Kerberos and the End of RC4: Protocol Hardening and Preparing for CVE‑2026‑20833
CVE-2026-20833 addresses the continued use of the RC4‑HMAC algorithm within the Kerberos protocol in Active Directory environments. Although RC4 has been retained for many years for compatibility with legacy systems, it is now considered cryptographically weak and unsuitable for modern authentication scenarios. As part of the security evolution of Kerberos, Microsoft has initiated a process of progressive protocol hardening, whose objective is to eliminate RC4 as an implicit fallback, establishing AES128 and AES256 as the default and recommended algorithms. This change should not be treated as optional or merely preventive. It represents a structural change in Kerberos behavior that will be progressively enforced through Windows security updates, culminating in a model where RC4 will no longer be implicitly accepted by the KDC. If Active Directory environments maintain service accounts, applications, or systems dependent on RC4, authentication failures may occur after the application of the updates planned for 2026, especially during the enforcement phases introduced starting in April and finalized in July 2026. For this reason, it is essential that organizations proactively identify and eliminate RC4 dependencies, ensuring that accounts, services, and applications are properly configured to use AES128 or AES256 before the definitive changes to Kerberos protocol behavior take effect. Official Microsoft References CVE-2026-25177 - Security Update Guide - Microsoft - Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Microsoft Support – How to manage Kerberos KDC usage of RC4 for service account ticket issuance changes related to CVE-2026-20833 (KB 5073381) Microsoft Learn – Detect and Remediate RC4 Usage in Kerberos AskDS – What is going on with RC4 in Kerberos? Beyond RC4 for Windows authentication | Microsoft Windows Server Blog So, you think you’re ready for enforcing AES for Kerberos? | Microsoft Community Hub Risk Associated with the Vulnerability When RC4 is used in Kerberos tickets, an authenticated attacker can request Service Tickets (TGS) for valid SPNs, capture these tickets, and perform offline brute-force attacks, particularly Kerberoasting scenarios, with the goal of recovering service account passwords. Compared to AES, RC4 allows significantly faster cracking, especially for older accounts or accounts with weak passwords. Technical Overview of the Exploitation In simplified terms, the exploitation flow occurs as follows: The attacker requests a TGS for a valid SPN. The KDC issues the ticket using RC4, when that algorithm is still accepted. The ticket is captured and analyzed offline. The service account password is recovered. The compromised account is used for lateral movement or privilege escalation. Official Timeline Defined by Microsoft Important clarification on enforcement behavior Explicit account encryption type configurations continue to be honored even during enforcement mode. The Kerberos hardening associated with CVE‑2026‑20833 focuses on changing the default behavior of the KDC, enforcing AES-only encryption for TGS ticket issuance when no explicit configuration exists. This approach follows the same enforcement model previously applied to Kerberos session keys in earlier security updates (for example, KB5021131 related to CVE‑2022‑37966), representing another step in the progressive removal of RC4 as an implicit fallback. January 2026 – Audit Phase Starting in January 2026, Microsoft initiated the Audit Phase related to changes in RC4 usage within Kerberos, as described in the official guidance associated with CVE-2026-20833. The primary objective of this phase is to allow organizations to identify existing RC4 dependencies before enforcement changes are applied in later phases. During this phase, no functional breakage is expected, as RC4 is still permitted by the KDC. However, additional auditing mechanisms were introduced, providing greater visibility into how Kerberos tickets are issued in the environment. Analysis is primarily based on the following events recorded in the Security Log of Domain Controllers: Event ID 4768 – Kerberos Authentication Service (AS request / Ticket Granting Ticket) Event ID 4769 – Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (Ticket Granting Service – TGS) Additional events related to the KDCSVC service These events allow identification of: the account that requested authentication the requested service or SPN the source host of the request the encryption algorithm used for the ticket and session key This information is critical for detecting scenarios where RC4 is still being implicitly used, enabling operations teams to plan remediation ahead of the enforcement phase. If these events are not being logged on Domain Controllers, it is necessary to verify whether Kerberos auditing is properly enabled. For Kerberos authentication events to be recorded in the Security Log, the corresponding audit policies must be configured. The minimum recommended configuration is to enable Success auditing for the following subcategories: Kerberos Authentication Service Kerberos Service Ticket Operations Verification can be performed directly on a Domain Controller using the following commands: auditpol /get /subcategory:"Kerberos Service Ticket Operations" auditpol /get /subcategory:"Kerberos Authentication Service" In enterprise environments, the recommended approach is to apply this configuration via Group Policy, ensuring consistency across all Domain Controllers. The corresponding policy can be found at: Computer Configuration - Policies - Windows Settings - Security Settings - Advanced Audit Policy Configuration - Audit Policies - Account Logon Once enabled, these audits record events 4768 and 4769 in the Domain Controllers’ Security Log, allowing analysis tools—such as inventory scripts or SIEM/Log Analytics queries—to accurately identify where RC4 is still present in the Kerberos authentication flow. April 2026 – Enforcement with Manual Rollback With the April 2026 update, the KDC begins operating in AES-only mode (0x18) when the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute is not defined. This means RC4 is no longer accepted as an implicit fallback. During this phase, applications, accounts, or computers that still implicitly depend on RC4 may start failing. Manual rollback remains possible via explicit configuration of the attribute in Active Directory. July 2026 – Final Enforcement Starting in July 2026, audit mode and rollback options are removed. RC4 will only function if explicitly configured—a practice that is strongly discouraged. This represents the point of no return in the hardening process. Official Monitoring Approach Microsoft provides official scripts in the repository: https://github.com/microsoft/Kerberos-Crypto/tree/main/scripts The two primary scripts used in this analysis are: Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 The Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 script, provided by Microsoft in the Kerberos‑Crypto repository, is designed to identify how Kerberos tickets are issued in the environment by analyzing authentication events recorded on Domain Controllers. Data collection is primarily based on: Event ID 4768 – Kerberos Authentication Service (AS‑REQ / TGT issuance) Event ID 4769 – Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (TGS issuance) From these events, the script extracts and consolidates several relevant fields for authentication flow analysis: Time – when the authentication occurred Requestor – IP address or host that initiated the request Source – account that requested the ticket Target – requested service or SPN Type – operation type (AS or TGS) Ticket – algorithm used to encrypt the ticket SessionKey – algorithm used to protect the session key Based on these fields, it becomes possible to objectively identify which algorithms are being used in the environment, both for ticket issuance and session establishment. This visibility is essential for detecting RC4 dependencies in the Kerberos authentication flow, enabling precise identification of which clients, services, or accounts still rely on this legacy algorithm. Example usage: .\Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 -Encryption RC4 -Searchscope AllKdcs | Export-Csv -Path .\KerbUsage_RC4_All_ThisDC.csv -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8 Data Consolidation and Analysis In enterprise environments, where event volumes may be high, it is recommended to consolidate script results into analytical tools such as Power BI to facilitate visualization and investigation. The presented image illustrates an example dashboard built from collected results, enabling visibility into: Total events analyzed Number of Domain Controllers involved Number of requesting clients (Requestors) Most frequently involved services or SPNs (Targets) Temporal distribution of events RC4 usage scenarios (Ticket, SessionKey, or both) This type of visualization enables rapid identification of RC4 usage patterns, remediation prioritization, and progress tracking as dependencies are eliminated. Additionally, dashboards help answer key operational questions, such as: Which services still depend on RC4 Which clients are negotiating RC4 for sessions Which Domain Controllers are issuing these tickets Whether RC4 usage is decreasing over time This combined automated collection + analytical visualization approach is the recommended strategy to prepare environments for the Microsoft changes related to CVE‑2026‑20833 and the progressive removal of RC4 in Kerberos. Visualizing Results with Power BI To facilitate analysis and monitoring of RC4 usage in Kerberos, it is recommended to consolidate script results into a Power BI analytical dashboard. 1. Install Power BI Desktop Download and install Power BI Desktop from the official Microsoft website 2. Execute data collection After running the Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 script, save the generated CSV file to the following directory: C:\Temp\Kerberos_KDC_usage_of_RC4_Logs\KerbEncryptionUsage_RC4.csv 3. Open the dashboard in Power BI Open the file RC4-KerbEncryptionUsage-Dashboards.pbix using Power BI Desktop. If you are interested, please leave a comment on this post with your email address, and I will be happy to share with you. 4. Update the data source If the CSV file is located in a different directory, it will be necessary to adjust the data source path in Power BI. As illustrated, the dashboard uses a parameter named CsvFilePath, which defines the path to the collected CSV file. To adjust it: Open Transform Data in Power BI. Locate the CsvFilePath parameter in the list of Queries. Update the value to the directory where the CSV file was saved. Click Refresh Preview or Refresh to update the data. Click Home → Close & Apply. This approach allows rapid identification of RC4 dependencies, prioritization of remediation actions, and tracking of progress throughout the elimination process. List-AccountKeys.ps1 This script is used to identify which long-term keys are present on user, computer, and service accounts, enabling verification of whether RC4 is still required or whether AES128/AES256 keys are already available. Interpreting Observed Scenarios Microsoft recommends analyzing RC4 usage by jointly considering two key fields present in Kerberos events: Ticket Encryption Type Session Encryption Type Each combination represents a distinct Kerberos behavior, indicating the source of the issue, risk level, and remediation point in the environment. In addition to events 4768 and 4769, updates released starting January 13, 2026, introduce new Kdcsvc events in the System Event Log that assist in identifying RC4 dependencies ahead of enforcement. These events include: Event ID 201 – RC4 usage detected because the client advertises only RC4 and the service does not have msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes defined. Event ID 202 – RC4 usage detected because the service account does not have AES keys and the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute is not defined. Event ID 203 – RC4 usage blocked (enforcement phase) because the client advertises only RC4 and the service does not have msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes defined. Event ID 204 – RC4 usage blocked (enforcement phase) because the service account does not have AES keys and msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes is not defined. Event ID 205 – Detection of explicit enablement of insecure algorithms (such as RC4) in the domain policy DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes. Event ID 206 – RC4 usage detected because the service accepts only AES, but the client does not advertise AES support. Event ID 207 – RC4 usage detected because the service is configured for AES, but the service account does not have AES keys. Event ID 208 – RC4 usage blocked (enforcement phase) because the service accepts only AES and the client does not advertise AES support. Event ID 209 – RC4 usage blocked (enforcement phase) because the service accepts only AES, but the service account does not have AES keys. https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/topic/how-to-manage-kerberos-kdc-usage-of-rc4-for-service-account-ticket-issuance-changes-related-to-cve-2026-20833-1ebcda33-720a-4da8-93c1-b0496e1910dc They indicate situations where RC4 usage will be blocked in future phases, allowing early detection of configuration