Preventing Data Leakage to AI: A Strategic Framework for the Global Enterprise
In an organization with thousands of users, "Shadow AI" isn't just an IT nuisance - it’s a fundamental shift in the risk surface. We’ve all seen it: a well-intentioned employee pastes proprietary code into a public LLM to "clean it up," or a team lead uploads a customer list to a "free" AI formatter. These aren't malicious acts; they are productivity shortcuts that create massive security gaps. To enable innovation without compromising safety, we need a Zero Trust–aligned framework that acts as a guardrail rather than a gate. This requires a layered model centered on Identity, Device Health, and Data Intelligence. The 7-Layer Defense Architecture In a complex tenant, we don't rely on a single gatekeeper. We implement a stack where each layer provides a fail-safe for the one before it. Layer Enterprise Objective Primary Technology 1. Identity Anchor Verified Access & Device Health Microsoft Entra ID + Intune 2. Global Radar Continuous Shadow AI Discovery Purview AI Hub + Defender for Cloud Apps 3. Session Guard Real-time Intervention & Input Filtering Conditional Access App Control (MCAS) 4. Data Core Auto-Labeling & Persistent DLP Microsoft Purview Information Protection 5. Agent Governance Lifecycle & Identity for AI Agents Agent 365 + Entra Agent ID 6. The Human Layer Secure Prompting & AI Skilling Approved Prompt Templates & Training 7. Continuous Ops Monitoring & Regulatory Auditability Microsoft Sentinel + Insider Risk Mgmt 1. Universal Discovery via the Purview AI Hub Visibility is the prerequisite for governance. In a complex environment, you need a "single pane of glass" to monitor AI usage across the tenant. The Insight: Use the Purview AI Hub to identify "high-risk" prompts and see exactly which sensitive data types (PII, IP, Code) are being shared. The Radar: Integration with Defender for Endpoint ensures we capture AI usage even when users are off-network or traveling, leaving no blind spots in the global telemetry. 2. Identity-Driven Access & Tenant Boundaries Access must be tied to the health of the device. If the device isn't managed, the AI shouldn't be reachable. Conditional Access: Enforce policies requiring a "Managed and Compliant" device for any AI service. The "Account Leak" Fix: Deploy Tenant Restrictions v2 (TRv2). This is the only way to effectively stop employees from using corporate assets to sign into personal Microsoft accounts, keeping data strictly within your managed boundary. 3. Real-Time Session Governance & Inbound Protection The biggest leak in the enterprise isn't a hack; it's the copy-paste. However, we must also guard against Prompt Injection. Granular Controls: Use Session Policies to allow an AI tool while blocking specific risky actions - like uploading a document with a "Highly Confidential" label. Inbound Sanitization: Implement filters to detect malicious external data that might attempt to "hijack" a session via Indirect Prompt Injection. Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE): This ensures that if a user’s risk level changes, their access to AI is revoked in near real-time. 4. Hardening the Data (Auto-Classification & DLP) If security is embedded in the data, the location of the data becomes secondary. Intelligent Labeling: Move beyond manual tagging. Use Auto-labeling at the service level to scan and encrypt sensitive data (e.g., credit card numbers or internal project names) before it can be processed by an LLM. Clipboard Guard: Use Endpoint DLP to stop the "Clipboard Leak." This prevents users from moving sensitive text from a protected document into a web-based AI interface. 5. The "Agentic" Era: Agent 365 As we move from chatbots to autonomous agents, governance must manage an ecosystem of AI agents. Agent 365: A centralized control plane to manage the registry and lifecycle of every AI agent (sanctioned or "shadow") active in your tenant. Entra Agent ID: Treat agents like enterprise identities. Assign unique IDs to manage permissions so an agent’s access doesn't outlive its business purpose. 6. The Human Layer: Skilling & Secure Prompting Technical guardrails are the safety net, but user intent is the driver. Context Minimization: Train users to provide AI with only the data it needs. Redacting proprietary names or PII before prompting should be a baseline habit. The "Safe Harbor": Move users away from risky public tools by providing a superior experience in Microsoft 365 Copilot. Security shouldn't be a "No," it should be a "Yes, use this instead." 7. Continuous Ops & Regulatory Compliance Security is not a "set and forget" project. For the global enterprise, this layer provides the Audit Trail required for the EU AI Act and GDPR. Shadow AI Migration: Track the % of users moving from "Shadow" to sanctioned tools. Sentinel Correlation: Correlate AI prompts and DLP alerts in Microsoft Sentinel to allow the SOC to automate responses to misuse. Compliance Reporting: Generate automated reports on data residency and AI interaction logs to satisfy global regulatory requirements. Technical & Licensing Baseline This framework focuses on identity-, data-, and app/session-level controls (e.g., Defender for Cloud Apps/CAAC). It does not include network-level controls such as Cloud Proxy or ZTNA, which can complement these measures. Most capabilities require Microsoft 365 E5 and Entra ID P2. Features like Purview AI Hub, Agent 365, and Entra Agent ID may be in preview or offered as add-ons - verify availability and licensing with your Microsoft account team. Conclusion Securing AI at scale is not about building a wall; it is about engineering a dynamic foundation. In a global enterprise, "No" is a temporary delay, not a sustainable policy. By anchoring our strategy in Identity, Auto-Classification, and Agentic Governance, we transform AI from a fragmented "shadow risk" into a governed, competitive advantage. This framework ensures that as our digital ecosystem evolves, the organization's "crown jewels" remain protected - not by restricting innovation, but by making security the adaptive, automated engine that powers it.Step by Step: 2-Tier PKI Lab
Purpose of this blog Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the backbone of secure digital identity management, enabling encryption, digital signatures, and certificate-based authentication. However, neither setting up a PKI nor management of certificates is something most IT pros do on a regular basis and given the complexity and vastness of the subject it only makes sense to revisit the topic from time to time. What I have found works best for me is to just set up a lab and get my hands dirty with the topic that I want to revisit. One such topic that I keep coming back to is PKI - be it for creating certificate templates, enrolling clients, or flat out creating a new PKI itself. But every time I start deploying a lab or start planning a PKI setup, I end up spending too much time sifting through the documentations and trying to figure out why my issuing certificate authority won't come online! To make my life easier I decided to create a cheatsheet to deploy a simple but secure 2-tier PKI lab based on industry best practices that I thought would be beneficial for others like me, so I decided to polish it and make it into a blog. This blog walks through deploying a two-tier PKI hierarchy using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) on Windows Server: an offline Root Certification Authority (Root CA) and an online Issuing Certification Authority (Issuing CA). We’ll cover step-by-step deployment and best practices for securing the root CA, conducting key ceremonies, and maintaining Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Overview: Two-Tier PKI Architecture and Components In a two-tier PKI, the Root CA sits at the top of the trust hierarchy and issues a certificate only to the subordinate Issuing CA. The Root CA is kept offline (disconnected from networks) to protect its private key and is typically a standalone CA (not domain-joined). The Issuing CA (sometimes called a subordinate or intermediate CA) is kept online to issue certificates to end-entities (users, computers, services) and is usually an enterprise CA integrated with Active Directory for automation and certificate template support. Key components: Offline Root CA: A standalone CA, often on a workgroup server, powered on only when necessary (initial setup, subordinate CA certificate signing, or periodic CRL publishing). By staying offline, it is insulated from network threats. Its self-signed certificate serves as the trust anchor for the entire PKI. The Root CA’s private key must be rigorously protected (ideally by a Hardware Security Module) because if the root is compromised, all certificates in the hierarchy are compromised. Online Issuing CA: An enterprise subordinate CA (domain-joined) that handles day-to-day certificate issuance for the organization. It trusts the Root CA (via the root’s certificate) and is the one actually responding to certificate requests. Being online, it must also be secured, but its key is kept online for operations. Typically, the Issuing CA publishes certificates and CRLs to Active Directory and/or HTTP locations for clients to download. The following diagram shows the simplified view of this implementations: The table below summarizes the roles and differences: Aspect Offline Root CA Online Issuing CA Role Standalone Root CA (workgroup) Enterprise Subordinate CA (domain member) Network Connectivity Kept offline (powered off or disconnected when not issuing) Online (running continuously to serve requests) Usage Signs only one certificate (the subordinate CA’s cert) and CRLs Issues end-entity certificates (users, computers, services) Active Directory Not a member of AD domain; doesn’t use templates or auto-enrollment Integrated with AD DS; uses certificate templates for streamlined issuance Security Extremely high: physically secured, limited access, often protected by HSM Very High: server hardened, but accessible on network; HSM recommended for private key CRL Publication Manual. Admin must periodically connect, generate, and distribute CRL. Delta CRLs usually disabled. Automatic. Publishes CRLs to configured CDP locations (AD DS, HTTP) at scheduled intervals. Validity Period Longer (e.g. 5-10+ years for the CA certificate) to reduce frequency of renewal. Shorter (e.g. 2 years) to align with organizational policy; renewed under the root when needed. In this lab setup, we will create a Contoso Root CA (offline) and a Contoso Issuing CA (online) as an example. This mirrors real-world best practices which is to "deploy a standalone offline root CA and an online enterprise subordinate CA”. Deploying the Offline Root CA Setting up the offline Root CA involves preparing a dedicated server, installing AD CS, configuring it as a root CA, and then securing it. We’ll also configure certificate CDP/AIA (CRL Distribution Point and Authority Information Access) locations so that issued certificates will point clients to the correct locations to fetch the CA’s certificate and revocation list. Step 1: Prepare the Root CA Server (Offline) Provision an isolated server: Install a Windows Server OS (e.g., Windows Server 2022) on the machine designated to be the Root CA. Preferably on a portable enterprise grade physical server that can be stored in a safe. Do not join this server to any domain – it should function in a Workgroup to remain independent of your AD forest. System configuration: Give the server a descriptive name (e.g., ROOTCA) and assign a static IP (even though it will be offline, a static IP helps when connecting it temporarily for management). Install the latest updates and security patches while it’s still able to go online. Lock down network access: Once setup is complete, disable or unplug network connections. If the server must remain powered on for any reason, ensure all unnecessary services/ports are disabled to minimize exposure. In practice, you will keep this server shut down or physically disconnected except when performing CA maintenance. Step 2: Install the AD CS Role on the Root CA Add the Certification Authority role: On the Root CA server, open Server Manager and add the Active Directory Certificate Services role. During the wizard, select the Certification Authority role service (no need for web enrollment or others on the root). Proceed through the wizard and complete the installation. You can also install the CA role and management tools via PowerShell: Install-WindowsFeature AD-Certificate -IncludeManagementToolsThis Role Services: Choose Certification Authority. Setup Type: Select Standalone CA (since this root CA is not domain-joined). CA Type: Select Root CA. Private Key: Choose “Create a new private key.” Cryptography: If using an HSM, select the HSM’s Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) here; otherwise use default. Choose a strong key length (e.g., 2048 or 4096 bits) and a secure hash algorithm (SHA-256 or higher). CA Name: Provide a common name for the CA (e.g., “Contoso Root CA”). This name will appear in issued certificates as the Issuer. Avoid using a machine DNS name here for security – pick a name without revealing the server’s actual hostname. Validity Period: Set a long validity (e.g., 10 years) for the root CA’s self-signed certificate. A decade is common for enterprise roots, reducing how often you must touch the offline CA for renewal. Database: Specify locations for the CA database and logs (the defaults are fine for a lab). Review settings and complete the configuration. This process will generate the root CA’s key pair and self-signed certificate, establishing the Root CA.Post-install configuration: After the binary installation, click Configure Active Directory Certificate Services (a notification in Server Manager). In the configuration wizard: You can also perform this configuration via PowerShell in one line: Install-AdcsCertificationAuthority ` -CAType StandaloneRootCA ` -CryptoProviderName "YourHSMProvider" ` -HashAlgorithmName SHA256 -KeyLength 2048 ` -CACommonName "Contoso Root CA" ` -ValidityPeriod Years -ValidityPeriodUnits 10 This would set up a standalone Root CA named "Contoso Root CA" with a 2048-bit key on an HSM provider, valid for 10 years. Step 3: Integrate an HSM (Optional but Recommended) If your lab has a Hardware Security Module, use it to secure the Root CA’s keys. Using an HSM provides a dedicated, tamper-resistant storage for CA private keys and can further protect against key compromise. To integrate: Install the HSM vendor’s software and drivers on the Root CA server. Initialize the HSM and create a security world or partition as per the vendor instructions. Before or during the CA configuration (Step 2 above), ensure the HSM is ready to generate/store the key. When running the AD CS configuration, select the HSM’s CSP/KSP for the cryptographic provider so that the CA’s private key is generated on the HSM. Secure any HSM admin tokens or smartcards. For a root CA, you might employ M of N key splits – requiring multiple key custodians to collaborate to activate the HSM or key – as part of the key ceremony (discussed later). (If an HSM is not available, the root key will be stored on the server’s disk. At minimum, protect it with a strong admin passphrase when prompted, and consider enabling the option to require administrator interaction (e.g., a password) whenever the key is accessed.) Step 4: Configure CA Extensions (CDP/AIA) It’s critical to configure how the Root CA publishes its certificate and revocation list, since the root is offline and cannot use Active Directory auto-publishing. Open the Certification Authority management console (certsrv.msc), right-click the CA name > Properties, and go to the Extensions tab. We will set the CRL Distribution Points (CDP) and Authority Information Access (AIA) URLs: CRL Distribution Point (CDP): This is where certificates will tell clients to fetch the CRL for the Root CA. By default, a standalone CA might have a file:// path or no HTTP URL. Click Add and specify an HTTP URL that will be accessible to all network clients, such as: http://<IssuingCA_Server>/CertEnroll/<CaName><CRLNameSuffix><DeltaCRLAllowed>.crl For example, if your issuing CA’s server name is ISSUINGCA.contoso.local, the URL might be http://issuingca.contoso.local/CertEnroll/Contoso%20Root%20CA.crl This assumes the Issuing CA (or another web server) will host the Root CA’s CRL in the CertEnroll directory. Check the boxes for “Include in the CDP extension of issued certificates” and “Include in all CRLs. Clients use this to find Delta CRLs” (you can uncheck the delta CRL publication on the root, as we won’t use delta CRLs on an offline root). Since the root CA won’t often revoke its single issued cert (the subordinate CA), delta CRLs aren’t necessary. Note: If your Active Directory is in use and you want to publish the Root CA’s CRL to AD, you can also add an ldap:///CN=... path and check “Publish in Active Directory”. However, publishing to AD from an offline CA must be done manually using the following command when the root is temporarily connected. certutil -dspublish Many setups skip LDAP for offline roots and rely on HTTP distribution. Authority Information Access (AIA): This is where the Root CA’s certificate will be published for clients to download (to build certificate chains). Add an HTTP URL similarly, for example: http://<IssuingCA_Server>/CertEnroll/<ServerDNSName>_<CaName><CertificateName>.crt This would point to a copy of the Root CA’s certificate that will be hosted on the issuing CA web server. Check “Include in the AIA extension of issued certificates”. This way, any certificate signed by the Root CA (like your subordinate CA’s cert) contains a URL where clients can fetch the Root CA’s cert if they don’t already have it. After adding these, remove any default entries that are not applicable (e.g., LDAP if the root isn’t going to publish to AD, or file paths that won’t be used by clients). These settings ensure that certificates issued by the Root CA (in practice, just the subordinate CA’s certificate) will carry the correct URLs for chain building and revocation checking. Step 5: Back Up the Root CA and Issue the Subordinate Certificate With the Root CA configured, we need to issue a certificate for the Issuing CA (subordinate). We’ll perform that in the next section from the Issuing CA’s side via a request file. Before taking the root offline, ensure you: Back up the CA’s private key and certificate: In the Certification Authority console, or via the CA Backup wizard, export the Root CA’s key pair and CA certificate. Protect this backup (store it offline in a secure location, e.g., on encrypted removable media in a safe). This backup is crucial for disaster recovery or if the Root CA needs to be migrated or restored. Save the Root CA Certificate: You will need the Root CA’s public certificate (*.crt) to distribute to other systems. Have it exported (Base-64 or DER format) for use on the Issuing CA and for clients. Initial CRL publication: Manually publish the first CRL so that it can be distributed. Open an elevated Command Prompt on the Root CA and run: certutil -crl This generates a new CRL file (in the CA’s configured CRL folder, typically %windir%\system32\CertSrv\CertEnroll). Take that CRL file and copy it to the designated distribution point (for example, to the CertEnroll directory on the Issuing CA’s web server, as per the HTTP URL configured). If using Active Directory for CRL distribution, you would also publish it to AD now (e.g., certutil -dspublish -f RootCA.crl on a domain-connected machine). In most lab setups, copying to an HTTP share is sufficient. With these tasks done, the Root CA is ready. At this point, disconnect or power off the Root CA and store it securely – it should remain offline except when it’s absolutely needed (like publishing a new CRL or renewing the subordinate CA’s certificate in the far future). Keeping the root CA offline maximizes its security by minimizing exposure to compromise. Best Practices for Securing the Root CA: The Root CA is the trust anchor, so apply stringent security practices: Physical security: Store the Root CA machine in a locked, secure location. If it’s a virtual machine, consider storing it on a disconnected hypervisor or a USB drive locked in a safe. Only authorized PKI team members should have access. An offline CA should be treated like crown jewels – offline CAs should be stored in secure locations. Minimal exposure: Keep the Root CA powered off and disconnected when not in use. It should not be left running or connected to any network. Routine operations (like issuing end-entity certs) should never involve the root. Admin access control: Limit administrative access on the Root CA server. Use dedicated accounts for PKI administration. Enable auditing on the CA for any changes or issuance events. No additional roles or software: Do not use the Root CA server for any other function (no web browsing, no email, etc.). Fewer installed components means fewer potential vulnerabilities. Protect the private key: Use an HSM if possible; if not, ensure the key is at least protected by a strong password and consider splitting knowledge of that password among multiple people (so no single person can activate the CA). Many organizations opt for an offline root key ceremony (see below) to generate and handle the root key with multiple witnesses and strict procedures. Keep system time and settings consistent: If the Root CA is powered off for long periods, ensure its clock is accurate whenever it is started (to avoid issuing a CRL or certificate with a wrong date). Don’t change the server name or CA name after installation (doing so invalidates issued certs). Periodic health checks: Even though offline, plan to turn on the Root CA at a secure interval (e.g., semi-annually or annually) to perform tasks like CRL publishing and system updates. Make sure to apply OS security updates during these maintenance windows, as offline does not mean immune to vulnerabilities (especially if it ever connects to a network for CRL publication or uses removable media). Deploying the Online Issuing CA Next, set up the Issuing CA server which will actually issue certificates to end entities in the lab. This server will be domain-joined (if using AD integration) and will obtain its CA certificate from the Root CA we just configured. Step 1: Prepare the Issuing CA Server Provision the server: Install Windows Server on a new machine (or VM) that will be the Issuing CA. Join this server to the Active Directory domain (e.g., Contoso.local). Being an enterprise CA, it needs domain membership to publish templates and integrate with AD security groups. Rename the server to something descriptive like ISSUINGCA for clarity. Assign a static IP and ensure it can communicate on the network. IIS for web enrollment (optional): If you plan to use the Web Enrollment or Certificate Enrollment Web Services, ensure IIS is installed. (The AD CS installation wizard can add it if you include those role services.) For this guide, we will include the Web Enrollment role so that the CertEnroll directory is set up for hosting certificate and CRL files. Step 2: Install AD CS Role on Issuing CA On the Issuing CA server, add the Active Directory Certificate Services role via Server Manager or PowerShell. This time, select both Certification Authority and Certification Authority Web Enrollment role services (Web Enrollment will set up the HTTP endpoints for certificate requests if needed). For example, using PowerShell: Install-WindowsFeature AD-Certificate, ADCS-Web-Enrollment -IncludeManagementTools After installation, launch the AD CS configuration wizard: Role Services: Choose Certification Authority (and Web Enrollment if prompted). Setup Type: Select Enterprise CA (since this CA will integrate with AD DS). CA Type: Select Subordinate CA (this indicates it will get its cert from an existing root CA). Private Key: Choose “Create a new private key” (we’ll generate a new key pair for this CA). Cryptography: If using an HSM here as well, select the HSM’s CSP/KSP for the issuing CA’s key. Otherwise, choose a strong key length (2048+ bits, SHA256 or better for hash). CA Name: Provide a name (e.g., “Contoso Issuing CA”). This name will appear as the Issuer on certificates it issues. Certificate Request: The wizard will ask how you want to get the subordinate CA’s certificate. Choose “Save a certificate request to file”. Specify a path, e.g., C:\CertRequest\issuingCA.req. The wizard will generate a request file that we need to take to the Root CA for signing. (Since our Root CA is offline, this file transfer might be via secure USB or a network share when the root is temporarily online.) CA Database: Choose locations or accept defaults for the certificate DB and logs. Finish the configuration wizard, which will complete pending because the CA doesn’t have a certificate yet. The AD CS service on this server won’t start until we import the issued cert from the root. Step 3: Integrate HSM on Issuing CA (Optional) If available, repeat the HSM setup on the Issuing CA: install HSM drivers, initialize it, and generate/secure the key for the subordinate CA on the HSM. Ensure you chose the HSM provider during the above configuration so that the issuing CA’s private key is stored in the HSM. Even though this CA is online, an HSM still greatly enhances security by protecting the private key from extraction. The issuing CA’s HSM may not require multiple custodians to activate (as it needs to run continuously), but should still be physically secured. Step 4: Obtain the Issuing CA’s Certificate from the Root CA Now we have a pending request (issuingCA.req) for the subordinate CA. To get its certificate: Transport the request to the Root CA: Copy the request file to the offline Root CA (via secure means – e.g., formatted new USB stick). Start up the Root CA (in a secure, offline setting) and open the Certification Authority console. Submit the request on Root CA: Right-click the Root CA in the CA console -> All Tasks -> Submit new request, and select the .req file. The request will appear in the Pending Requests on the root. Issue the subordinate CA certificate: Find the pending request (it will list the Issuing CA’s name). Right-click and choose All Tasks > Issue. The subordinate CA’s certificate is now issued by the Root CA. Export the issued certificate: Still on the Root CA, go to Issued Certificates, find the newly issued subordinate CA cert (you can identify it by the Request ID or by the name). Right-click it and choose Open or All Tasks > Export to get the certificate in a file form. If using the console’s built-in “Export” it might only allow binary; alternatively use the certutil command: certutil -dup <RequestID> .