After the Agent Acts: Proving What Happened and Who Authorized It
In part one of this series, we covered AGT's runtime governance: the policy engine, zero-trust identity, execution sandboxing, and the OWASP Agentic AI risk mapping. In part two, we moved earlier in the lifecycle: shift-left governance, CI/CD gates, attestation workflows, and supply chain integrity. Both posts focused on governance that happens around the moment of action, before it, during it, or right after it. That coverage is essential. But after those posts went live, a different pattern emerged in conversations with teams deploying agents in production. The question was more pointed: "An agent executed a financial transfer last Tuesday. A compliance officer is asking us to show who authorized it, through what chain, and exactly what scope it was granted. We have logs. But can we prove they weren't altered?" No policy engine prevents a past action. No CI gate reconstructs a delegation chain after the fact. No shift-left tool tells an auditor whether the cryptographic identity that authorized a trade was legitimately derived from a human principal, or was injected mid-chain. This is the accountability gap. It is the governance question that neither runtime enforcement nor pre-runtime checks were designed to answer. Regulatory frameworks are tightening: the EU AI Act includes high-risk obligations with enforcement timelines in 2026, and the Colorado AI Act introduces requirements for automated decision-making. Courts are beginning to encounter AI agents in the evidentiary record. The accountability infrastructure has not caught up. This post covers what post-hoc accountability means for autonomous agents, what the Agent Governance Toolkit has to help address it, and three value propositions that are real but not yet visible in how governance tooling is typically described. Note: The policy files, workflow configurations, and code samples in this post are illustrative examples designed to show the concepts. For working implementations, see the QUICKSTART.md in the repository. The Accountability Gap in Multi-Agent Systems The accountability problem is architectural. When a single agent takes a single action, accountability is straightforward: you know which model ran, what prompt it received, and what it called. When agents delegate to sub-agents, which delegate further to tool-execution agents, the chain of authorization becomes progressively disconnected from the original human instruction that started it. Consider this delegation topology, common in any production orchestration scenario: Human Principal └── Orchestrator Agent (did:mesh:orchestrator-001) └── Data Analyst Agent (did:mesh:analyst-001) └── File Write Tool (write /reports/q3-summary.csv) By the time file_write fires, three delegation hops have occurred. The file write tool has no reliable way to know whether the human principal actually authorized file writes, what scope they granted to the orchestrator, or whether the analyst agent's instructions arrived through a legitimate delegation or were injected by a prompt injection attack. This gap has three concrete consequences: Consequence Operational Impact Post-hoc audits cannot reconstruct authorization Incident investigations are limited to "the agent did this," not "here is who authorized this, through what chain, at what time, with what scope" Agents cannot distinguish legitimate delegation from injection A prompt injection attack that inserts itself into a delegation chain is indistinguishable from a real orchestrator instruction without cryptographic verification Accountability cannot be attributed to a human authorization event When a regulator asks "who is responsible for this action," the answer is a shrug and a log file AGT already has the technical foundations designed to help close all three. The gap is not capability, it is visibility. What AGT Has: The Cryptographic Accountability Stack AGT's accountability infrastructure spans three components that work together: cryptographic agent identity, delegation chains, and tamper-evident audit logs. 1. Ed25519 Agent Identity with Lifecycle Management Every agent in an AGT-governed system carries a cryptographic identity: a verifiable Ed25519 keypair with a W3C DID Document that can be exported, shared, and verified by any participant in the system. from agentmesh import AgentIdentity, IdentityRegistry # Create a verifiable agent identity identity = AgentIdentity.create( name="data-analyst", sponsor="operator@contoso.com", capabilities=["data.read", "report.write"], organization="data-team", description="Q3 close data analyst agent" ) # Export as W3C DID Document for cross-system verification did_document = identity.to_did_document() # Register in the shared identity registry registry = IdentityRegistry() registry.register(identity) Identity lifecycle states, active, suspended, revoked, are tracked and cascaded. When an orchestrator identity is revoked, every downstream agent delegated from it is also invalidated. This cascade revocation behavior lets you kill a compromised delegation chain from its root rather than hunting sub-agents individually. 2. Delegation Chains with Scope Inheritance When an orchestrator delegates to a sub-agent, AGT records the delegation cryptographically: who delegated, to whom, what capabilities were transferred, and what restrictions were applied. Sub-agents are designed to be unable to exceed the scope of their delegating principal. from agentmesh import ScopeChain, DelegationLink # Create a scope chain rooted in a human sponsor chain, root_link = ScopeChain.create_root( sponsor_email="operator@contoso.com", root_agent_did=str(orchestrator_identity.did), capabilities=["data.read", "report.write", "data.delete"], sponsor_verified=True, ) # Orchestrator delegates narrowed scope to analyst agent link = DelegationLink( link_id="link-analyst-001", depth=1, parent_did=str(orchestrator_identity.did), child_did=str(analyst_identity.did), parent_capabilities=["data.read", "report.write", "data.delete"], delegated_capabilities=["data.read", "report.write"], # narrowed: no delete parent_signature=orchestrator_identity.sign( f"{orchestrator_identity.did}:{analyst_identity.did}:data.read,report.write".encode() ), link_hash="", # computed on add previous_link_hash=root_link.link_hash, ) link.link_hash = link.compute_hash() chain.add_link(link) # Verify the entire chain: scope narrowing + hash integrity + signatures valid, reason = chain.verify() if not valid: raise ValueError(f"Chain verification failed: {reason}") The scope chain carries the human authorization context: the root sponsor email, when the chain was created, and what capabilities were granted at the top. Every downstream agent can trace any capability back through the chain using chain.trace_capability("data.read"). A file write tool executing three hops from the human principal can verify that the original sponsor authorized file writes in this scope. This is the mechanism designed to help close the prompt injection gap: an injected instruction cannot produce a valid signed delegation link from a legitimate orchestrator identity. 