onboarding
229 TopicsUrgent help with missing course progress on Microsoft Learn for Educators
Hello Microsoft Learn for Educators Support Team, I applied to the program and enrolled in several courses on November 16, 2026. I completed some of those courses the same day. When I signed back in on November 17, the portal redirected me to the “Welcome! Let’s create your profile” page. I’m unable to get past that screen or view my course enrollments and completion records. Could you please check whether my existing profile and course records are still linked to my Microsoft account and restore access as soon as possible? I’ve attached a screenshot for reference.60Views2likes3CommentsInstitution verification blocked by AVE, and support case form is failing
Hello, I am unable to complete institution verification for Microsoft Learn for Educators, and both documented support channels are currently failing for me. What is happening: 1. My institution verification was rejected with a "Blocked" response from AVE. 2. The in-portal Create a Case form returns "An error has occurred while processing your request. Please try again later" every time I submit, so I cannot raise a ticket through the documented route. I understand at least one other educator has reported this same combination recently, so I am writing directly in the hope this can be routed manually. I believe the AVE block is because our institutional domain is pathfinderfoundation.co.in rather than a .edu or .ac.in domain. In India, a large proportion of accredited private higher education institutions operate on .co.in and .org domains, so the suffix is not an indicator of accreditation status here. AICTE records are the authoritative source. Institution details: Name: Pathfinder Research and Training Foundation (PRTF) Website: https://pathfinderfoundation.co.in/ Accreditation: Approved by the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), the statutory national regulator for technical and management education in India, under the Ministry of Education, Government of India. AICTE Permanent Institution ID: 1-43701706366 AISHE Code: C-72792 Programmes offered: 1. Post Graduate Diploma in Management (PGDM), AICTE approved, two-year full-time, 120 students per batch. The programme is AI-centric by design, with Year 2 specialisation tracks in AI and Data Sciences, and Marketing and Finance. 2. Professional certification programmes in cloud and AI, delivered on campus as continuing education alongside the PGDM. Both fall within the Educational Institution Option scope, which covers accredited degree, diploma, certificate, and continuing or further education programmes. Faculty verification: I am Associate Professor in the AI and Data Science department. My profile, showing my institutional email address, is published at https://pathfinderfoundation.co.in/mentor-and-guest-faculty/ Domain ownership: pathfinderfoundation.co.in is owned and operated by the institution.. Intended use: Microsoft Official Curriculum maps onto our existing teaching plan. AI-900 and AI-102 into the AI and Data Sciences track, PL-300 and MB-220 into Marketing and Finance, AZ-900 and DP-900 as core digital foundations. Could someone please complete verification manually, or advise on an alternative route while the case form is unavailable? I am happy to provide any further documentation. Thank you, Aayan Kumar Associate Professor, AI and Data Science Department Pathfinder Research and Training Foundation (PRTF) email address removed for privacy reasonsSolved853Views1like4CommentsThe CISO Cheat Sheet to Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2026
I know we’re all busy, so I’ve pulled the most important data from this year’s Microsoft Digital Defense Report into one short read. The full report is well worth exploring, but this article focuses on the numbers and trends most relevant to security leaders. This year’s edition shows that AI is lowering the time, expertise and cost required to discover and exploit weaknesses, enabling attackers to operate with greater speed, scale and autonomy. The report describes this as AI “changing the physics of cybersecurity”: attack timelines are compressing and agentic systems are beginning to automate more of the attack lifecycle. Trend 1: Time has collapsed The clearest finding is about speed. Vulnerability discovery is increasingly running ahead of remediation, while the time from discovery to weaponisation is shrinking. In the AI era, weaponisation can follow in hours. Vulnerability discovery and weaponisation now often needs only a well-written prompt. The median time from discovery in the wild to weaponisation is below 24 hours. Vulnerabilities were on track for a record estimated 72,000 CVEs in 2026. The report expects a multi-year period in which the number of known but unpatched vulnerabilities rises sharply before eventually declining. The median time from container start to first exploit attempt is 5.3 hours. The ransomware actor Storm-1175 moved from web-facing exploitation to deploying Medusa ransomware in as little as 24 