Azure Incident Retrospective - Please register! Session 2 - Tracking ID: 7Q30-010
Join our upcoming live webcast for a transparent discussion about this recent Azure service incident led by our engineering teams. Network connectivity – Gateway service degradation Tracking ID: 7Q30-010 | Impacted: 30 September 2026 Same content presented in both sessions: pick the one that works best for your timezone! What to expect 📚 Understand What happened, how we responded, and what we learned 💬 Ask Live Q&A with our engineering experts throughout the session 🛠 Learn The fixes we've put in place and guidance for workload resiliency Choose your session Same content presented at both times: pick the one that works best for your timezone: Session 1 17:30 UTC Thursday, 22 Oct 2026 Register now → Session 2 05:30 UTC Friday, 23 Oct 2026 Register now → 11:30 AM US Pacific (PDT) 2:30 PM US Eastern (EDT) 7:30 PM London (BST) 2:30 AM +1 Beijing (CST) 5:30 AM +1 Sydney (AEDT) 7:30 AM +1 Auckland (NZDT) 11:30 PM -1 US Pacific (PDT) 2:30 AM US Eastern (EDT) 7:30 AM London (BST) 2:30 PM Beijing (CST) 5:30 PM Sydney (AEDT) 7:30 PM Auckland (NZDT) Our engineering leaders Sudha Mahajan General Manager Azure Networking Cloud+AI Engineering LinkedIn ↗ Bikash Agrawala Partner Director of Engineering Azure Networking Cloud+AI Engineering LinkedIn ↗ ⚠️ Prepare before the livestream Read the Post Incident Review (PIR) ahead of time so you can ask any follow up questions during the live Q&A Helpful resources 🔔 Azure Service Health Alerts Get alerts for relevant incidents by setting up notifications via email, SMS, or webhook 🎥 Past Retrospective Recordings Watch recordings of previous retrospective livestreams 📄 Azure Post Incident Reviews Learn more about PIRs and the retrospective programAzure Incident Retrospective - Please register! Session 1 - Tracking ID: 7Q30-010
Join our upcoming live webcast for a transparent discussion about this recent Azure service incident led by our engineering teams. Network connectivity – Gateway service degradation Tracking ID: 7Q30-010 | Impacted: 30 September 2026 Same content presented in both sessions: pick the one that works best for your timezone! What to expect 📚 Understand What happened, how we responded, and what we learned 💬 Ask Live Q&A with our engineering experts throughout the session 🛠 Learn The fixes we've put in place and guidance for workload resiliency Choose your session Same content presented at both times: pick the one that works best for your timezone: Session 1 17:30 UTC Thursday, 22 Oct 2026 Register now → Session 2 05:30 UTC Friday, 23 Oct 2026 Register now → 11:30 AM US Pacific (PDT) 2:30 PM US Eastern (EDT) 7:30 PM London (BST) 2:30 AM +1 Beijing (CST) 5:30 AM +1 Sydney (AEDT) 7:30 AM +1 Auckland (NZDT) 11:30 PM -1 US Pacific (PDT) 2:30 AM US Eastern (EDT) 7:30 AM London (BST) 2:30 PM Beijing (CST) 5:30 PM Sydney (AEDT) 7:30 PM Auckland (NZDT) Our engineering leaders Sudha Mahajan General Manager Azure Networking Cloud+AI Engineering LinkedIn ↗ Bikash Agrawala Partner Director of Engineering Azure Networking Cloud+AI Engineering LinkedIn ↗ ⚠️ Prepare before the livestream Read the Post Incident Review (PIR) ahead of time so you can ask any follow up questions during the live Q&A Helpful resources 🔔 Azure Service Health Alerts Get alerts for relevant incidents by setting up notifications via email, SMS, or webhook 🎥 Past Retrospective Recordings Watch recordings of previous retrospective livestreams 📄 Azure Post Incident Reviews Learn more about PIRs and the retrospective programAzure Incident Retrospective - Please register! Session 2 - Tracking ID: 7QL5-Z50
Join our upcoming live webcast for a transparent discussion about this recent Azure service incident led by our engineering teams. AOAI/Foundry – Intermittent failures in Sweden Central Tracking ID: 7QL5-Z50 | Impacted: 29 September 2026 Same content presented in both sessions: pick the one that works best for your timezone! What to expect 📚 Understand What happened, how we responded, and what we learned 💬 Ask Live Q&A with our engineering experts throughout the session 🛠 Learn The fixes we've put in place and guidance for workload resiliency Choose your session Same content presented at both times: pick the one that works best for your timezone: Session 1 17:30 UTC Thursday, 22 Oct 2026 Register now → Session 2 05:30 UTC Friday, 23 Oct 2026 Register now → 10:30 AM US Pacific (PDT) 1:30 PM US Eastern (EDT) 6:30 PM London (BST) 1:30 AM Beijing (CST) 4:30 AM +1 Sydney (AEDT) 6:30 AM +1 Auckland (NZDT) 10:30 PM -1 US Pacific (PDT) 1:30 AM -1 US Eastern (EDT) 6:30 AM London (BST) 1:30 PM Beijing (CST) 4:30 PM Sydney (AEDT) 6:30 PM Auckland (NZDT) Our engineering leader Bhuwan Sahni Partner, Software Engineer CoreAI Engineering LinkedIn ↗ ⚠️ Prepare before the livestream Read the Post Incident Review (PIR) ahead of time so you can ask any follow up questions during the live Q&A Helpful resources 🔔 Azure Service Health Alerts Get alerts for relevant incidents by setting up notifications via email, SMS, or webhook 🎥 Past Retrospective Recordings Watch recordings of previous retrospective livestreams 📄 Azure Post Incident Reviews Learn more about PIRs and the retrospective programAzure Incident Retrospective - Please register! Session 1 - Tracking ID: 7QL5-Z50
Join our upcoming live webcast for a transparent discussion about this recent Azure service incident led by our engineering teams. AOAI/Foundry – Intermittent failures in Sweden Central Tracking ID: 7QL5-Z50 | Impacted: 29 September 2026 Same content presented in both sessions: pick the one that works best for your timezone! What to expect 📚 Understand What happened, how we responded, and what we learned 💬 Ask Live Q&A with our engineering experts throughout the session 🛠 Learn The fixes we've put in place and guidance for workload resiliency Choose your session Same content presented at both times: pick the one that works best for your timezone: Session 1 17:30 UTC Thursday, 22 Oct 2026 Register now → Session 2 05:30 UTC Friday, 23 Oct 2026 Register now → 10:30 AM US Pacific (PDT) 1:30 PM US Eastern (EDT) 6:30 PM London (BST) 1:30 AM Beijing (CST) 4:30 AM +1 Sydney (AEDT) 6:30 AM +1 Auckland (NZDT) 10:30 PM -1 US Pacific (PDT) 1:30 AM -1 US Eastern (EDT) 6:30 AM London (BST) 1:30 PM Beijing (CST) 4:30 PM Sydney (AEDT) 6:30 PM Auckland (NZDT) Our engineering leader Bhuwan Sahni Partner, Software Engineer CoreAI Engineering LinkedIn ↗ ⚠️ Prepare before the livestream Read the Post Incident Review (PIR) ahead of time so you can ask any follow up questions during the live Q&A Helpful resources 🔔 Azure Service Health Alerts Get alerts for relevant incidents by setting up notifications via email, SMS, or webhook 🎥 Past Retrospective Recordings Watch recordings of previous retrospective livestreams 📄 Azure Post Incident Reviews Learn more about PIRs and the retrospective program
Azure Backup for PostgreSQL flexible server and elastic cluster (v2) is now in public preview
Azure Backup for PostgreSQL flexible servers and elastic clusters (v2) is now in public preview. Built on physical, snapshot-based backups, v2 brings scalable protection, flexible retention and streamlined recovery to PostgreSQL estates of all sizes. It helps customers improve data resiliency through vaulted backups and support compliance requirements with long-term retention of backups. Organizations can protect larger databases, back them up more frequently and restore them directly to a server when recovery is needed. What v2 can do V2 protects both Azure Database for PostgreSQL flexible servers and elastic clusters. It supports databases of up to 32 TB on Premium SSD v1 and up to 64 TB on Premium SSD v2, including production configurations with high availability, virtual network or private endpoint connectivity through Trusted Access, and Customer Managed Key encryption. You can schedule backups daily or weekly, with a recovery point objective goal of one day, and create on-demand backups whenever an additional recovery point is required. The first backup is full and subsequent backups are incremental, enabling a practical daily protection cadence even for multi-terabyte databases. Retention can range from 7 days to 10 years. Separate daily, weekly, monthly and yearly retention rules make it possible to align one policy with both operational recovery and long-term compliance requirements. Recovery points are stored in an Azure Backup vault and can use the platform protections organizations already rely on: Soft delete and WORM immutability to protect backups from premature deletion or alteration. Multi-user authorisation and MFA for sensitive operations. Customer Managed Key encryption and cross-subscription vaulting within the same tenant. Central monitoring and management through Backup center. Restore as Server Restore as Server turns a recovery point into a ready-to-use PostgreSQL environment by restoring it directly to a pre-created flexible server or elastic cluster. Unlike Restore as Files, which writes the backup to