Operational Notes on Microsoft Security Copilot Agents in Defender XDR and Microsoft Entra ID
Microsoft Security Copilot is now becoming more visible inside day-to-day security operations, especially through embedded experiences and agent-based workflows across Microsoft Defender XDR, Microsoft Entra ID, Microsoft Intune, and Microsoft Purview. Instead of looking at Security Copilot only as a standalone prompt interface, SOC and identity teams should also understand how Security Copilot agents are deployed, how they consume Security Compute Units, how they appear in operational workflows, and where activity can be monitored. This post summarizes practical observations from a security operations perspective, with a focus on Microsoft Defender XDR, Microsoft Entra ID, usage monitoring, and KQL-based activity review. Licensing & Capacity Units Requirements Requires eligible Microsoft security licensing, typically: Microsoft 365 E5 Microsoft 365 E7 Security Compute Units (SCUs) Security Copilot capacity is measured using Security Compute Units (SCUs). SCUs are billed based on provisioned capacity. Indicative pricing: $4 per Provisionied SCU/hour $6 per Overage SCU/hour Billing is calculated hourly, based on the amount of SCUs provisioned. Included Capacity Organizations with: 1,000 Microsoft 365 E5 licenses Receive: 400 included SCUs Included SCUs are shared across the tenant within a common capacity pool. Scaling SCU capacity can be scaled dynamically based on operational requirements and workload demand. Data Retention Security Copilot session and interaction data without active SCU-backed retention is typically retained for: 90 days Security Copilot Agents - Microsoft Defender This section outlines the Microsoft Security Copilot agents currently available in the Microsoft Defender portal. NameKey characteristics Security Alert Triage Agent (Preview) Manual setup from Defender portal Automatically creates Unified RBAC custom role Runs automatically when a user reports a suspicious email or when a new supported alert is generated, supported alert sources: MDI, MDC, MDO If an alert tuning rule is enabled, it will be automatically disabled when the agent is deployed. Creates and connects with agentic user account: Phishing Triage Agent (Security Copilot) Automatic alert assignment to SecurityCopilotAgentUser-db16fec3-f1fb-4632-843e-46d07408c584@<tenant-domain>Alert was assigned to Phishing Triage Agent (Security Copilot). Adds Tag Agent to the created Incidents Threat Hunting Agent Manual setup from Defender portal Automatically creates Unified RBAC custom role This agent runs manually. There isn't an automatic trigger. Creates and connects with agentic user account: Threat Hunting Agent (Security Copilot) Analyst Questions in natural language Generates and executed KQL queries in Advanced hunting Provides charts, dynamic follow-up questions and remediation actions recommendations No activity is identified from agent's identity during agent execution Threat Intelligence Briefing Agent Manual setup from Defender portal Provides automated TI briefing summary Configured from https://security.microsoft.com/securitysettings/defender/agent_configuration-threatintelligencebriefingagent Security Analyst Agent Manual setup from Defender portal Dynamic Threat Detection Agent (Preview) Automatically enabled always-on, runs continuously in the background Correlates: Alerts, Security events, Behavioral anomalies, TI signals Generates Alerts with Detection Source: Security Copilot The Alerts can be correlated with existing Multi-Stage Incidents No agentic user account identity is used by this agent Available free of charge during public preview, will begin consuming Security Compute Units (SCUs) once generally available (GA) Incidents handled by Security Alert Triage Agent: Alerts created by Dynamic Threat Detection Agent: Execution of Threat Hunting Agent: View agents in use: https://security.microsoft.com/security-copilot/agents View Unified RBAC custom roles: https://security.microsoft.com/mtp_roles View Security Copilot user identities in Microsoft Entra ID: Notes: CloudAppEvents activity logs only from the following agents: Phishing Triage Agent Conditional Access Optimization Agent Security Copilot Agents - Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access Optimization Agent Usage Monitoring Sign-in to Security Copilot portal using Global Admin account and navigate to the following location: https://securitycopilot.microsoft.com/usage-monitoring Reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/copilot/security/manage-usage Logging Activity Copilot Agents Management: CloudAppEvents | where ActionType contains "CopilotAgent" | extend AgentName = RawEventData.AgentName | extend Workload = RawEventData.Workload | extend ResultStatus = RawEventData.ResultStatus | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, ResultStatus, AgentName, Application, Workload All Copilot Workload data: CloudAppEvents | extend Workload = RawEventData.Workload | where Workload == "Copilot" | summarize EventCount = count() by ActionType, AccountDisplayName