3. Tamper-Evident Audit Logs Every policy decision, every delegation event, every tool call, every trust score evaluation: AGT writes a signed, append-only audit record. The signature covers the content hash of the log entry plus the hash of the preceding entry, forming a chain where tampering is designed to be detectable. from agentmesh import PolicyEngine, AuditLog # Create the audit log (with optional external sink for production) audit_log = AuditLog() # Log a governance decision entry = audit_log.log( event_type="policy_decision", agent_did=str(analyst_identity.did), action="report.write", resource="/reports/q3-summary.csv", data={"task_id": "q3-close-2026"}, outcome="success", policy_decision="allow", ) # Verify the audit chain has not been tampered with valid, reason = audit_log.verify_chain() # valid == True: all hashes and chain links are intact # Query audit trail for a specific agent trail = audit_log.get_entries_for_agent(str(analyst_identity.did)) The audit trail for a single task session includes the complete delegation chain, from human authorization event at the top to tool execution at the bottom, with cryptographic signatures at every step. Validating a Compliance Evidence Package The three components above are most powerful when used together. At runtime, AGT's audit chain, identity registry, and delegation system each produce structured records. Assembling these into a single evidence package for compliance submission or incident investigation is a deployment-level concern: your CI pipeline or orchestration layer collects the outputs into a JSON artifact. Once assembled, AGT's agt verify --evidence flag validates the package: checking that signatures are intact, delegation chains are complete, and audit entries have not been tampered with. # Validate a runtime evidence package agt verify --evidence ./agt-evidence.json # Strict mode: fail if evidence is missing, incomplete, or signatures don't verify agt verify --evidence ./agt-evidence.json --strict Future direction: A built-in agt evidence collect command to automate evidence assembly is on the backlog. The evidence package helps answer the audit questions directly: Auditor Question Where It Lives in the Evidence Package Which agent executed this action? identity.agent_id with Ed25519 public key Who authorized it? delegation_chain[0].human_principal with timestamp What scope was granted? delegation_chain[*].granted_capabilities at each hop Was the delegation legitimate? delegation_chain[*].signature, verifiable against issuer's public key Was the audit log altered? audit_trail.chain_valid: true/false with entry-level hash verification What policy governed the action? policy_decision.rule_name with the policy YAML snapshot at decision time This is the difference between "we have logs" and "here is a verifiable chain of custody backed by cryptographic signatures." The Governance Dial: Enabling Autonomy, Not Just Blocking Risk There is a framing problem in how agent governance is typically described. Governance is described almost entirely as a constraint: what agents cannot do, what gets blocked, what violations get caught. This framing is accurate but incomplete. Governance is the mechanism that helps you safely expand what your agents can do. Without governance evidence, every expansion of agent autonomy is a leap of faith. With it, expansions are decisions with a measured risk profile: Scenario Without Governance Evidence With AGT Accountability Stack Expand agent to write to production databases Requires human approval on every write indefinitely Pilot with human-in-loop for 500 writes; audit trail shows 0 violations; graduate to autonomous Deploy agent in a regulated data environment Blocked by legal until "we can prove it" Evidence package helps satisfy audit requirement; deployment proceeds Respond to a security incident involving an agent Manually reconstruct what happened from scattered logs Pull the task session's evidence package; full chain of custody in minutes The governance layer is the dial between supervised and autonomous operation. Audit evidence is what helps justify turning the dial further in the autonomous direction. Blast Radius: The Governance Assurance You're Not Advertising The sandboxing and privilege ring system in AGT is typically described in security terms: isolation, privilege reduction, process-level enforcement. But there is a more concrete operational value: blast radius definition before an incident occurs. The question every operations team needs to answer before deploying an autonomous agent at scale is: *"If this agent goes wrong, not if, when, what is the worst-case outcome?"* Without governance-enforced privilege boundaries, the answer is uncomfortably open-ended. With AGT's capability model and execution rings, the blast radius is a policy configuration: a bounded, declared set of resources the agent can touch, scoped to what the task requires. # policies/financial-agent.yaml apiVersion: governance.toolkit/v1 version: "1.0" name: financial-agent-policy default_action: deny rules: - name: allow-report-write condition: "tool_name == 'report.write' and path.startswith('/data/reports/')" action: allow priority: 10 - name: allow-data-read condition: "tool_name == 'data.read' and path.startswith('/data/processed/')" action: allow priority: 10 With this policy in place, the worst-case outcome for this agent is declared in the policy file, not discovered during a post-incident review. The audit log records not just what the agent did, but also every action that was blocked, giving you a full picture of how close any session came to the declared blast boundary. Regulatory Alignment The OWASP-COMPLIANCE.md in the AGT repository maps the toolkit's controls to each of the 10 OWASP Agentic AI risks. The compliance picture for specific regulatory frameworks: Regulatory Requirement Relevant Framework AGT Control Technical documentation for high-risk AI EU AI Act, Art. 9-11 Evidence package, policy audit trail, OWASP attestation Logging for automated decisions EU AI Act, Art. 12 Tamper-evident audit log with entry-level signatures Human oversight mechanisms EU AI Act, Art. 14 Circuit breakers, privilege rings, delegation scope limits Algorithmic impact assessment Colorado AI Act Policy snapshot at decision time, signed governance evidence Audit trail for automated decisions HIPAA, SOC 2 Type II Immutable audit log with W3C DID-based agent identity Non-repudiation of agent actions Financial services (MiFID II, SEC) Ed25519-signed audit entries, delegation chain with human auth context Note: The Agent Governance Toolkit does not guarantee compliance with any specific regulatory framework. The mappings above show how the toolkit's controls align with common requirements. Consult legal counsel for your specific obligations. Putting It Together The three posts in this series cover three distinct layers of the governance lifecycle: Layer Timing Primary Value Post Shift-left governance Before production Catch policy violations at commit, PR, and CI time Part 2 Runtime governance At the moment of action Deterministic policy enforcement, zero-trust identity, sandboxing Part 1 Post-hoc accountability After the action Cryptographic chain of custody, blast radius evidence, regulatory proof This post None of these layers substitutes for the others. Pre-runtime governance cannot prevent a runtime violation. Runtime enforcement cannot retroactively prove authorization. Post-hoc accountability cannot undo an action that runtime governance should have blocked. They compose. Getting Started If you already have the AGT policy engine in place, the path to full accountability coverage is incremental: Add agent identity - Create identities for each agent and register them. Export DID documents for cross-service verification. Record delegation tokens - At each orchestrator-to-agent delegation boundary, create and sign a delegation link. Pass tokens as context to the policy engine. Configure a tamper-evident audit backend - Configure the audit chain with a signing key and chain verification. For production, use an immutable backend: Azure Blob with WORM retention, S3 Object Lock, or equivalent. Generate your first evidence package: agt verify --evidence ./agt-evidence.json --strict Add evidence generation to your CI/CD release gate: # .github/workflows/release.yml - name: Governance Evidence Gate uses: microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit/action@<sha> #v3.5.0 with: command: governance-verify evidence-path: ./agt-evidence.json strict: true fail-on-missing-chain: true Conclusion Runtime governance and shift-left governance answer the question: did we apply the right controls? Post-hoc accountability answers the question: can we prove it? The Agent Governance Toolkit has the technical infrastructure designed to help answer it: Ed25519 agent identity with cascade revocation, cryptographically signed delegation chains with human authorization context, and tamper-evident audit logs that form a verifiable chain of custody from human principal to terminal tool call. The governance dial analogy is worth keeping. Every autonomous agent deployment exists on a spectrum between fully supervised and fully autonomous. The limiting factor on where you can set that dial is not model capability or framework maturity. It is how much governance evidence you have, and how verifiable that evidence is. Resources GitHub: microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit: AI Agent Governance Toolkit — Policy enforcement, zero-trust identity, execution sandboxing, and reliability engineering for autonomous AI agents. Covers 10/10 OWASP Agentic Top 10. Quickstart: Quick Start - Agent Governance Toolkit OWASP Compliance Mapping: OWASP Compliance - Agent Governance Toolkit PyPI: pip install agent-governance-toolkit[full] npm: npm install microsoft/agent-governance-sdk NuGet: dotnet add package Microsoft.AgentGovernance Have questions about deploying AGT in your environment? Open an issue at aka.ms/agent-governance-toolkit or join the conversation in the comments below.Run OpenClaw Agents on Azure Linux VMs (with Secure Defaults)