a storage container and requires a separate manual import into PostgreSQL, Restore as Server removes that intermediate phase. This reduces operational effort, shortens the path to application recovery and provides a more consistent restore experience at scale. How v2 improves on v1 V2 moves from logical exports to physical backups created from managed disk snapshots. This architectural change expands the service from the 1 TB limit in v1 to as much as 64 TB on supported storage, while incremental backups make daily schedules possible instead of limiting vaulted backups to a weekly full copy. The new solution also extends protection to elastic clusters and introduces direct restoration to a server. Together, these improvements provide broader workload coverage, more frequent recovery points and a simpler path from backup to a usable PostgreSQL environment. How to get started with v2 You can configure v2 in the Azure portal from a Backup vault, the Resiliency experience, or the LTR (Vaulted Backups) pane of the flexible server. Each entry point leads to the same policy and protection workflow. Before enabling protection, confirm that the server meets the preview requirements and check details on supported scenarios and limitations. Once eligibility is confirmed, create or select a Backup vault, define the schedule and retention rules that fit your recovery objectives, and enable protection for the server or elastic cluster. For PostgreSQL flexible server and elastic cluster vaulted backup v2 (preview), you incur charges from 15 October 2026. Refer to Azure Backup pricing page and pricing calculator for more details. How to migrate from v1 to v2 Existing protected items can be moved to v2 while retaining the same policy and Backup vault. The protected item and its existing recovery points are preserved, allowing organisations to adopt the new capabilities without losing backups already retained for operational or compliance needs. The migration is one way, so review readiness before starting. Servers running PostgreSQL 14 or earlier must first be upgraded to PostgreSQL 15 or later, and servers on the Burstable tier must be scaled to General Purpose or Memory Optimized. With those prerequisites complete, the move to v2 opens the way to larger-scale protection, daily incremental backups, elastic cluster coverage and direct server recovery—all while preserving the continuity of your existing backup estate.Azure Incident Retrospective - Please register! Session 2 - Tracking ID: SPCX-S1Z
Join our upcoming live webcast for a transparent discussion about this recent Azure service incident led by our engineering teams. Power issue in Southeast Asia Tracking ID: SPCX-S1Z | Impacted: 25-26 August 2026 Same content presented in both sessions: pick the one that works best for your timezone! What to expect 📚 Understand What happened, how we responded, and what we learned 💬 Ask Live Q&A with our engineering experts throughout the session 🛠 Learn The fixes we've put in place and guidance for workload resiliency Choose your session Same content presented at both times: pick the one that works best for your timezone: Session 1 15:30 UTC Thursday, 24 Sept 2026 Register now → Session 2 03:30 UTC Friday, 25 Sept 2026 Register now → 8:30 AM US Pacific (PDT) 11:30 AM US Eastern (EDT) 4:30 PM London (BST) 11:30 PM Beijing (CST) 1:30 AM +1 Sydney (AEDT) 3:30 AM +1 Auckland (NZDT) 8:30 PM -1 US Pacific (PDT) 11:30 PM -1 US Eastern (EDT) 4:30 AM London (BST) 11:30 AM Beijing (CST) 1:30 PM Sydney (AEDT) 3:30 PM Auckland (NZDT) Our engineering leaders Terry Lo Datacenter Operations Manager Southeast Asia Cloud+AI Engineering LinkedIn ↗ ⚠️ Prepare before the livestream Read the Post Incident Review (PIR) ahead of time so you can ask any follow up questions during the live Q&A Helpful resources 🔔 Azure Service Health Alerts Get alerts for relevant incidents by setting up notifications via email, SMS, or webhook 🎥 Past Retrospective Recordings Watch recordings of previous retrospective livestreams 📄 Azure Post Incident Reviews Learn more about PIRs and the retrospective programAzure Incident Retrospective - Please register! Session 1 - Tracking ID: SPCX-S1Z