hours. CISA added over 110 CVEs to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue between November 2025 and May 2026, most within a week of disclosure. The mismatch with enterprise reality is the uncomfortable part. The report says the disclosure-to-exploitation window has shrunk to single-digit days. Between November 2025 and May 2026, CISA added more than 110 vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, most within a week of disclosure. In one example, Storm-1175 moved from exploiting a web-facing vulnerability to deploying Medusa ransomware in as little as 24 hours. Microsoft’s Red Team makes an important point: a patch is also a disclosure. Every fix points attackers towards the flaw it closes. As AI-assisted analysis makes reversing patches faster and more reliable, the report argues that patch velocity, not simply patch availability, becomes the control that matters. Trend 2: Attack chains are gaining autonomy The report charts a clear progression: September–November 2025: AI assists in orchestrating a campaign, as in the Anthropic-reported espionage case. April–June 2026: Full-chain autonomy is demonstrated in labs. July 2026: Real-world autonomous attacks of increasing complexity appear. Two frontier models, Mythos and GPT-5.5, completed a 32-step attack chain against an emulated enterprise with no human help. The test environment had no defenders. The UK AI Security Institute reached a similar finding independently. GPT-5.5 was the second model to solve its end-to-end corporate network attack simulation, a task AISI estimates would take a human about 20 hours. Open-weight models lag closed models at orchestrating attacks by about seven months. In the wild, early July 2026 saw the first documented automated ransomware extortion attack, named JADEPUFFER by Sysdig. Microsoft has seen AI-orchestrated intrusions that share elements with it. Initial access consistently came from internet-exposed services running known-vulnerable software. The report is measured on this point. Volumes of AI-orchestrated activity remain low. In most observed real-world operations, complex end-to-end intrusions still retain meaningful human direction. The Red Team's framing is the most useful one: AI doesn't create a new class of attack, it collapses the effort needed to find and exploit existing attack paths. Trend 3: AI has become an attack surface The report's second takeaway is that attackers are already targeting AI itself. The adoption numbers explain why. 88% of enterprises are experimenting with agents, and 82% of leaders plan broader rollouts within 12–18 months. The report cites industry projections of roughly 1.3 billion agents in production by 2028. What attackers are doing to AI systems: Four techniques accounted for roughly 90% of observed attack activity in telemetry from Azure AI workloads: malicious link injection (52%), jailbreaks (16%), tool and agent abuse (12%), and identity and credential abuse (10%). Memory poisoning: An attacker who can place content anywhere an agent reads can often place it where the agent remembers. Email is the dominant pathway the Red Team has observed. Human-in-the-loop isn't a complete control: Red team testing saw approval prompts ignored, or bypassed by a policy stored in poisoned memory. Developer tools turned against their owners: The "s1ngularity" malware hijacked locally installed AI command-line tools to hunt for secrets. It leaked about 2,000 secrets and 20,000 files across 225 victims. AI browsers: In daily use at more than 40% of organisations in Microsoft's dataset, they were the initial infection vector in incidents involving 57 malware families in a May 2026 analysis. Chat histories as a target: Malicious AI-assistant extensions reached nearly 900,000 installs and more than 20,000 enterprise tenants, harvesting AI chat histories that often contain code, architecture and credentials. The identity implications are direct. Each agent needs its own identity, not one borrowed from an employee, and a named human sponsor. The report also treats revocation latency, the time to cut off a compromised agent, as a measured outcome. Trend 4: The front door is still identity AI changes the speed and personalisation of social engineering. It hasn't changed where attacks start. Initial access in Defender Experts data: User execution: 30% Valid accounts: 20% Malicious copy-and-paste: 13% Phishing: 11% Together, user execution and valid accounts account for over half of observed activity. In incident response engagements, phishing as an initial access vector jumped from 7% to 23% year on year. The standout numbers: ClickFix: Defender saw user-pasted malicious commands on more than 1.1 million unique devices between February and early May 2026, roughly an 8x increase. AiTM: URLs accounted for 45% of the identified phishing techniques in the report’s breakdown. Separately, the share of AiTM phishing and token-theft attacks more than doubled during the first six months of 2026, although the report notes that their overall share remained comparatively small. Teams vishing: Weekly confirmed malicious volume increased 502% year on year. Per attempt, 48% of vishing calls kept the victim engaged for more than 20 seconds, and 30% lasted more than one minute. When a call succeeds, attackers can persuade the victim to install a remote-management tool and complete reconnaissance in two minutes or less. Business contact impersonation (BCI): The report introduces this term for conversations that start with a trusted-looking contact. Microsoft detected more than 46 million attacks in 12 months, with a 121% spike in April 2026. The share of first-contact messages that explicitly asked for money or documents fell from 17% to 3%. The first message is deliberately bland, like "Are you at your desk?" Password attacks declined 26% year on year, which the report describes as strong evidence that MFA and passkeys are forcing attackers to pivot. That pivot includes techniques such as fatigue attacks, AiTM phishing and token theft designed to circumvent conventional MFA. Trend 5: Attackers are inheriting trust rather than breaking in The report's headline theme is that risk is increasingly interconnected. Threats travel through the trusted relationships between identities, software supply chains, partners and cloud platforms. The numbers: Supply chain: Major open-source ecosystems saw attacks roughly every ten days, accelerating through Q2 2026. Shai-Hulud 2.0 affected 25,000 repositories. Megalodon backdoored 5,561 GitHub repositories in under six hours. Trusted signing: In May 2026, Microsoft disrupted Fox Tempest, a "malware-signing-as-a-service" operation that obtained genuine certificates for ransomware loaders and infostealers. Microsoft revoked over a thousand fraudulent code-signing certificates. Legitimate access: An unsanctioned remote monitoring tool is now one of the most reliable mid-stage indicators of a human-operated intrusion. Cloud identity: Cloud identity abuse was the most observed technique against critical infrastructure, representing 78% of the technique mix in Microsoft’s data for March to June 2026. Hybrid intrusions: The Storm-2885 case showed an attacker using a privileged cloud identity to close and downgrade security alerts. The report says identity governance and alert-handling workflows deserve Tier 0 treatment. Dwell time: DART data shows a statistically significant increase in dwell time year on year, meaning organisations took longer to detect intrusions. Ransomware shows the same ecosystem pattern. Qilin led leak-site data with 16.4% of victims, up 386%. Defender detections tell a different story, with Akira at 22%. Trend 6: Defence works best when it's connected The report is not only a catalogue of threats. The strongest defensive evidence: Disruption works. Following the March 2026 disruption, Tycoon2FA activity had fallen 95% from its November 2025 peak by June. Its share of CAPTCHA-gated phishing declined from 76% in December 2025 to 12% in June 2026. Correlation is the highest-leverage variable. The report argues that how well defenders share and correlate signals across endpoint, identity, cloud, email and network is one of the highest-leverage strategic variables under their control. AI is also changing defensive operations. The report describes AI-assisted triage, incident summarisation, hunting-query generation and detection engineering as ways to accelerate investigations and allow analysts to concentrate on higher-value work. Automated disruption can compress response time. The report says that when a correlated incident reaches a defined confidence threshold, defensive systems can automatically isolate devices, disable compromised accounts, revoke sessions or quarantine affected cloud resources. It also stresses the importance of appropriate governance and human oversight for high-risk AI actions. The report also recommends changing what leaders measure. It suggests moving from patches deployed to exposure reduced, detection coverage increased and time-to-mitigate compressed. What the MDDR recommends: ten security priorities The report starts its recommendations with the foundations: Secure by Design, Secure by Default and Secure Operations, applied through identity-centric Zero Trust. Microsoft says these keep the priorities below durable as AI adds more identities, applications, agents and dependencies to govern. Govern cyber risk at leadership level. Report identity exposure, patch latency, agent permissions, critical dependencies, dwell time and recovery readiness to the board. Defend identity as the primary control plane. Deploy passkeys and phishing-resistant MFA, reduce privilege and govern human and non-human identities. Invalidate and rotate tokens and session credentials quickly. Establish governance, visibility and data controls for AI. Keep visibility of approved AI tools, services and agents, and monitor for unauthorised or unmanaged use. Apply sensitivity-aware access and data protection to the data those systems can reach. Reduce exposure and edge risk. Continuously discover internet-facing assets and patch edge devices quickly. Centralise