Many teams want an enterprise-ready personal AI assistant, but they need it on infrastructure they control, with security boundaries they can explain to IT. That is exactly where OpenClaw fits on Azure. OpenClaw is a self-hosted, always-on personal agent runtime you run in your enterprise environment and Azure infrastructure. Instead of relying only on a hosted chat app from a third-party provider, you can deploy, operate, and experiment with an agent on an Azure Linux VM you control — using your existing GitHub Copilot licenses, Azure OpenAI deployments, or API plans from OpenAI, Anthropic Claude, Google Gemini, and other model providers you already subscribe to. Once deployed on Azure, you can interact with an OpenClaw agent through familiar channels like Microsoft Teams, Slack, Telegram, WhatsApp, and many more! For Azure users, this gives you a practical middle ground: modern personal-agent workflows on familiar Azure infrastructure. What is OpenClaw, and how is it different from ChatGPT/Claude/chat apps? OpenClaw is a self-hosted personal agent runtime that can be hosted on Azure compute infrastructure. How it differs: ChatGPT/Claude apps are primarily hosted chat experiences tied to one provider's models OpenClaw is an always-on runtime you operate yourself, backed by your choice of model provider — GitHub Copilot, Azure OpenAI, OpenAI, Anthropic Claude, Google Gemini, and others OpenClaw lets you keep the runtime boundary in your own Azure VM environment within your Azure enterprise subscription In practice, OpenClaw is useful when you want a persistent assistant for operational and workflow tasks, with your own infrastructure as the control point. You bring whatever model provider and API plan you already have — OpenClaw connects to it. Why Azure Linux VMs? Azure Linux VMs are a strong fit because they provide: A suitable host machine for the OpenClaw agent to run on Enterprise-friendly infrastructure and identity workflows Repeatable provisioning via the Azure CLI Network hardening with NSG rules Managed SSH access through Azure Bastion instead of public SSH exposure How to Set Up OpenClaw on an Azure Linux VM This guide sets up an Azure Linux VM, applies NSG (Network Security Group) hardening, configures Azure Bastion for managed SSH access, and installs an always-on OpenClaw agent within the VM that you can interact with through various messaging channels. What you'll do Create Azure networking (VNet, subnets, NSG) and compute resources with the Azure CLI Apply Network Security Group rules so VM SSH is allowed only from Azure Bastion Use Azure Bastion for SSH access (no public IP on the VM) Install OpenClaw on the Azure VM Verify OpenClaw installation and configuration on the VM What you need An Azure subscription with permission to create compute and network resources Azure CLI installed (install steps) An SSH key pair (the guide covers generating one if needed) ~20–30 minutes Configure deployment Step 1: Sign in to Azure CLI az login # Select a suitable Azure subscription during Azure login az extension add -n ssh # SSH extension is required for Azure Bastion SSH The ssh extension is required for Azure Bastion native SSH tunneling. Step 2: Register required resource providers (one-time) Register required Azure Resource Providers (one time registration): az provider register --namespace Microsoft.Compute az provider register --namespace Microsoft.Network Verify registration. Wait until both show Registered. az provider show --namespace Microsoft.Compute --query registrationState -o tsv az provider show --namespace Microsoft.Network --query registrationState -o tsv Step 3: Set deployment variables Set the deployment environment variables that will be needed throughout this guide. RG="rg-openclaw" LOCATION="westus2" VNET_NAME="vnet-openclaw" VNET_PREFIX="10.40.0.0/16" VM_SUBNET_NAME="snet-openclaw-vm" VM_SUBNET_PREFIX="10.40.2.0/24" BASTION_SUBNET_PREFIX="10.40.1.0/26" NSG_NAME="nsg-openclaw-vm" VM_NAME="vm-openclaw" ADMIN_USERNAME="openclaw" BASTION_NAME="bas-openclaw" BASTION_PIP_NAME="pip-openclaw-bastion" Adjust names and CIDR ranges to fit your environment. The Bastion subnet must be at least /26. Step 4: Select SSH key Use your existing public key if you have one: SSH_PUB_KEY="$(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)" If you don't have an SSH key yet, generate one: ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -a 100 -f ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -C "you@example.com" SSH_PUB_KEY="$(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)" Step 5: Select VM size and OS disk size VM_SIZE="Standard_B2as_v2" OS_DISK_SIZE_GB=64 Choose a VM size and OS disk size available in your subscription and region: Start smaller for light usage and scale up later Use more vCPU/RAM/disk for heavier automation, more channels, or larger model/tool workloads If a VM size is unavailable in your region or subscription quota, pick the closest available SKU List VM sizes available in your target region: az vm list-skus --location "${LOCATION}" --resource-type virtualMachines -o table Check your current vCPU and disk usage/quota: az vm list-usage --location "${LOCATION}" -o table Deploy Azure resources Step 1: Create the resource group The Azure resource group will contain all of the Azure resources that the OpenClaw agent needs. az group create -n "${RG}" -l "${LOCATION}" Step 2: Create the network security group Create the NSG and add rules so only the Bastion subnet can SSH into the VM. az network nsg create \ -g "${RG}" -n "${NSG_NAME}" -l "${LOCATION}" # Allow SSH from the Bastion subnet only az network nsg rule create \ -g "${RG}" --nsg-name "${NSG_NAME}" \ -n AllowSshFromBastionSubnet --priority 100 \ --access Allow --direction Inbound --protocol Tcp \ --source-address-prefixes "${BASTION_SUBNET_PREFIX}" \ --destination-port-ranges 22 # Deny SSH from the public internet az network nsg rule create \ -g "${RG}" --nsg-name "${NSG_NAME}" \ -n DenyInternetSsh --priority 110 \ --access Deny --direction Inbound --protocol Tcp \ --source-address-prefixes Internet \ --destination-port-ranges 22 # Deny SSH from other VNet sources az network nsg rule create \ -g "${RG}" --nsg-name "${NSG_NAME}" \ -n DenyVnetSsh --priority 120 \ --access Deny --direction Inbound --protocol Tcp \ --source-address-prefixes VirtualNetwork \ --destination-port-ranges 22 The rules are evaluated by priority (lowest number first): Bastion traffic is allowed at 100, then all other SSH is blocked at 110 and 120. Step 3: Create the virtual network and subnets Create the VNet with the VM subnet (NSG attached), then add the Bastion subnet. az network vnet create \ -g "${RG}" -n "${VNET_NAME}" -l "${LOCATION}" \ --address-prefixes "${VNET_PREFIX}" \ --subnet-name "${VM_SUBNET_NAME}" \ --subnet-prefixes "${VM_SUBNET_PREFIX}" # Attach the NSG to the VM subnet az network vnet subnet update \ -g "${RG}" --vnet-name "${VNET_NAME}" \ -n "${VM_SUBNET_NAME}" --nsg "${NSG_NAME}" # AzureBastionSubnet — name is required by Azure az network vnet subnet create \ -g "${RG}" --vnet-name "${VNET_NAME}" \ -n AzureBastionSubnet \ --address-prefixes "${BASTION_SUBNET_PREFIX}" Step 4: Create the Virtual Machine Create the VM with no public IP. SSH access for OpenClaw configuration will be exclusively through Azure Bastion. az vm create \ -g "${RG}" -n "${VM_NAME}" -l "${LOCATION}" \ --image "Canonical:ubuntu-24_04-lts:server:latest" \ --size "${VM_SIZE}" \ --os-disk-size-gb "${OS_DISK_SIZE_GB}" \ --storage-sku StandardSSD_LRS \ --admin-username "${ADMIN_USERNAME}" \ --ssh-key-values "${SSH_PUB_KEY}" \ --vnet-name "${VNET_NAME}" \ --subnet "${VM_SUBNET_NAME}" \ --public-ip-address "" \ --nsg "" --public-ip-address "" prevents a public IP from being assigned. --nsg "" skips creating a per-NIC NSG (the subnet-level NSG created earlier handles security). Reproducibility: The command above uses latest for the Ubuntu image. To pin a specific version, list available versions and replace latest: az vm image list \ --publisher Canonical --offer ubuntu-24_04-lts \ --sku server --all -o table Step 5: Create Azure Bastion Azure Bastion provides secure-managed SSH access to the VM without exposing a public IP. Bastion Standard SKU with tunneling is required for CLI-based "az network bastion ssh" command. az network public-ip create \ -g "${RG}" -n "${BASTION_PIP_NAME}" -l "${LOCATION}" \ --sku Standard --allocation-method Static az network bastion create \ -g "${RG}" -n "${BASTION_NAME}" -l "${LOCATION}" \ --vnet-name "${VNET_NAME}" \ --public-ip-address "${BASTION_PIP_NAME}" \ --sku Standard --enable-tunneling true Bastion provisioning typically takes 5–10 minutes but can take up to 15–30 minutes in some regions. Step 6: Verify Deployments After all resources are deployed, your resource group should look like the following: Install OpenClaw Step 1: SSH into the VM through Azure Bastion VM_ID="$(az vm show -g "${RG}" -n "${VM_NAME}" --query id -o tsv)" az network bastion ssh \ --name "${BASTION_NAME}" \ --resource-group "${RG}" \ --target-resource-id "${VM_ID}" \ --auth-type ssh-key \ --username "${ADMIN_USERNAME}" \ --ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 Step 2: Install OpenClaw (in the Bastion SSH shell) curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash The installer installs Node LTS and dependencies if not already present, installs OpenClaw, and launches the OpenClaw onboarding wizard. For more information, see the open source OpenClaw install docs. OpenClaw Onboarding: Choosing an AI Model Provider During OpenClaw onboarding, you'll choose the AI model provider for the OpenClaw agent. This can be GitHub Copilot, Azure OpenAI, OpenAI, Anthropic Claude, Google Gemini, or another supported provider. See the open source OpenClaw install docs for details on choosing an AI model provider when going through the onboarding wizard. Most enterprise Azure teams already have GitHub Copilot licenses. If that is your case, we recommend choosing the GitHub Copilot provider in the OpenClaw onboarding wizard. See the open source OpenClaw docs on configuring GitHub Copilot as the AI model provider. OpenClaw Onboarding: Setting up Messaging Channels During OpenClaw onboarding, there will be an optional step where you can set up various messaging channels to interact with your OpenClaw agent. For first time users, we recommend setting up Telegram due to ease of setup. Other messaging channels such as Microsoft Teams, Slack, WhatsApp, and others can also be set up. To configure OpenClaw for messaging through chat channels, see the open source OpenClaw chat channels docs. Step 3: Verify OpenClaw Configuration To validate that everything was set up correctly, run the following commands within the same Bastion SSH session: openclaw status openclaw gateway status If there are any issues reported, you can run the onboarding wizard again with the steps above. Alternatively, you can run the following command: openclaw doctor Message OpenClaw Once you have configured the OpenClaw agent to be reachable via various messaging channels, you can verify that it is responsive by messaging it. Enhancing OpenClaw for Use Cases There you go! You now have a 24/7, always-on personal AI agent, living on its own Azure VM environment. For awesome OpenClaw use cases, check out the awesome-openclaw-usecases repository. To enhance your OpenClaw agent with additional AI skills so that it can autonomously perform multi-step operations on any domain, check out the awesome-openclaw-skills repository. You can also check out ClawHub and ClawSkills, two popular open source skills directories that can enhance your OpenClaw agent. Cleanup To delete all resources created by this guide: az group delete -n "${RG}" --yes --no-wait This removes the resource group and everything inside it (VM, VNet, NSG, Bastion, public IP). This also deletes the OpenClaw agent running within the VM. If you'd like to dive deeper about deploying OpenClaw on Azure, please check out the open source OpenClaw on Azure docs.
Failed to enter windows
Hi everyone, After installing ubuntu, I can not get into the windows and struggle with a bios loop, and failed to repair it with iso or other startup disks. Gently ask if there is any possiblility I can repair the Windows reserving documents in C. System information : MB : B350M MORTAR (MS-7A37) CPU: AMD RYZEN 7 1700X EIGHT CORE PROCESSOR RAM 32768MB BIOS E7A37AMS.170From Policy to Practice: Built-In CIS Benchmarks on Azure - Flexible, Hybrid-Ready
Security is more important than ever. The industry-standard for secure machine configuration is the Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks. These benchmarks provide consensus-based prescriptive guidance to help organizations harden diverse systems, reduce risk, and streamline compliance with major regulatory frameworks and industry standards like NIST, HIPAA, and PCI DSS. In our previous post, we outlined our plans to improve the Linux server compliance and hardening experience on Azure and shared a vision for integrating CIS Benchmarks. Today, that vision has turned into reality. We're now announcing the next phase of this work: Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks are now available on Azure for all Azure endorsed distros, at no additional cost to Azure and Azure Arc customers. With today's announcement, you get access to the CIS Benchmarks on Azure with full parity to what’s published by the Center for Internet Security (CIS). You can adjust parameters or define exceptions, tailoring security to your needs and applying consistent controls across cloud, hybrid, and on-premises environments - without having to implement every control manually. Thanks to this flexible architecture, you can truly manage compliance as code. How we achieve parity To ensure accuracy and trust, we rely on and ingest CIS machine-readable Benchmark content (OVAL/XCCDF files) as the source of truth. This guarantees that the controls and rules you apply in Azure match the official CIS specifications, reducing drift and ensuring compliance confidence. What’s new under the hood At the core of this update is azure-osconfig’s new compliance engine - a lightweight, open-source module developed by the Azure Core Linux team. It evaluates Linux systems directly against industry-standard benchmarks like CIS, supporting both audit and, in the future, auto-remediation. This enables accurate, scalable compliance checks across large Linux fleets. Here you can read more about azure-osconfig. Dynamic rule evaluation The new compliance engine supports simple fact-checking operations, evaluation of logic operations on them (e.g., anyOf, allOf) and Lua based scripting, which allows to express complex checks required by the CIS Critical Security Controls - all evaluated natively without external scripts. Scalable architecture for large fleets When the assignment is created, the Azure control plane instructs the machine to pull the latest Policy package via the Machine Configuration agent. Azure-osconfig’s compliance engine is integrated as a light-weight library to the package and called by Machine Configuration agent for evaluation – which happens every 15-30minutes. This ensures near real-time compliance state without overwhelming resources and enables consistent evaluation across thousands of VMs and Azure Arc-enabled servers. Future-ready for remediation and enforcement While the Public Preview starts with audit-only mode, the roadmap includes per-rule remediation and enforcement using technologies like eBPF for kernel-level