Join our upcoming live webcast for a transparent discussion about this recent Azure service incident led by our engineering teams. Power issue in Southeast Asia Tracking ID: SPCX-S1Z | Impacted: 25-26 August 2026 Same content presented in both sessions: pick the one that works best for your timezone! What to expect 📚 Understand What happened, how we responded, and what we learned 💬 Ask Live Q&A with our engineering experts throughout the session 🛠 Learn The fixes we've put in place and guidance for workload resiliency Choose your session Same content presented at both times: pick the one that works best for your timezone: Session 1 15:30 UTC Thursday, 24 Sept 2026 Register now → Session 2 03:30 UTC Friday, 25 Sept 2026 Register now → 8:30 AM US Pacific (PDT) 11:30 AM US Eastern (EDT) 4:30 PM London (BST) 11:30 PM Beijing (CST) 1:30 AM +1 Sydney (AEDT) 3:30 AM +1 Auckland (NZDT) 8:30 PM -1 US Pacific (PDT) 11:30 PM -1 US Eastern (EDT) 4:30 AM London (BST) 11:30 AM Beijing (CST) 1:30 PM Sydney (AEDT) 3:30 PM Auckland (NZDT) Our engineering leaders Terry Lo Datacenter Operations Manager Southeast Asia Cloud+AI Engineering LinkedIn ↗ ⚠️ Prepare before the livestream Read the Post Incident Review (PIR) ahead of time so you can ask any follow up questions during the live Q&A Helpful resources 🔔 Azure Service Health Alerts Get alerts for relevant incidents by setting up notifications via email, SMS, or webhook 🎥 Past Retrospective Recordings Watch recordings of previous retrospective livestreams 📄 Azure Post Incident Reviews Learn more about PIRs and the retrospective programAzure Retirements Livestream - Please register! Session 2 - Tracking ID: 0P59-60Z
Join our upcoming live webcast for a transparent discussion about this upcoming Azure retirement — led by our engineering teams. Network Security Group (NSG) flow logs in Azure Network Watcher Tracking ID: 0P59-60Z | Retirement Date: 30 September 2027 Same content presented in both sessions — pick the one that works best for your timezone! What to expect 📚 Understand What will happen, the timelines for the change, and how you can manage it 💬 Ask Live Q&A with our engineering experts throughout the session 🛠 Learn How to manage the change smoothly Choose your session Same content presented at both times — pick the one that works best for your timezone: Session 1 16:30 UTC Thursday, 24 Sept 2026 Register now → Session 2 04:30 UTC Friday, 25 Sept 2026 Register now → 9:30 AM US Pacific (PDT) 12:30 PM US Eastern (EDT) 5:30 PM London (BST) 12:30 AM +1 Beijing (CST) 2:30 AM +1 Sydney (AEDT) 4:30 AM +1 Auckland (NZDT) 9:30 PM -1 US Pacific (PDT) 12:30 AM US Eastern (EDT) 5:30 AM London (BST) 12:30 PM Beijing (CST) 2:30 PM Sydney (AEDT) 4:30 PM Auckland (NZDT) Our engineering leaders Chaithanya Rai Senior Product Manager Azure Network Security & Observability LinkedIn ↗ Helpful resources 🔔 Azure Service Health Alerts Get alerts for relevant incidents by setting up notifications via email, SMS, or webhook 🎥 Past Retrospective Recordings Watch recordings of previous retrospective livestreams 📄 Azure Post Incident Reviews Learn more about PIRs and the retrospective programAzure Retirements Livestream - Please register! Session 1 - Tracking ID: 0P59-60Z
Join our upcoming live webcast for a transparent discussion about this upcoming Azure retirement — led by our engineering teams. Network Security Group (NSG) flow logs in Azure Network Watcher Tracking ID: 0P59-60Z | Retirement Date: 30 September 2027 Same content presented in both sessions — pick the one that works best for your timezone! What to expect 📚 Understand What will happen, the timelines for the change, and how you can manage it 💬 Ask Live Q&A with our engineering experts throughout the session 🛠 Learn How to manage the change smoothly Choose your session Same content presented at both times — pick the one that works best for your timezone: Session 1 16:30 UTC Thursday, 24 Sept 2026 Register now → Session 2 04:30 UTC Friday, 25 Sept 2026 Register now → 9:30 AM US Pacific (PDT) 12:30 PM US Eastern (EDT) 5:30 PM London (BST) 12:30 AM +1 Beijing (CST) 2:30 AM +1 Sydney (AEDT) 4:30 AM +1 Auckland (NZDT) 9:30 PM -1 US Pacific (PDT) 12:30 AM US Eastern (EDT) 5:30 AM London (BST) 12:30 PM Beijing (CST) 2:30 PM Sydney (AEDT) 4:30 PM Auckland (NZDT) Our engineering leaders Chaithanya Rai Senior Product Manager Azure Network Security & Observability LinkedIn ↗ Helpful resources 🔔 Azure Service Health Alerts Get alerts for relevant incidents by setting up notifications via email, SMS, or webhook 🎥 Past Retrospective Recordings Watch recordings of previous retrospective livestreams 📄 Azure Post Incident Reviews Learn more about PIRs and the retrospective programChoosing two-zone and three-zone patterns for zone-resilient Azure workloads