issues in clients, services, or accounts. These events are logged under: Log: System Source: Kdcsvc Below are the primary scenarios observed during the analysis of Kerberos authentication behavior, highlighting how RC4 usage manifests across different ticket and session encryption combinations. Each scenario represents a distinct risk profile and indicates specific remediation actions required to ensure compliance with the upcoming enforcement phases. Scenario A – RC4 / RC4 In this scenario, both the Kerberos ticket and the session key are issued using RC4. This is the worst possible scenario from a security and compatibility perspective, as it indicates full and explicit dependence on RC4 in the authentication flow. This condition significantly increases exposure to Kerberoasting attacks, since RC4‑encrypted tickets can be subjected to offline brute-force attacks to recover service account passwords. In addition, environments remaining in this state have a high probability of authentication failure after the April 2026 updates, when RC4 will no longer be accepted as an implicit fallback by the KDC. Events Associated with This Scenario During the Audit Phase, this scenario is typically associated with: Event ID 201 – Kdcsvc Indicates that: the client advertises only RC4 the service does not have msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes defined the Domain Controller does not have DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes defined This means RC4 is being used implicitly. This event indicates that the authentication will fail during the enforcement phase. Event ID 202 – Kdcsvc Indicates that: the service account does not have AES keys the service does not have msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes defined This typically occurs when: legacy accounts have never had their passwords reset only RC4 keys exist in Active Directory Possible Causes Common causes include: the originating client (Requestor) advertises only RC4 the target service (Target) is not explicitly configured to support AES the account has only legacy RC4 keys the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute is not defined Recommended Actions To remediate this scenario: Correctly identify the object involved in the authentication flow, typically: a service account (SPN) a computer account or a Domain Controller computer object Verify whether the object has AES keys available using analysis tools or scripts such as List-AccountKeys.ps1. If AES keys are not present, reset the account password, forcing generation of modern cryptographic keys (AES128 and AES256). Explicitly define the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute to enable AES support. Recommended value for modern environments: 0x18 (AES128 + AES256) = 24 As illustrated below, this configuration can be applied directly to the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute in Active Directory. AES can also be enabled via Active Directory Users and Computers by explicitly selecting: This account supports Kerberos AES 128 bit encryption This account supports Kerberos AES 256 bit encryption These options ensure that new Kerberos tickets are issued using AES algorithms instead of RC4. Temporary RC4 Usage (Controlled Rollback) In transitional scenarios—during migration or troubleshooting—it may be acceptable to temporarily use: 0x1C (RC4 + AES) = 28 This configuration allows the object to accept both RC4 and AES simultaneously, functioning as a controlled rollback while legacy dependencies are identified and corrected. However, the final objective must be to fully eliminate RC4 before the final enforcement phase in July 2026, ensuring the environment operates exclusively with AES128 and AES256. Scenario B – AES / RC4 In this case, the ticket is protected with AES, but the session is still negotiated using RC4. This typically indicates a client limitation, legacy configuration, or restricted advertisement of supported algorithms. Events Associated with This Scenario During the Audit Phase, this scenario may generate: Event ID 206 Indicates that: the service accepts only AES the client does not advertise AES in the Advertised Etypes In this case, the client is the issue. Recommended Action Investigate the Requestor Validate operating system, client type, and advertised algorithms Review legacy GPOs, hardening configurations, or settings that still force RC4 For Linux clients or third‑party applications, review krb5.conf, keytabs, and Kerberos libraries Scenario C – RC4 / AES Here, the session already uses AES, but the ticket is still issued using RC4. This indicates an implicit RC4 dependency on the Target or KDC side, and the environment may fail once enforcement begins. Events Associated with This Scenario This scenario may generate: Event ID 205 Indicates that the domain has explicit insecure algorithm configuration in: DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes This means RC4 is explicitly allowed at the domain level. Recommended Action Correct the Target object Explicitly define msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes with 0x18 = 24 Revalidate new ticket issuance to confirm full migration to AES / AES Conclusion CVE‑2026‑20833 represents a structural change in Kerberos behavior within Active Directory environments. Proper monitoring is essential before April 2026, and the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute becomes the primary control point for service accounts, computer accounts, and Domain Controllers. July 2026 represents the final enforcement point, after which there will be no implicit rollback to RC4.
Why “Data in Switzerland” Is Not Enough
Moving from Residency to Control in Microsoft 365 Every conversation about data sovereignty in regulated industries tends to start the same way: “We use Multi-Geo. The data stays in Switzerland.” It’s the right starting point. Microsoft 365 Multi-Geo allows organizations to place selected workloads - SharePoint sites, OneDrive accounts, Teams data, or Exchange mailboxes - into specific regions, including Switzerland, while maintaining a single global tenant. This makes it possible to align sensitive data with regulatory or customer requirements without fragmenting the overall environment. But it only answers one question: Where is the data stored? It does not answer who accessed the data, from where, under which conditions, or what happened after access. That is where the real problem begins. A scenario that happens every day A Swiss engineering firm stores sensitive project documentation in Switzerland using Multi-Geo. An external contractor - working from an unmanaged device outside Switzerland - is granted access to review a file. The document opens. The data is now on a screen in an unknown location, on a device with no compliance posture, in a session with no restrictions. From the platform’s perspective, residency was enforced. From a sovereignty perspective, control was lost the moment access was granted without conditions. The file never left Switzerland. But sovereignty did. Residency is static. Control is not. The moment a document is opened, storage location stops being the relevant boundary. The file is no longer just “in Switzerland.” It moves instantly across endpoints and browsers, collaboration tools like Teams, external users and partners, and increasingly AI-driven contexts. The infrastructure remains unchanged. The data does not. From the platform’s perspective, everything is working as designed - access was granted, residency was enforced - and control was lost. Most “data in Switzerland” strategies fail at exactly this moment: when the data is used. The shift: from location to conditions If data sovereignty is the goal, the question must change. Not “Where is the data stored?” but: Under which conditions can data be accessed and used? This shift fundamentally changes the architecture. Control must be applied across three distinct layers - and all three must be connected. Layer 1: Access is conditional, not static Conditional Access extends control beyond authentication and turns it into continuous evaluation. Access decisions can depend on: Device compliance Location (geo-restriction) Identity and risk signals Multi-Geo ensures data is placed correctly. Conditional Access ensures it is reachable only under defined conditions. The two must work together - residency without access governance is an incomplete control. Layer 2: The session is the real risk surface Even with strict access controls, risk remains. A session is an exposure surface by design. During an active session, data is viewed, copied, shared, processed by applications, and connected to AI prompts. The gap does not appear at storage or authentication. It appears during active usage - inside the session. This is the layer most architectures do not explicitly address. Controls must extend into the session itself: limiting data transfer and replication, restricting interaction patterns, and enforcing policies in real time. Access is no longer a one-time event. It becomes continuously governed. This becomes even more critical as AI assistants consume content across SharePoint, Teams, Exchange, and other Microsoft 365 services. The question is no longer only where the source document resides - but whether the AI interaction itself is governed by the same access and protection controls as direct access. Layer 3: The document becomes the control point The most durable control does not sit in the network or in the session. It sits in the data itself. In regulated industries, organizations often arrive at this architecture having first evaluated sovereign or national encryption solutions. The decision to rely on native Microsoft 365 Purview encryption rather than a separate layer comes down to integration: AES-256 protection operating natively at file, user, and SharePoint level - including geo-based access restrictions - without an additional system to maintain. When protection is applied directly to the document through Microsoft Purview: Sensitivity labels define classification - automatically assigned based on content Encryption enforces access - AES-256, bound to the file itself IRM controls usage - view, copy, print, share, and presentation rights DLP governs movement across services - preventing data from leaving defined boundaries Dynamic watermarking tracks exposure - applied on open, view, or print At that point, access is enforced by the file, usage restrictions travel with it, and control persists regardless of location. The document becomes the perimeter. Platform control: limiting provider access One dimension often overlooked in sovereignty discussions is platform access itself. Even a perfectly configured tenant is only as sovereign as the controls placed on the operator. Customer Lockbox ensures that even Microsoft support cannot access customer data without explicit, logged, time-bound approval. Every access request is visible, auditable, and subject to customer veto. Data control applies not only to users - but also to the platform operating the service. Enforcement requires an integrated architecture Most organizations already have the required capabilities: Multi-Geo, Conditional Access, session control, Purview (labels, encryption, DLP, IRM), and monitoring. The issue is not capability. It is fragmentation. In practice, fragmentation looks like this: residency is configured in one project, Conditional Access policies are managed by a different team, and Purview labels were applied during a compliance initiative that never connected to the access layer. The tools exist. The signals do not flow between them. When designed as a single architecture: Data is placed intentionally - residency aligned to regulatory requirements Access is governed by context - device, location, and identity evaluated continuously Usage is controlled dynamically - session-level restrictions enforced in real time Protection is embedded in the document - encryption and IRM travel with the file Signals are connected across the platform - monitoring feeds access policy, not just audit logs “Data in Switzerland” becomes not just a statement - but an enforceable system property. Closing thought Placing data in Switzerland is the right first step. Multi-Geo makes it possible, even in global environments. But residency alone is not control. Data residency answers where information is stored. Data sovereignty requires proving who can access it, under which conditions, and what controls remain in place after access is granted. In Microsoft 365, sovereignty is no longer defined by geography alone. It is defined by the ability to enforce control wherever the data travels.Passkey Sign in Method (Entra Account) missing in Security
Hi Microsoft Support we enable FIDO2 passkey in entraId. However, when we try to register the FIDO2 passkey on myaccount.microsoft.com -> Security -> Add a Sign-in Method -> Passkey is missing. Attached screenshot. For a personal account, the Passkey method is available at the same location, even though interface is slightly different than an Entra Id account. Attached screenshot for the personal account as well. Kindly guide us on where to register the passkey or if we need to enable certain settings in EntraId for the passkey to show up in sign-in methods. We have Auth Strengths enabled in EntraId for the particular user in question and this reflects in the Device Lockscreen during login on Entra Registred Device. Thanks Chandra
Windows Hello passkeys dialog appearing and cannot remove or suppress it.