controls. This will allow proactive prevention of configuration drift and runtime hardening at scale. Please reach out if you interested in auto-remediation or enforcement. Extensibility beyond CIS Benchmarks The architecture was designed to support other security and compliance standards as well and isn’t limited to CIS Benchmarks. The compliance engine is modular, and we plan to extend the platform with STIG and other relevant industry benchmarks. This positions Azure as a platform for a place where you can manage your compliance from a single control-plane without duplicating efforts elsewhere. Collaboration with the CIS This milestone reflects a close collaboration between Microsoft and the CIS to bring industry-standard security guidance into Azure as a built-in capability. Our shared goal is to make cloud-native compliance practical and consistent, while giving customers the flexibility to meet their unique requirements. We are committed to continuously supporting new Benchmark releases, expanding coverage with new distributions and easing adoption through built-in workflows, such as moving from your current Benchmark version to a new version while preserving your custom configurations. Certification and trust We can proudly announce that azure-osconfig has met all the requirements and is officially certified by the CIS for Benchmark assessment, so you can trust compliance results as authoritative. Minor benchmark updates will be applied automatically, while major version will be released separately. We will include workflows to help migrate customizations seamlessly across versions. Key Highlights Built-in CIS Benchmarks for Azure Endorsed Linux distributions Full parity with official CIS Benchmarks content and certified by the CIS for Benchmark Assessment Flexible configuration: adjust parameters, define exceptions, tune severity Hybrid support: enforce the same baseline across Azure, on-prem, and multi-cloud with Azure Arc Reporting format in CIS tooling style Supported use cases Certified CIS Benchmarks for all Azure Endorsed Distros - Audit only (L1/L2 server profiles) Hybrid / On-premises and other cloud machines with Azure Arc for the supported distros Compliance as Code (example via Github -> Azure OIDC auth and API integration) Compatible with GuestConfig workbook What’s next? Our next mission is to bring the previously announced auto-remediation capability into this experience, expand the distribution coverage and elevate our workflows even further. We’re focused on empowering you to resolve issues while honoring the unique operational complexity of your environments. Stay tuned! Get Started Documentation link for this capability Enable CIS Benchmarks in Machine Configuration and select the “Official Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks for Linux Workloads” then select the distributions for your assignment, and customize as needed. In case if you want any additional distribution supported or have any feedback for azure-osconfig – please open an Azure support case or a Github issue here Relevant Ignite 2025 session: Hybrid workload compliance from policy to practice on Azure Connect with us at Ignite Meet the Linux team and stop by the Linux on Azure booth to see these innovations in action: Session Type Session Code Session Name Date/Time (PST) Theatre THR 712 Hybrid workload compliance from policy to practice on Azure Tue, Nov 18/ 3:15 PM – 3:45 PM Breakout BRK 143 Optimizing performance, deployments, and security for Linux on Azure Thu, Nov 20/ 1:00 PM – 1:45 PM Breakout BRK 144 Build, modernize, and secure AKS workloads with Azure Linux Wed, Nov 19/ 1:30 PM – 2:15 PM Breakout BRK 104 From VMs and containers to AI apps with Azure Red Hat OpenShift Thu, Nov 20/ 8:30 AM – 9:15 AM Theatre THR 701 From Container to Node: Building Minimal-CVE Solutions with Azure Linux Wed, Nov 19/ 3:30 PM – 4:00 PM Lab Lab 505 Fast track your Linux and PostgreSQL migration with Azure Migrate Tue, Nov 18/ 4:30 PM – 5:45 PM PST Wed, Nov 19/ 3:45 PM – 5:00 PM PST Thu, Nov 20/ 9:00 AM – 10:15 AM PSTDalec: Declarative Package and Container Builds
Build once, deploy everywhere. From a single YAML specification, Dalec produces native Linux packages (RPM, DEB) and container images - no Dockerfiles, no complex RPM spec or control files, just declarative configuration. Dalec, a Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF) Sandbox project, is a Docker BuildKit frontend that enables users to build system packages and container images from declarative YAML specifications. As a BuildKit frontend, Dalec integrates directly into the Docker build process, requiring no additional tools beyond Docker itself.Ubuntu Pro FIPS 22.04 LTS on Azure: Secure, compliant, and optimized for regulated industries
Organizations across government (including local and federal agencies and their contractors), finance, healthcare, and other regulated industries running workloads on Microsoft Azure now have a streamlined path to meet rigorous FIPS 140-3 compliance requirements. Canonical is pleased to announce the availability of Ubuntu Pro FIPS 22.04 LTS on the Azure Marketplace, featuring newly certified cryptographic modules. This offering extends the stability and comprehensive security features of Ubuntu Pro, tailored for state agencies, federal contractors, and industries requiring a FIPS-validated foundation on Azure. It provides the enterprise-grade Ubuntu experience, optimized for performance on Azure in collaboration with Microsoft, and enhanced with critical compliance capabilities. For instance, if you are building a Software as a Service (SaaS) application on Azure that requires FedRAMP authorization, utilizing Ubuntu Pro FIPS 22.04 LTS can help you meet specific controls like SC-13 (Cryptographic Protection), as FIPS 140-3 validated modules are a foundational requirement. This significantly streamlines your path to achieving FedRAMP compliance. What is FIPS 140-3 and why does it matter? FIPS 140-3 is the latest iteration of the benchmark U.S. government standard for validating cryptographic module implementations, superseding FIPS 140-2. Managed by NIST, it's essential for federal agencies and contractors and is a recognized best practice in many regulated industries like finance and healthcare. Using FIPS-validated components helps ensure cryptography is implemented correctly, protecting sensitive data in transit and at rest. Ubuntu Pro FIPS 22.04 LTS includes FIPS 140-3 certified versions of the Linux kernel and key cryptographic libraries (like OpenSSL, Libgcrypt, GnuTLS) pre-enabled, which are drop-in replacements for the standard packages, greatly simplifying deployment for compliance needs. The importance of security updates (fips-updates) A FIPS certificate applies to a specific module version at its validation time. Over time, new vulnerabilities (CVEs) are discovered in these certified modules. Running code with known vulnerabilities poses a significant security risk. This creates a tension between strict certification adherence and maintaining real-world security. Recognizing this, Canonical provides security fixes for the FIPS modules via the fips-updates stream, available through Ubuntu Pro. We ensure these security patches do not alter the validated cryptographic functions. This approach aligns with modern security thinking, including recent FedRAMP guidance, which acknowledges the greater risk posed by unpatched vulnerabilities compared to solely relying on the original certified binaries. Canonical strongly recommends all users enable the fips-updates repository to ensure their systems are both compliant and secure against the latest threats. FIPS 140-3 vs 140-2 The new FIPS 140-3 standard includes modern ciphers such as TLS v1.3, as well as deprecating older algorithms like MD5. If you are upgrading systems and workloads to FIPS 140-3, it will be necessary to perform rigorous testing to ensure that applications continue to work correctly. Compliance tooling Included Ubuntu Pro FIPS also includes access to Canonical's Ubuntu Security Guide (USG) tooling, which assists with automated hardening and compliance checks against benchmarks like CIS and DISA-STIG, a key requirement for FedRAMP deployments. How to get Ubuntu Pro FIPS on Azure You can leverage Ubuntu Pro FIPS 22.04 LTS on Azure in two main ways: Deploy the Marketplace Image: Launch a new VM directly from the dedicated Ubuntu Pro FIPS 22.04 LTS listing on the Azure Marketplace. This image comes with the FIPS modules pre-enabled for immediate use. Enable on an Existing Ubuntu Pro VM: If you already have an Ubuntu Pro 22.04 LTS VM running on Azure, you can enable the FIPS modules using the Ubuntu Pro Client (pro enable fips-updates). Upgrading standard Ubuntu: If you have a standard Ubuntu 22.04 LTS VM on Azure, you first need to attach Ubuntu Pro to it. This is a straightforward process detailed in the Azure documentation for getting Ubuntu Pro. Once Pro is attached, you can enable FIPS as described above. Learn More Ubuntu Pro FIPS provides a robust, maintained, and compliant foundation for your sensitive workloads on Azure. Watch Joel Sisko from Microsoft speak with Ubuntu experts in this webinar Explore all features of Ubuntu Pro on Azure Read details on the FIPS 140-3 certification for Ubuntu 22.04 LTS Official NIST certification linkAzure Image Testing for Linux (AITL)