This article complements our Advancing Reliability series post, Two zones or three? A design framework for zone-resilient Azure workloads. Together, they provide guidance on both the considerations and deployment patterns for zone-resilient Azure workloads. Purpose This article helps customers evaluate Azure workload components and choose zone-resilient patterns that meet their requirements during a single-zone failure. The goal is to identify where two zones can meet workload requirements, where three zones are required, and where service-managed zone redundancy is the right approach. Important: This guidance is a decision framework, not a service support matrix. Availability zone behavior varies by Azure service, SKU, tier, region, and configuration. Always validate the selected design against the relevant Azure reliability guidance and test the workload's actual failure behavior before finalizing the architecture. Zone resiliency helps protect against the loss of a single availability zone. It does not protect against a full-region outage. For mission-critical workloads or workloads with strict disaster recovery requirements, evaluate whether the workload also requires a multi-region design. Availability zones are separate groups of datacenters within an Azure region. Each availability zone has independent power, cooling, and networking infrastructure. Azure services that support availability zones generally expose support through zone-redundant or zonal deployment models. Key takeaways Evaluate zone patterns at the workload component level, not only at the whole-workload level. Many workloads can meet single-zone failure objectives by using two zones for some components and three zones only where component requirements demand them. For the single-zone failure mode, two-zone and three-zone patterns can both meet resource availability objectives when remaining capacity and failover behavior are validated. Use service-managed zone redundancy when it meets workload requirements. Use two zones when the component can meet its availability, durability, capacity, performance, and operational requirements across two zones. Use three zones when a component requires the additional zone for post-failure capacity, data durability, replication topology, quorum, leader election, or operational margin. Balance cost and operational complexity after defining the workload's resiliency objective. Do not assume that two zones are always cheaper or that three zones are always required. Zone-redundant and zonal deployment models Zone-resilient designs depend on the deployment model used by each Azure service. Zone-redundant resources are distributed or replicated across multiple availability zones. Azure manages replication, request distribution, and failover behavior for the service. Where available and aligned to workload requirements, zone-redundant resources should be preferred, especially for production deployments. Zonal resources are pinned to a specific availability zone. A zonal resource is isolated from failures in other zones, but it is not automatically resilient to a failure in its own zone. To make a zonal service resilient, customers need to deploy separate instances across multiple zones and design the workload to route traffic, replicate data, detect failures, and recover. Some Azure services offer both zonal and zone-redundant deployment options, while others may be zone-resilient by default. In some cases, availability zone support requires additional configuration, service modification, or redeployment. Support can also vary by region, SKU, tier, or service configuration. Before choosing a deployment model, review the service-specific reliability guidance and availability zone support matrix to understand the options and requirements for your scenario. Primary decision dimensions Current Azure Well-Architected guidance emphasizes deploying production workloads across two or more failure domains to improve resiliency to failures within a single failure domain. In Azure regions that support availability zones, those failure domains are exposed as availability zone boundaries. When deciding whether a component should use two zones, three zones, or service-managed zone redundancy, evaluate three dimensions: Resource availability: For the single-zone failure mode, two-zone and three-zone patterns can both meet resource availability objectives when the remaining zone or zones can support the required operating state and failover behavior. The additional zone in a three-zone design does not by itself make the component resilient to more than