\ContosoIssuingCA.cer or simply open and copy to file. Save the certificate as issuingCA.cer. Also make sure you have a copy of the Root CA’s certificate (if not already done). Publish Root CA cert and CRL as needed: Before leaving the Root CA, you may also want to ensure the Root’s own certificate and latest CRL are available to the issuing CA and clients. If not already done in Step 5 of root deployment, export the Root CA cert (DER format) and copy the CRL file. You might use certutil -crl again if some time has passed since initial CRL. Now take the issuingCA.cer file (and root cert/CRL files) and move them back to the Issuing CA server. Step 5: Install the Issuing CA’s Certificate and Complete Configuration On the Issuing CA server (which is still waiting for its CA cert): Install the subordinate CA certificate: In Server Manager or the Certification Authority console on the Issuing CA, there should be an option to “Install CA Certificate” (if the AD CS configuration wizard is still open, it will prompt for the file; or otherwise, in the CA console right-click the CA name > All Tasks > Install CA Certificate). Provide the issuingCA.cer file obtained from the root. This will install the CA’s own certificate and start the CA service. The Issuing CA is now operational as a subordinate CA. Alternatively, use PowerShell: certutil -installcert C:\CertRequest\issuingCA.cer This installs the cert and associates it with the pending key. Trust the Root CA certificate: Because the Issuing CA is domain-joined, when you install the subordinate cert, it might automatically place the Root CA’s certificate in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store on that server (and possibly publish it to AD). If not, you should manually install the Root CA’s certificate into the Trusted Root CA store on the Issuing CA machine (using the Certificates MMC or certutil -addstore -f Root rootCA.cer). This step prevents any “chain not trusted” warnings on the Issuing CA and ensures it trusts its parent. In an enterprise environment, you would also distribute the root certificate to all client machines (e.g., via Group Policy) so that they trust the whole chain. Import Root CRL: Copy the Root CA’s CRL (*.crl file) to the Issuing CA’s CRL distribution point location (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\CertSrv\CertEnroll\ if that’s the directory served by the web server). This matches the HTTP URL we configured on the root. Place the CRL file there and ensure it is accessible (the Issuing CA’s IIS might need to serve static .crl files; often, if Web Enrollment is installed, the CertEnroll folder is under C:\Inetpub\wwwroot\CertEnroll). At this point, the subordinate CA and any client hitting the HTTP URL can retrieve the root’s CRL. The subordinate CA is now fully established. It holds a certificate issued by the Root CA (forming a complete chain of trust), and it’s ready to issue end-entity certificates. Step 6: Configure Issuing CA Settings and Start Services Start the Certificate Services: If the CA service (CertSvc) isn’t started automatically, start or restart it. On PowerShell: Restart-Service certsvc The CA should show as running in the CA console with the name “Contoso Issuing CA” (or your chosen name). Configure Certificate Templates: Because this is an Enterprise CA, it can utilize certificate templates stored in Active Directory to simplify issuing common cert types (user auth, computer auth, web server SSL, etc.). By default, some templates (e.g., User, Computer) are available but not issued. In the Certification Authority console under Certificate Templates, you can choose which templates to issue (e.g., right-click > New > Certificate Template to Issue, then select templates like “User” or “Computer”). This lab guide doesn’t require specific templates but know that only Enterprise CAs can use templates. Templates define the policies and settings (cryptography, enrollment permissions, etc.) for issued certificates. Ensure you enable only the templates needed and configure their permissions appropriately (e.g., allow the appropriate groups to enroll). Set CRL publishing schedule: The Issuing CA will automatically publish its own CRL (for certificates it issues) at intervals. You can adjust the CRL and Delta CRL publication interval in the CA’s Properties > CRL Period. A common practice is a small base CRL period (e.g., 1 week or 2 weeks) for issuing CAs, because they may revoke user certs more frequently; and enable Delta CRLs (published daily) for timely revocation information. Make sure the CDP/AIA for the Issuing CA itself are properly configured too (the wizard usually sets LDAP and HTTP locations, but verify in the Extensions tab). In a lab, the default settings are fine. Web Enrollment (if installed): You can verify the web enrollment by browsing to http://<IssuingCA>/certsrv. This web UI allows browser-based certificate requests. It’s a legacy interface mostly, but for testing it can be used if your clients aren’t domain-joined or if you want a manual request method. In modern use, the Certificate Enrollment Web Service/Policy roles or auto-enrollment via Group Policy are preferred for remote and automated enrollment. At this stage, your PKI is operational: the Issuing CA trusts the offline Root CA and can issue certificates. The Root CA can be kept offline with confidence that the subordinate will handle all regular work. Validation and Testing of the PKI It’s important to verify that the PKI is configured correctly: Check CA status: On the Issuing CA, open the Certification Authority console and ensure no errors. Verify that the Issuing CA’s certificate shows OK (no red X). On the Root CA (offline most of the time), you can use the Pkiview.msc snap-in (Microsoft PKI Health Tool) on a domain-connected machine to check the health of the PKI. This tool will show if the CDPs/AIA are reachable and if certificates are properly published. Trust chain on clients: On a domain-joined client PC, the Root CA certificate should be present in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store (if the Issuing CA was installed as Enterprise CA, it likely published the root cert to AD automatically; you can also distribute it via Group Policy or manually). The Issuing CA’s certificate should appear in the Intermediate Certification Authorities store. This establishes the chain of trust. If not, import the root cert into the domain’s Group Policy for Trusted Roots. A quick test: on a client, run certutil -config "ISSUINGCA\\Contoso Issuing CA" -ping to see if it can contact the CA (or use the Certification Authority MMC targeting the issuing CA). Enroll a test certificate: Try to enroll for a certificate from the Issuing CA. For instance, from a domain-joined client, use the Certificates MMC (in Current User or Computer context) and initiate a certificate request for a User or Computer certificate (depending on templates issued). If auto-enrollment is configured via Group Policy for a template, you can simply log on a client and see if it automatically receives a certificate. Alternatively, use the web enrollment page or certreq command to submit a request. The request should be approved and a certificate issued by "Contoso Issuing CA". After enrollment, inspect the issued certificate: it should chain up to "Contoso Root CA" without errors. Ensure that the certificate’s CDP points to the URL we set (and try to browse that URL to see the CRL file), and that the AIA points to the root cert location. Revocation test (optional): To test CRL behavior, you could revoke a test certificate on the Issuing CA (using the CA console) and publish a new CRL. On the client, after updating the CRL, the revoked certificate should show as revoked. For the Root CA, since it shouldn’t issue end-entity certs, you wouldn’t normally revoke anything except potentially the subordinate CA’s certificate (which would be a drastic action in case of compromise). By issuing a test certificate and validating the chain and revocation, you confirm that your two-tier PKI lab is functioning correctly. Maintaining the PKI: CRLs, Key Ceremonies, and Security Procedures Deploying the PKI is only the beginning. Proper maintenance and operational procedures are crucial to ensure the PKI remains secure and reliable over time. Periodic CRL Updates for the Offline Root: The Root CA’s CRL has a defined validity period (set during configuration, often 6 or 12 months for offline roots). Before the CRL expires, the Root CA must be brought online (in a secure environment) to issue a new CRL. It’s recommended to schedule CRL updates periodically (e.g., semi-annually) to prevent the CRL from expiring. An expired CRL can cause certificate chain validation to fail, potentially disrupting services. Typically, organizations set the offline root CRL validity so that publishing 1-2 times a year is sufficient. When the time comes: Start the Root CA (ensuring the system clock is correct). Run certutil -crl to issue a fresh CRL. Distribute the new CRL: copy it to the HTTP CDP location (overwrite the old file) and, if applicable, use certutil -dspublish -f RootCA.crl to update it in Active Directory. Verify that the new CRL’s next update date is extended appropriately (e.g., another 6 months out). Clients and the Issuing CA will automatically pick up the new CRL when checking for revocation. (The Issuing CA, if configured, might cache the root CRL and need a restart or certutil -setreg ca\CRLFlags +CRLF_REVCHECK_IGNORE_OFFLINE tweak if the root CRL expires unexpectedly. Keeping the schedule prevents such issues.) Issuing CA CRL and OCSP: The Issuing CA’s CRLs are published automatically as it is online. Ensure the IIS or file share hosting the CRL is accessible. Optionally, consider setting up an Online Responder (OCSP) for real-time status checking, especially if CRLs are large or you need faster revocation information. OCSP is another AD CS role service that can be configured on the issuing CA or another server to answer certificate status queries. This might be beyond a simple lab, but it’s worth mentioning for completeness. Key Ceremonies and Documentation: For production environments (and good practice even in labs), formalize the process of handling CA keys in a Key Ceremony. A key ceremony is a carefully controlled process for activities like generating the Root CA’s key pair, installing the CA, and signing subordinate certificates. It often involves multiple people to ensure no single person has unilateral control (principle of dual control) and to witness the process. Best practices for a Root CA key ceremony include: Advance Planning: Create a step-by-step script of the ceremony tasks. Include who will do what, what materials are needed (HSMs, installation media, backup devices, etc.), and the order of operations. Multiple trusted individuals present: Roles might include a Ceremony Administrator (leads the process), a Security Officer (responsible for HSM or key material handling), an Auditor (to observe and record), etc. This prevents any one person from manipulating the process and increases trust. Secure environment: Conduct the ceremony in a secure location (e.g., a locked room) free of recording devices or unauthorized personnel. Ensure the Root CA machine is isolated (no network), and ideally that BIOS/USB access controls are in place to prevent any malware. Generate keys with proper controls: If using