📣 MSLE Onboarding Session — Português
Olá, 👋 Espero que estejam bem! ✨Participe da sessão de introdução ao programa MSLE para Educadores! Nesta sessão: ✅ Vamos explorar os benefícios e o alcance do programa ✅ Conhecer em detalhe os dois portais principais aos quais você terá acesso ✅ Esclarecer todas as suas dúvidas em um ambiente colaborativo Este é o seu primeiro passo rumo a uma experiência enriquecedora, onde conhecimento, inovação e comunidade se unem para impulsionar você ao próximo nível. No horário indicado, favor realizar acesso ao link.MSLE Onboarding Session — English
✨ Ready to take your teaching to the next level? Join Carlos, our MSLE Community Manager (English), for an exclusive induction session on the MSLE Program for Educators! ✅ Discover the benefits and scope of the program ✅ Explore the two main portals you’ll have access to ✅ Get your questions answered in a collaborative environment This is your first step toward an enriching experience where knowledge, innovation, and community come together to empower you. 📅 Don’t miss it—your journey starts here! MSLE Onboarding Session — English | Meeting-Join | Microsoft Teams
MSLE Onboarding Session — French
✨ Envie de faire évoluer votre manière d'enseigner ? Rejoignez la séance de présentation exclusive du programme MSLE (Microsoft Learn pour les Enseignants ) ! ✅ Découvrez les avantages du programme ✅ Explorez les deux principaux portails auxquels vous aurez accès ✅ Posez vos questions dans un environnement collaboratif C’est votre première étape vers une expérience enrichissante où savoir, innovation et communauté se rejoignent pour vous accompagner. 📅 Ne manquez pas cette opportunité. Votre parcours commence ici ! Rejoignez la réunion ici
Easy Auth Configuration for Logic App Standard through CI/CD
Problem Statement When Easy Auth (Azure App Service’s built-in authentication and authorization) is enabled on a Logic App Standard, users frequently report that they cannot open the run history. Specifically, the inputs and outputs of the trigger and actions fail to load on the run details page, even though the workflow itself runs and the user has access to the resource. Background — How Easy Auth Interacts with Logic Apps Easy Auth is a feature of Azure App Service. Every request that reaches a Logic App Standard is first routed through the App Service layer, and only then handed off to the Logic App runtime for further processing. When Easy Auth is enabled, App Service authenticates each incoming request and decides whether it should be allowed or blocked — before the Logic App runtime ever sees it. This dual-layer model is what causes the run-history symptom: The Logic App runtime authenticates run-history requests using a SAS token specific to that run, generated from the Logic App access keys. The portal calls that load the inputs and outputs of historical runs do not carry a bearer token — they carry the SAS. Because App Service only knows how to validate Easy Auth tokens (not SAS), it blocks these requests whenever unauthenticatedClientAction is set to disallow unauthenticated traffic. The request never reaches the runtime, so the runtime cannot apply its SAS validation, and the inputs/outputs panel stays empty. Solution There are two ways to fix this, depending on what your security policy allows. Option 1 — Allow unauthenticated requests The simplest fix is to configure Easy Auth to allow unauthenticated requests. This does not mean anyone can invoke the workflow. Instead, all calls (failed and successful) are routed through to the Logic App runtime, and the runtime decides how to handle them: A workflow trigger call with no token → the runtime applies its own auth (SAS, AAD, etc.) and rejects unauthorized invocations. A run-history call carrying a valid SAS → App Service marks it as “failed Easy Auth” but still forwards it; the runtime sees the valid SAS and returns the data. The underlying App Service platform has no knowledge of SAS or any other Logic-App-specific auth scheme, so letting the runtime arbitrate is what makes the run-history experience work. Option 2 — Keep Easy Auth strict, but exclude the runtime paths In many enterprises the security team will not permit “Allow unauthenticated requests.” For those cases, you can leave authentication required but add the runtime endpoints to the excludedPaths list, so App Service skips Easy Auth specifically for those calls. The Logic App runtime continues to authenticate them via SAS. Important: The Azure portal lets you toggle Easy Auth, but it does not expose the excludedPaths setting. You must configure it through ARM, Bicep, the REST API, or CLI — which is exactly why this needs to live in your CI/CD pipeline. There are two ways to apply this through CI/CD. Approach 1 — ARM Template ( Microsoft.Web/sites/config ) Add a Microsoft.Web/sites/config resource of type authsettingsV2 to the same ARM template that deploys the Logic App. Below is the sample template: { "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#", "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0", "parameters": { "logicAppName": { "type": "string" }, "location": { "type": "string", "defaultValue": "[resourceGroup().location]" }, "tenantID": { "type": "string" }, "ClientID": { "type": "string" } }, "variables": {}, "resources": [ { "type": "Microsoft.Web/sites", "apiVersion": "2022-03-01", "name": "[parameters('logicAppName')]", "location": "[parameters('location')]", "kind": "functionapp,workflowapp", "identity": { "type": "SystemAssigned" }, "properties": { "serverFarmId": "<App Service Plan ID>", "siteConfig": { "appSettings": [ { "name": "FUNCTIONS_EXTENSION_VERSION", "value": "~4" }, { "name": "FUNCTIONS_WORKER_RUNTIME", "value": "dotnet" }, { "name": "AzureWebJobsStorage", "value": "<Storage Account Connection String>" }, { "name": "APP_KIND", "value": "workflowApp" } ] }, "httpsOnly": true } }, { "type": "Microsoft.Web/sites/config", "apiVersion": "2021-02-01", "name": "[concat(parameters('logicAppName'), '/authsettingsV2')]", "location": "[parameters('location')]", "properties": { "platform": { "enabled": true, "runtimeVersion": "~1" }, "globalValidation": { "requireAuthentication": true, "unauthenticatedClientAction": "Return401", "excludedPaths": ["/runtime/*"] }, "identityProviders": { "azureActiveDirectory": { "enabled": true, "registration": { "openIdIssuer": "[concat('https://sts.windows.net/', parameters('tenantID'), '/v2.0')]", "clientId": "parameters('ClientID')", "clientSecretSettingName": "OVERRIDE_USE_MI_FIC_ASSERTION_CLIENTID" }, "login": { "disableWWWAuthenticate": false }, "validation": { "jwtClaimChecks": {}, "allowedAudiences": [], "defaultAuthorizationPolicy": { "allowedPrincipals": {}, "allowedApplications": ["<LIST OF ALLOWED APPLICATIONS ID>"] } } } } }, "dependsOn": [ "[resourceId('Microsoft.Web/sites', parameters('logicAppName'))]" ] } ], "outputs": {} } Key things to notice in the template: requireAuthentication: true and unauthenticatedClientAction: Return401 keep Easy Auth strict for the public surface. excludedPaths: ["/runtime/*"] carves out the runtime endpoints so the SAS-authenticated run-history calls aren’t blocked. allowedApplications lets you whitelist specific AAD app IDs that are allowed to call the workflow. Reference: Microsoft.Web/sites/config — authsettingsV2 (ARM template) · Bicep variant This is the easiest way to add or update Easy Auth on a new or existing Logic App. Approach 2 — REST API call as a post-deployment pipeline step If you’d rather keep your infra template lean (or you’re updating Easy Auth on a Logic App that already exists), add a step to your CI/CD pipeline that calls the App Service authsettingsV2 REST API after the Logic App infra deployment completes. The payload mirrors the properties block from the ARM example above — including excludedPaths: ["/runtime/*"] . This approach is useful when: The Logic App is provisioned by a different pipeline or team than the one owning auth configuration. You need to update Easy Auth settings without redeploying the site. You want to apply environment-specific values (tenant ID, client ID, allowed application list) at release time rather than template-compile time. Reference: Web Apps - Update Auth Settings V2 - REST API (Azure App Service) | Microsoft Learn · GlobalValidation Summary The “inputs/outputs don’t load on run history” symptom after enabling Easy Auth is caused by App Service blocking SAS-authenticated runtime calls before the Logic App runtime can see them. Either allow unauthenticated requests (and let the runtime do all the auth), or keep Easy Auth strict and exclude /runtime/* . Because the portal doesn’t expose excludedPaths , the production-grade fix is to deploy it through CI/CD — either by adding an authsettingsV2 config resource to your ARM template or by calling the App Service auth REST API as a pipeline step after deployment.Identity Attack Graph in Microsoft Sentinel
