Moving Microsoft 365 authentication to Entra ID Cloud Auth from On-Prem ADFS
Hi Identity Brain Trust, Assuming this would be the right place for my question as I couldn't find any other hub more relevant for this one. We have several applications configured to be authenticated via ADFS. We are looking to move these gradually to Entra ID Cloud auth and decommission ADFS, eventually. I would like to test out how Microsoft 365 can be moved to Cloud Auth from ADFS for a certain group of people. I have tried to use ADFS migration wizard in Entra but 365 app is not showing in the ADFS Application Migration section of Entra ID. I've read this official guide but still couldn't find how this can be manually done when App Migration section won't have the app appearing there. - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/migrate-ad-fs-application-overview Appreciate any of your inputs on this one! Kev
MFA Issue blocks Global Admin / Data Protection Team disconnects calls
Hi. I have just learned that the Microsoft Authenticator app allows you to create MFA for multiple Global Administrator accounts, but those accounts will not properly transfer when you move to a new Smartphone. I have one tenant that has only one Global Admin Account secured using MFA and the Microsoft Authenticator App. The MFA is no longer working. I have been told to work with the Microsoft Data Protection Team by calling them at 800-865-9408. The weird thing is they keep disconnecting the call before the issue gets addressed. It has happened multiple times. Calling them back results in hold times averaging over 2 hours. Does anyone have ideas how I can get my MFA issue solved perhaps by reaching the proper group at Microsoft in another fashion? Is there some customer advocate resource at Microsoft I can contact?
From “No” to “Now”: A 7-Layer Strategy for Enterprise AI Safety
The “block” posture on Generative AI has failed. In a global enterprise, banning these tools doesn't stop usage; it simply pushes intellectual property into unmanaged channels and creates a massive visibility gap in corporate telemetry. The priority has now shifted from stopping AI to hardening the environment so that innovation can run at velocity without compromising data sovereignty. Traditional security perimeters are ineffective against the “slow bleed” of AI leakage - where data moves through prompts, clipboards, and autonomous agents rather than bulk file transfers. To secure this environment, a 7-layer defense-in-depth model is required to treat the conversation itself as the new perimeter. 1. Identity: The Only Verifiable Perimeter Identity is the primary control plane. Access to AI services must be treated with the same rigor as administrative access to core infrastructure. The strategy centers on enforcing device-bound Conditional Access, where access is strictly contingent on device health. To solve the "Account Leak" problem, the deployment of Tenant Restrictions v2 (TRv2) is essential to prevent users from signing into personal tenants using corporate-managed devices. For enhanced coverage, Universal Tenant Restrictions (UTR) via Global Secure Access (GSA) allows for consistent enforcement at the cloud edge. While TRv2 authentication-plane is GA, data-plane protection is GA for the Microsoft 365 admin center and remains in preview for other workloads such as SharePoint and Teams. 2. Eliminating the Visibility Gap (Shadow AI) You can’t secure what you can't see. Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps (MDCA) serves to discover and govern the enterprise AI footprint, while Purview DSPM for AI (formerly AI Hub) monitors Copilot and third-party interactions. By categorizing tools using MDCA risk scores and compliance attributes, organizations can apply automated sanctioning decisions and enforce session controls for high-risk endpoints. 3. Data Hygiene: Hardening the “Work IQ” AI acts as a mirror of internal permissions. In a "flat" environment, AI acts like a search engine for your over-shared data. Hardening the foundation requires automated sensitivity labeling in Purview Information Protection. Identifying PII and proprietary code before assigning AI licenses ensures that labels travel with the data, preventing labeled content from being exfiltrated via prompts or unauthorized sharing. 4. Session Governance: Solving the “Clipboard Leak” The most common leak in 2025 is not a file upload; it’s a simple copy-paste action or a USB transfer. Deploying Conditional Access App Control (CAAC) via MDCA session policies allows sanctioned apps to function while specifically blocking cut/copy/paste. This is complemented by Endpoint DLP, which extends governance to the physical device level, preventing sensitive data from being moved to unmanaged USB storage or printers during an AI-assisted workflow. Purview Information Protection with IRM rounds this out by enforcing encryption and usage rights on the files themselves. When a user tries to print a "Do Not Print" document, Purview triggers an alert that flows into Microsoft Sentinel. This gives the SOC visibility into actual policy violations instead of them having to hunt through generic activity logs. 5. The “Agentic” Era: Agent 365 & Sharing Controls Now that we're moving from "Chat" to "Agents", Agent 365 and Entra Agent ID provide the necessary identity and control plane for autonomous entities. A quick tip: in large-scale tenants, default settings often present a governance risk. A critical first step is navigating to the Microsoft 365 admin center (Copilot > Agents) to disable the default “Anyone in organization” sharing option. Restricting agent creation and sharing to a validated security group is essential to prevent unvetted agent sprawl and ensure that only compliant agents are discoverable. 6. The Human Layer: “Safe Harbors” over Bans Security fails when it creates more friction than the risk it seeks to mitigate. Instead of an outright ban, investment in AI skilling-teaching users context minimization (redacting specifics before interacting with a model) - is the better path. Providing a sanctioned, enterprise-grade "Safe Harbor" like M365 Copilot offers a superior tool that naturally cuts down the use of Shadow AI. 7. Continuous Ops: Monitoring & Regulatory Audit Security is not a “set and forget” project, particularly with the EU AI Act on the horizon. Correlating AI interactions and DLP alerts in Microsoft Sentinel using Purview Audit (specifically the CopilotInteraction logs) data allows for real-time responses. Automated SOAR playbooks can then trigger protective actions - such as revoking an Agent ID - if an entity attempts to access sensitive HR or financial data. Final Thoughts Securing AI at scale is an architectural shift. By layering Identity, Session Governance, and Agentic Identity, AI moves from being a fragmented risk to a governed tool that actually works for the modern workplace.