high-fidelity logging, enforce strong authentication and combine network visibility with threat intelligence. Focus on cross-signal correlation. Correlate endpoint, identity, cloud, application, email and network signals to detect intrusions earlier. Correlation also helps defenders anticipate attack paths and likely targets. Enact a continuous threat and vulnerability management model. Combine asset visibility, vulnerability identification, threat detection and AI-accelerated insight into a single continuous programme. Validate exposure through proactive testing. Run assume-breach exercises on cloud services, SaaS platforms, APIs and workflow automation. Prioritise them by where your highest-value data is stored, accessed or aggregated. Secure software dependencies. Harden software installation, keep a software inventory and validate provenance. Monitor packages and prepare for rapid containment. Participate in collective defence. Share actionable threat indicators and victim-informed intelligence with trusted partners and law enforcement. This supports coordinated tracking, investigation and disruption. Prepare for long-horizon technology transitions. Build a cryptographic inventory and advance post-quantum planning alongside AI governance. Read together, the numbers tell one story: the attacker’s workflow is becoming faster and less expensive. AI can shorten vulnerability discovery, exploitation, secret discovery and lateral movement, while organisations still face the slower operational work of testing, coordinating and deploying safe changes across complex environments. At the same time, agent identities can proliferate faster than organisations can inventory, govern and revoke them The defining question for boards today is not whether disruption will occur, but whether the organization can continue operating, contain harm, recover quickly, and maintain trust when it does. Source: Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2026, Version 1.1. Reporting period: July 2025–June 2026.AZ-900 courses not provisioned in Skillable – no Instructor role or lab keys
Hello, I am an educator and Program Advisor at the University of Bielsko-Biala, participating in the Microsoft Learn for Educators Educational Institution program. Our institution was accepted into the MSLE program only recently, and these are the first courses we have registered in the MSLE portal, so this is also our first attempt to provision Skillable labs through MSLE. I registered two AZ-900 / Microsoft Azure Fundamentals courses in the MSLE portal: 2026-01D-AZ900 – currently shown as In Progress 2026-02Z-AZ900 – currently shown as Upcoming / scheduled The first course has already reached its scheduled start date, but I have not received any email from Skillable, class information, or Training Keys. I can successfully sign in to the MSLE Skillable portal using the same Microsoft Account associated with my MSLE profile. However, my Skillable account currently shows: Role: Basic User no Active Classes no Active Course Assignments no Instructor Dashboard or Instructor role. So it appears that my Skillable account exists, but the MSLE classes have not been provisioned or assigned to me as an instructor. I have already: submitted support requests (tickets) to both Microsoft/MSLE and Skillable - I have not received any acknowledgement, ticket number, or response checked spam/junk folders verified that I can access the Skillable portal contacted mailto:email address removed for privacy reasons - no reply; Could someone from the MSLE team please verify whether my course requests were correctly sent to Skillable and whether my account should have been provisioned with the Instructor role? Any guidance on how to proceed would be greatly appreciated. Thank you, Łukasz Więcław University of Bielsko-BialaSolved151Views0likes2CommentsLabs and Training terms
Hi MSLE community, I have recently added my institution to MSLE to access Azure courses and labs through Learn on Demand (Skillable); however, I am not able to see or agree to the Labs and Training Terms. Where exactly is it located or could I get assistance with thisSolved190Views0likes2CommentsEasy Auth Configuration for Logic App Standard through CI/CD
Problem Statement When Easy Auth (Azure App Service’s built-in authentication and authorization) is enabled on a Logic App Standard, users frequently report that they cannot open the run history. Specifically, the inputs and outputs of the trigger and actions fail to load on the run details page, even though the workflow itself runs and the user has access to the resource. Background — How Easy Auth Interacts with Logic Apps Easy Auth is a feature of Azure App Service. Every request that reaches a Logic App Standard is first routed through the App Service layer, and only then handed off to the Logic App runtime for further processing. When Easy Auth is enabled, App Service authenticates each incoming request and decides whether it should be allowed or blocked — before the Logic App runtime ever sees it. This dual-layer model is what causes the