one zone failure within the same region. Data consistency and durability: Stateful components might require three zones when data durability, replication topology, quorum, consensus, leader election, or split-brain prevention depends on a third failure domain or third replica placement. Cost and capacity: For the same post-failure performance target, a two-zone design can require more recovery capacity than a three-zone design. Cost optimization should be evaluated after the resiliency objective is defined. If more than one availability zone is unavailable in the same region, the concern can become regional rather than only workload-specific because foundational regional services require at least two surviving availability zones for continued regional availability. Workloads with requirements beyond a single-zone failure should evaluate disaster recovery or multi-region design separately. Common workload components can be grouped as follows: Component category Typical zone decision Stateless resources that support networking or application code and do not store persistent data Two-zone or three-zone flexibility, based on remaining capacity, routing, latency, and operational requirements. Stateful resources that use node-based quorum, consensus, or leader election Three zones, a third failure domain, or a product-specific witness pattern is commonly required to avoid split-brain or quorum-loss scenarios. Critical data stores that require three replicas for the highest durability targets Three-zone replication might be required to support the intended durability level, such as eleven-nines-style durability targets. Validate service-specific claims. Other stateful resources Two-zone, three-zone, or service-managed patterns can be valid depending on service behavior, recovery time objective (RTO), recovery point objective (RPO), durability, failover, and recovery requirements. Component-level decision framework Walk through the workload by critical flow and component. For each component, determine whether service-managed zone redundancy applies, whether a two-zone pattern can meet the component's single-zone failure objective, or whether three zones are required. Component question What to evaluate Decision guidance Is zone resiliency managed by the Azure service? Confirm whether the service provides zone-redundant or zone-resilient behavior through a supported configuration, SKU, tier, or replication mode. Use service-managed zone redundancy when it meets workload requirements. Do not force a two-zone or three-zone customer-managed design onto services where Azure manages placement and failover internally. Is the component stateless or easily replaceable? Evaluate routing, health probes, scale-out behavior, post-failure capacity, deployment automation, monitoring, and recovery steps. Two zones can often meet requirements for stateless or easily replaceable components when the remaining zone can support the required degraded or full operating state. Use three zones when capacity distribution or operational requirements justify the added design and testing scope. Does the component store durable state? Evaluate replication mode, data durability, consistency, RTO, RPO, failover behavior, recovery behavior, and service-specific support. Use the pattern that satisfies the data protection and recovery requirements. Three zones might be required when the storage or data service requires an additional zone for durability, triple-replica placement, replication topology, or recovery behavior. Does the component use quorum, consensus, or leader election? Validate replica placement, majority behavior, witness or tie-breaker design, leader election, split-brain prevention, recovery, and failback. Do not assume that three replicas across two zones are sufficient. Three zones, a third failure domain, or a product-specific witness pattern might be required to tolerate a zone loss safely. Is the component latency-sensitive? Define latency and throughput thresholds, test candidate zone pairs with realistic protocols and configuration, and identify which paths are actually latency-sensitive. Two zones can be appropriate for latency-sensitive synchronous paths that use tested placement. Logical zone numbers can map to different physical zones across subscriptions, so validate zone mapping when selected zone pairs matter. What capacity must remain after one zone fails? Define the required post-failure operating state for the component: degraded but acceptable, full baseline, or standby