Windows Hello passkeys dialog appearing and cannot remove or suppress it.
Hi everyone, I’m dealing with a persistent Windows Hello and passkey issue in Chrome and Brave and yes this is relevant as they're the only browsers having this issue whilst Edge for example is fine, and at this point I’m trying to understand whether this is expected behavior, a bug, or a design oversight. PS. Yes, I'm in contact with related browser support teams but since they seem utterly hopeless i'm asking here, since its at least partially Windows Hello issue. Problem description Even with: Password managers disabled in browser settings, Windows Hello disabled in Chrome/Brave settings, Windows Hello PIN enabled only for device login, Passkeys still stored under chrome://settings/passkeys (which I cannot delete since its used for logging on the device), The devices are connected to Entra ID but this is not required to reproduce the issue although a buisness account configuration creates a Passkey with Windows Hello afaik. Observed behavior When I attempt to sign in on office.com, Windows Hello automatically triggers a dialog offering authentication via passkeys, even though: I don’t want passkeys used for browser logins, passkeys are turned off everywhere they can be, Windows Hello is intended only for local device authentication. The dialog cannot be suppressed, disabled, or hidden(trust me, i tried for weeks). It effectively forces the Windows Hello prompt as a primary option, which causes problems both personally and in business contexts (wrong credential signaling, misleading users that are supposed to use a dedicated password manager solution insted of browser password managers, enforcing an unwanted authentication flow, etc.). What I already verified Many, many, (too many) Windows registry workarounds that never worked. Dug through almost all flags on those browsers. Chrome/Brave → Password Manager: disabled Chrome/Brave → Windows Hello toggle: off Looked through what feels like almost every related option in Windows Settings. Tried gpedit.msc local rules System up to date Windows Hello configured to use PIN, but stores "passkeys used to log on to this device" Why this is a problem Windows Hello automatically assumes that the device-level Windows Hello credentials should always be available as a WebAuthn authenticator. This feels like a big security and UX issue due to: unexpected authentication dialogs, Inability to controll where and how passkey credential are shared to applications, inability to turn the feature off, no administrative or local option to disable Hello for WebAuthn separately from device login. Buisness users either having issues with keeping passwords in order (our buissnes uses a dedicated Password Manager but this behaviour covers its dialog option) or not having PIN to their devices (when I disable windows hello entierly, since when there is no passkeys the option doesn't appear) Questions Is there any supported way to disable Windows Hello as a WebAuthn/passkey option in browsers, while keeping Hello enabled for local device login? Is this expected behavior from the Windows Hello, or is it considered a bug? Are there registry/policy settings (documented or upcoming) that allow disabling the Windows platform authenticator specifically for browsers like Chrome and Brave? Is Microsoft aware of this issue? If so, is it tracked anywhere? Additional notes This issue replicates 100% across (as long as there are passkeys configured): Windows 11 devices i've managed to get my hands on, Chrome and Brave (latest versions), multiple Microsoft accounts and tenants, multiple clean installations. Any guidance or clarification from the Windows security or identity teams would be greatly appreciated. And honestly if there is any more info i could possibly provide PLEASE ask away.