an HSM, initialize and generate the key with the required number of key custodians each providing part of the activation material (e.g., smartcards or passphrases). Immediately back up the HSM partition or key to secure media (requiring the same custodians to restore). Sign subordinate CA certificate: As part of the ceremony, once the root key is ready, sign the subordinate’s request. This might also be a witnessed step. Document every action: Write down each command run, each key generated, serial numbers of devices used, and have all participants sign an acknowledgment of the outcomes. Also record the fingerprints of the generated Root CA certificate and any subordinate certificate to ensure they are exactly as expected. Secure storage: After the ceremony, store the Root CA machine (if it’s a laptop or VM) and HSM tokens in a tamper-evident bag or safe. The idea is to make it evident if someone tries to access the root outside of an authorized ceremony. While a full key ceremony might be overkill for a small lab, understanding these practices is important. Even in a lab, you can simulate some aspects (for learning), like documenting the procedure of taking the root online to sign the request and then locking it away. These practices greatly increase the trust in a production PKI by ensuring transparency and accountability for critical operations. Backup and Recovery Plans: Both CAs’ data should be regularly backed up: For the Root CA: since it’s rarely online, backup after any change. Typically, you’d back up the CA’s private key and certificate once (right after setup or any renewal). Store this securely offline (separate from the server itself). Also back up the CA database if it ever issues more than one cert (for root it might not issue many). For the Issuing CA: schedule automated backups of the CA database and private key. You can use the built-in certutil -backup or Windows Server Backup (which is aware of the AD CS database). Keep backups secure and test restoration procedures. Having a documented recovery procedure for the CA is crucial for continuity. Also consider backup of templates and any scripts. Maintain spare hardware or VMs in case you need to restore the CA on new hardware (especially for the root, having a procedure to restore on a new machine if the original is destroyed). Security maintenance: Apply OS updates to the CAs carefully. For the offline root, patch it offline if possible (offline servicing or connecting it briefly to a management network). For the issuing CA, treat it as a critical infrastructure server: limit its exposure (firewall it so only required services are reachable), monitor its event logs (enable auditing for Certificate Services events, which can log each issuance and revocation), and employ anti-malware tools with caution (whitelisting the CA processes to avoid interference). Also, periodically review the CA’s configuration and certificate templates to ensure they meet current security standards (for example, deprecate any weak cryptography or adjust validity periods if needed). By following these maintenance steps and best practices, your two-tier PKI will remain secure and trustworthy over time. Remember that PKI is not “set and forget” – it requires operational diligence, but the payoff is a robust trust infrastructure for your organization’s security. Additional AD CS Features and References Active Directory Certificate Services provides more capabilities than covered in this basic lab. Depending on your needs, you might explore: Certificate Templates: We touched on templates; they are a powerful feature on Enterprise CAs to enforce standardized certificate settings. Administrators can create custom templates for various use cases (SSL, S/MIME email, code signing) and control enrollment permissions. Understanding template versions and permissions is key for enterprise deployments. (Refer to Microsoft’s documentation on Certificate template concepts in Windows Server for details on how templates work and can be customized.) Web Services for Enrollment: In scenarios with remote or non-domain clients, AD CS offers the Certificate Enrollment Web Service (CES) and Certificate Enrollment Policy Web Service (CEP) role services. These allow clients to fetch enrollment policy information and request certificates over HTTP or HTTPS, even when not connected directly to the domain. They work with the certificate templates to enable similar auto-enrollment experiences over the web. See Microsoft’s guides on the Certificate Enrollment Web Service overview and Certificate Enrollment Policy Web Service overview for when to use these. Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES): This AD CS role service implements the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) to allow devices like routers, switches, and mobile devices to obtain certificates from the CA without domain credentials. NDES acts as a proxy (Registration Authority) between devices and the CA, using one-time passwords for authentication. If you need to issue certificates to network equipment or MDM-managed mobile devices, NDES is the solution. Microsoft Docs provide a Network Device Enrollment Service(NDES) overview and even details on using a policy module with NDES for advanced scenarios (like customizing how requests are processed or integrating with custom policies). Online Responders (OCSP): As mentioned, an Online Responder can be configured to answer revocation status queries more efficiently than CRLs, especially useful if your CRLs grow large or you have high-volume certificate validation (VPNs, etc.). AD CS’s Online Responder role service can be installed on a member server and configured with the OCSP Response Signing certificate from your Issuing CA. Monitoring and Auditing: Windows Servers have options to audit CA events. Enabling auditing can log events such as certificate issuance, revocation, or changes to the CA configuration. These logs are important in enterprise PKI to track who did what (for compliance and security forensics). Also, tools like the PKI Health Tool (pkiview.msc) and PowerShell cmdlets (like Get-CertificationAuthority, Get-CertificationAuthorityCertificate) can help monitor the health and configuration of your CAs. Conclusion By following this guide, you have set up a secure two-tier PKI environment consisting of an offline Root CA and an online Issuing CA. This design, which uses an offline root, is considered a security best practice for enterprise PKI deployments because it reduces the risk of your root key being compromised. With the offline Root CA acting as a hardened trust anchor and the enterprise Issuing CA handling day-to-day certificate issuance, your lab PKI can issue certificates for various purposes (HTTPS, code signing, user authentication, etc.) in a way that models real-world deployments. As you expand this lab or move to production, always remember that PKI security is as much about process as technology. Applying strict controls to protect CA keys, keeping software up to date, and monitoring your PKI’s health are all part of the journey. For further reading and official guidance, refer to these Microsoft documentation resources: 📖 AD CS PKI Design Considerations: PKI design considerations using Active Directory Certificate Services in Windows Server helps in planning a PKI deployment (number of CAs, hierarchy depth, naming, key lengths, validity periods, etc.). This is useful to read when adapting this lab design to a production environment. It also covers configuring CDP/AIA and why offline roots usually don’t need delta CRLs. 📖 AD CS Step-by-Step Guides: Microsoft’s Test Lab Guide Test Lab Guide: Deploying an AD CS Two-Tier PKI Hierarchy walk through a similar scenario.Security as the core primitive - Securing AI agents and apps
This week at Microsoft Ignite, we shared our vision for Microsoft security -- In the agentic era, security must be ambient and autonomous, like the AI it protects. It must be woven into and around everything we build—from silicon to OS, to agents, apps, data, platforms, and clouds—and throughout everything we do. In this blog, we are going to dive deeper into many of the new innovations we are introducing this week to secure AI agents and apps. As I spend time with our customers and partners, there are four consistent themes that have emerged as core security challenges to secure AI workloads. These are: preventing agent sprawl and access to resources, protecting against data oversharing and data leaks, defending against new AI threats and vulnerabilities, and adhering to evolving regulations. Addressing these challenges holistically requires a coordinated effort across IT, developers, and security leaders, not just within security teams and to enable this, we are introducing several new innovations: Microsoft Agent 365 for IT, Foundry Control Plane in Microsoft Foundry for developers, and the Security Dashboard for AI for security leaders. In addition, we are releasing several new purpose-built capabilities to protect and govern AI apps and agents across Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Entra, and Microsoft Purview. Observability at every layer of the stack To facilitate the organization-wide effort that it takes to secure and govern AI agents and apps – IT, developers, and security leaders need observability (security, management, and monitoring) at every level. IT teams need to enable the development and deployment of any agent in their environment. To ensure the responsible and secure deployment of agents into an organization, IT needs a unified agent registry, the ability to assign an identity to every agent, manage the agent’s access to data and resources, and manage the agent’s entire lifecycle. In addition, IT needs to be able to assign access to common productivity and collaboration tools, such as email and file storage, and be able to observe their entire agent estate for risks such as over-permissioned agents. Development teams need to build and test agents, apply security and compliance controls by default, and ensure AI models are evaluated for safety guardrails and security vulnerabilities. Post deployment, development teams must observe agents to ensure they are staying on task, accessing applications and data sources appropriately, and operating within their cost and performance expectations. Security & compliance teams must ensure overall security of their AI estate, including their AI infrastructure, platforms, data, apps, and agents. They need comprehensive visibility into all their security risks- including agent sprawl and resource access, data oversharing and leaks, AI threats and vulnerabilities, and complying with global regulations. They want to address these risks by extending their existing security investments that they are already invested in and familiar with, rather than using siloed or bolt-on tools. These teams can be most effective in delivering trustworthy AI to their organizations if security is natively integrated into the tools and platforms that they use every day, and if those tools and platforms share consistent security primitives such as agent identities from Entra; data security and compliance controls from Purview; and security posture, detections, and protections from Defender. With the new capabilities being released today, we are delivering observability at every layer of the AI stack, meeting IT, developers, and security teams where they are in the tools they already use to innovate with confidence. For IT Teams - Introducing Microsoft Agent 365, the control plane for agents, now in preview The best infrastructure for managing your agents is the one you already use to manage your users. With Agent 365, organizations can extend familiar tools and policies to confidently deploy and secure agents, without reinventing the wheel. By using the same trusted Microsoft 365 infrastructure, productivity apps, and protections, organizations can now apply consistent and familiar governance and security controls that are purpose-built to protect against agent-specific threats and risks. gement and governance of agents across organizations Microsoft Agent 365 delivers a unified agent Registry, Access Control, Visualization, Interoperability, and Security capabilities for your organization. These capabilities work together to help organizations manage agents and drive business value. The Registry powered by the Entra provides a complete and unified inventory of all the agents deployed and used in your organization including both Microsoft and third-party agents. Access Control allows you to limit the access privileges of your agents to only the resources that they need and protect their access to resources in real time. Visualization gives organizations