How to check RDP access to the server
Hello, I have a virtual machine running Windows Server 2019 Datacenter with Active Directory, and all users access it via RDP. No specific access configurations have been set up; I wanted to know if it is possible to check how many times a specific user has connected and from which IP address—is that possible? Also, I wanted to ask if it is possible to determine whether a specific user copied files to their local PC using copy/paste during a session. Thank youSecure Boot update still pending on deadline day
After checking the registry keys on 2x VMs which run services for a number of important customers I found they both have: UEFICA2023Error 2147942750 Apparently this means they're pending a reboot. https://blog.mindcore.dk/2026/04/secure-boot-certificate-update-intune/ I can't reboot the VM inside working hours, can they be rebooted after the deadline or do I need to disable Secure Boot on the VMs? I'm concerned I'll have to disable Secure Boot before they're next rebooted for Windows updates.Save the date: Secure Boot Q&A in July
To help, Microsoft is continuing its Q&A series with several opportunities to connect directly with Microsoft experts. Whether you're managing physical servers, virtualized workloads, or working with your hardware partners on firmware readiness, you can get answers to the questions that matter most to your environment. Learn more and add the events to your calendar: 8:00 AM PDT July 1 - Windows Server Secure Boot AMA 8:00 AM PDT July 8 - Secure Boot Office Hours for virtualized environments 7:00 AM - 7:00 PM PDT July 15 - OEM Secure Boot Office Hours If there's a question that's been holding up your rollout—or one you simply want to validate before moving forward—this is a great opportunity to ask. Feel free to post questions ahead of time or join the conversation live. We look forward to seeing you there.
Windows Server 2025 update with error 0x80073712
Hello Can I have some help? Windows Server 2025 Std, V 24H2, OS build: 26100.32522 The 2026-04 Security Update (KB5082063) (26100.32690) fails with the following error: Installation failed: Windows failed to install the following update with error 0x80073712: 2026-04 Security Update (KB5082063) (26100.32690). Thanks in advance MadUrantia
Phase 2 of Kerberos RC4 hardening begins with the April 2026 Windows security update
Windows updates released in April 2026 and later begin the second deployment phase of protections designed to address a Kerberos information disclosure vulnerability (CVE‑2026‑20833). This second phase continues the shift away from legacy encryption types such as RC4 by moving toward stronger default ticket behavior. After installing the April 2026 update, domain controllers default to supporting Advanced Encryption Standard (AES‑SHA1) encrypted tickets for accounts that do not have an explicit Kerberos encryption type configuration. If your organization relies on service accounts or applications that depend on RC4-based Kerberos service tickets, now is the time to address those dependencies to avoid authentication issues before the Enforcement phase begins in July 2026. Microsoft recommends continuing to monitor the System event log for Kerberos-related audit events and identify and address misconfigurations or remaining dependencies, then enabling enforcement when warning, blocking, or policy events are no longer logged. See How to manage Kerberos KDC usage of RC4 for service account ticket issuance changes related to CVE-2026-20833 and CVE‑2026‑20833 to learn more about the vulnerability, timelines, recommended preparation steps, and configuration options to ensure compliance before Enforcement mode begins in July 2026.
ntoskrnl.exe and build version not getting updated after applying KB5078740 on server 2025
I have installed the latest March patch kb5078740 on server 2025 which was upgraded from server 2022. the patch is showing installed but the ntoskrnl.exe and build version is still showing 10.0.26100.4652. Qualys is detecting it as patch not installed based on file version which should be 10.0.21600.32522. Please let me know how to fix this issue.Bookmark the Secure Boot playbook for Windows Server
Secure Boot is a long‑standing security capability that works in conjunction with the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to confirm that firmware and boot components are trusted before they are allowed to run. Microsoft is updating the Secure Boot certificates originally issued in 2011 to ensure Windows devices continue to verify trusted boot software. These older certificates begin expiring in June 2026. While Windows Server 2025 certified server platforms already include the 2023 certificates in firmware. For servers that do not, you will need to manually update the certificates. Unlike Windows PCs, which may receive the 2023 Secure Boot certificates through Controlled Feature Rollout (CFR) as part of the monthly update process, Windows Server requires manual action. Luckily, there is a step=by-step guide to help! With the Secure Boot Playbook for Windows Server, you'll find information on the tools and options available to help you update Secure Boot certificates on Windows Server. Check it out today!CrowdStrike Secure Boot Lifecycle Management Content Pack
CrowdStrike has recently released the Secure Boot Lifecycle Management Content Pack. This new feature helps Falcon for IT module users manage Windows Secure Boot certificate updates ahead of these certificates’ expiration beginning in late June 2026. The dashboard provides an at‑a‑glance view of Secure Boot–enabled devices, showing which systems are already compliant with the updated 2023 Secure Boot certificate, which are in progress, and which are blocked or require opt‑in to a managed rollout. It also highlights certificate update failures that may require investigation. In addition, overall readiness is summarized through a compliance gauge, while a 30‑day trend shows how pass and fail counts change as remediation progresses. Filters by operating system, server edition, hostname, and update status help administrators quickly identify devices that need action to help ensure systems remain secure after the certificates expire. The feature also provides management options to opt devices into Microsoft's managed rollout for gradual, tested deployment, and to block updates on hardware with known compatibility issues to prevent boot failures. Note that this feature is available as part of CrowdStrike's Falcon for IT module. CrowdStrike Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) customers who are not licensed for this module can enable a free trial from the CrowdStrike Store. To learn more about this feature, please see the content pack tutorial video.
Beyond RC4 for Windows authentication - Question regarding KB5073381
In KB5021131 MS recommends setting the value for DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes to 0x38, in the new KB 5073381 it's 0x18. This removes the setting that forces "AES Session Keys" which should be fine if Kerberos Tickets can only use AES Encryption. But what about accounts that have RC4 enabled in their msds-supportedEncryptionTypes attribute? They could still use RC4 for Kerberos ticket encryption and would then also fallback to RC4 session ticket encryption. As far as I believe the DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes was explicitly introduced to avoid this scenario. Or is there now some hard-coded mechanism that always ensures that Session Keys are AES encrypted?