Never Get Locked Out: The Importance of a Break Glass Admin Account
One of the simplest but most critical safeguards in Microsoft Entra ID is having a Break Glass Admin account. In my lab, I created a dedicated emergency account with: - Permanent Global Admin role (for emergencies only) - Excluded from Conditional Access policies - Strong password stored securely - Monitoring in place to detect any sign-in attempts This account is never used for daily operations — it exists only to guarantee access in case Conditional Access, MFA, or identity protection policies block all other admins. This setup prevents accidental lockouts and ensures continuity. Does your organization maintain a Break Glass Admin account, and how do you secure it?Hunting for MFA manipulations in Entra ID tenants using KQL
The following article, Hunting for MFA manipulations in Entra ID tenants using KQL proved to be an invaluable resource in my search for an automated way to notify users of MFA modifications. I've adapted the KQL query to function within Defender Advanced Hunting or Azure Entra, my objective is to establish an alert that directly E-Mails the affected user, informing them of the MFA change and advising them to contact security if they did not initiate it. While the query runs correctly under Defender Advanced Hunting, I'm currently unable to create a workable custom alert because no "ReportId" is being captured. Despite consulting with Copilot, Gemini, CDW Support, and Microsoft Support, no workable solution has been achieved. Any insight would be greatly appreciated - Thank You! //Advanced Hunting query to parse modified: //StrongAuthenticationUserDetails (SAUD) //StrongAuthenticationMethod (SAM) let SearchWindow = 1h; let AuthenticationMethods = dynamic(["TwoWayVoiceMobile","TwoWaySms","TwoWayVoiceOffice","TwoWayVoiceOtherMobile","TwoWaySmsOtherMobile","OneWaySms","PhoneAppNotification","PhoneAppOTP"]); let AuthenticationMethodChanges = CloudAppEvents | where ActionType == "Update user." and RawEventData contains "StrongAuthenticationMethod" | extend Target = tostring(RawEventData.ObjectId) | extend Actor = tostring(RawEventData.UserId) | mv-expand ModifiedProperties = parse_json(RawEventData.ModifiedProperties) | where ModifiedProperties.Name == "StrongAuthenticationMethod" | project Timestamp,Actor,Target,ModifiedProperties,RawEventData,ReportId; let OldValues = AuthenticationMethodChanges | extend OldValue = parse_json(tostring(ModifiedProperties.OldValue)) | mv-apply OldValue on (extend Old_MethodType=tostring(OldValue.MethodType),Old_Default=tostring(OldValue.Default) | sort by Old_MethodType); let NewValues = AuthenticationMethodChanges | extend NewValue = parse_json(tostring(ModifiedProperties.NewValue)) | mv-apply NewValue on (extend New_MethodType=tostring(NewValue.MethodType),New_Default=tostring(NewValue.Default) | sort by New_MethodType); let RemovedMethods = AuthenticationMethodChanges | join kind=inner OldValues on ReportId | join kind=leftouter NewValues on ReportId,$left.Old_MethodType==$right.New_MethodType | where Old_MethodType != New_MethodType | extend Action = strcat("Removed (" , AuthenticationMethods[toint(Old_MethodType)], ") from Authentication Methods.") | extend ChangedValue = "Method Removed"; let AddedMethods = AuthenticationMethodChanges | join kind=inner NewValues on ReportId | join kind=leftouter OldValues on ReportId,$left.New_MethodType==$right.Old_MethodType | where Old_MethodType != New_MethodType | extend Action = strcat("Added (" , AuthenticationMethods[toint(New_MethodType)], ") as Authentication Method.") | extend ChangedValue = "Method Added"; let DefaultMethodChanges = AuthenticationMethodChanges | join kind=inner OldValues on ReportId | join kind=inner NewValues on ReportId | where Old_Default != New_Default and Old_MethodType == New_MethodType and New_Default == "true" | join kind=inner OldValues on ReportId | where Old_Default1 == "true" and Old_MethodType1 != New_MethodType | extend Old_MethodType = Old_MethodType1 | extend Action = strcat("Default Authentication Method was changed to (" , AuthenticationMethods[toint(New_MethodType)], ").") | extend ChangedValue = "Default Method"; let AuthenticationMethodReport = union RemovedMethods,AddedMethods,DefaultMethodChanges | project Timestamp,Action,Actor,Target,ChangedValue,OldValue=case(isempty(Old_MethodType), "",strcat(Old_MethodType,": ", AuthenticationMethods[toint(Old_MethodType)])),NewValue=case(isempty( New_MethodType),"", strcat(New_MethodType,": ", AuthenticationMethods[toint(New_MethodType)])); let AuthenticationDetailsChanges = CloudAppEvents | where ActionType == "Update user." and RawEventData contains "StrongAuthenticationUserDetails" | extend Target = tostring(RawEventData.ObjectId) | extend Actor = tostring(RawEventData.UserId) | extend ReportId= tostring(RawEventData.ReportId) | mvexpand