Hi everyone, I’m dealing with a persistent Windows Hello and passkey issue in Chrome and Brave and yes this is relevant as they're the only browsers having this issue whilst Edge for example is fine, and at this point I’m trying to understand whether this is expected behavior, a bug, or a design oversight. PS. Yes, I'm in contact with related browser support teams but since they seem utterly hopeless i'm asking here, since its at least partially Windows Hello issue. Problem description Even with: Password managers disabled in browser settings, Windows Hello disabled in Chrome/Brave settings, Windows Hello PIN enabled only for device login, Passkeys still stored under chrome://settings/passkeys (which I cannot delete since its used for logging on the device), The devices are connected to Entra ID but this is not required to reproduce the issue although a buisness account configuration creates a Passkey with Windows Hello afaik. Observed behavior When I attempt to sign in on office.com, Windows Hello automatically triggers a dialog offering authentication via passkeys, even though: I don’t want passkeys used for browser logins, passkeys are turned off everywhere they can be, Windows Hello is intended only for local device authentication. The dialog cannot be suppressed, disabled, or hidden(trust me, i tried for weeks). It effectively forces the Windows Hello prompt as a primary option, which causes problems both personally and in business contexts (wrong credential signaling, misleading users that are supposed to use a dedicated password manager solution insted of browser password managers, enforcing an unwanted authentication flow, etc.). What I already verified Many, many, (too many) Windows registry workarounds that never worked. Dug through almost all flags on those browsers. Chrome/Brave → Password Manager: disabled Chrome/Brave → Windows Hello toggle: off Looked through what feels like almost every related option in Windows Settings. Tried gpedit.msc local rules System up to date Windows Hello configured to use PIN, but stores "passkeys used to log on to this device" Why this is a problem Windows Hello automatically assumes that the device-level Windows Hello credentials should always be available as a WebAuthn authenticator. This feels like a big security and UX issue due to: unexpected authentication dialogs, Inability to controll where and how passkey credential are shared to applications, inability to turn the feature off, no administrative or local option to disable Hello for WebAuthn separately from device login. Buisness users either having issues with keeping passwords in order (our buissnes uses a dedicated Password Manager but this behaviour covers its dialog option) or not having PIN to their devices (when I disable windows hello entierly, since when there is no passkeys the option doesn't appear) Questions Is there any supported way to disable Windows Hello as a WebAuthn/passkey option in browsers, while keeping Hello enabled for local device login? Is this expected behavior from the Windows Hello, or is it considered a bug? Are there registry/policy settings (documented or upcoming) that allow disabling the Windows platform authenticator specifically for browsers like Chrome and Brave? Is Microsoft aware of this issue? If so, is it tracked anywhere? Additional notes This issue replicates 100% across (as long as there are passkeys configured): Windows 11 devices i've managed to get my hands on, Chrome and Brave (latest versions), multiple Microsoft accounts and tenants, multiple clean installations. Any guidance or clarification from the Windows security or identity teams would be greatly appreciated. And honestly if there is any more info i could possibly provide PLEASE ask away.Security Dashboard for AI: 3 Ways CISOs Drive Impact Today
AI is reshaping the enterprise and, with it, the threat landscape. Today's organizations face new threats with AI agents that modify configurations, execute workflows, and access data without direct human oversight. As a result, the gap between AI adoption and AI governance is widening, and CISOs face growing challenges to maintain visibility, control, and compliance across an increasingly complex ecosystem. As AI becomes embedded across the enterprise, CISOs face four key challenges: Scale without visibility: Over 75% of enterprises surveyed by PWC report they are already adopting AI agents. ¹ At the same time, over 80% of security teams surveyed by Nokod report visibility gaps into the applications and AI agents created within their organization. ² Rapid AI proliferation and evolving regulations make unified visibility across AI platforms, apps, and agents critical for CISOs. Fragmentation: Organizations rely on multiple siloed tools for AI asset visibility, making oversight fragmented and inefficient. According to Gartner’s 2024 survey of 162 enterprises, organizations use 45 cybersecurity tools on average. Expanding AI risk: AI proliferation is rapidly increasing the attack and risk surface, with the surge of AI-generated identities. By 2027, 4 out of 5 organizations will face phishing attacks powered by AI-generated synthetic identities, according to IDC. ³ This makes it harder for CISOs to track emerging threats, unmanaged assets, and shifting risk patterns. Overload: Alert fatigue is now a top challenge, with organizations now receiving an average of 2,992 security alerts daily, yet 63% go unaddressed. ⁴ Increasing AI risk without a way to prioritize what matters most compounds pressure on CISOs. In conversations between Microsoft and CISOs, one common need emerged: a single place to view integrated AI risk across the enterprise. To address these growing challenges, we are excited to provide CISOs with the Security Dashboard for AI, which recently became generally available. This unified dashboard aggregates posture and real-time risk signals from Microsoft Defender, Entra, and Purview into one unified, executive-level view of AI posture, risk, and inventory across agents, apps, and platforms. The Security Dashboard for AI helps CISOs: Gain unified AI risk visibility: Discover AI agents and applications and continuously monitor posture across the environment Prioritize critical risks: Correlate signals across identity, data, and threat protection to surface the most urgent issues Drive risk mitigations: Investigate activity and take action to help reduce exposure across the AI ecosystem The dashboard is capable of aggregating and surfacing AI risks from across Microsoft Defender, Entra, Purview - including Microsoft 365 Copilot, Microsoft Copilot Studio agents, and Microsoft Foundry applications and agents as well as cross-platform AI risks with Microsoft network-based or SDK-enabled integrations, and MCP servers. This supports comprehensive visibility and control, regardless of where applications and agents are built. As you activate Microsoft Security for AI capabilities, you can gain richer visibility into different aspects of your AI risk posture. Figure 1: Security Dashboard for AI in browser Getting Started with the Security Dashboard for AI The Security Dashboard for AI is provided at no additional cost to customers already using Defender, Entra, and/or Purview to protect their AI innovation. Based on how early adopter CISOs are using the dashboard, here are three ways you can start leveraging the dashboard today. 1. Manage Daily AI Risk Beyond reporting, you must stay hands-on with AI risks, scanning for emerging issues, verifying asset governance, and delegating remediations. The Security Dashboard for AI consolidates daily operations into a single pane of glass, surfacing critical alerts, unmanaged assets, and emerging risks. Use the dashboard as a daily AI risk radar, enabling rapid triage and ensuring you focus on the most urgent threats. Scan and triage daily AI risk: Start each day by identifying and prioritizing the highest-risk AI exposures. Risks are prioritized on severity reported by underlying security tools, helping you focus on the most critical exposures. Track AI asset inventory and monitor agent sprawl: Use the Inventory page to gain comprehensive visibility into all AI assets. Identify newly registered assets to mitigate the risk of shadow or unmanaged IT and surface inactive agents to proactively monitor and control agent sprawl. Delegate tasks for remediation: Move from insight to action by delegating tasks to your security team with easy click delegation. Delegation routes ownership via email or Microsoft Teams with notifications, due date, and ownership tracking. Delegate actions to specific roles such as global admin and AI administrator, without granting full access to underlying tools. Figure 2: Security Dashboard for AI risk page 2. Guide Briefings with Security Teams You require up-to-date intelligence to guide conversations with Security Teams about what is happening across the AI estate. The Security Dashboard for AI helps you anchor discussions in specific risks, trends, and ownership gaps surfaced in the data. The dashboard becomes a conversation driver, helping you ask the right questions about risk and security posture, to help ensure you and your team are triaging the right priorities. Because the dashboard consolidates signals from Defender, Entra, and Purview, both CISO and security teams operate from the same facts, enabling more outcome-driven discussions and faster prioritization, so you can shift the conversations from status updates to targeted action planning. Prioritize top AI Risk: Use the dashboard to help you prioritize the AI risk that matters the most. In preparation for team meetings, use Microsoft Security Copilot to explore AI risks, agent activity, and security recommendations via prompts to strengthen your AI security posture. With your team, take a closer look at risk vectors like data leakage, oversharing and unethical behavior, and discuss what actions need to be taken. Review Security Recommendations: Create a routine with your security team to review the recommended Microsoft security actions and track your progress over time. Across regular team check‑ins, review what has been addressed, what remains open, and which actions require follow‑up so you are prepared to respond to regulatory, audit, or executive questions with up‑to‑date metrics. Figure 3: Security Dashboard for AI inventory page Figure 4: Security Dashboard for AI delegation 3. Executive Reporting Reporting to the board on AI security posture has historically meant weeks of manual data gathering across multiple tools. The Security Dashboard for AI streamlines the data collection process with a single source of truth for AI risk, enabling confident, data-backed insights for your board presentations and conversations. Early adopters confirm the value and are using it for quarterly executive briefings. Prepare for Board Discussions: Use the dashboard to help get the right insights at the right altitude to help you prepare for discussions with your board. The Overview page aggregates identity, data security, and threat protection signals from Defender, Entra, and Purview into an AI risk scorecard with risk factors. The embedded Security Copilot AI-powered insights provide suggested prompts with risk assessments, summaries, and recommendations to help you prioritize what matters most. Extend Observability to Executive Stakeholders: Authorize AI risk follow‑ups to the appropriate security, identity, or governance owners using Microsoft Teams or email. Distribute visibility across GRC lead, AI governance, and IT leaders, while maintaining executive‑level oversight. Figure 5: Security Dashboard for AI Copilot prompt gallery Next Steps The Security Dashboard for AI helps CISOs manage AI risk faster, more confidently and more collaboratively with their team. Defender, Entra, and Purview signals are surfaced in a single pane of glass, providing observability across your AI estate. Drive faster triage, use data to support board-level discussions about AI risk, and enable coordinated action with integrated insights, recommendations, and delegation to help accelerate remediation across existing security workflows. The Security Dashboard for AI is generally available now. If your organization uses Microsoft Defender, Entra, and/or Purview, you already have access, no additional licensing is required. Visit ai.security.microsoft.com to access the dashboard directly, or navigate to it from the Defender, Entra, or Purview portals. Learn more about the Security Dashboard for AI on the MS Learn page and the Security Dashboard for AI Security Blog. Discover new features in the Security Dashboard for AI such as the Security Reader role, new delegation flow, and new identity risk section here. ¹AI agent survey. PwC, May 2025 ²Security Teams Taking on Expanded AI Data Responsibilities. Bedrock Data, March 2025 ³IDC FutureScape: Worldwide Security and Trust 2026 Predictions, November 2025 ⁴2026 State of Threat Detection and Response Report. Vectra AI, February 2026Security Dashboard for AI - Now Generally Available