the ability to see what matters most and gain insights through a unified dashboard, advanced analytics, and role-based reporting. Interop allows agents to access organizational data through Work IQ for added context, and to integrate with Microsoft 365 apps such as Outlook, Word, and Excel so they can create and collaborate alongside users. Security enables the proactive detection of vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, protects against common attacks such as prompt injections, prevents agents from processing or leaking sensitive data, and gives organizations the ability to audit agent interactions, assess compliance readiness and policy violations, and recommend controls for evolving regulatory requirements. Microsoft Agent 365 also includes the Agent 365 SDK, part of Microsoft Agent Framework, which empowers developers and ISVs to build agents on their own AI stack. The SDK enables agents to automatically inherit Microsoft's security and governance protections, such as identity controls, data security policies, and compliance capabilities, without the need for custom integration. For more details on Agent 365, read the blog here. For Developers - Introducing Microsoft Foundry Control Plane to observe, secure and manage agents, now in preview Developers are moving fast to bring agents into production, but operating them at scale introduces new challenges and responsibilities. Agents can access tools, take actions, and make decisions in real time, which means development teams must ensure that every agent behaves safely, securely, and consistently. Today, developers need to work across multiple disparate tools to get a holistic picture of the cybersecurity and safety risks that their agents may have. Once they understand the risk, they then need a unified and simplified way to monitor and manage their entire agent fleet and apply controls and guardrails as needed. Microsoft Foundry provides a unified platform for developers to build, evaluate and deploy AI apps and agents in a responsible way. Today we are excited to announce that Foundry Control Plane is available in preview. This enables developers to observe, secure, and manage their agent fleets with built-in security, and centralized governance controls. With this unified approach, developers can now identify risks and correlate disparate signals across their models, agents, and tools; enforce consistent policies and quality gates; and continuously monitor task adherence and runtime risks. Foundry Control Plane is deeply integrated with Microsoft’s security portfolio to provide a ‘secure by design’ foundation for developers. With Microsoft Entra, developers can ensure an agent identity (Agent ID) and access controls are built into every agent, mitigating the risk of unmanaged agents and over permissioned resources. With Microsoft Defender built in, developers gain contextualized alerts and posture recommendations for agents directly within the Foundry Control Plane. This integration proactively prevents configuration and access risks, while also defending agents from runtime threats in real time. Microsoft Purview’s native integration into Foundry Control Plane makes it easy to enable data security and compliance for every Foundry-built application or agent. This allows Purview to discover data security and compliance risks and apply policies to prevent user prompts and AI responses from safety and policy violations. In addition, agent interactions can be logged and searched for compliance and legal audits. This integration of the shared security capabilities, including identity and access, data security and compliance, and threat protection and posture ensures that security is not an afterthought; it’s embedded at every stage of the agent lifecycle, enabling you to start secure and stay secure. For more details, read the blog. For Security Teams - Introducing Security Dashboard for AI - unified risk visibility for CISOs and AI risk leaders, coming soon AI proliferation in the enterprise, combined with the emergence of AI governance committees and evolving AI regulations, leaves CISOs and AI risk leaders needing a clear view of their AI risks, such as data leaks, model vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and unethical agent actions across their entire AI estate, spanning AI platforms, apps, and agents. 90% of security professionals, including CISOs, report that their responsibilities have expanded to include data governance and AI oversight within the past year. 1 At the same time, 86% of risk managers say disconnected data and systems lead to duplicated efforts and gaps in risk coverage. 2 To address these needs, we are excited to introduce the Security Dashboard for AI. This serves as a unified dashboard that aggregates posture and real-time risk signals from Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Entra, and Microsoft Purview. This unified dashboard allows CISOs and AI risk leaders to discover agents and AI apps, track AI posture and drift, and correlate risk signals to investigate and act across their entire AI ecosystem. For example, you can see your full AI inventory and get visibility into a quarantined agent, flagged for high data risk due to oversharing sensitive information in Purview. The dashboard then correlates that signal with identity insights from Entra and threat protection alerts from Defender to provide a complete picture of exposure. From there, you can delegate tasks to the appropriate teams to enforce policies and remediate issues quickly. With the Security Dashboard for AI, CISOs and risk leaders gain a clear, consolidated view of AI risks across agents, apps, and platforms—eliminating fragmented visibility, disconnected posture insights, and governance gaps as AI adoption scales. Best of all, there’s nothing new to buy. If you’re already using Microsoft security products to secure AI, you’re already a Security Dashboard for AI customer. Figure 5: Security Dashboard for AI provides CISOs and AI risk leaders with a unified view of their AI risk by bringing together their AI inventory, AI risk, and security recommendations to strengthen overall posture Together, these innovations deliver observability and security across IT, development, and security teams, powered by Microsoft’s shared security capabilities. With Microsoft Agent 365, IT teams can manage and secure agents alongside users. Foundry Control Plane gives developers unified governance and lifecycle controls for agent fleets. Security Dashboard for AI provides CISOs and AI risk leaders with a consolidated view of AI risks across platforms, apps, and agents. Added innovation to secure and govern your AI workloads In addition to the IT, developer, and security leader-focused innovations outlined above, we continue to accelerate our pace of innovation in Microsoft Entra, Microsoft Purview, and Microsoft Defender to address the most pressing needs for securing and governing your AI workloads. These needs are: Manage agent sprawl and resource access e.g. managing agent identity, access to resources, and permissions lifecycle at scale Prevent data oversharing and leaks e.g. protecting sensitive information shared in prompts, responses, and agent interactions Defend against shadow AI, new threats, and vulnerabilities e.g. managing unsanctioned applications, preventing prompt injection attacks, and detecting AI supply chain vulnerabilities Enable AI governance for regulatory compliance e.g. ensuring AI development, operations, and usage comply with evolving global regulations and frameworks Manage agent sprawl and resource access 76% of business leaders expect employees to manage agents within the next 2–3 years. 3 Widespread adoption of agents is driving the need for visibility and control, which includes the need for a unified registry, agent identities, lifecycle governance, and secure access to resources. Today, Microsoft Entra provides robust identity protection and secure access for applications and users. However, organizations lack a unified way to manage, govern, and protect agents in the same way they manage their users. Organizations need a purpose-built identity and access framework for agents. Introducing Microsoft Entra Agent ID, now in preview Microsoft Entra Agent ID offers enterprise-grade capabilities that enable organizations to prevent agent sprawl and protect agent identities and their access to resources. These new purpose-built capabilities enable organizations to: Register and manage agents: Get a complete inventory of the agent fleet and ensure all new agents are created with an identity built-in and are automatically protected by organization policies to accelerate adoption. Govern agent identities and lifecycle: Keep the agent fleet under control with lifecycle management and IT-defined guardrails for both agents and people who create and manage them. Protect agent access to resources: Reduce risk of breaches, block risky agents, and prevent agent access to malicious resources with conditional access and traffic inspection. Agents built in Microsoft Copilot Studio, Microsoft Foundry, and Security Copilot get an Entra Agent ID built-in at creation. Developers can also adopt Entra Agent ID for agents they build through Microsoft Agent Framework, Microsoft Agent 365 SDK, or Microsoft Entra Agent ID SDK. Read the Microsoft Entra blog to learn more. Prevent data oversharing and leaks Data security is more complex than ever. Information Security Media Group (ISMG) reports that 80% of leaders cite leakage of sensitive data as their top concern. 4 In addition to data security and compliance risks of generative AI (GenAI) apps, agents introduces new data risks such as unsupervised data access, highlighting the need to protect all types of corporate data, whether it is accessed by employees or agents. To mitigate these risks, we are introducing new Microsoft Purview data security and compliance capabilities for Microsoft 365 Copilot and for agents and AI apps built with Copilot Studio and Microsoft Foundry, providing unified protection, visibility, and control for users, AI Apps, and Agents. New Microsoft Purview controls safeguard Microsoft 365 Copilot with real-time protection and bulk remediation of oversharing risks Microsoft Purview and Microsoft 365 Copilot deliver a fully integrated solution for protecting sensitive data in AI workflows. Based on ongoing customer feedback, we’re introducing new capabilities to deliver real-time protection for sensitive data in M365 Copilot and accelerated remediation of oversharing risks: Data risk assessments: Previously, admins could monitor oversharing risks such as SharePoint sites with unprotected sensitive data. Now, they can perform item-level investigations and bulk remediation for overshared files in SharePoint and OneDrive to quickly reduce oversharing exposure. Data Loss Prevention (DLP) for M365 Copilot: DLP previously excluded files with sensitivity labels from Copilot processing. Now in preview, DLP also prevents prompts that include sensitive data from being processed in M365 Copilot, Copilot Chat, and Copilot agents, and prevents Copilot from using sensitive data in prompts for web grounding. Priority cleanup for M365 Copilot assets: Many organizations have org-wide policies to retain or delete data. Priority cleanup, now generally available, lets admins delete assets that are frequently processed by Copilot, such as meeting transcripts and recordings, on an independent schedule from the org-wide policies while maintaining regulatory compliance. On-demand classification for meeting transcripts: Purview can now detect sensitive information in meeting transcripts on-demand. This enables data security admins to apply DLP policies and enforce Priority cleanup based on the sensitive information detected. & bulk remediation Read the full Data Security blog to learn more. Introducing new Microsoft Purview data security capabilities for agents and apps built with Copilot Studio and Microsoft Foundry, now in preview Microsoft Purview now extends the same data security and compliance for users and Copilots to agents and apps. These new capabilities are: Enhanced Data Security Posture Management: A centralized DSPM dashboard that provides observability, risk assessment, and guided remediation across users, AI apps, and agents. Insider Risk Management (IRM) for Agents: Uniquely designed for agents, using dedicated behavioral analytics, Purview dynamically assigns risk levels to agents based on their risky handing of sensitive data and enables admins to apply conditional policies based on that risk level. Sensitive data protection with Azure AI Search: Azure AI Search enables fast, AI-driven retrieval across large document collections, essential for building