ModifiedProperties = parse_json(RawEventData.ModifiedProperties) | where ModifiedProperties.Name == "StrongAuthenticationUserDetails" | extend NewValue = parse_json(replace_string(replace_string(tostring(ModifiedProperties.NewValue),"[",""),"]","")) | extend OldValue = parse_json(replace_string(replace_string(tostring(ModifiedProperties.OldValue),"[",""),"]","")) | mv-expand NewValue | mv-expand OldValue | where (tostring( bag_keys(OldValue)) == tostring(bag_keys(NewValue))) or (isempty(OldValue) and tostring(NewValue) !contains ":null") or (isempty(NewValue) and tostring(OldValue) !contains ":null") | extend ChangedValue = tostring(bag_keys(NewValue)[0]) | extend OldValue = tostring(parse_json(OldValue)[ChangedValue]) | extend NewValue = tostring(parse_json(NewValue)[ChangedValue]) | extend OldValue = case(ChangedValue == "PhoneNumber" or ChangedValue == "AlternativePhoneNumber", replace_strings(OldValue,dynamic([' ','(',')']), dynamic(['','',''])), OldValue ) | extend NewValue = case(ChangedValue == "PhoneNumber" or ChangedValue == "AlternativePhoneNumber", replace_strings(NewValue,dynamic([' ','(',')']), dynamic(['','',''])), NewValue ) | where tostring(OldValue) != tostring(NewValue) | extend Action = case(isempty(OldValue), strcat("Added new ",ChangedValue, " to Strong Authentication."),isempty(NewValue),strcat("Removed existing ",ChangedValue, " from Strong Authentication."),strcat("Changed ",ChangedValue," in Strong Authentication.")); union AuthenticationMethodReport, AuthenticationDetailsChanges | extend AccountUpn = Target | where Timestamp > ago(SearchWindow) //| summarize count() by Timestamp, Action, Actor, Target, ChangedValue, OldValue, NewValue, ReportId, AccountDisplayName, AccountId, AccountUpn | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by Action | project Timestamp, Action, Actor, Target, ChangedValue, OldValue, NewValue, ReportId, AccountDisplayName, AccountId, AccountUpn | sort by Timestamp desc
User app registration - exploitable for BEC?
Hello. Recently dealt with a case of BEC. I'm not trained in forensics, but doing my best. Appears the hacker used an application called eM Client for their attack, getting access to a user's mailbox and hijacking a thread. I can see the login from two weeks ago (the incident was only noticed a couple days ago, however) - from a European country that SHOULD have been blocked by Conditional Access. Come to find out, the tenant conditional access was unassigned from everyone. We're not sure how - we re-enabled it, and audited changes, but the only change that appears was us re-enabling it. Which I thought indicates it was never configured right, except we've got a ticket documenting a change to Conditional Access a couple days after the hack that ALSO does not appear in the logs. So... it's likely it was changed, yet I have no record of that change (atleast, not through Entra > Monitoring > Auditing). If anyone knows any other ways of checking this, please advise - but I can't seem to even access our Diagnostic settings, the page tells me I need an Azure Active Directory subscription (I'm on Entra ID P1, which includes AAD.... this might be related to being global admin, and not Security Admin - we don't use that role in this relationship) ANYWAY, my amateur forensic skills have found that the attacker used an app called eM Client to get access. I'm not sure yet how they obtained the password, and got past MFA... But quick research shows this application (esp it's pro version) is known for use in BEC. The app was registered in Entra, and granted certain read permissions in Entra ID for shared mailboxes, presumably to find a decent thread to hijack. I'm not 100% sure yet there was any actual exploit done using this app, but it's popularity amongst hackers implies it does SOMETHING useful (i think remember that it authenticates using Exchange Web Services instead of Exchange Online, or something similar? Will update when I have the chance to check). We're in the process of improving our Secure Score, and this incident makes me think user's ability to register apps should be locked down. Checked Secure Score for this, and while there ARE recommendations around apps, disabling user app registration is NOT one of them. Just curious about people's thoughts. I just barely understand App Registration in Entra, but if this is a known attack vector, I would think disabling app registration would be a security recommendation?
Cannot login to Service Trust Portal
Hi, I'm trying to get some certificates from the service trust portal, but I keep getting "Service Trust Portal no longer support Microsoft Account (MSA) access." I'm using an account registered on Azure and I checked the Azure Active Directory, and the user exists (seeing it's the owner of the account). What am I missing here?