AI proliferation in the enterprise, combined with the emergence of AI governance committees and evolving AI regulations, leaves CISOs and AI risk leaders needing a clear view of their AI risks, such as data leaks, model vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and unethical agent actions across their entire AI estate, spanning AI platforms, apps, and agents. 53% of security professionals say their current AI risk management needs improvement, presenting an opportunity to better identify, assess and manage risk effectively. 1 At the same time, 86% of leaders prefer integrated platforms over fragmented tools, citing better visibility, fewer alerts and improved efficiency. 2 To address these needs, we are excited to announce the Security Dashboard for AI, previously announced at Microsoft Ignite, is now generally available. This unified dashboard aggregates posture and real-time risk signals from Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Entra, and Microsoft Purview - enabling users to see left-to-right across purpose-built security tools from within a single pane of glass. The dashboard equips CISOs and AI risk leaders with a governance tool to discover agents and AI apps, track AI posture and drift, and correlate risk signals to investigate and act across their entire AI ecosystem. Security teams can continue using the tools they trust while empowering security leaders to govern and collaborate effectively. Gain Unified AI Risk Visibility Consolidating risk signals from across purpose-built tools can simplify AI asset visibility and oversight, increase security teams’ efficiency, and reduce the opportunity for human error. The Security Dashboard for AI provides leaders with unified AI risk visibility by aggregating security, identity, and data risk across Defender, Entra, Purview into a single interactive dashboard experience. The Overview tab of the dashboard provides users with an AI risk scorecard, providing immediate visibility to where there may be risks for security teams to address. It also assesses an organization's implementation of Microsoft security for AI capabilities and provides recommendations for improving AI security posture. The dashboard also features an AI inventory with comprehensive views to support AI assets discovery, risk assessments, and remediation actions for broad coverage of AI agents, models, MCP servers, and applications. The dashboard provides coverage for all Microsoft AI solutions supported by Entra, Defender and Purview—including Microsoft 365 Copilot, Microsoft Copilot Studio agents, and Microsoft Foundry applications and agents—as well as third-party AI models, applications, and agents, such as Google Gemini, OpenAI ChatGPT, and MCP servers. This supports comprehensive visibility and control, regardless of where applications and agents are built. Prioritize Critical Risk with Security Copilots AI-Powered Insights Risk leaders must do more than just recognize existing risks—they also need to determine which ones pose the greatest threat to their business. The dashboard provides a consolidated view of AI-related security risks and leverages Security Copilot’s AI-powered insights to help find the most critical risks within an environment. For example, Security Copilot natural language interaction improves agent discovery and categorization, helping leaders identify unmanaged and shadow AI agents to enhance security posture. Furthermore, Security Copilot allows leaders to investigate AI risks and agent activities through prompt-based exploration, putting them in the driver’s seat for additional risk investigation. Drive Risk Mitigation By streamlining risk mitigation recommendations and automated task delegation, organizations can significantly improve the efficiency of their AI risk management processes. This approach can reduce the potential hidden AI risk and accelerate compliance efforts, helping to ensure that risk mitigation is timely and accurate. To address this, the Security Dashboard for AI evaluates how organizations put Microsoft’s AI security features into practice and offers tailored suggestions to strengthen AI security posture. It leverages Microsoft’s productivity tools for immediate action within the practitioner portal, making it easy for administrators to delegate recommendation tasks to designated users. With the Security Dashboard for AI, CISOs and risk leaders gain a clear, consolidated view of AI risks across agents, apps, and platforms—eliminating fragmented visibility, disconnected posture insights, and governance gaps as AI adoption scales. Best of all, the Security Dashboard for AI is included with eligible Microsoft security products customers already use. If an organization is already using Microsoft security products to secure AI, they are already a Security Dashboard for AI customer. Getting Started Existing Microsoft Security customers can start using Security Dashboard for AI today. It is included when a customer has the Microsoft Security products—Defender, Entra and Purview—with no additional licensing required. To begin using the Security Dashboard for AI, visit http://ai.security.microsoft.com or access the dashboard from the Defender, Entra or Purview portals. Learn more about the Security Dashboard for AI at Microsoft Security MS Learn. 1AuditBoard & Ascend2 Research. The Connected Risk Report: Uniting Teams and Insights to Drive Organizational Resilience. AuditBoard, October 2024. 2Microsoft. 2026 Data Security Index: Unifying Data Protection and AI Innovation. Microsoft Security, 2026Step by Step: 2-Tier PKI Lab
Purpose of this blog Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the backbone of secure digital identity management, enabling encryption, digital signatures, and certificate-based authentication. However, neither setting up a PKI nor management of certificates is something most IT pros do on a regular basis and given the complexity and vastness of the subject it only makes sense to revisit the topic from time to time. What I have found works best for me is to just set up a lab and get my hands dirty with the topic that I want to revisit. One such topic that I keep coming back to is PKI - be it for creating certificate templates, enrolling clients, or flat out creating a new PKI itself. But every time I start deploying a lab or start planning a PKI setup, I end up spending too much time sifting through the documentations and trying to figure out why my issuing certificate authority won't come online! To make my life easier I decided to create a cheatsheet to deploy a simple but secure 2-tier PKI lab based on industry best practices that I thought would be beneficial for others like me, so I decided to polish it and make it into a blog. This blog walks through deploying a two-tier PKI hierarchy using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) on Windows Server: an offline Root Certification Authority (Root CA) and an online Issuing Certification Authority (Issuing CA). We’ll cover step-by-step deployment and best practices for securing the root CA, conducting key ceremonies, and maintaining Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Overview: Two-Tier PKI Architecture and Components In a two-tier PKI, the Root CA sits at the top of the trust hierarchy and issues a certificate only to the subordinate Issuing CA. The Root CA is kept offline (disconnected from networks) to protect its private key and is typically a standalone CA (not domain-joined). The Issuing CA (sometimes called a subordinate or intermediate CA) is kept online to issue certificates to end-entities (users, computers, services) and is usually an enterprise CA integrated with Active Directory for automation and certificate template support. Key components: Offline Root CA: A standalone CA, often on a workgroup server, powered on only when necessary (initial setup, subordinate CA certificate signing, or periodic CRL publishing). By staying offline, it is insulated from network threats. Its self-signed certificate serves as the trust anchor for the entire PKI. The Root CA’s private key must be rigorously protected (ideally by a Hardware Security Module) because if the root is compromised, all certificates in the hierarchy are compromised. Online Issuing CA: An enterprise subordinate CA (domain-joined) that handles day-to-day certificate issuance for the organization. It trusts the Root CA (via the root’s certificate) and is the one actually responding to certificate requests. Being online, it must also be secured, but its key is kept online for operations. Typically, the Issuing CA publishes certificates and CRLs to Active Directory and/or HTTP locations for clients to download. The following diagram shows the simplified view of this implementations: The table below summarizes the roles and differences: Aspect Offline Root CA Online Issuing CA Role Standalone Root CA (workgroup) Enterprise Subordinate CA (domain member) Network Connectivity Kept offline (powered off or disconnected when not issuing) Online (running continuously to serve requests) Usage Signs only one certificate (the subordinate CA’s cert) and CRLs Issues end-entity certificates (users, computers, services) Active Directory Not a member of AD domain; doesn’t use templates or auto-enrollment Integrated with AD DS; uses certificate templates for streamlined issuance Security Extremely high: physically secured, limited access, often protected by HSM Very High: server hardened, but accessible on network; HSM recommended for private key CRL Publication Manual. Admin must periodically connect, generate, and distribute CRL. Delta CRLs usually disabled. Automatic. Publishes CRLs to configured CDP locations (AD DS, HTTP) at scheduled intervals. Validity Period Longer (e.g. 5-10+ years for the CA certificate) to reduce frequency of renewal. Shorter (e.g. 2 years) to align with organizational policy; renewed under the root when needed. In this lab setup, we will create a Contoso Root CA (offline) and a Contoso Issuing CA (online) as an example. This mirrors real-world best practices which is to "deploy a standalone offline root CA and an online enterprise subordinate CA”. Deploying the Offline Root CA Setting up the offline Root CA involves preparing a dedicated server, installing AD CS, configuring it as a root CA, and then securing it. We’ll also configure certificate CDP/AIA (CRL Distribution Point and Authority Information Access) locations so that issued certificates will point clients to the correct locations to fetch the CA’s certificate and revocation list. Step 1: Prepare the Root CA Server (Offline) Provision an isolated server: Install a Windows Server OS (e.g., Windows Server 2022) on the machine designated to be the Root CA. Preferably on a portable enterprise grade physical server that can be stored in a safe. Do not join this server to any domain – it should function in a Workgroup to remain independent of your AD forest. System configuration: Give the server a descriptive name (e.g., ROOTCA) and assign a static IP (even though it will be offline, a static IP helps when connecting it temporarily for management). Install the latest updates and security patches while it’s still able to go online. Lock down network access: Once setup is complete, disable or unplug network connections. If the server must remain powered on for any reason, ensure all unnecessary services/ports are disabled to minimize exposure. In practice, you will keep this server shut down or physically disconnected except when performing CA maintenance. Step 2: Install the AD CS Role on the Root CA Add the Certification Authority role: On the Root CA server, open Server Manager and add the Active Directory Certificate Services role. During the wizard, select the Certification Authority role service (no need for web enrollment or others on the root). Proceed through the wizard and complete the installation. You can also install the CA role and management tools via PowerShell: Install-WindowsFeature AD-Certificate -IncludeManagementToolsThis Role Services: Choose Certification Authority. Setup Type: Select Standalone CA (since this root CA is not domain-joined). CA Type: Select Root CA. Private Key: Choose “Create a new private key.” Cryptography: If using an HSM, select the HSM’s Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) here; otherwise use default. Choose a strong key length (e.g., 2048 or 4096 bits) and a secure hash algorithm (SHA-256 or higher). CA Name: Provide a common name for the CA (e.g., “Contoso Root CA”). This name will appear in issued certificates as the Issuer. Avoid using a machine DNS