AI Apps. When apps or agents use Azure AI Search to index or retrieve data, Purview sensitivity labels are preserved in the search index, ensuring that any sensitive information remains protected under the organization’s data security & compliance policies. For more information on preventing data oversharing and data leaks - Learn how Purview protects and governs agents in the Data Security and Compliance for Agents blog. Defend against shadow AI, new threats, and vulnerabilities AI workloads are subject to new AI-specific threats like prompt injections attacks, model poisoning, and data exfiltration of AI generated content. Although security admins and SOC analysts have similar tasks when securing agents, the attack methods and surfaces differ significantly. To help customers defend against these novel attacks, we are introducing new capabilities in Microsoft Defender that deliver end-to-end protection, from security posture management to runtime defense. Introducing Security Posture Management for agents, now in preview As organizations adopt AI agents to automate critical workflows, they become high-value targets and potential points of compromise, creating a critical need to ensure agents are hardened, compliant, and resilient by preventing misconfigurations and safeguarding against adversarial manipulation. Security Posture Management for agents in Microsoft Defender now provides an agent inventory for security teams across Microsoft Foundry and Copilot Studio agents. Here, analysts can assess the overall security posture of an agent, easily implement security recommendations, and identify vulnerabilities such as misconfigurations and excessive permissions, all aligned to the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Additionally, the new agent attack path analysis visualizes how an agent’s weak security posture can create broader organizational risk, so you can quickly limit exposure and prevent lateral movement. Introducing Threat Protection for agents, now in preview Attack techniques and attack surfaces for agents are fundamentally different from other assets in your environment. That’s why Defender is delivering purpose-built protections and detections to help defend against them. Defender is introducing runtime protection for Copilot Studio agents that automatically block prompt injection attacks in real time. In addition, we are announcing agent-specific threat detections for Copilot Studio and Microsoft Foundry agents coming soon. Defender automatically correlates these alerts with Microsoft’s industry-leading threat intelligence and cross-domain security signals to deliver richer, contextualized alerts and security incident views for the SOC analyst. Defender’s risk and threat signals are natively integrated into the new Microsoft Foundry Control Plane, giving development teams full observability and the ability to act directly from within their familiar environment. Finally, security analysts will be able to hunt across all agent telemetry in the Advanced Hunting experience in Defender, and the new Agent 365 SDK extends Defender’s visibility and hunting capabilities to third-party agents, starting with Genspark and Kasisto, giving security teams even more coverage across their AI landscape. To learn more about how you can harden the security posture of your agents and defend against threats, read the Microsoft Defender blog. Enable AI governance for regulatory compliance Global AI regulations like the EU AI Act and NIST AI RMF are evolving rapidly; yet, according to ISMG, 55% of leaders report lacking clarity on current and future AI regulatory requirements. 5 As enterprises adopt AI, they must ensure that their AI innovation aligns with global regulations and standards to avoid costly compliance gaps. Introducing new Microsoft Purview Compliance Manager capabilities to stay ahead of evolving AI regulations, now in preview Today, Purview Compliance Manager provides over 300 pre-built assessments for common industry, regional, and global standards and regulations. However, the pace of change for new AI regulations requires controls to be continuously re-evaluated and updated so that organizations can adapt to ongoing changes in regulations and stay compliant. To address this need, Compliance Manager now includes AI-powered regulatory templates. AI-powered regulatory templates enable real-time ingestion and analysis of global regulatory documents, allowing compliance teams to quickly adapt to changes as they happen. As regulations evolve, the updated regulatory documents can be uploaded to Compliance Manager, and the new requirements are automatically mapped to applicable recommended actions to implement controls across Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Entra, Microsoft Purview, Microsoft 365, and Microsoft Foundry. Automated actions by Compliance Manager further streamline governance, reduce manual workload, and strengthen regulatory accountability. Introducing expanded Microsoft Purview compliance capabilities for agents and AI apps now in preview Microsoft Purview now extends its compliance capabilities across agent-generated interactions, ensuring responsible use and regulatory alignment as AI becomes deeply embedded across business processes. New capabilities include expanded coverage for: Audit: Surface agent interactions, lifecycle events, and data usage with Purview Audit. Unified audit logs across user and agent activities, paired with traceability for every agent using an Entra Agent ID, support investigation, anomaly detection, and regulatory reporting. Communication Compliance: Detect prompts sent to agents and agent-generated responses containing inappropriate, unethical, or risky language, including attempts to manipulate agents into bypassing policies, generating risky content, or producing noncompliant outputs. When issues arise, data security admins get full context, including the prompt, the agent’s output, and relevant metadata, so they can investigate and take corrective action Data Lifecycle Management: Apply retention and deletion policies to agent-generated content and communication flows to automate lifecycle controls and reduce regulatory risk. Read about Microsoft Purview data security for agents to learn more. Finally, we are extending our data security, threat protection, and identity access capabilities to third-party apps and agents via the network. Advancing Microsoft Entra Internet Access Secure Web + AI Gateway - extend runtime protections to the network, now in preview Microsoft Entra Internet Access, part of the Microsoft Entra Suite, has new capabilities to secure access to and usage of GenAI at the network level, marking a transition from Secure Web Gateway to Secure Web and AI Gateway. Enterprises can accelerate GenAI adoption while maintaining compliance and reducing risk, empowering employees to experiment with new AI tools safely. The new capabilities include: Prompt injection protection which blocks malicious prompts in real time by extending Azure AI Prompt Shields to the network layer. Network file filtering which extends Microsoft Purview to inspect files in transit and prevents regulated or confidential data from being uploaded to unsanctioned AI services. Shadow AI Detection that provides visibility into unsanctioned AI applications through Cloud Application Analytics and Defender for Cloud Apps risk scoring, empowering security teams to monitor usage trends, apply Conditional Access, or block high-risk apps instantly. Unsanctioned MCP server blocking prevents access to MCP servers from unauthorized agents. With these controls, you can accelerate GenAI adoption while maintaining compliance and reducing risk, so employees can experiment with new AI tools safely. Read the Microsoft Entra blog to learn more. As AI transforms the enterprise, security must evolve to meet new challenges—spanning agent sprawl, data protection, emerging threats, and regulatory compliance. Our approach is to empower IT, developers, and security leaders with purpose-built innovations like Agent 365, Foundry Control Plane, and the Security Dashboard for AI. These solutions bring observability, governance, and protection to every layer of the AI stack, leveraging familiar tools and integrated controls across Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Entra, and Microsoft Purview. The future of security is ambient, autonomous, and deeply woven into the fabric of how we build, deploy, and govern AI systems. Explore additional resources Learn more about Security for AI solutions on our webpage Learn more about Microsoft Agent 365 Learn more about Microsoft Entra Agent ID Get started with Microsoft 365 Copilot Get started with Microsoft Copilot Studio Get started with Microsoft Foundry Get started with Microsoft Defender for Cloud Get started with Microsoft Entra Get started with Microsoft Purview Get started with Microsoft Purview Compliance Manager Sign up for a free Microsoft 365 E5 Security Trial and Microsoft Purview Trial 1 Bedrock Security, 2025 Data Security Confidence Index, published Mar 17, 2025. 2 AuditBoard & Ascend2, Connected Risk Report 2024; as cited by MIT Sloan Management Review, Spring 2025. 3 KPMG AI Quarterly Pulse Survey | Q3 2025. September 2025. n= 130 U.S.-based C-suite and business leaders representing organizations with annual revenue of $1 billion or more 4 First Annual Generative AI study: Business Rewards vs. Security Risks, , Q3 2023, ISMG, N=400 5 First Annual Generative AI study: Business Rewards vs. Security Risks, Q3 2023, ISMG, N=400Security Guidance Series: CAF 4.0 Threat Hunting From Detection to Anticipation
The CAF 4.0 update reframes C2 (Threat Hunting) as a cornerstone of proactive cyber resilience. According to the NCSC CAF 4.0, this principle is no longer about occasional investigations or manual log reviews; it now demands structured, frequent, and intelligence-led threat hunting that evolves in line with organizational risk. The expectation is that UK public sector organizations will not just respond to alerts but will actively search for hidden or emerging threats that evade standard detection technologies, documenting their findings and using them to strengthen controls and response. In practice, this represents a shift from detection to anticipation. Threat hunting under CAF 4.0 should be hypothesis-driven, focusing on attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) rather than isolated indicators of compromise (IoCs). Organizations must build confidence that their hunting processes are repeatable, measurable, and continuously improving, leveraging automation and threat intelligence to expand coverage and consistency. Microsoft E3 Microsoft E3 equips organizations with the baseline capabilities to begin threat investigation, forming the starting point for Partially Achieved maturity under CAF 4.0 C2. At this level, hunting is ad hoc and event-driven, but it establishes the foundation for structured processes. How E3 contributes to the following objectives in C2: Reactive detection for initial hunts: Defender for Endpoint Plan 1 surfaces alerts on phishing, malware, and suspicious endpoint activity. Analysts can use these alerts to triage incidents and document steps taken, creating the first iteration of a hunting methodology. Identity correlation and manual investigation: Entra ID P1 provides Conditional Access and MFA enforcement, while audit telemetry in the Security & Compliance Centre supports manual reviews of identity anomalies. These capabilities allow organizations to link endpoint and identity signals during investigations. Learning from incidents: By recording findings from reactive hunts and feeding lessons into risk decisions, organizations begin to build repeatable processes, even if hunts are not yet hypothesis-driven or frequent enough to match risk. What’s missing for Achieved: Under E3, hunts remain reactive, lack documented hypotheses, and do not routinely convert findings into automated detections. Achieving full maturity typically requires regular, TTP-focused hunts, automation, and integration with advanced analytics, capabilities found in higher-tier solutions. Microsoft E5 Microsoft E5 elevates threat hunting from reactive investigation to a structured, intelligence-driven discipline, a defining feature of Achieved maturity under CAF 4.0, C2. Distinctive E5 capabilities for C2: Hypothesis-driven hunts at scale: Defender Advanced Hunting (KQL) enables analysts to test hypotheses across correlated telemetry from endpoints, identities, email, and SaaS applications. This supports hunts focused on adversary TTPs, not just atomic IoCs, as CAF requires. Turning hunts into detections: Custom hunting queries can be converted into alert rules, operationalizing