As cloud and AI evolve at an unprecedented pace, the need to deliver high-quality, secure, and reliable Linux VM images has never been more essential. Azure Image Testing for Linux (AITL) is a self-service validation tool designed to help developers, ISVs, and Linux distribution partners ensure their images meet Azure’s standards before deployment. With AITL, partners can streamline testing, reduce engineering overhead, and ensure compliance with Azure’s best practices, all in a scalable and automated manner. Let’s explore how AITL is redefining image validation and why it’s proving to be a valuable asset for both developers and enterprises. Before AITL, image validation was largely a manual and repetitive process, engineers were often required to perform frequent checks, resulting in several key challenges: Time-Consuming: Manual validation processes delayed image releases. Inconsistent Validation: Each distro had different methods for testing, leading to varying quality levels. Limited Scalability: Resource constraints restricted the ability to validate a broad set of images. AITL addresses these challenges by enabling partners to seamlessly integrate image validation into their existing pipelines through APIs. By executing tests within their own Azure subscriptions prior to publishing, partners can ensure that only fully validated, high-quality Linux images are promoted to production in the Azure environment. How AITL Works? AITL is powered by LISA, which is a test framework and a comprehensive opensource tool contains 400+ test cases. AITL provides a simple, yet powerful workflow run LISA test cases: Registration: Partners register their images in AITL’s validation framework. Automated Testing: AITL runs a suite of predefined validation tests using LISA. Detailed Reporting: Developers receive comprehensive results highlighting compliance, performance, and security areas. All test logs are available to access. Self-Service Fixes: Any detected issues can be addressed by the partner before submission, eliminating delays and back-and-forth communication. Final Sign-Off: Once tests pass, partners can confidently publish their images, knowing they meet Azure’s quality standards. Benefits of AITL AITL is a transformative tool that delivers significant benefits across the Linux and cloud ecosystem: Self-Service Capability: Enables developers and ISVs to independently validate their images without requiring direct support from Microsoft. Scalable by Design: Supports concurrent testing of multiple images, driving greater operational efficiency. Consistent and Standardized Testing: Offers a unified validation framework to ensure quality and consistency across all endorsed Linux distributions. Proactive Issue Detection: Identifies potential issues early in the development cycle, helping prevent costly post-deployment fixes. Seamless Pipeline Integration: Easily integrates with existing CI/CD workflows to enable fully automated image validation. Use Cases for AITL AITL designed to support a diverse set of users across the Linux ecosystem: Linux Distribution Partners: Organizations such as Canonical, Red Hat, and SUSE can validate their images prior to publishing on the Azure Marketplace, ensuring they meet Azure’s quality and compliance standards. Independent Software Vendors (ISVs): Companies providing custom Linux Images can verify that their custom Linux-based solutions are optimized for performance and reliability on Azure. Enterprise IT Teams: Businesses managing their own Linux images on Azure can use AITL to validate updates proactively, reducing risk and ensuring smooth production deployments. Current Status and Future Roadmap AITL is currently in private preview, with five major Linux distros and select ISVs actively integrating it into their validation workflows. Microsoft plans to expand AITL’s capabilities by adding: Support for Private Test Cases: Allowing partners to run custom tests within AITL securely. Kernel CI Integration: Enhancing low-level kernel validation for more robust testing and results for community. DPDK and Specialized Validation: Ensuring network and hardware performance for specialized SKU (CVM, HPC) and workloads How to Get Started? For developers and partners interested in AITL, following the steps to onboard. Register for Private Preview AITL is currently hidden behind a preview feature flag. You must first register the AITL preview feature with your subscription so that you can then access the AITL Resource Provider (RP). These are one-time steps done for each subscription. Run the “az feature register” command to register the feature: az feature register --namespace Microsoft.AzureImageTestingForLinux --name JobandJobTemplateCrud Sign Up for Private Preview – Contact Microsoft’s Linux Systems Group to request access. Private Preview Sign Up To confirm that your subscription is registered, run the above command and check that properties.state = “Registered” Register the Resource Provider Once the feature registration has been approved, the AITL Resource Provider can be registered by running the “az provider register” command: az provider register --namespace Microsoft.AzureImageTestingForLinux *If your subscription is not registered to Microsoft.Compute/Network/Storage, please do so. These are also prerequisites to using the service. This can be done for each namespace (Microsoft.Compute, Microsoft.Network, Microsoft.Storage) through this command: az provider register --namespace Microsoft.Compute Setup Permissions The AITL RP requires a permission set to create test resources, such as the VM and storage account. The permissions are provided through a custom role that is assigned to the AITL Service Principal named AzureImageTestingForLinux. We provide a script setup_aitl.py to make it simple. It will create a role and grant to the service principal. Make sure the active subscription is expected and download the script to run in a python environment. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/microsoft/lisa/main/microsoft/utils/setup_aitl.py You can run the below command: python setup_aitl.py -s "/subscriptions/xxxx" Before running this script, you should check if you have the permission to create role definition in your subscription. *Note, it may take up to 20 minutes for the permission to be propagated. Assign an AITL jobs access role If you want to use a service principle or registration application to call AITL APIs. The service principle or App should be assigned a role to access AITL jobs. This role should include the following permissions: az role definition create --role-definition '{ "Name": "AITL Jobs Access Role", "Description": "Delegation role is to read and write AITL jobs and job templates", "Actions": [ "Microsoft.AzureImageTestingForLinux/jobTemplates/read", "Microsoft.AzureImageTestingForLinux/jobTemplates/write", "Microsoft.AzureImageTestingForLinux/jobTemplates/delete", "Microsoft.AzureImageTestingForLinux/jobs/read", "Microsoft.AzureImageTestingForLinux/jobs/write", "Microsoft.AzureImageTestingForLinux/jobs/delete", "Microsoft.AzureImageTestingForLinux/operations/read", "Microsoft.Resources/subscriptions/read", "Microsoft.Resources/subscriptions/operationresults/read", "Microsoft.Resources/subscriptions/resourcegroups/write", "Microsoft.Resources/subscriptions/resourcegroups/read", "Microsoft.Resources/subscriptions/resourcegroups/delete" ], "IsCustom": true, "AssignableScopes": [ "/subscriptions/01d22e3d-ec1d-41a4-930a-f40cd90eaeb2" ] }' You can create a custom role using the above command in the cloud shell, and assign this role to the service principle or the App. All set! Please go through a quick start to try AITL APIs. Download AITL wrapper AITL is served by Azure management API. You can use any REST API tool to access it. We provide a Python wrapper for better experience. The AITL wrapper is composed of a python script and input files. It calls “az login” and “az rest” to provide similar experience like the az CLI. The input files are used for creating test jobs. Make sure az CLI and python 3 are installed. Clone LISA code, or only download files in the folder. lisa/microsoft/utils/aitl at main · microsoft/lisa (github.com). Use the command below to check the help text. python -m aitl job –-help python -m aitl job create --help Create a job Job creation consists of two entities: A job template and an image. The quickest way to get started with the AITL service is to create a Job instance with your job template properties in the request body. Replace placeholders with the real subscription id, resource group, job name to start a test job. This example runs 1 test case with a marketplace image using the tier0.json template. You can create a new json file to customize the test job. The name is optional. If it’s not provided, AITL wrapper will generate one. python -m aitl job create -s {subscription_id} -r {resource_group} -n {job_name} -b ‘@./tier0.json’ The default request body is: { "location": "westus3", "properties": { "jobTemplateInstance": { "selections": [ { "casePriority": [ 0 ] } ] } } } This example runs the P0 test cases with the default image. You can choose to add fields to the request, such as image to test. All possible fields are described in the API Specification – Jobs section. The “location” property is a required field that represents the location where the test job should be created, it doesn’t affect the location of VMs. AITL supports “westus”, “westus2”, or “westus3”. The image object in the request body json is where the image type to be used for testing is detailed, as well as the CPU architecture and VHD Generation. If the image object is not included, LISA will pick a Linux marketplace image that meets the requirements for running the specified tests. When an image type is specified, additional information will be required based on the image type. Supported image types are VHD, Azure Marketplace image, and Shared Image Gallery. - VHD requires the SAS URL. - Marketplace image requires the publisher, offer, SKU, and version. - Shared Image Gallery requires the gallery name, image definition, and version. Example of how to include the image object for shared image gallery. (<> denotes placeholder): { "location": "westus3", “properties: { <...other properties from default request body here>, "image": { "type": "shared_gallery", "architecture": "x64", "vhdGeneration": 2, "gallery": "<Example: myAzureComputeGallery>", "definition": "<Example: myImage1>", "version": "<Example: 1.0.1>" } } } Check Job Status & Test Results A job is an asynchronous operation that is updated throughout the job’s lifecycle with its operation and ongoing tests status. A job has 6 provisioning states – 4 are non-terminal states and 2 are terminal states. Non-terminal states represent ongoing operation stages and terminal states represent the status at completion. The job’s current state is reflected in the `properties.provisioningState` property located in the response body. The states are described below: Operation States State Type Description Accepted Non-Terminal state Initial ARM state describing the resource creation is being initialized. Queued Non-Terminal state The job has been queued by AITL to run LISA using the provided job template parameters. Scheduling Non-Terminal state The job has been taken off the queue and AITL is preparing to launch LISA. Provisioning Non-Terminal state LISA is creating your VM within your subscription using the default or provided image. Running Non-Terminal state LISA is running the specified tests on your image and VM configuration. Succeeded Terminal state LISA completed the job run and has uploaded the final test results to the job. There may be failed test cases. Failed Terminal state There was a failure during the job’s execution. Test results may be present and reflect the latest status for each listed test. Test results are updated in near real-time and can be seen in the ‘properties.results’ property in the response body. Results will begin to get updated during the “Running” state and the final set of result updates will happen prior to reaching a terminal state (“Completed” or “Failed”). For a complete list of possible test result properties, go to the API Specification – Test Results section. Run below command to get detailed test results. python -m aitl job get -s {subscription_id} -r {resource_group} -n {job_name} The query argument can format or filter results by JMESquery. Please refer to help text for more information. For example, List test results and error messages. python -m aitl job get -s {subscription_id} -r {resource_group} -n {job_name} -o table -q 'properties.results[].{name:testName,status:status,message:message}' Summarize test results. python -m aitl job get -s {subscription_id} -r {resource_group} -n {job_name} -q 'properties.results[].status|{TOTAL:length(@),PASSED:length([?@==`"PASSED"`]),FAILED:length([?@==`"FAILED"`]),SKIPPED:length([?@==`"SKIPPED"`]),ATTEMPTED:length([?@==`"ATTEMPTED"`]),RUNNING:length([?@==`"RUNNING"`]),ASSIGNED:length([?@==`"ASSIGNED"`]),QUEUED:length([?@==`"QUEUED"`])}' Access Job Logs To access logs and read from Azure Storage, the AITL user must have “Storage Blob Data Owner” role. You should check if you have the permission to create role definition in your subscription, likely with your administrator. For information on this role and instructions on how to add this permission, see this Azure documentation. To access job logs, send a GET request with the job name and use the logUrl in the response body to retrieve the logs, which are stored in Azure storage container. For more details on interpreting logs, refer to the LISA documentation on troubleshooting test failures. To quickly view logs online (note that file size limitations may apply), select a .log Blob file and click "edit" in the top toolbar of the Blob menu. To download the log, click the download button in the toolbar. Conclusion AITL represents a forward-looking approach to Linux image validation bringing automation, scalability, and consistency to the forefront. By shifting validation earlier in the development cycle, AITL helps reduce risk, accelerate time to market, and ensure a reliable, high-quality Linux experience on Azure. Whether you're a developer, a Linux distribution partner, or an enterprise managing Linux workloads on Azure, AITL offers a powerful way to modernize and streamline your validation workflows. To learn more or get started with AITL or more details and access to AITL, reach out to Microsoft Linux Systems GroupCanonical Ubuntu 20.04 LTS Reaching End of Standard Support