name here for security – pick a name without revealing the server’s actual hostname. Validity Period: Set a long validity (e.g., 10 years) for the root CA’s self-signed certificate. A decade is common for enterprise roots, reducing how often you must touch the offline CA for renewal. Database: Specify locations for the CA database and logs (the defaults are fine for a lab). Review settings and complete the configuration. This process will generate the root CA’s key pair and self-signed certificate, establishing the Root CA.Post-install configuration: After the binary installation, click Configure Active Directory Certificate Services (a notification in Server Manager). In the configuration wizard: You can also perform this configuration via PowerShell in one line: Install-AdcsCertificationAuthority ` -CAType StandaloneRootCA ` -CryptoProviderName "YourHSMProvider" ` -HashAlgorithmName SHA256 -KeyLength 2048 ` -CACommonName "Contoso Root CA" ` -ValidityPeriod Years -ValidityPeriodUnits 10 This would set up a standalone Root CA named "Contoso Root CA" with a 2048-bit key on an HSM provider, valid for 10 years. Step 3: Integrate an HSM (Optional but Recommended) If your lab has a Hardware Security Module, use it to secure the Root CA’s keys. Using an HSM provides a dedicated, tamper-resistant storage for CA private keys and can further protect against key compromise. To integrate: Install the HSM vendor’s software and drivers on the Root CA server. Initialize the HSM and create a security world or partition as per the vendor instructions. Before or during the CA configuration (Step 2 above), ensure the HSM is ready to generate/store the key. When running the AD CS configuration, select the HSM’s CSP/KSP for the cryptographic provider so that the CA’s private key is generated on the HSM. Secure any HSM admin tokens or smartcards. For a root CA, you might employ M of N key splits – requiring multiple key custodians to collaborate to activate the HSM or key – as part of the key ceremony (discussed later). (If an HSM is not available, the root key will be stored on the server’s disk. At minimum, protect it with a strong admin passphrase when prompted, and consider enabling the option to require administrator interaction (e.g., a password) whenever the key is accessed.) Step 4: Configure CA Extensions (CDP/AIA) It’s critical to configure how the Root CA publishes its certificate and revocation list, since the root is offline and cannot use Active Directory auto-publishing. Open the Certification Authority management console (certsrv.msc), right-click the CA name > Properties, and go to the Extensions tab. We will set the CRL Distribution Points (CDP) and Authority Information Access (AIA) URLs: CRL Distribution Point (CDP): This is where certificates will tell clients to fetch the CRL for the Root CA. By default, a standalone CA might have a file:// path or no HTTP URL. Click Add and specify an HTTP URL that will be accessible to all network clients, such as: http://<IssuingCA_Server>/CertEnroll/<CaName><CRLNameSuffix><DeltaCRLAllowed>.crl For example, if your issuing CA’s server name is ISSUINGCA.contoso.local, the URL might be http://issuingca.contoso.local/CertEnroll/Contoso%20Root%20CA.crl This assumes the Issuing CA (or another web server) will host the Root CA’s CRL in the CertEnroll directory. Check the boxes for “Include in the CDP extension of issued certificates” and “Include in all CRLs. Clients use this to find Delta CRLs” (you can uncheck the delta CRL publication on the root, as we won’t use delta CRLs on an offline root). Since the root CA won’t often revoke its single issued cert (the subordinate CA), delta CRLs aren’t necessary. Note: If your Active Directory is in use and you want to publish the Root CA’s CRL to AD, you can also add an ldap:///CN=... path and check “Publish in Active Directory”. However, publishing to AD from an offline CA must be done manually using the following command when the root is temporarily connected. certutil -dspublish Many setups skip LDAP for offline roots and rely on HTTP distribution. Authority Information Access (AIA): This is where the Root CA’s certificate will be published for clients to download (to build certificate chains). Add an HTTP URL similarly, for example: http://<IssuingCA_Server>/CertEnroll/<ServerDNSName>_<CaName><CertificateName>.crt This would point to a copy of the Root CA’s certificate that will be hosted on the issuing CA web server. Check “Include in the AIA extension of issued certificates”. This way, any certificate signed by the Root CA (like your subordinate CA’s cert) contains a URL where clients can fetch the Root CA’s cert if they don’t already have it. After adding these, remove any default entries that are not applicable (e.g., LDAP if the root isn’t going to publish to AD, or file paths that won’t be used by clients). These settings ensure that certificates issued by the Root CA (in practice, just the subordinate CA’s certificate) will carry the correct URLs for chain building and revocation checking. Step 5: Back Up the Root CA and Issue the Subordinate Certificate With the Root CA configured, we need to issue a certificate for the Issuing CA (subordinate). We’ll perform that in the next section from the Issuing CA’s side via a request file. Before taking the root offline, ensure you: Back up the CA’s private key and certificate: In the Certification Authority console, or via the CA Backup wizard, export the Root CA’s key pair and CA certificate. Protect this backup (store it offline in a secure location, e.g., on encrypted removable media in a safe). This backup is crucial for disaster recovery or if the Root CA needs to be migrated or restored. Save the Root CA Certificate: You will need the Root CA’s public certificate (*.crt) to distribute to other systems. Have it exported (Base-64 or DER format) for use on the Issuing CA and for clients. Initial CRL publication: Manually publish the first CRL so that it can be distributed. Open an elevated Command Prompt on the Root CA and run: certutil -crl This generates a new CRL file (in the CA’s configured CRL folder, typically %windir%\system32\CertSrv\CertEnroll). Take that CRL file and copy it to the designated distribution point (for example, to the CertEnroll directory on the Issuing CA’s web server, as per the HTTP URL configured). If using Active Directory for CRL distribution, you would also publish it to AD now (e.g., certutil -dspublish -f RootCA.crl on a domain-connected machine). In most lab setups, copying to an HTTP share is sufficient. With these tasks done, the Root CA is ready. At this point, disconnect or power off the Root CA and store it securely – it should remain offline except when it’s absolutely needed (like publishing a new CRL or renewing the subordinate CA’s certificate in the far future). Keeping the root CA offline maximizes its security by minimizing exposure to compromise. Best Practices for Securing the Root CA: The Root CA is the trust anchor, so apply stringent security practices: Physical security: Store the Root CA machine in a locked, secure location. If it’s a virtual machine, consider storing it on a disconnected hypervisor or a USB drive locked in a safe. Only authorized PKI team members should have access. An offline CA should be treated like crown jewels – offline CAs should be stored in secure locations. Minimal exposure: Keep the Root CA powered off and disconnected when not in use. It should not be left running or connected to any network. Routine operations (like issuing end-entity certs) should never involve the root. Admin access control: Limit administrative access on the Root CA server. Use dedicated accounts for PKI administration. Enable auditing on the CA for any changes or issuance events. No additional roles or software: Do not use the Root CA server for any other function (no web browsing, no email, etc.). Fewer installed components means fewer potential vulnerabilities. Protect the private key: Use an HSM if possible; if not, ensure the key is at least protected by a strong password and consider splitting knowledge of that password among multiple people (so no single person can activate the CA). Many organizations opt for an offline root key ceremony (see below) to generate and handle the root key with multiple witnesses and strict procedures. Keep system time and settings consistent: If the Root CA is powered off for long periods, ensure its clock is accurate whenever it is started (to avoid issuing a CRL or certificate with a wrong date). Don’t change the server name or CA name after installation (doing so invalidates issued certs). Periodic health checks: Even though offline, plan to turn on the Root CA at a secure interval (e.g., semi-annually or annually) to perform tasks like CRL publishing and system updates. Make sure to apply OS security updates during these maintenance windows, as offline does not mean immune to vulnerabilities (especially if it ever connects to a network for CRL publication or uses removable media). Deploying the Online Issuing CA Next, set up the Issuing CA server which will actually issue certificates to end entities in the lab. This server will be domain-joined (if using AD integration) and will obtain its CA certificate from the Root CA we just configured. Step 1: Prepare the Issuing CA Server Provision the server: Install Windows Server on a new machine (or VM) that will be the Issuing CA. Join this server to the Active Directory domain (e.g., Contoso.local). Being an enterprise CA, it needs domain membership to publish templates and integrate with AD security groups. Rename the server to something descriptive like ISSUINGCA for clarity. Assign a static IP and ensure it can communicate on the network. IIS for web enrollment (optional): If you plan to use the Web Enrollment or Certificate Enrollment Web Services, ensure IIS is installed. (The AD CS installation wizard can add it if you include those role services.) For this guide, we will include the Web Enrollment role so that the CertEnroll directory is set up for hosting certificate and CRL files. Step 2: Install AD CS Role on Issuing CA On the Issuing CA server, add the Active Directory Certificate Services role via Server Manager or PowerShell. This time, select both Certification Authority and Certification Authority Web Enrollment role services (Web Enrollment will set up the HTTP endpoints for certificate requests if needed). For example, using PowerShell: Install-WindowsFeature AD-Certificate, ADCS-Web-Enrollment -IncludeManagementTools After installation, launch the AD CS configuration wizard: Role Services: Choose Certification Authority (and Web Enrollment if prompted). Setup Type: Select Enterprise CA (since this CA will integrate with AD DS). CA Type: Select Subordinate CA (this indicates it will get its cert from an existing root CA). Private Key: Choose “Create a new private key” (we’ll generate a new key pair for this CA). Cryptography: If using an HSM here as well, select the HSM’s CSP/KSP for the issuing CA’s key. Otherwise, choose a strong key length (2048+ bits, SHA256 or better for hash). CA Name: Provide a name (e.g., “Contoso Issuing CA”). This name will appear as the Issuer on certificates it issues. Certificate Request: The wizard will ask how you want to get the subordinate CA’s certificate. Choose “Save a certificate request to file”. Specify a path, e.g., C:\CertRequest\issuingCA.req. The wizard will generate a request file that we need to take to the Root CA for signing. (Since our Root CA is offline, this file transfer might be via secure USB or a network share when the root is temporarily online.) CA Database: Choose locations or accept defaults for the certificate DB and logs. Finish the configuration wizard, which will complete pending because the CA doesn’t have a certificate yet. The AD CS service on this server won’t start until we import the issued cert from the root. Step 3: Integrate HSM on Issuing CA (Optional) If available, repeat the HSM setup on the Issuing CA: install HSM drivers, initialize it, and generate/secure the key for the subordinate CA on the HSM. Ensure you chose the HSM provider during the above configuration so that the issuing CA’s private key is stored in the HSM. Even though this CA is online, an HSM still greatly enhances security by protecting the private key from extraction. The issuing CA’s HSM may not require multiple custodians to activate (as it needs to run continuously), but should still be physically secured. Step 4: Obtain the Issuing CA’s Certificate from the Root CA Now we have a pending request (issuingCA.req) for the subordinate CA. To get its certificate: Transport the request to the Root CA: Copy the request file to the offline Root CA (via secure means – e.g., formatted new USB stick). Start up the Root CA (in a secure, offline setting) and open the Certification Authority console. Submit the request on Root CA: Right-click the Root CA in the CA console -> All Tasks -> Submit new request, and select the .req file. The request will appear in the Pending Requests on the root. Issue the subordinate CA certificate: Find the pending request (it will list the Issuing CA’s name). Right-click and choose All Tasks > Issue. The subordinate CA’s certificate is now issued by the Root CA. Export the issued certificate: Still on the Root CA, go to Issued Certificates, find the newly issued subordinate CA cert (you can identify it by the Request ID or by the name). Right-click it and choose Open or All Tasks > Export to get the certificate in a file form. If using the console’s built-in “Export” it might only allow binary; alternatively use the certutil command: certutil -dup <RequestID> .