findings into automated detection and reducing reliance on manual triage. Threat intelligence integration: Microsoft Threat Intelligence feeds real-time actor tradecraft and sector-specific campaigns into the hunting workflow, ensuring hunts anticipate emerging threats rather than react to incidents. Identity and lateral movement focus: Defender for Identity surfaces Kerberos abuse, credential replay, and lateral movement patterns, enabling hunts that span beyond endpoints and email. Documented and repeatable process: E5 supports recording hunt queries and outcomes via APIs and portals, creating evidence for audits and driving continuous improvement, a CAF expectation. By embedding hypothesis-driven hunts, automation, and intelligence into business-as-usual operations, E5 helps public sector organizations meet CAF C2’s requirement for regular, documented hunts that proactively reduce risk, and evolve with the threat landscape. Sentinel Microsoft Sentinel takes threat hunting beyond the Microsoft ecosystem, unifying telemetry from endpoints, firewalls, OT systems, and third-party SaaS into a single cloud-native SIEM and SOAR platform. This consolidation helps enable hunts that span the entire attack surface, a critical step toward achieving maturity under CAF 4.0 C2. Key capabilities for control C2: Attacker-centric analysis: MITRE ATT&CK-aligned analytics and KQL-based hunting allow teams to identify stealthy behaviours, simulate breach paths, and validate detection coverage. Threat intelligence integration: Sentinel enriches hunts with national and sector-specific intelligence (e.g. NCSC advisories), ensuring hunts target the most relevant TTPs. Automation and repeatability: SOAR playbooks convert post-hunt findings into automated workflows for containment, investigation, and documentation, meeting CAF’s requirement for structured, continuously improving hunts. Evidence-driven improvement: Recorded hunts and automated reporting create a feedback loop that strengthens posture and demonstrates compliance. By combining telemetry, intelligence, and automation, Sentinel helps organizations embed threat hunting as a routine, scalable process, turning insights into detections and ensuring hunts evolve with the threat landscape. The video below shows how E3, E5 and Sentinel power real C2 threat hunts. Bringing it all Together By progressing from E3’s reactive investigation to E5’s intelligence-led correlation and Sentinel’s automated hunting and orchestration, organizations can develop an end-to-end capability that not only detects but anticipates and helps prevent disruption to essential public services across the UK. This is the operational reality of Achieved under CAF 4.0 C2 (Threat Hunting) - a structured, data-driven, and intelligence-informed approach that transforms threat hunting from an isolated task into an ongoing discipline of proactive defence. To demonstrate what effective, CAF-aligned threat hunting looks like, the following one-slider and demo walk through how Microsoft’s security tools support structured, repeatable hunts that match organizational risk. These examples help translate C2’s expectations into practical, operational activity. CAF 4.0 challenges public-sector defenders to move beyond detection and embrace anticipation. How mature is your organization’s ability to uncover the threats that have not yet been seen? In this final post of the series, the message is clear - true cyber resilience moves beyond reactivity towards a predictive approach.Security Guidance Series: CAF 4.0 Understanding Threat From Awareness to Intelligence-Led Defence
The updated CAF 4.0 raises expectations around control A2.b - Understanding Threat. Rather than focusing solely on awareness of common cyber-attacks, the framework now calls for a sector-specific, intelligence-informed understanding of the threat landscape. According to the NCSC, CAF 4.0 emphasizes the need for detailed threat analysis that reflects the tactics, techniques, and resources of capable adversaries, and requires that this understanding directly shapes security and resilience decisions. For public sector authorities, this means going beyond static risk registers to build a living threat model that evolves alongside digital transformation and service delivery. Public sector authorities need to know which systems and datasets are most exposed, from citizen records and clinical information to education systems, operational platforms, and payment gateways, and anticipate how an attacker might exploit them to disrupt essential services. To support this higher level of maturity, Microsoft’s security ecosystem helps public sector authorities turn threat intelligence into actionable understanding, directly aligning with CAF 4.0’s Achieved criteria for control A2.b. Microsoft E3 - Building Foundational Awareness Microsoft E3 provides public sector authorities with the foundational capabilities to start aligning with CAF 4.0 A2.b by enabling awareness of common threats and applying that awareness to risk decisions. At this maturity level, organizations typically reach Partially Achieved, where threat understanding is informed by incidents rather than proactive analysis. How E3 contributes to Contributing Outcome A2.b: Visibility of basic threats: Defender for Endpoint Plan 1 surfaces malware and unsafe application activity, giving organizations insight into how adversaries exploit endpoints. This telemetry helps identify initial attacker entry points and informs reactive containment measures. Identity risk reduction: Entra ID P1 enforces MFA and blocks legacy authentication, mitigating common credential-based attacks. These controls reduce the likelihood of compromise at early stages of an attacker’s path. Incident-driven learning: Alerts and Security & Compliance Centre reports allow organizations to review how attacks unfolded, supporting documentation of observed techniques and feeding lessons into risk decisions. What’s missing for Achieved: To fully meet the contributing outcomes A2.b, public sector organizations must evolve from incident-driven awareness to structured, intelligence-led threat analysis. This involves anticipating probable attack methods, developing plausible scenarios, and maintaining a current threat picture through proactive hunting and threat intelligence. These capabilities extend beyond the E3 baseline and require advanced analytics and dedicated platforms. Microsoft E5 – Advancing to Intelligence-Led Defence Where E3 establishes the foundation for identifying and documenting known threats, Microsoft E5 helps public sector organizations to progress toward the Achieved level of CAF control A2.b by delivering continuous, intelligence-driven analysis across every attack surface. How E5 aligns with Contributing Outcome A2.b: Detailed, up-to-date view of attacker paths: At the core of E5 is Defender XDR, which correlates telemetry from Defender for Endpoint Plan 2, Defender for Office 365 Plan 2, Defender for Identity, and Defender for Cloud Apps. This unified view reveals how attackers move laterally between devices, identities, and SaaS applications - directly supporting CAF’s requirement to understand probable attack methods and the steps needed to reach critical targets. Advanced hunting and scenario development: Defender for Endpoint P2 introduces advanced hunting via Kusto Query Language (KQL) and behavioural analytics. Analysts can query historical data to uncover persistence mechanisms or privilege escalation techniques, assisting organizations to anticipate attack chains and develop plausible scenarios, a key expectation under A2.b. Email and collaboration threat modelling: Defender for Office 365 P2 detects targeted phishing, business email compromise, and credential harvesting campaigns. Attack Simulation Training adds proactive testing of social engineering techniques, helping organizations maintain awareness of evolving attacker tradecraft and refine mitigations. Identity-focused threat analysis: Defender for Identity and Entra ID P2 expose lateral movement, credential abuse, and risky sign-ins. By mapping tactics and techniques against frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK, organizations can gain the attacker’s perspective on identity systems - fulfilling CAF’s call to view networks from a threat actor’s lens. Cloud application risk visibility: Defender for Cloud Apps highlights shadow IT and potential data exfiltration routes, helping organizations to document and justify controls at each step of the attack chain. Continuous threat intelligence: Microsoft Threat Intelligence enriches detections with global and sector-specific insights on active adversary groups, emerging malware, and infrastructure trends. This sustained feed helps organizations maintain a detailed understanding of current threats, informing risk decisions and prioritization. Why this meets Achieved: E5 capabilities help organizations move beyond reactive alerting to a structured, intelligence-led approach. Threat knowledge is continuously updated, scenarios are documented, and controls are justified at each stage of the attacker path, supporting CAF control A2.b’s expectation that threat understanding informs risk management and defensive prioritization. Sentinel While Microsoft E5 delivers deep visibility across endpoints, identities, and applications, Microsoft Sentinel acts as the unifying layer that helps transform these insights into a comprehensive, evidence-based threat model, a core expectation of Achieved maturity under CAF 4.0 A2.b. How Sentinel enables Achieved outcomes: Comprehensive attack-chain visibility: As a cloud-native SIEM and SOAR, Sentinel ingests telemetry from Microsoft and non-Microsoft sources, including firewalls, OT environments, legacy servers, and third-party SaaS platforms. By correlating these diverse signals into a single analytical view, Sentinel allows defenders to visualize the entire attack chain, from initial reconnaissance through lateral movement and data exfiltration. This directly supports CAF’s requirement to understand how capable, well-resourced actors could systematically target essential systems. Attacker-centric analysis and scenario building: Sentinel’s Analytics Rules and MITRE ATT&CK-aligned detections provide a structured lens on tactics and techniques. Security teams can use Kusto Query Language (KQL) and advanced hunting to identify anomalies, map adversary behaviours, and build plausible threat scenarios, addressing CAF’s expectation to anticipate probable attack methods and justify mitigations at each step. Threat intelligence integration: Sentinel enriches local telemetry with intelligence from trusted sources such as the NCSC and Microsoft’s global network. This helps organizations maintain a current, sector-specific understanding of threats, applying that knowledge to prioritize risk treatment and policy decisions, a defining characteristic of Achieved maturity. Automation and repeatable processes: Sentinel’s SOAR capabilities operationalize intelligence through automated playbooks that contain threats, isolate compromised assets, and trigger investigation workflows. These workflows create a documented, repeatable process for threat analysis and response, reinforcing CAF’s emphasis on continuous learning and refinement. This video brings CAF A2.b – Understanding Threat – to life, showing how public sector organizations can use Microsoft security tools to build a clear, intelligence-led view of attacker behaviour and meet the expectations of CAF 4.0. Why this meets Achieved: By consolidating telemetry, threat intelligence, and automated response into one platform, Sentinel elevates public sector organizations from isolated detection to an integrated, intelligence-led defence posture. Every alert, query, and playbook contributes to an evolving organization-wide threat model, supporting CAF A2.b’s requirement for detailed, proactive, and documented threat understanding. CAF 4.0 challenges every public-sector organization to think like a threat actor, to understand not just what could go wrong, but how and why. Does your organization have the visibility, intelligence, and confidence to turn that understanding into proactive defence? To illustrate how this contributing outcome can be achieved in practice, the one-slider and demo show how Microsoft’s security capabilities help organizations build the detailed, intelligence-informed threat picture expected by CAF 4.0. These examples turn A2.b’s requirements into actionable steps for organizations. In the next article, we’ll explore C2 - Threat Hunting: moving from detection to anticipation and embedding proactive resilience as a daily capability.
Windows Hello passkeys dialog appearing and cannot remove or suppress it.