Identity is now one of the most important attack surfaces in cloud security. In many real-world incidents, attackers do not rely only on malware or network movement. Instead, they abuse identities, permissions, role assignments, group memberships, service principals, and misconfigured access paths to move from an initial compromise to high-value resources. This is why the new Identity Attack Graph in Microsoft Sentinel is an important capability. It helps security teams visualize how identities are connected to Azure resources and how an attacker could potentially move from one identity to another resource through permissions and relationships. What is the Identity Attack Graph? The Identity Attack Graph in Microsoft Sentinel provides a visual way to understand how identities, permissions, groups, and Azure resources are connected. Instead of manually checking multiple portals, logs, and role assignments, the graph helps analysts understand relationships such as: Which identities have access to specific Azure resources Which users or service principals are over-privileged Which groups provide indirect access to sensitive resources Which identities may have a path to critical assets What the potential blast radius of a compromised identity could be How attackers could move laterally through identity and permission relationships This is especially useful because identity risk is often not obvious when looking at a single user, group, or role assignment in isolation. The real risk usually appears when these relationships are connected together. A user may not directly have access to a sensitive resource, but the user may be a member of a group that has access to another resource, which then has permissions that create a path toward a high-value asset. The Identity Attack Graph helps expose these hidden relationships. Why this matters In many Azure environments, permissions grow over time. Users change roles, groups are reused, emergency access is granted, service principals are created, and temporary permissions are not always removed. As a result, organizations often end up with: Too many privileged identities Unused or stale permissions Service principals with excessive access Guest users with unnecessary permissions Groups that provide indirect access to sensitive resources Subscription-level roles that are broader than required Lack of visibility into who can reach critical assets Traditional investigation usually requires analysts to move between several places, including Microsoft Entra ID, Azure RBAC, Azure Activity logs, Sentinel queries, Defender XDR, and Azure Resource Graph. The Identity Attack Graph reduces this complexity by presenting identity relationships as a connected graph. This makes it easier to answer practical security questions such as: “What can this identity access?” “What happens if this user is compromised?” “Which identities have a path to critical resources?” “Which access path should we remediate first?” “Which permissions create the highest risk?” “Why does this identity have access to this asset?” Key use cases The feature can support several important identity security and cloud security scenarios. 1. Attack path discovery Security teams can use the graph to identify how an attacker could move from a compromised identity to a sensitive Azure resource. This is useful during both proactive assessments and active incident response. For example, if a user account is suspected to be compromised, the graph can help identify which resources may be reachable through that identity’s direct or indirect permissions. 2. Blast-radius analysis When an identity is compromised, one of the first questions is: What could the attacker access with this identity? The Identity Attack Graph can help analysts understand the potential impact of a compromised user, group, service principal, or managed identity. This can help with containment, prioritization, and communication with stakeholders. 3. Over-privileged identity detection The graph can help identify identities that have more permissions than they need. Include: Users with Owner or Contributor access at subscription level Service principals with broad permissions Guest users with privileged access Groups that grant access to sensitive resources Identities that have access to multiple critical assets This is useful for enforcing least privilege and reducing identity attack surface. 4. Privileged access review IAM and cloud security teams can use the graph to support access reviews. Instead of only reviewing a list of role assignments, teams can understand the real impact of those permissions. This helps answer: Is this role assignment still required? Does this group create unnecessary risk? Does this identity have access to critical resources? Is this access direct or inherited? Is this path expected or suspicious? 