\ContosoIssuingCA.cer or simply open and copy to file. Save the certificate as issuingCA.cer. Also make sure you have a copy of the Root CA’s certificate (if not already done). Publish Root CA cert and CRL as needed: Before leaving the Root CA, you may also want to ensure the Root’s own certificate and latest CRL are available to the issuing CA and clients. If not already done in Step 5 of root deployment, export the Root CA cert (DER format) and copy the CRL file. You might use certutil -crl again if some time has passed since initial CRL. Now take the issuingCA.cer file (and root cert/CRL files) and move them back to the Issuing CA server. Step 5: Install the Issuing CA’s Certificate and Complete Configuration On the Issuing CA server (which is still waiting for its CA cert): Install the subordinate CA certificate: In Server Manager or the Certification Authority console on the Issuing CA, there should be an option to “Install CA Certificate” (if the AD CS configuration wizard is still open, it will prompt for the file; or otherwise, in the CA console right-click the CA name > All Tasks > Install CA Certificate). Provide the issuingCA.cer file obtained from the root. This will install the CA’s own certificate and start the CA service. The Issuing CA is now operational as a subordinate CA. Alternatively, use PowerShell: certutil -installcert C:\CertRequest\issuingCA.cer This installs the cert and associates it with the pending key. Trust the Root CA certificate: Because the Issuing CA is domain-joined, when you install the subordinate cert, it might automatically place the Root CA’s certificate in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store on that server (and possibly publish it to AD). If not, you should manually install the Root CA’s certificate into the Trusted Root CA store on the Issuing CA machine (using the Certificates MMC or certutil -addstore -f Root rootCA.cer). This step prevents any “chain not trusted” warnings on the Issuing CA and ensures it trusts its parent. In an enterprise environment, you would also distribute the root certificate to all client machines (e.g., via Group Policy) so that they trust the whole chain. Import Root CRL: Copy the Root CA’s CRL (*.crl file) to the Issuing CA’s CRL distribution point location (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\CertSrv\CertEnroll\ if that’s the directory served by the web server). This matches the HTTP URL we configured on the root. Place the CRL file there and ensure it is accessible (the Issuing CA’s IIS might need to serve static .crl files; often, if Web Enrollment is installed, the CertEnroll folder is under C:\Inetpub\wwwroot\CertEnroll). At this point, the subordinate CA and any client hitting the HTTP URL can retrieve the root’s CRL. The subordinate CA is now fully established. It holds a certificate issued by the Root CA (forming a complete chain of trust), and it’s ready to issue end-entity certificates. Step 6: Configure Issuing CA Settings and Start Services Start the Certificate Services: If the CA service (CertSvc) isn’t started automatically, start or restart it. On PowerShell: Restart-Service certsvc The CA should show as running in the CA console with the name “Contoso Issuing CA” (or your chosen name). Configure Certificate Templates: Because this is an Enterprise CA, it can utilize certificate templates stored in Active Directory to simplify issuing common cert types (user auth, computer auth, web server SSL, etc.). By default, some templates (e.g., User, Computer) are available but not issued. In the Certification Authority console under Certificate Templates, you can choose which templates to issue (e.g., right-click > New > Certificate Template to Issue, then select templates like “User” or “Computer”). This lab guide doesn’t require specific templates but know that only Enterprise CAs can use templates. Templates define the policies and settings (cryptography, enrollment permissions, etc.) for issued certificates. Ensure you enable only the templates needed and configure their permissions appropriately (e.g., allow the appropriate groups to enroll). Set CRL publishing schedule: The Issuing CA will automatically publish its own CRL (for certificates it issues) at intervals. You can adjust the CRL and Delta CRL publication interval in the CA’s Properties > CRL Period. A common practice is a small base CRL period (e.g., 1 week or 2 weeks) for issuing CAs, because they may revoke user certs more frequently; and enable Delta CRLs (published daily) for timely revocation information. Make sure the CDP/AIA for the Issuing CA itself are properly configured too (the wizard usually sets LDAP and HTTP locations, but verify in the Extensions tab). In a lab, the default settings are fine. Web Enrollment (if installed): You can verify the web enrollment by browsing to http://<IssuingCA>/certsrv. This web UI allows browser-based certificate requests. It’s a legacy interface mostly, but for testing it can be used if your clients aren’t domain-joined or if you want a manual request method. In modern use, the Certificate Enrollment Web Service/Policy roles or auto-enrollment via Group Policy are preferred for remote and automated enrollment. At this stage, your PKI is operational: the Issuing CA trusts the offline Root CA and can issue certificates. The Root CA can be kept offline with confidence that the subordinate will handle all regular work. Validation and Testing of the PKI It’s important to verify that the PKI is configured correctly: Check CA status: On the Issuing CA, open the Certification Authority console and ensure no errors. Verify that the Issuing CA’s certificate shows OK (no red X). On the Root CA (offline most of the time), you can use the Pkiview.msc snap-in (Microsoft PKI Health Tool) on a domain-connected machine to check the health of the PKI. This tool will show if the CDPs/AIA are reachable and if certificates are properly published. Trust chain on clients: On a domain-joined client PC, the Root CA certificate should be present in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store (if the Issuing CA was installed as Enterprise CA, it likely published the root cert to AD automatically; you can also distribute it via Group Policy or manually). The Issuing CA’s certificate should appear in the Intermediate Certification Authorities store. This establishes the chain of trust. If not, import the root cert into the domain’s Group Policy for Trusted Roots. A quick test: on a client, run certutil -config "ISSUINGCA\\Contoso Issuing CA" -ping to see if it can contact the CA (or use the Certification Authority MMC targeting the issuing CA). Enroll a test certificate: Try to enroll for a certificate from the Issuing CA. For instance, from a domain-joined client, use the Certificates MMC (in Current User or Computer context) and initiate a certificate request for a User or Computer certificate (depending on templates issued). If auto-enrollment is configured via Group Policy for a template, you can simply log on a client and see if it automatically receives a certificate. Alternatively, use the web enrollment page or certreq command to submit a request. The request should be approved and a certificate issued by "Contoso Issuing CA". After enrollment, inspect the issued certificate: it should chain up to "Contoso Root CA" without errors. Ensure that the certificate’s CDP points to the URL we set (and try to browse that URL to see the CRL file), and that the AIA points to the root cert location. Revocation test (optional): To test CRL behavior, you could revoke a test certificate on the Issuing CA (using the CA console) and publish a new CRL. On the client, after updating the CRL, the revoked certificate should show as revoked. For the Root CA, since it shouldn’t issue end-entity certs, you wouldn’t normally revoke anything except potentially the subordinate CA’s certificate (which would be a drastic action in case of compromise). By issuing a test certificate and validating the chain and revocation, you confirm that your two-tier PKI lab is functioning correctly. Maintaining the PKI: CRLs, Key Ceremonies, and Security Procedures Deploying the PKI is only the beginning. Proper maintenance and operational procedures are crucial to ensure the PKI remains secure and reliable over time. Periodic CRL Updates for the Offline Root: The Root CA’s CRL has a defined validity period (set during configuration, often 6 or 12 months for offline roots). Before the CRL expires, the Root CA must be brought online (in a secure environment) to issue a new CRL. It’s recommended to schedule CRL updates periodically (e.g., semi-annually) to prevent the CRL from expiring. An expired CRL can cause certificate chain validation to fail, potentially disrupting services. Typically, organizations set the offline root CRL validity so that publishing 1-2 times a year is sufficient. When the time comes: Start the Root CA (ensuring the system clock is correct). Run certutil -crl to issue a fresh CRL. Distribute the new CRL: copy it to the HTTP CDP location (overwrite the old file) and, if applicable, use certutil -dspublish -f RootCA.crl to update it in Active Directory. Verify that the new CRL’s next update date is extended appropriately (e.g., another 6 months out). Clients and the Issuing CA will automatically pick up the new CRL when checking for revocation. (The Issuing CA, if configured, might cache the root CRL and need a restart or certutil -setreg ca\CRLFlags +CRLF_REVCHECK_IGNORE_OFFLINE tweak if the root CRL expires unexpectedly. Keeping the schedule prevents such issues.) Issuing CA CRL and OCSP: The Issuing CA’s CRLs are published automatically as it is online. Ensure the IIS or file share hosting the CRL is accessible. Optionally, consider setting up an Online Responder (OCSP) for real-time status checking, especially if CRLs are large or you need faster revocation information. OCSP is another AD CS role service that can be configured on the issuing CA or another server to answer certificate status queries. This might be beyond a simple lab, but it’s worth mentioning for completeness. Key Ceremonies and Documentation: For production environments (and good practice even in labs), formalize the process of handling CA keys in a Key Ceremony. A key ceremony is a carefully controlled process for activities like generating the Root CA’s key pair, installing the CA, and signing subordinate certificates. It often involves multiple people to ensure no single person has unilateral control (principle of dual control) and to witness the process. Best practices for a Root CA key ceremony include: Advance Planning: Create a step-by-step script of the ceremony tasks. Include who will do what, what materials are needed (HSMs, installation media, backup devices, etc.), and the order of operations. Multiple trusted individuals present: Roles might include a Ceremony Administrator (leads the process), a Security Officer (responsible for HSM or key material handling), an Auditor (to observe and record), etc. This prevents any one person from manipulating the process and increases trust. Secure environment: Conduct the ceremony in a secure location (e.g., a locked room) free of recording devices or unauthorized personnel. Ensure the Root CA machine is isolated (no network), and ideally that BIOS/USB access controls are in place to prevent any malware. Generate keys with proper controls: If using an HSM, initialize and generate the key with the required number of key custodians each providing part of the activation material (e.g., smartcards or passphrases). Immediately back up the HSM partition or key to secure media (requiring the same custodians to restore). Sign subordinate CA certificate: As part of the ceremony, once the root key is ready, sign the subordinate’s request. This might also be a witnessed step. Document every action: Write down each command run, each key generated, serial numbers of devices used, and have all