Hi everyone, I’m dealing with a persistent Windows Hello and passkey issue in Chrome and Brave and yes this is relevant as they're the only browsers having this issue whilst Edge for example is fine, and at this point I’m trying to understand whether this is expected behavior, a bug, or a design oversight. PS. Yes, I'm in contact with related browser support teams but since they seem utterly hopeless i'm asking here, since its at least partially Windows Hello issue. Problem description Even with: Password managers disabled in browser settings, Windows Hello disabled in Chrome/Brave settings, Windows Hello PIN enabled only for device login, Passkeys still stored under chrome://settings/passkeys (which I cannot delete since its used for logging on the device), The devices are connected to Entra ID but this is not required to reproduce the issue although a buisness account configuration creates a Passkey with Windows Hello afaik. Observed behavior When I attempt to sign in on office.com, Windows Hello automatically triggers a dialog offering authentication via passkeys, even though: I don’t want passkeys used for browser logins, passkeys are turned off everywhere they can be, Windows Hello is intended only for local device authentication. The dialog cannot be suppressed, disabled, or hidden(trust me, i tried for weeks). It effectively forces the Windows Hello prompt as a primary option, which causes problems both personally and in business contexts (wrong credential signaling, misleading users that are supposed to use a dedicated password manager solution insted of browser password managers, enforcing an unwanted authentication flow, etc.). What I already verified Many, many, (too many) Windows registry workarounds that never worked. Dug through almost all flags on those browsers. Chrome/Brave → Password Manager: disabled Chrome/Brave → Windows Hello toggle: off Looked through what feels like almost every related option in Windows Settings. Tried gpedit.msc local rules System up to date Windows Hello configured to use PIN, but stores "passkeys used to log on to this device" Why this is a problem Windows Hello automatically assumes that the device-level Windows Hello credentials should always be available as a WebAuthn authenticator. This feels like a big security and UX issue due to: unexpected authentication dialogs, Inability to controll where and how passkey credential are shared to applications, inability to turn the feature off, no administrative or local option to disable Hello for WebAuthn separately from device login. Buisness users either having issues with keeping passwords in order (our buissnes uses a dedicated Password Manager but this behaviour covers its dialog option) or not having PIN to their devices (when I disable windows hello entierly, since when there is no passkeys the option doesn't appear) Questions Is there any supported way to disable Windows Hello as a WebAuthn/passkey option in browsers, while keeping Hello enabled for local device login? Is this expected behavior from the Windows Hello, or is it considered a bug? Are there registry/policy settings (documented or upcoming) that allow disabling the Windows platform authenticator specifically for browsers like Chrome and Brave? Is Microsoft aware of this issue? If so, is it tracked anywhere? Additional notes This issue replicates 100% across (as long as there are passkeys configured): Windows 11 devices i've managed to get my hands on, Chrome and Brave (latest versions), multiple Microsoft accounts and tenants, multiple clean installations. Any guidance or clarification from the Windows security or identity teams would be greatly appreciated. And honestly if there is any more info i could possibly provide PLEASE ask away.Microsoft Ignite 2025: Top Security Innovations You Need to Know
🤖 Security & AI -The Big Story This Year 2025 marks a turning point for cybersecurity. Rapid adoption of AI across enterprises has unlocked innovation but introduced new risks. AI agents are now part of everyday workflows-automating tasks and interacting with sensitive data—creating new attack surfaces that traditional security models cannot fully address. Threat actors are leveraging AI to accelerate attacks, making speed and automation critical for defense. Organizations need solutions that deliver visibility, governance, and proactive risk management for both human and machine identities. Microsoft Ignite 2025 reflects this shift with announcements focused on securing AI at scale, extending Zero Trust principles to AI agents, and embedding intelligent automation into security operations. As a Senior Cybersecurity Solution Architect, I’ve curated the top security announcements from Microsoft Ignite 2025 to help you stay ahead of evolving threats and understand the latest innovations in enterprise security. Agent 365: Control Plane for AI Agents Agent 365 is a centralized platform that gives organizations full visibility, governance, and risk management over AI agents across Microsoft and third-party ecosystems. Why it matters: Unmanaged AI agents can introduce compliance gaps and security risks. Agent 365 ensures full lifecycle control. Key Features: Complete agent registry and discovery Access control and conditional policies Visualization of agent interactions and risk posture Built-in integration with Defender, Entra, and Purview Available via the Frontier Program Microsoft Agent 365: The control plane for AI agents Deep dive blog on Agent 365 Entra Agent ID: Zero Trust for AI Identities Microsoft Entra is the identity and access management suite (covering Azure AD, permissions, and secure access). Entra Agent ID extends Zero Trust identity principles to AI agents, ensuring they are governed like human identities. Why it matters: Unmanaged or over-privileged AI agents can create major security gaps. Agent ID enforces identity governance on AI agents and reduces automation risks. Key Features: Provides unique identities for AI agents Lifecycle governance and sponsorship for agents Conditional access policies applied to agent activity Integrated with open SDKs/APIs for third‑party platforms Microsoft Entra Agent ID Overview Entra Ignite 2025 announcements Public Preview details Security Copilot Expansion Security Copilot is Microsoft’s AI assistant for security teams, now expanded to automate threat hunting, phishing triage, identity risk remediation, and compliance tasks. Why it matters: Security teams face alert fatigue and resource constraints. Copilot accelerates response and reduces manual effort. Key Features: 12 new Microsoft-built agents across Defender, Entra, Intune, and Purview. 30+ partner-built agents available in the Microsoft Security Store. Automates threat hunting, phishing triage, identity risk remediation, and compliance tasks. Included for Microsoft 365 E5 customers at no extra cost. Security Copilot inclusion in Microsoft 365 E5 Security Copilot Ignite blog Security Dashboard for AI A unified dashboard for CISOs and risk leaders to monitor AI risks, aggregate signals from Microsoft security services, and assign tasks via Security Copilot - included at no extra cost. Why it matters: Provides a single pane of glass for AI risk management, improving visibility and decision-making. Key Features: Aggregates signals from Entra, Defender, and Purview Supports natural language queries for risk insights Enables task assignment via Security Copilot Ignite Session: Securing AI at Scale Microsoft Security Blog Microsoft Defender Innovations Microsoft Defender serves as Microsoft’s CNAPP solution, offering comprehensive, AI-driven threat protection that spans endpoints, email, cloud workloads, and SIEM/SOAR integrations. Why It Matters Modern attacks target multi-cloud environments and software supply chains. These innovations provide proactive defense, reduce breach risks before exploitation, and extend protection beyond Microsoft ecosystems-helping organizations secure endpoints, identities, and workloads at scale. Key Features: Predictive Shielding: Proactively hardens attack paths before adversaries pivot. Automatic Attack Disruption: Extended to AWS, Okta, and Proofpoint via Sentinel. Supply Chain Security: Defender for Cloud now integrates with GitHub Advanced Security. What’s new in Microsoft Defender at Ignite Defender for Cloud innovations Global Secure Access & AI Gateway Part of Microsoft Entra’s secure access portfolio, providing secure connectivity and inspection for web and AI traffic. Why it matters: Protects against lateral movement and AI-specific threats while maintaining secure connectivity. Key Features: TLS inspection, URL/file filtering AI Prompt Injection protection Private access for domain controllers to prevent lateral movement attacks. Learn about Secure Web and AI Gateway for agents Microsoft Entra: What’s new in secure access on the AI frontier Purview Enhancements Microsoft Purview is the data governance and compliance platform, ensuring sensitive data is classified, protected, and monitored. Why it matters: Ensures sensitive data remains protected and compliant in AI-driven environments. Key Features: AI Observability: Monitor agent activities and prevent sensitive data leakage. Compliance Guardrails: Communication compliance for AI interactions. Expanded DSPM: Data Security Posture Management for AI workloads. Announcing new Microsoft Purview capabilities to protect GenAI agents Intune Updates Microsoft Intune is a cloud-based endpoint device management solution that secures apps, devices, and data across platforms. It simplifies endpoint security management and accelerates response to device risks using AI. Why it matters: Endpoint security is critical as organizations manage diverse devices in hybrid environments. These updates reduce complexity, speed up remediation, and leverage AI-driven automation-helping security teams stay ahead of evolving threats. Key Features: Security Copilot agents automate policy reviews, device offboarding, and risk-based remediation. Enhanced remote management for Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). Policy Configuration Agent in Intune lets IT admins create and validate policies with natural language What’s new in Microsoft Intune at Ignite Your guide to Intune at Ignite Closing Thoughts Microsoft Ignite 2025 signals the start of an AI-driven security era. From visibility and governance for AI agents to Zero Trust for machine identities, automation in security operations, and stronger compliance for AI workloads-these innovations empower organizations to anticipate threats, simplify governance, and accelerate secure AI adoption without compromising compliance or control. 📘 Full Coverage: Microsoft Ignite 2025 Book of NewsSecurity Guidance Series: CAF 4.0 Building Proactive Cyber Resilience
It’s Time To Act Microsoft's Digital Defense Report 2025 clearly describes the cyber threat landscape that this guidance is situated in, one that has become more complex, more industrialized, and increasingly democratized. Each day, Microsoft processes more than 100 trillion security signals, giving unparalleled visibility into adversarial tradecraft. Identity remains the most heavily targeted attack vector, with 97% of identity-based attacks relying on password spray, while phishing and unpatched assets continue to provide easy routes for initial compromise. Financially motivated attacks, particularly ransomware and extortion, now make up over half of global incidents, and nation-state operators continue to target critical sectors, including IT, telecommunications, and Government networks. AI is accelerating both sides of the equation: enhancing attacker capability, lowering barriers to entry through open-source models, and simultaneously powering more automated, intelligence-driven defence. Alongside this, emerging risks such as quantum computing underline the urgency of preparing today for tomorrow’s threats. Cybersecurity has therefore become a strategic imperative shaping national resilience and demanding genuine cross-sector collaboration to mitigate systemic risk. It is within this environment that UK public sector organizations are rethinking their approach to cyber resilience. As an Account Executive Apprentice in the Local Public Services team here at Microsoft, I have seen how UK public sector organizations are rethinking their approach to cyber resilience, moving beyond checklists and compliance toward a culture of continuous improvement and intelligence-led defence. When we talk about the UK public sector in this series, we are referring specifically to central government departments, local government authorities, health and care organizations (including the NHS), education institutions, and public safety services such as police, fire, and ambulance. These organizations form a deeply interconnected ecosystem delivering essential services to millions of citizens every day, making cyber resilience not just a technical requirement but a foundation of public trust. Against this backdrop, the UK public sector is entering a new era of cyber resilience with the release of CAF 4.0, the latest evolution of the National Cyber Security Centre’s Cyber Assessment Framework. This guidance has been developed in consultation with national cyber security experts, including the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and is an aggregation of knowledge and internationally recognized expertise. Building on the foundations of CAF 3.2, this update marks a decisive shift, like moving from a static map to a live radar. Instead of looking back at where threats once were, organizations can now better anticipate them and adjust their digital defences in real time. For the UK’s public sector, this transformation could not be timelier. The complexity of digital public services, combined with the growing threat of ransomware, insider threat, supply chain compromise, and threats from nation state actors, demands a faster, smarter, and more connected approach to resilience. Where CAF 3.2 focused on confirming the presence and effectiveness of security measures, CAF 4.0 places greater emphasis on developing organizational capability and improving resilience in a more dynamic threat environment. While the CAF remains an outcome-based framework, not a maturity model, it is structured around Objectives, Principles, and Contributing Outcomes, with each contributing outcome supported by Indicators of Good Practice. For simplicity, I refer to these contributing outcomes as “controls” throughout this blog and use that term to describe the practical expectations organizations are assessed against. CAF 4.0 challenges organizations not only to understand the threats they face but to anticipate, detect, and respond in a more informed and adaptive way. Two contributing outcomes exemplify this proactive mindset: A2.b Understanding Threat and C2 Threat Hunting. Together, they represent what it truly means to understand your adversaries and act before harm occurs. For the UK’s public sector, achieving these new objectives may seem daunting, but the path forward is clearer than ever. Many organizations are already beginning this journey, supported by technologies that help turn insight into action and coordination into resilience. At Microsoft, we’ve seen how tools like E3, E5, and Sentinel are already helping public sector teams to move from reactive to intelligence-driven security operations. Over the coming weeks, we’ll explore how these capabilities align to CAF 4.0’s core principles and share practical examples of how councils can strengthen their resilience journey through smarter visibility, automation, and collaboration. CAF 4.0 vs CAF 3.2 - What’s Changed and Why It Matters The move from CAF 3.2 to CAF 4.0 represents a fundamental shift in how the UK public sector builds cyber resilience. The focus is no longer on whether controls exist - it is on whether they work, adapt, and improve over time. CAF 4.0 puts maturity at the centre. It pushes organizations to evolve from compliance checklists to operational capability, adopting a threat-informed, intelligence-led, and proactive security posture, by design. CAF 4.0 raises the bar for cyber maturity across the public sector. It calls for departments and authorities to build on existing foundations and embrace live threat intelligence, behavioural analytics, and structured threat hunting to stay ahead of adversaries. By understanding how attackers might target essential services and adapting controls in real time, organizations can evolve from awareness to active defence. Today’s threat actors are agile, persistent, and increasingly well-resourced, which means reactive measures are no longer enough. CAF 4.0 positions resilience as a continuous process of learning, adapting, and improving, supported by data-driven insights and modern security operations. CAF 4.0 is reshaping how the UK’s public sector approaches security maturity. In the coming weeks, we’ll explore what this looks like in practice, starting with how to build a deeper understanding of threat (control A2.b) and elevate threat hunting (control C2) into an everyday capability, using the tools and insights that are available within existing Microsoft E3 and E5 licences to help support these objectives. Until then, how ready is your organization to turn insight into action?