recovery. Choose the zone pattern that can satisfy the required post-failure operating state. Two zones can meet requirements when each remaining zone has enough capacity for the target state. Three zones can reduce the capacity each zone must carry for the same post-failure target. How will the design be operated and reviewed? Assign owners for monitoring, testing, incident response, failover, failback, and periodic reassessment. Confirm that identity, network security, encryption, secrets management, policy, monitoring, and data protection requirements are preserved. Document why each component uses service-managed zone redundancy, two zones, or three zones. If three zones are required for a component, state the requirement that drives that decision. Where two zones can meet requirements A two-zone pattern can be a practical way to meet single-zone failure objectives when the component's requirements are satisfied across two zones. Common examples include: Stateless compute, application, or network components where traffic can be routed to the remaining zone. Pairwise active-passive or active-active designs that are simpler to deploy, test, and operate across two zones. Latency-sensitive synchronous paths where a tested zone pair meets performance requirements. Customer-managed zonal resources where the remaining capacity, failover process, monitoring, recovery, and failback behavior are validated. Components whose acceptable degraded operating state can be supported after one zone is unavailable. The design should define what happens after one zone is unavailable, including remaining capacity, acceptable degradation, data consistency, failover behavior, recovery steps, observability, and operational ownership. Where three zones are required Three zones are required when two zones cannot meet the component's requirements during or after a single-zone failure. Examples include: A required post-failure operating state that cannot be supported by the remaining zone in a two-zone design. Data durability or replication requirements that depend on placement across three zones, such as triple-replica placement for the highest durability targets. Quorum, consensus, or leader-election designs that require a third failure domain or witness placement to avoid losing quorum or creating split-brain risk. Three zones still primarily help a workload tolerate a single availability-zone failure within a region. When this guidance refers to an additional failure domain, it means an additional Azure availability-zone placement option or an application-level failure domain needed by a specific component design, such as quorum, witness, or leader-election behavior. Where three zones may add value Some components do not strictly require three zones but can benefit from the additional placement option. In these cases, the value is usually related to capacity distribution, maintenance flexibility, or operational margin, not a different single-zone availability failure mode. Use three zones when the additional zone helps the component meet the required post-failure operating state, reduces how much capacity each zone must carry, or improves the ability to maintain and recover the component without violating workload requirements. Data consistency and durability considerations Stateful components should be evaluated based on consistency, replication, quorum, durability, RTO, and RPO requirements. Some distributed systems use quorum, leader election, or consensus-based coordination to maintain consistent state. Three zones are not universally required for every quorum-based architecture, but quorum-based systems require careful validation. Replica count alone is not enough. Replica placement, majority behavior, witness or tie-breaker placement, leader election, write consistency, split-brain prevention, recovery behavior, and failure-domain assumptions all affect whether a two-zone or three-zone deployment is appropriate. Some systems can place three or more replicas across two zones, and some managed services provide zone-resilient behavior without exposing direct customer control over zone placement. These patterns should not be generalized. In customer-managed majority-quorum systems, placing replicas across only two failure domains can still lose quorum if the majority-holding zone is unavailable. A third failure domain, witness, or tie-breaker might be required to tolerate a zone loss safely, depending on the product architecture. For customer-managed stateful systems, validate