run-history symptom: The Logic App runtime authenticates run-history requests using a SAS token specific to that run, generated from the Logic App access keys. The portal calls that load the inputs and outputs of historical runs do not carry a bearer token — they carry the SAS. Because App Service only knows how to validate Easy Auth tokens (not SAS), it blocks these requests whenever unauthenticatedClientAction is set to disallow unauthenticated traffic. The request never reaches the runtime, so the runtime cannot apply its SAS validation, and the inputs/outputs panel stays empty. Solution There are two ways to fix this, depending on what your security policy allows. Option 1 — Allow unauthenticated requests The simplest fix is to configure Easy Auth to allow unauthenticated requests. This does not mean anyone can invoke the workflow. Instead, all calls (failed and successful) are routed through to the Logic App runtime, and the runtime decides how to handle them: A workflow trigger call with no token → the runtime applies its own auth (SAS, AAD, etc.) and rejects unauthorized invocations. A run-history call carrying a valid SAS → App Service marks it as “failed Easy Auth” but still forwards it; the runtime sees the valid SAS and returns the data. The underlying App Service platform has no knowledge of SAS or any other Logic-App-specific auth scheme, so letting the runtime arbitrate is what makes the run-history experience work. Option 2 — Keep Easy Auth strict, but exclude the runtime paths In many enterprises the security team will not permit “Allow unauthenticated requests.” For those cases, you can leave authentication required but add the runtime endpoints to the excludedPaths list, so App Service skips Easy Auth specifically for those calls. The Logic App runtime continues to authenticate them via SAS. Important: The Azure portal lets you toggle Easy Auth, but it does not expose the excludedPaths setting. You must configure it through ARM, Bicep, the REST API, or CLI — which is exactly why this needs to live in your CI/CD pipeline. There are two ways to apply this through CI/CD. Approach 1 — ARM Template ( Microsoft.Web/sites/config ) Add a Microsoft.Web/sites/config resource of type authsettingsV2 to the same ARM template that deploys the Logic App. Below is the sample template: { "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#", "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0", "parameters": { "logicAppName": { "type": "string" }, "location": { "type": "string", "defaultValue": "[resourceGroup().location]" }, "tenantID": { "type": "string" }, "ClientID": { "type": "string" } }, "variables": {}, "resources": [ { "type": "Microsoft.Web/sites", "apiVersion": "2022-03-01", "name": "[parameters('logicAppName')]", "location": "[parameters('location')]", "kind": "functionapp,workflowapp", "identity": { "type": "SystemAssigned" }, "properties": { "serverFarmId": "<App Service Plan ID>", "siteConfig": { "appSettings": [ { "name": "FUNCTIONS_EXTENSION_VERSION", "value": "~4" }, { "name": "FUNCTIONS_WORKER_RUNTIME", "value": "dotnet" }, { "name": "AzureWebJobsStorage", "value": "<Storage Account Connection String>" }, { "name": "APP_KIND", "value": "workflowApp" } ] }, "httpsOnly": true } }, { "type": "Microsoft.Web/sites/config", "apiVersion": "2021-02-01", "name": "[concat(parameters('logicAppName'), '/authsettingsV2')]", "location": "[parameters('location')]", "properties": { "platform": { "enabled": true, "runtimeVersion": "~1" }, "globalValidation": { "requireAuthentication": true, "unauthenticatedClientAction": "Return401", "excludedPaths": ["/runtime/*"] }, "identityProviders": { "azureActiveDirectory": { "enabled": true, "registration": { "openIdIssuer": "[concat('https://sts.windows.net/', parameters('tenantID'), '/v2.0')]", "clientId": "parameters('ClientID')", "clientSecretSettingName": "OVERRIDE_USE_MI_FIC_ASSERTION_CLIENTID" }, "login": { "disableWWWAuthenticate": false }, "validation": { "jwtClaimChecks": {}, "allowedAudiences": [], "defaultAuthorizationPolicy": { "allowedPrincipals": {}, "allowedApplications": ["<LIST OF ALLOWED APPLICATIONS ID>"] } } } } }, "dependsOn": [ "[resourceId('Microsoft.Web/sites', parameters('logicAppName'))]" ] } ], "outputs": {} } Key things to notice in the template: requireAuthentication: true and unauthenticatedClientAction: Return401 keep Easy Auth strict for the public surface. excludedPaths: ["/runtime/*"] carves out the runtime endpoints so the SAS-authenticated run-history calls aren’t blocked. allowedApplications lets you whitelist specific AAD app IDs that are allowed to call the workflow. Reference: Microsoft.Web/sites/config — authsettingsV2 (ARM template) · Bicep variant This is the easiest way to add or update Easy Auth on a new or existing Logic App. Approach 2 — REST API call as a post-deployment pipeline step If you’d rather keep your infra template lean (or you’re updating Easy Auth on a Logic App that already exists), add a step to your CI/CD pipeline that calls the App Service authsettingsV2 REST API after the Logic App infra deployment