participants sign an acknowledgment of the outcomes. Also record the fingerprints of the generated Root CA certificate and any subordinate certificate to ensure they are exactly as expected. Secure storage: After the ceremony, store the Root CA machine (if it’s a laptop or VM) and HSM tokens in a tamper-evident bag or safe. The idea is to make it evident if someone tries to access the root outside of an authorized ceremony. While a full key ceremony might be overkill for a small lab, understanding these practices is important. Even in a lab, you can simulate some aspects (for learning), like documenting the procedure of taking the root online to sign the request and then locking it away. These practices greatly increase the trust in a production PKI by ensuring transparency and accountability for critical operations. Backup and Recovery Plans: Both CAs’ data should be regularly backed up: For the Root CA: since it’s rarely online, backup after any change. Typically, you’d back up the CA’s private key and certificate once (right after setup or any renewal). Store this securely offline (separate from the server itself). Also back up the CA database if it ever issues more than one cert (for root it might not issue many). For the Issuing CA: schedule automated backups of the CA database and private key. You can use the built-in certutil -backup or Windows Server Backup (which is aware of the AD CS database). Keep backups secure and test restoration procedures. Having a documented recovery procedure for the CA is crucial for continuity. Also consider backup of templates and any scripts. Maintain spare hardware or VMs in case you need to restore the CA on new hardware (especially for the root, having a procedure to restore on a new machine if the original is destroyed). Security maintenance: Apply OS updates to the CAs carefully. For the offline root, patch it offline if possible (offline servicing or connecting it briefly to a management network). For the issuing CA, treat it as a critical infrastructure server: limit its exposure (firewall it so only required services are reachable), monitor its event logs (enable auditing for Certificate Services events, which can log each issuance and revocation), and employ anti-malware tools with caution (whitelisting the CA processes to avoid interference). Also, periodically review the CA’s configuration and certificate templates to ensure they meet current security standards (for example, deprecate any weak cryptography or adjust validity periods if needed). By following these maintenance steps and best practices, your two-tier PKI will remain secure and trustworthy over time. Remember that PKI is not “set and forget” – it requires operational diligence, but the payoff is a robust trust infrastructure for your organization’s security. Additional AD CS Features and References Active Directory Certificate Services provides more capabilities than covered in this basic lab. Depending on your needs, you might explore: Certificate Templates: We touched on templates; they are a powerful feature on Enterprise CAs to enforce standardized certificate settings. Administrators can create custom templates for various use cases (SSL, S/MIME email, code signing) and control enrollment permissions. Understanding template versions and permissions is key for enterprise deployments. (Refer to Microsoft’s documentation on Certificate template concepts in Windows Server for details on how templates work and can be customized.) Web Services for Enrollment: In scenarios with remote or non-domain clients, AD CS offers the Certificate Enrollment Web Service (CES) and Certificate Enrollment Policy Web Service (CEP) role services. These allow clients to fetch enrollment policy information and request certificates over HTTP or HTTPS, even when not connected directly to the domain. They work with the certificate templates to enable similar auto-enrollment experiences over the web. See Microsoft’s guides on the Certificate Enrollment Web Service overview and Certificate Enrollment Policy Web Service overview for when to use these. Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES): This AD CS role service implements the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) to allow devices like routers, switches, and mobile devices to obtain certificates from the CA without domain credentials. NDES acts as a proxy (Registration Authority) between devices and the CA, using one-time passwords for authentication. If you need to issue certificates to network equipment or MDM-managed mobile devices, NDES is the solution. Microsoft Docs provide a Network Device Enrollment Service(NDES) overview and even details on using a policy module with NDES for advanced scenarios (like customizing how requests are processed or integrating with custom policies). Online Responders (OCSP): As mentioned, an Online Responder can be configured to answer revocation status queries more efficiently than CRLs, especially useful if your CRLs grow large or you have high-volume certificate validation (VPNs, etc.). AD CS’s Online Responder role service can be installed on a member server and configured with the OCSP Response Signing certificate from your Issuing CA. Monitoring and Auditing: Windows Servers have options to audit CA events. Enabling auditing can log events such as certificate issuance, revocation, or changes to the CA configuration. These logs are important in enterprise PKI to track who did what (for compliance and security forensics). Also, tools like the PKI Health Tool (pkiview.msc) and PowerShell cmdlets (like Get-CertificationAuthority, Get-CertificationAuthorityCertificate) can help monitor the health and configuration of your CAs. Conclusion By following this guide, you have set up a secure two-tier PKI environment consisting of an offline Root CA and an online Issuing CA. This design, which uses an offline root, is considered a security best practice for enterprise PKI deployments because it reduces the risk of your root key being compromised. With the offline Root CA acting as a hardened trust anchor and the enterprise Issuing CA handling day-to-day certificate issuance, your lab PKI can issue certificates for various purposes (HTTPS, code signing, user authentication, etc.) in a way that models real-world deployments. As you expand this lab or move to production, always remember that PKI security is as much about process as technology. Applying strict controls to protect CA keys, keeping software up to date, and monitoring your PKI’s health are all part of the journey. For further reading and official guidance, refer to these Microsoft documentation resources: 📖 AD CS PKI Design Considerations: PKI design considerations using Active Directory Certificate Services in Windows Server helps in planning a PKI deployment (number of CAs, hierarchy depth, naming, key lengths, validity periods, etc.). This is useful to read when adapting this lab design to a production environment. It also covers configuring CDP/AIA and why offline roots usually don’t need delta CRLs. 📖 AD CS Step-by-Step Guides: Microsoft’s Test Lab Guide Test Lab Guide: Deploying an AD CS Two-Tier PKI Hierarchy walk through a similar scenario.Why UK Enterprise Cybersecurity Is Failing in 2026 (And What Leaders Must Change)
Enterprise cybersecurity in large organisations has always been an asymmetric game. But with the rise of AI‑enabled cyber attacks, that imbalance has widened dramatically - particularly for UK and EMEA enterprises operating complex cloud, SaaS, and identity‑driven environments. Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Microsoft Defender Security Research have publicly reported a clear shift in how attackers operate: AI is now embedded across the entire attack lifecycle. Threat actors use AI to accelerate reconnaissance, generate highly targeted phishing at scale, automate infrastructure, and adapt tactics in real time - dramatically reducing the time required to move from initial access to business impact. In recent months, Microsoft has documented AI‑enabled phishing campaigns abusing legitimate authentication mechanisms, including OAuth and device‑code flows, to compromise enterprise accounts at scale. These attacks rely on automation, dynamic code generation, and highly personalised lures - not on exploiting traditional vulnerabilities or stealing passwords. The Reality Gap: Adaptive Attackers vs. Static Enterprise Defences Meanwhile, many UK enterprises still rely on legacy cybersecurity controls designed for a very different threat model - one rooted in a far more predictable world. This creates a dangerous "Resilience Gap." Here is why your current stack is failing- and the C-Suite strategy required to fix it. 1. The Failure of Traditional Antivirus in the AI Era Traditional antivirus (AV) relies on static signatures and hashes. It assumes malicious code remains identical across different targets. AI has rendered this assumption obsolete. Modern malware now uses automated mutation to generate unique code variants at execution time, and adapts behaviour based on its environment. Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed threat actors using AI‑assisted tooling to rapidly rewrite payload components, ensuring that every deployment looks subtly different. In this model, there is no reliable signature to detect. By the time a pattern exists, the attacker has already moved on. Signature‑based detection is not just slow - it is structurally misaligned with AI‑driven attacks. The Risk: If your security relies on "recognising" a threat, you are already breached. By the time a signature exists, the attacker has evolved. The C-Suite Pivot: Shift investment from artifact detection to EDR/XDR (Extended Detection and Response). We must prioritise behavioural analytics and machine learning models that identify intent rather than file names. 2. Why Perimeter Firewalls Fail in a Cloud-First World Many UK enterprise still rely on firewalls enforcing static allow/deny rules based on IP addresses and ports. This model worked when applications were predictable and networks clearly segmented. Today, enterprise traffic is encrypted, cloud‑hosted, API‑driven, and deeply integrated with SaaS and identity services. AI‑assisted phishing campaigns abusing OAuth and device‑code flows demonstrate this clearly. From a network perspective, everything looks legitimate: HTTPS traffic to trusted identity providers. No suspicious port. No malicious domain. Yet the attacker successfully compromises identity. The Risk: Traditional firewalls are "blind" to identity-based breaches in cloud environments. The C-Suite Pivot: Move to Identity-First Security. Treat Identity as the new Control Plane, integrating signals like user risk, device health, and geolocation into every access decision. 3. The Critical Weakness of Single-Factor Authentication Despite clear NCSC guidance, single-factor passwords remain a common vulnerability in legacy applications and VPNs. AI-driven credential abuse has changed the economics of these attacks. Threat actors now deploy adaptive phishing campaigns that evolve in real-time. Microsoft has observed attackers using AI to hyper-target high-value UK identities- specifically CEOs, Finance Directors, and Procurement leads. The Risk: Static passwords are now the primary weak link in UK supply chain security. The C-Suite Pivot: Mandate Phishing‑resistant MFA (Passkeys or hardware security keys). Implement Conditional Access policies that evaluate risk dynamically at the moment of access, not just at login. Legacy Security vs. AI‑Era Reality 4. The Inherent Risk of VPN-Centric Security VPNs were built on a flawed assumption: that anyone "inside" the network is trustworthy. In 2026, this logic is a liability. AI-assisted attackers now use automation to map internal networks and identify escalation paths the moment they gain VPN access. Furthermore, Microsoft has tracked nation-state actors using AI to create synthetic employee identities- complete with fake resumes and deepfake communication. In these scenarios, VPN access isn't "hacked"; it is legally granted to a fraudster. The Risk: A compromised VPN gives an attacker the "keys to the kingdom." The C-Suite Pivot: Transition to Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA). Access must be explicit, scoped to the specific application, and continuously re‑evaluated using behavioural signals. 5. Data: The High-Velocity Target Sensitive data sitting unencrypted in legacy databases or backups is a ticking time bomb. In the AI era, data discovery is no longer a slow, manual process for a hacker. Attackers now use AI to instantly analyse your directory structures, classify your files, and prioritise high-value data for theft. Unencrypted data significantly increases your "blast radius," turning a containable incident into a catastrophic board-level crisis. The Risk: Beyond the technical breach, unencrypted data leads to massive UK GDPR fines and irreparable brand damage. The C-Suite Pivot: Adopt Data-Centric Security. Implement encryption by default, classify data while adding sensitivity labels and start board-level discussions regarding post‑quantum cryptography (PQC) to future-proof your most sensitive assets. 