Get-RetentionPolicyTag

Get-RetentionCompliancePolicy

Get-RetentionComplianceRule

Findings:

  • No Sent Items retention tag.
  • No retention policy targeting Sent Items.
  • No Purview retention/compliance policy appears to explain this behavior.
  • Activity pattern does not resemble normal retention processing.

Add-ins Investigation

Mailbox add-ins:

Polls

Share to Teams

Send to OneNote

Action Items

Bing Maps

My Templates

Unsubscribe

No third-party mailbox-management or archiving add-ins found.

Client Information Seen During Investigation

Examples observed in mailbox audit logs:

Client=OutlookService;MacOutlook/16.112

a { text-decoration: none; color: #464feb; } tr th, tr td { border: 1px solid #e6e6e6; } tr th { background-color: #f5f5f5; }

What Has Been Ruled Out

✅ Admin activity

✅ Delegate activity

✅ Inbox Rules

✅ Hidden Inbox Rules

✅ Outlook add-ins

✅ MRM retention policies

✅ Sent Items retention tags

✅ Purview compliance retention policies

✅ Exchange transport deleting the messages

Question

Has anyone encountered a similar case where:

Thousands of messages were moved from Sent Items to Deleted Items

Operation = MoveToDeletedItems

LogonType = 0 (Owner)

No rules

No retention policy

No delegate activity

 

particularly involving:

Outlook for iOS

Outlook for Mac

Client=OutlookService

 

Any similar experiences, findings, or recommendations would be greatly appreciated.

As we need to know the root cause for this issue. 

 

Thanks 

 

2 Replies

  • Thank you for the feedback.

    We have already reviewed the mailbox audit logs extensively for the incident period and confirmed the following:

    • Approximately 4,997 MoveToDeletedItems operations affected messages in Sent Items.
    • All sampled records show LogonType = 0 (Owner).
    • No Inbox Rules (including hidden rules), retention policies, compliance policies, delegate activity, or administrative actions were identified.
    • Message Trace confirms affected messages were successfully copied to Sent Items (CopiedToSentItems=True, DeleteAfterSubmit=False) and were not removed by Exchange transport.
    • Audit records associated with the bulk Sent Items deletion activity consistently show:

    Plain Text

    1

    ClientInfoString:

    2

    Client=OutlookService;MacOutlook/16.112.26081010;

    3

     

    4

    ActorInfoString:

    5

    MacOutlook/16.112.26081010 (ARM64 Mac OS X 26.5.2 Build 25F84)

    Show more lines

    We agree that LogonType=0 does not identify the specific user action performed, and that mailbox auditing alone does not conclusively identify the exact physical device. However, Microsoft Support has already indicated that they have seen similar Outlook for Mac cases, so we are currently working with Microsoft to correlate affected Message IDs and audit records with their backend telemetry.

    At this stage, the evidence points to a client-originated mailbox action rather than retention, transport, rules, delegation, or server-side processing.

  • he audit evidence confirms an owner-context move, but LogonType 0 does not identify the human action or exact client. ClientInfoString, ClientIPAddress, SessionId, LogonUserSid, and timestamps are the fields that can narrow it down. Export the full audit records for the three-hour window, group them by session and client IP, and compare those values with Microsoft Entra sign-in logs. The MacOutlook value indicates an Outlook service path, not conclusively a Mac user gesture. Temporarily remove the mailbox from iOS and Mac clients one at a time and check whether new move events stop. Preserve and restore the affected messages from Deleted Items before further testing. If any sign-in is unfamiliar, reset the password and revoke sessions immediately. Check Microsoft 365 service health. With rules, retention, delegates, and transport already excluded, Microsoft Support will need the exported audit JSON, timestamps, tenant, mailbox, and session identifiers to determine the server-side origin.