completes. The payload mirrors the properties block from the ARM example above — including excludedPaths: ["/runtime/*"] . This approach is useful when: The Logic App is provisioned by a different pipeline or team than the one owning auth configuration. You need to update Easy Auth settings without redeploying the site. You want to apply environment-specific values (tenant ID, client ID, allowed application list) at release time rather than template-compile time. Reference: Web Apps - Update Auth Settings V2 - REST API (Azure App Service) | Microsoft Learn · GlobalValidation Summary The “inputs/outputs don’t load on run history” symptom after enabling Easy Auth is caused by App Service blocking SAS-authenticated runtime calls before the Logic App runtime can see them. Either allow unauthenticated requests (and let the runtime do all the auth), or keep Easy Auth strict and exclude /runtime/* . Because the portal doesn’t expose excludedPaths , the production-grade fix is to deploy it through CI/CD — either by adding an authsettingsV2 config resource to your ARM template or by calling the App Service auth REST API as a pipeline step after deployment.📣 MSLE Onboarding Session — Português
Olá, 👋 Espero que estejam bem! ✨Participe da sessão de introdução ao programa MSLE para Educadores! Nesta sessão: ✅ Vamos explorar os benefícios e o alcance do programa ✅ Conhecer em detalhe os dois portais principais aos quais você terá acesso ✅ Esclarecer todas as suas dúvidas em um ambiente colaborativo Este é o seu primeiro passo rumo a uma experiência enriquecedora, onde conhecimento, inovação e comunidade se unem para impulsionar você ao próximo nível. No horário indicado, favor realizar acesso ao link.Microsoft Learn for Educators sign up blocked by AVE
When trying to sign up for Microsoft Learn for Educators the sign up fails with the verification throwing up an error that the domain was blocked by AVE. The email from the domain used as institution email for verification is a M365 tenant with educative licenses. Our students can use their student mail to sign up for Azure for Students. I have tried the linked Microsoft Forms link - But I have not gotten a response so far. This is outside of the purview of Microsoft Customer Support, but it is also not directly related to our Azure/M365 Subscription. What are my best options to resolve this?Solved134Views0likes1CommentMC1457836 vs docs: Sentinel in unified RBAC with a service principal or GDAP. Which is it?
This is about the article https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-xdr/activate-defender-rbac, which states: Assigning permissions to a service principal or to a GDAP user group in Microsoft Sentinel isn’t supported in unified RBAC. If you need either capability, don’t activate Sentinel in unified RBAC yet. Continue using Azure RBAC for Microsoft Sentinel. Message center notice MC1457836 announces that Microsoft automatically enables unified RBAC on all tenants between late September and late December 2026, including Sentinel Reader, Responder and Contributor workspace permissions. These two statements cannot both be followed. The article tells affected customers not to activate Sentinel; MC1457836 activates it for them. This is not hypothetical for MSSPs. We operate a managed XDR service across roughly 25 customer tenants. Both unsupported capabilities are load-bearing in that model: A service principal holds Microsoft Sentinel Contributor through Azure Lighthouse and deploys analytics rules via ARM (Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules). GDAP user groups are the standard delegated access route for partners. Could this be clarified: Does the service principal and GDAP limitation also apply to tenants activated through the MC1457836 automatic rollout, or does that path behave differently? If it does apply, what is the recommended action for tenants that are auto-activated before the limitation is lifted? Is deactivating the Sentinel workload after activation the supported mitigation, and is it expected to fully restore Azure RBAC behaviour for a service principal? Can a tenant be excluded from automatic Sentinel activation in advance, rather than only opting out afterwards? The article also warns that changing permissions in the Azure portal after Sentinel is active in unified RBAC may cause sync errors. For Lighthouse-delegated permissions, which are managed outside the customer tenant entirely, is that a supported configuration once Sentinel is active? A note in the “Before you begin” section describing how this limitation interacts with the automatic rollout would help partners decide whether to pre-emptively opt out.117Views0likes0CommentsPower BI, PL-300
I am new to this program, creating a community college level course on Power BI. I have accessed the downloads; however, I do not see the actual content anywhere. I even found best practices for 12 modules, but I can't find the modules/course materials for students anywhere. Can you please provide a link or instructions on where to go. Thank you!Solved337Views0likes1Comment