replica count and placement, quorum behavior, leader election behavior, synchronous and asynchronous replication, split-brain prevention, failure recovery behavior, data durability requirements, and RTO and RPO objectives. For managed data services, understand how the service implements zone resiliency, which configuration choices are available, and how the service behaves during zone-down scenarios. Capacity planning for a single-zone failure Capacity planning should start with the component's required operating state after the loss of one availability zone. Determine the capacity required to support the component in an approved degraded resiliency state, then use that post-failure target to compare zone patterns. For active-active deployments, use: Total Capacity = Target Remaining Capacity x Z / (Z - 1) In this formula: Target Remaining Capacity is the capacity the component must have after one zone is unavailable. Z is the number of zones used by the component. For example, if a component requires 100 units of baseline capacity and can operate at an approved degraded level of at least 80 units after losing one zone, the model estimates: Deployment model Formula Total provisioned capacity Capacity per zone Remaining after one zone loss Two availability zones 80 x 2 / (2 - 1) 160 units 80 units 80 units Three availability zones 80 x 3 / (3 - 1) 120 units 40 units 80 units This example compares designs against the same post-failure operating objective. The acceptable degraded state should be explicitly defined, tested, and approved. It should include the minimum remaining capacity, expected throttling or prioritization behavior, scale-out assumptions, and how long the component can remain in the degraded state. If the component must maintain full baseline capacity after one zone is unavailable, use the full baseline capacity as the target remaining capacity. Capacity requirements depend on workload architecture, scaling behavior, service limits, failover behavior, and acceptable degradation. Cost and operational considerations Cost and operational complexity should be evaluated after the resiliency objective is defined. They should not be used to dismiss two-zone designs that can meet component requirements, and they should not be used to justify two-zone designs that do not meet requirements. For the same post-failure capacity target, a three-zone design can require less total provisioned capacity than a two-zone design because the recovery capacity is distributed across more zones. Use the capacity model to understand that tradeoff before optimizing costs. For workloads with predictable usage, evaluate commitment-based discounts such as Azure savings plans or Azure reservations where they apply to the selected services. Operationally, consider whether the selected pattern can be deployed, monitored, tested, failed over, recovered, and reviewed consistently. A two-zone pattern can be simpler for pairwise designs. A three-zone pattern can provide more operational margin for components that benefit from additional placement options. Component classification workflow Before finalizing the zone pattern, confirm that: Each critical flow is decomposed into the components that support it. Each component is evaluated across resource availability, data consistency and durability, and cost or capacity impact. Each component is classified as service-managed zone-redundant, two-zone customer-managed, or three-zone required. The reason for requiring three zones is documented when two zones do not meet the component objective. Each Azure service's zone support, SKU, tier, region, and configuration requirements are validated. Customer-managed zonal resources have validated routing, load balancing, replication, failover, monitoring, recovery, and failback. Remaining capacity and acceptable degradation after one zone loss are documented. Stateful or quorum-based components have validated replica placement, witness or tie-breaker behavior, leader election, and split-brain prevention. Latency-sensitive paths have been tested across the selected zone placement. Security, identity, monitoring, and data protection requirements are preserved. Ownership for testing, incident response, failover, failback, and periodic reassessment is assigned. Related public guidance Azure services that support availability zones Enable zone resiliency for Azure workloads Zonal resources and zone resiliency What are Azure availability zones Architecture strategies for availability zones and regions