We’re announcing the upcoming end of standard support for Ubuntu 20.04 LTS (Focal Fossa) on 31 May 2025, as we focus on delivering a more secure and optimized Linux experience. Originally released in April 2020, Ubuntu 20.04 LTS introduced key enhancements like improved UEFI Secure Boot and broader Kernel Livepatch coverage, strengthening security on Azure. You can continue using your existing virtual machines, but after this date, security, features, and maintenance updates will no longer be provided by Canonical, which may impact system security and reliability. Recommended action: It’s important to act before 31 May 2025 to ensure you’re on a supported operating system. Microsoft recommends either migrating to the next Ubuntu LTS release or upgrading to Ubuntu Pro to gain access to expanded security and maintenance from Canonical. Upgrading to Ubuntu 22.04 LTS or Ubuntu 24.04 LTS Transitioning to the latest operating system, such as Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, is important for performance, hardware enablement, new technology benefits, and is recommended for new instances. It may be a complex process for existing deployments and should be properly scoped and tested with your workloads. While there’s no direct upgrade path from Ubuntu 20.04 LTS to Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, you can directly upgrade to Ubuntu 22.04 LTS, and then to Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, or directly install Ubuntu 24.04 LTS. See the Ubuntu Server upgrade guide for more information. Ubuntu Pro – Expanded Security Maintenance to 2030 Ubuntu Pro includes security patching for all Ubuntu packages due to Expanded Security Maintenance (ESM) for Infrastructure and Applications and optional 24/7 phone and ticket support. Ubuntu Pro 20.04 LTS will remain fully supported until May 2030. New virtual machines can be deployed with Ubuntu Pro from the Azure Marketplace. You can also upgrade existing virtual machines to Ubuntu Pro by in-place upgrades via Azure CLI. More Information More information covering Ubuntu 20.04 LTS End of Standard Support can be found here. Refer to the documentation to learn more about handling Ubuntu 20.04 LTS on Azure. You can also check out Canonical’s blog post and watch the webinar here.Automating the Linux Quality Assurance with LISA on Azure
Introduction Building on the insights from our previous blog regarding how MSFT ensures the quality of Linux images, this article aims to elaborate on the open-source tools that are instrumental in securing exceptional performance, reliability, and overall excellence of virtual machines on Azure. While numerous testing tools are available for validating Linux kernels, guest OS images and user space packages across various cloud platforms, finding a comprehensive testing framework that addresses the entire platform stack remains a significant challenge. A robust framework is essential, one that seamlessly integrates with Azure's environment while providing the coverage for major testing tools, such as LTP and kselftest and covers critical areas like networking, storage and specialized workloads, including Confidential VMs, HPC, and GPU scenarios. This unified testing framework is invaluable for developers, Linux distribution providers, and customers who build custom kernels and images. This is where LISA (Linux Integration Services Automation) comes into play. LISA is an open-source tool specifically designed to automate and enhance the testing and validation processes for Linux kernels and guest OS images on Azure. In this blog, we will provide the history of LISA, its key advantages, the wide range of test cases it supports, and why it is an indispensable resource for the open-source community. Moreover, LISA is available under the MIT License, making it free to use, modify, and contribute. History of LISA LISA was initially developed as an internal tool by Microsoft to streamline the testing process of Linux images and kernel validations on Azure. Recognizing the value it could bring to the broader community, Microsoft open-sourced LISA, inviting developers and organizations worldwide to leverage and enhance its capabilities. This move aligned with Microsoft's growing commitment to open-source collaboration, fostering innovation and shared growth within the industry. LISA serves as a robust solution to validate and certify that Linux images meet the stringent requirements of modern cloud environments. By integrating LISA into the development and deployment pipeline, teams can: Enhance Quality Assurance: Catch and resolve issues early in the development cycle. Reduce Time to Market: Accelerate deployment by automating repetitive testing tasks. Build Trust with Users: Deliver stable and secure applications, bolstering user confidence. Collaborate and Innovate: Leverage community-driven improvements and share insights. Benefits of Using LISA Scalability: Designed to run large-scale test cases, from 1 test case to 10k test cases in one command. Multiple platform orchestration: LISA is created with modular design, to support run the same test cases on various platforms including Microsoft Azure, Windows HyperV, BareMetal, and other cloud-based platforms. Customization: Users can customize test cases, workflow, and other components to fit specific needs, allowing for targeted testing strategies. It’s like building kernels on-the-fly, sending results to custom database, etc. Community Collaboration: Being open source under the MIT License, LISA encourages community contributions, fostering continuous improvement and shared expertise. Extensive Test Coverage: It offers a rich suite of test cases covering various aspects of compatibility of Azure and Linux VMs, from kernel, storage, networking to middleware. How it works Infrastructure LISA is designed to be componentized and maximize compatibility with different distros. Test cases can focus only on test logic. Once test requirements (machines, CPU, memory, etc) are defined, just write the test logic without worrying about environment setup or stopping services on different distributions. Orchestration. LISA uses platform APIs to create, modify and delete VMs. For example, LISA uses Azure API to create VMs, run test cases, and delete VMs. During the test case running, LISA uses Azure API to collect serial log and can hot add/remove data disks. If other platforms implement the same serial log and data disk APIs, the test cases can run on the other platforms seamlessly. Ensure distro compatibility by abstracting over 100 commands in test cases, allowing focus on validation logic rather than distro compatibility. Pre-processing workflow assists in building the kernel on-the-fly, installing the kernel from package repositories, or modifying all test environments. Test matrix helps one run to test all. For example, one run can test different vm sizes on Azure, or different images, even different VM sizes and different images together. Anything is parameterizable, can be tested in a matrix. Customizable notifiers enable the saving of test results and files to any type of storage and database. Agentless and low dependency LISA operates test systems via SSH without requiring additional dependencies, ensuring compatibility with any system that supports SSH. Although some test cases require installing extra dependencies, LISA itself does not. This allows LISA to perform tests on systems with limited resources or even different operating systems. For instance, LISA can run on Linux, FreeBSD, Windows, and ESXi. Getting Started with LISA Ready to dive in? Visit the LISA project at aka.ms/lisa to access the documentation. Install: Follow the installation guide provided in the repository to set up LISA in your testing environment. Run: Follow the instructions to run LISA on local machine, Azure or existing systems. Extend: Follow the documents to extend LISA by test cases, data sources, tools, platform, workflow, etc. Join the Community: Engage with other users and contributors through forums and discussions to share experiences and best practices. Contribute: Modify existing test cases or create new ones to suit your needs. Share your contributions with the community to enhance LISA's capabilities. Conclusion LISA offers open-source collaborative testing solutions designed to operate across diverse environments and scenarios, effectively narrowing the gap between enterprise demands and community-led innovation. By leveraging LISA, customers can ensure their Linux deployments are reliable and optimized for performance. Its comprehensive testing capabilities, combined with the flexibility and support of an active community, make LISA an indispensable tool for anyone involved in Linux quality assurance and testing. Your feedback is invaluable, and we would greatly appreciate your insights.