5. Incident response and threat hunting For SOC teams, the graph can support investigations involving: Suspicious sign-ins Compromised users Privilege escalation Suspicious role assignments Lateral movement Service principal abuse Unusual access to sensitive resources The graph does not replace logs or hunting queries, but it gives analysts a faster way to understand relationships and prioritize what to investigate next. Important prerequisites and setup notes During my evaluation, there were a few important setup requirements that should be clearly highlighted. Microsoft Sentinel permissions The environment must already be onboarded to Microsoft Sentinel, and the user testing or configuring the feature must have the appropriate Microsoft Sentinel permissions. The documented role requirement includes Microsoft Sentinel Contributor. However, in my experience, this is not always enough for the full onboarding and validation experience. Subscription-level Owner permission One important prerequisite that should be clearly mentioned is that Owner permissions at the Azure subscription level may be required. This is especially important during onboarding and activation, because the graph depends on access to Azure resource and permission relationships. If the user does not have sufficient subscription-level permissions, some setup steps or visibility into resources and relationships may not work as expected. Recommended permission note: In addition to Microsoft Sentinel permissions, ensure that the user configuring the preview has Owner permissions at the subscription level for the subscriptions that should be represented in the graph. This should be made very clear in the onboarding documentation to avoid confusion during deployment. Required data connector: Azure Resource Graph Another very important setup step is the Azure Resource Graph data connector. The Azure Resource Graph connector must be: Installed manually Activated manually Connected to the relevant Sentinel workspace This is a key point. The connector is not automatically enabled just because the Identity Attack Graph feature is available. Without this connector, Sentinel may not have the required Azure resource relationship data needed to build a useful graph. Why Azure Resource Graph is important Azure Resource Graph provides visibility across Azure resources, subscriptions, and relationships. For an identity attack graph, this data is essential. The graph needs to understand not only identities, but also the resources those identities can reach. This may include: Subscriptions Resource groups Storage accounts Key Vaults Virtual machines Managed identities Role assignments Resource relationships Resource hierarchy Critical assets Without Azure Resource Graph data, the attack graph may not provide the full picture of how identities connect to Azure resources. For this reason, I believe the onboarding instructions should explicitly state: The Azure Resource Graph data connector must be manually installed and activated before using the Identity Attack Graph. Recommended onboarding checklist Before using the Identity Attack Graph, I would recommend validating the following: Requirement Recommendation Microsoft Sentinel workspace Ensure the workspace is active and accessible Sentinel role Microsoft Sentinel Contributor or equivalent access Subscription permissions Owner permissions at subscription level Azure Resource Graph connector Manually install and activate the connector Azure RBAC visibility Ensure access to relevant role assignments Microsoft Entra ID visibility Ensure identity and group data is available Resource visibility Validate that relevant subscriptions and resources are visible Data freshness Allow enough time for data collection and graph population This checklist can help avoid issues where the feature appears available but does not show the expected relationships. How the Identity Attack Graph improves investigation Before using a graph-based approach, an analyst often needs to manually collect and correlate data from multiple sources. A typical investigation may include: Checking the user in Microsoft Entra ID Reviewing group memberships Reviewing Azure RBAC assignments Checking subscription-level access Looking at resource-level permissions Reviewing PIM activations Searching Sentinel logs Running KQL queries Checking Azure Activity logs Validating access with cloud or IAM teams This process can be time-consuming. The Identity Attack Graph helps reduce this effort by showing relationships visually. This allows the analyst to understand the possible path faster and decide where to focus. For example, instead of manually asking: “Does this user have access to this resource through any group, role, or inherited permission?” The graph can help show the relationship directly. This is valuable because many risky permissions are indirect. The user may not have direct access, but may inherit access through a group, role assignment, nested relationship, or service principal path. Where validation is still needed Although the graph provides strong visibility, I would still validate findings before taking remediation action. This is especially important because removing access can affect business operations or production systems. I would still validate with: Microsoft Sentinel KQL queries Microsoft Entra sign-in logs Microsoft Entra audit logs Azure Activity logs Azure RBAC role assignments PIM activation history Defender XDR signals Defender for Cloud