6. The Failure of Static IDS Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) rely on known indicators of compromise - assuming attackers reuse the same tools and techniques. AI‑driven attacks deliberately avoid that assumption. Threat actors are now using Large Language Models (LLMs) to weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities within hours. While your team waits for a "known pattern" to be updated in your system, the attacker is already using a custom, AI-generated exploit. The Risk: Your team is defending against yesterday's news while the attacker is moving at machine speed. The C-Suite Pivot: Invest in Adaptive Threat Detection. Move toward Graph‑based XDR platforms that correlate signals across email, endpoint, and cloud to automate investigation and response before the damage spreads. From Static Security to Continuous Security Closing Thought: Security Is a Journey, Not a Destination For UK enterprises, the shift toward adaptive cybersecurity is no longer optional - it is increasingly driven by regulatory expectation, board oversight, and accountability for operational resilience. Recent UK cyber resilience reforms and evolving regulatory frameworks signal a clear direction of travel: cybersecurity is now a board‑level responsibility, not a back‑office technical concern. Directors and executive leaders are expected to demonstrate effective governance, risk ownership, and preparedness for cyber disruption - particularly as AI reshapes the threat landscape. AI is not a future cybersecurity problem. It is a current force multiplier for attackers, exposing the limits of legacy enterprise security architectures faster than many organisations are willing to admit. The uncomfortable truth for boards in 2026 is that no enterprise is 100% secure. Intrusions are inevitable. Credentials will be compromised. Controls will be tested. The difference between a resilient enterprise and a vulnerable one is not the absence of incidents, but how risk is managed when they occur. In mature organisations, this means assuming breach and designing for containment: Access controls that limit blast radius Least privilege and conditional access restricting attackers to the smallest possible scope if an identity is compromised Data‑centric security using automated classification and encryption, ensuring that even when access is misused, sensitive data cannot be freely exfiltrated As a Senior Enterprise Cybersecurity Architect, I see this moment as a unique opportunity. AI adoption does not have to repeat the mistakes of earlier technology waves, where innovation moved fast and security followed years later. We now have a rare chance to embed security from day one - designing identity controls, data boundaries, automated monitoring, and governance before AI systems become business‑critical. When security is built in upfront, enterprises don’t just reduce risk - they gain the confidence to move faster and unlock AI’s value safely. Security is no longer a “department”. In the age of AI, it is a continuous business function - essential to preserving trust and maintaining operational continuity as attackers move at machine speed. References: Inside an AI‑enabled device code phishing campaign | Microsoft Security Blog AI as tradecraft: How threat actors operationalize AI | Microsoft Security Blog Detecting and analyzing prompt abuse in AI tools | Microsoft Security Blog Post-Quantum Cryptography | CSRC Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2025 | Microsoft https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/government-adopt-passkey-technology-digital-servicesSecurity Copilot Skilling Series
Security Copilot joins forces with your favorite Microsoft Security products in a skilling series miles above the rest. The Security Copilot Skilling Series is your opportunity to strengthen your security posture through threat detection, incident response, and leveraging AI for security automation. These technical skilling sessions are delivered live by experts from our product engineering teams. Come ready to learn, engage with your peers, ask questions, and provide feedback. Upcoming sessions are noted below and will be available on-demand on the Microsoft Security Community YouTube channel. Coming Up Apr. 23 | Getting started with Security Copilot New to Security Copilot? This session walks through what you actually need to get started, including E5 inclusion requirements and a practical overview of the core experiences and agents you will use on day one. Apr. 28 | Security Copilot Agents, DSPM AI Observability, and IRM for Agents This session covers an overview of how Microsoft Purview supports AI risk visibility and investigation through Data Security Posture Management (DSPM) and Insider Risk Management (IRM), alongside Security Copilot–powered agents. This session will go over what is AI Observability in DSPM as well as IRM for Agents in Copilot Studio and Azure AI Foundry. Attendees will learn about the IRM Triage Agent and DSPM Posture Agent and their deployment. Attendees will gain an understanding of how DSPM and IRM capabilities could be leveraged to improve visibility, context, and response for AI-related data risks in Microsoft Purview. Now On-Demand Apr. 2 | Current capabilities of Copilot in Intune Speakers: Amit Ghodke and Carlos Brito This session on Copilot in Intune & Agents explores the current embedded Copilot experiences and AI‑powered agents available through Security Copilot in Microsoft Intune. Attendees will learn how these capabilities streamline administrative workflows, reduce manual effort, and accelerate everyday endpoint management tasks, helping organizations modernize how they operate and manage devices at scale. March 5 | Conditional Access Optimization Agent: What It Is & Why It Matters Speaker: Jordan Dahl Get a clear, practical look at the Conditional Access Optimization Agent—how it automates policy upkeep, simplifies operations, and uses new post‑Ignite updates like Agent Identity and dashboards to deliver smarter, standards‑aligned recommendations. February 19 | Agents That Actually Work: From an MVP Speaker: Ugur Koc, Microsoft MVP Microsoft MVP Ugur Koc will share a real-world workflow for building agents in Security Copilot, showing how to move from an initial idea to a consistently performing agent. The session highlights how to iterate on objectives, tighten instructions, select the right tools, and diagnose where agents break or drift from expected behavior. Attendees will see practical testing and validation techniques, including how to review agent decisions and fine-tune based on evidence rather than intuition to help determine whether an agent is production ready. February 5 | Identity Risk Management in Microsoft Entra Speaker: Marilee Turscak Identity teams face a constant stream of risky user signals, and determining which threats require action can be time‑consuming. This webinar explores the Identity Risk Management Agent in Microsoft Entra, powered by Security Copilot, and how it continuously monitors risky identities, analyzes correlated sign‑in and behavior signals, and explains why a user is considered risky. Attendees will see how the agent provides guided remediation recommendations—such as password resets or risk dismissal—at scale and supports natural‑language interaction for faster investigations. The session also covers how the agent learns from administrator instructions to apply consistent, policy‑aligned responses over time. January 28 | Security Copilot in Purview Technical Deep Dive Speakers: Patrick David, Thao Phan, Alexandra Roland Discover how AI-powered alert triage agents for Data Loss Prevention (DLP) and Insider Risk Management (IRM) are transforming incident response and compliance workflows. Explore new Data Security Posture Management (DSPM) capabilities that deliver deeper insights and automation to strengthen your security posture. This session will showcase real-world scenarios and actionable strategies to help you protect sensitive data and simplify compliance. January 22 | Security Copilot Skilling Series | Building Custom Agents: Unlocking Context, Automation, and Scale Speakers: Innocent Wafula, Sean Wesonga, and Sebuh Haileleul Microsoft Security Copilot already features a robust ecosystem of first-party and partner-built agents, but some scenarios require solutions tailored to your organization’s specific needs and context. In this session, you'll learn how the Security Copilot agent builder platform and MCP servers empower you to create tailored agents that provide context-aware reasoning and enterprise-scale solutions for your unique scenarios. December 18 | What's New in Security Copilot for Defender Speaker: Doug Helton Discover the latest innovations in Microsoft Security Copilot embedded in Defender that are transforming how organizations detect, investigate, and respond to threats. This session will showcase powerful new capabilities—like AI-driven incident response, contextual insights, and automated workflows—that help security teams stop attacks faster and simplify operations. Why Attend: Stay Ahead of Threats: Learn how cutting-edge AI features accelerate detection and remediation. Boost Efficiency: See how automation reduces manual effort and improves SOC productivity. Get Expert Insights: Hear directly from product leaders and explore real-world use cases. Don’t miss this opportunity to future-proof your security strategy and unlock the full potential of Security Copilot in Defender! December 4 | Discussion of Ignite Announcements Speakers: Zineb Takafi, Mike Danoski and Oluchi Chukwunwere, Priyanka Tyagi, Diana Vicezar, Thao Phan, Alex Roland, and Doug Helton Ignite 2025 is all about driving impact in the era of AI—and security is at the center of it. In this session, we’ll unpack the biggest Security Copilot announcements from Ignite on agents and discuss how Copilot capabilities across Intune, Entra, Purview, and Defender deliver end-to-end protection. November 13 | Microsoft Entra AI: Unlocking Identity Intelligence with Security Copilot Skills and Agents Speakers: Mamta Kumar, Sr. Product Manager; Margaret Garcia Fani, Sr. Product Manager This session will demonstrate how Security Copilot in Microsoft Entra transforms identity security by introducing intelligent, autonomous capabilities that streamline operations and elevate protection. Customers will discover how to leverage AI-driven tools to optimize conditional access, automate access reviews, and proactively manage identity and application risks - empowering them into a more secure, and efficient digital future. October 30 | What's New in Copilot in Microsoft Intune Speaker: Amit Ghodke, Principal PM Architect, CxE CAT MEM Join us to learn about the latest Security Copilot capabilities in Microsoft Intune. We will discuss what's new and how you can supercharge your endpoint management experience with the new AI capabilities in Intune. October 16 | What’s New in Copilot in Microsoft Purview Speaker: Patrick David, Principal Product Manager, CxE CAT Compliance Join us for an insider’s look at the latest innovations in Microsoft Purview —where alert triage agents for DLP and IRM are transforming how we respond to sensitive data risks and improve investigation depth and speed. We’ll also dive into powerful new capabilities in Data Security Posture Management (DSPM) with Security Copilot, designed to supercharge your security insights and automation. Whether you're driving compliance or defending data, this session will give you the edge. October 9 | When to Use Logic Apps vs. Security Copilot Agents Speaker: Shiv Patel, Sr. Product Manager, Security Copilot Explore how to scale automation in security operations by comparing the use cases and capabilities of Logic Apps and Security Copilot Agents. This webinar highlights when to leverage Logic Apps for orchestrated workflows and when Security Copilot Agents offer more adaptive, AI-driven responses to complex security scenarios. All sessions will be published to the Microsoft Security Community YouTube channel - Security Copilot Skilling Series Playlist __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Looking for more? Keep up on the latest information on the Security Copilot Blog. Join the Microsoft Security Community mailing list to stay up to date on the latest product news and events. 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