recommendations Azure Resource Graph queries IAM team input Cloud platform team input Application owner confirmation The graph is very useful for discovery and prioritization, but final remediation decisions should still be validated. GQL and graph-based investigation One of the interesting aspects of this feature is the use of graph-based thinking. Security teams are already familiar with query languages such as KQL for log analytics. However, graph investigation is different. KQL is excellent for searching and analyzing events over time, such as sign-ins, alerts, audit logs, and activity logs. Graph Query Language, or GQL, is designed for querying connected data. Instead of only asking what happened at a specific time, graph queries help answer how entities are connected. In identity security, this is very powerful because the risk often exists in the relationship between objects. Graph entities include: Users Groups Service principals Managed identities Roles Subscriptions Resource groups Azure resources Permissions Sessions Attack paths Graph relationships include: User is member of group Group has role assignment Identity has access to resource Service principal owns application Managed identity can access Key Vault User can escalate privilege Identity can reach critical asset This allows analysts to ask more relationship-focused questions, such as: Which identities can reach this resource? What is the shortest path from this user to a critical asset? Which groups create privileged access? Which service principals have paths to sensitive resources? Which identities have indirect access through nested relationships? Which attack paths include subscription Owner or Contributor permissions? KQL vs GQL: why both are useful KQL and GQL serve different but complementary purposes. Area KQL GQL / Graph Querying Main purpose Analyze logs and events Analyze relationships and paths Best for Time-based investigation Connected identity/resource investigation question “Did this user sign in from a risky location?” “What resources can this user reach?” Data model Tables Nodes and edges Common use Detection, hunting, analytics Attack path discovery, relationship mapping Strength Event correlation Path discovery In practice, security teams need both. KQL can identify a suspicious sign-in. The Identity Attack Graph can show what the compromised identity could access. KQL can then be used again to validate whether the attacker interacted with those resources. This creates a strong workflow between event-based detection and relationship-based investigation. Graph investigation scenarios The following are conceptual are the types of graph questions that would be useful in identity attack path analysis. Find paths from a user to critical resources A useful graph query would help answer: Show me all paths from this user to critical Azure resources. This could help determine whether a compromised identity has a direct or indirect route to sensitive assets. Find identities with paths to Key Vaults Key Vaults often contain secrets, certificates, and keys. A graph query could help identify: Which users, groups, service principals, or managed identities have a path to Key Vault resources? This would be useful for prioritizing access review and remediation. Find subscription-level privileged identities Subscription-level roles are high-impact because they can provide broad access. A graph query could help find: Which identities have Owner or Contributor access at subscription level? This is especially important because subscription-level permissions can create wide attack paths. Find indirect access through groups Many access paths are created through group membership. A graph query could help answer: Which users have access to this resource through group membership? This can help IAM teams clean up excessive or unnecessary group-based access. Find service principals with broad access Service principals are often used for automation and applications, but they can become high-risk if over-privileged. A useful query would identify: Which service principals have broad access to subscriptions or critical resources? This is important because service principal compromise can lead to significant impact. How GQL can improve analyst workflows Adding strong GQL support to the graph explorer would make the feature more powerful for advanced users. You could use graph queries to: Search for specific paths Filter by identity type Filter by role Filter by resource type Find shortest paths Find high-risk paths Exclude known approved paths Focus on critical assets Query only privileged relationships Identify unexpected permission chains This would help both SOC analysts and cloud security engineers move from visual exploration to repeatable analysis. A SOC analyst may want a quick visual graph during an incident, while a cloud security engineer
