Announcing Trusted Launch for Virtual Machines for Windows Server Insiders
Trusted Launch for virtual machines We are excited to announce Trusted Launch for virtual machines (TVMs) in Windows Server Insider Preview. Trusted Launch is a security feature you can enable when creating Hyper-V Generation 2 VMs. It enables Secure Boot, installs a virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM), protects vTPM state at rest, and supports boot integrity verification (ability to verify if the VM started in a well-known good state). Further, when the VM runs in a Failover Cluster, the vTPM state is automatically made available when the VM live migrates or fails over to other nodes in the cluster – this ensures the VM remains available after migration or failover. This is unlike a Generation 2 VM with a vTPM, which will not start after migration or failover to another node in the cluster – the TPM state protection key needs to be moved to the destination node manually so the VM can start. With boot integrity verification, the entire boot path is measured and boot integrity is verified by Microsoft Azure Attestation service. This helps detect any alterations to the boot path or boot components. Such alterations, e.g. implanting malware in the boot path, can be detected by boot integrity verification. Increasingly attackers prefer implanting malware in the boot path for a variety of reasons: the OS layer is usually well protected, while firmware – as highly privileged code – can be used to alter what gets loaded (boot loader and drivers). Such alterations are not easily detectable by anti-virus software running at the OS layer. Boot integrity verification helps detect such alterations so a relying party (such as an app or service) can take suitable remediation actions, e.g. shutting down the VM. Boot integrity verification is an important part of establishing trust by verifying that the virtual machine started in a well-known good state. Insider preview TVMs are available for preview starting with Windows Server Insider preview build 29621. This initial preview only supports some of the Trusted Launch capabilities: Secure boot, vTPM, and vTPM state protection (at rest). You can create and manage TVMs using PowerShell. Guest state protection: The guest state (including the vTPM state) for each TVM is protected using a unique key that is stored in a KSP (Key Storage Provider) local to the server. Without this key, the VM will not start. Moving the VM to another server is not supported in this release. Not supported in this release: Moving TVMs to another server. TVMs in Failover Clusters or Hyper-V Replica. Boot integrity verification. Support for TVMs in Windows Admin Center (WAC). Instructions At a high-level, the steps involve: Install Windows Server Insider preview build on your server Enable Hyper-V Enable Trusted Launch feature Verify guest state protection 1. Install Windows Server Insider preview build Trusted Launch for virtual machines is available starting with the Windows Insider preview build number 29621. Install this build or a later build on your server. (Join Windows Server Insiders if you haven’t already!) 2. Enable Hyper-V (if it is not already enabled) Install-WindowsFeature -Name Hyper-V -IncludeManagementTools -Restart After enabling Hyper-V, the server needs to be restarted. 3. Set registry key property value (required to enable the Trusted Launch feature) New-Item -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AszIgvmAgent" -Force New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AszIgvmAgent" -Name "TvmWinServer" -Value 1 -PropertyType DWord -Force Setting the above regkey informs relevant system components that the Trusted Launch feature is being used in a Windows Server environment. 4. Enable Trusted Launch feature Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName "IsolatedGuestVm" -NoRestart 5. Verify if IgvmAgent is running IgvmAgent (Isolated Guest Virtual Machine agent) is a system-level service that helps support Trusted Launch capabilities. Get-Service -Name "IGVmAgent" The output should show Status as Running. If the Status is Running, you can skip to next step. If the Status is not Running, please report the issue. Add the following event logs to the report: Event Viewer: Applications and Services Logs => Microsoft => Windows => IGVmAgent => Operational Event Viewer: Applications and Services Logs => Microsoft => Windows => IGVmSystem => Operational You can open Event Viewer via the Run dialog: Press Win + R → type "eventvwr.msc" → press Enter 6. Create an external virtual switch (if you don't already have one you can use) Create and configure a virtual switch with Hyper-V | Microsoft Learn To see available external virtual switches: (Get-VMSwitch | Where-Object { $_.SwitchType -eq "External" }).Name 7. Create TVM If you already have a virtual hard disk (VHD or VHDX) for a Gen 2 VM with an installed guest OS, run: New-VM -Name <VMName> -Generation 2 -GuestStateIsolationType TrustedLaunch -SwitchName <virtual switch name> -VHDPath <path to vhdx> -Path <path to where VM config files will be stored> Else, run: New-VM -Name <VMName> -SwitchName <virtual switch name> -NewVHDPath <path to where new VHD will be stored> -NewVHDSizeBytes 40GB -Generation 2 -GuestStateIsolationType TrustedLaunch -Path <path to where VM config files will be stored> Then, add to the VM a virtual DVD drive containing an ISO image for the guest OS (Windows or Linux OS-compatible with Hyper-V Gen 2 virtual machine). Add-VMDvdDrive -VMName <VMName> -Path <Guest OS ISO image path> Note: The guest OS will be installed when the VM starts up. When connecting to the VM you will be prompted to install the guest OS from the DVD drive. Make sure that the DVD drive is at the top of the boot order specified in the firmware so the VM will boot from the DVD drive. For more information, see New-VM. 8. Verify VM guest state isolation type (Get-VM -name <VMName>).GuestStateIsolationType should return "TrustedLaunch". 9. Verify guest state protection To verify guest state protection, stop IGVmAgent service and restart the VM. Without IGVmAgent in Running state, a TVM with guest state protection will not start. Call to action Trusted Launch brings foundational VM security — Secure Boot, a vTPM, and protected guest state — to Windows Server, helping safeguard your VMs against boot-level and firmware threats. Please try out TVMs and provide your feedback via the Windows Server Insiders Forum. — Christina Curlette and Ram Jeyaraman (and the Windows Server team)
How to check RDP access to the server
Hello, I have a virtual machine running Windows Server 2019 Datacenter with Active Directory, and all users access it via RDP. No specific access configurations have been set up; I wanted to know if it is possible to check how many times a specific user has connected and from which IP address—is that possible? Also, I wanted to ask if it is possible to determine whether a specific user copied files to their local PC using copy/paste during a session. Thank you
ntoskrnl.exe and build version not getting updated after applying KB5078740 on server 2025
I have installed the latest March patch kb5078740 on server 2025 which was upgraded from server 2022. the patch is showing installed but the ntoskrnl.exe and build version is still showing 10.0.26100.4652. Qualys is detecting it as patch not installed based on file version which should be 10.0.21600.32522. Please let me know how to fix this issue.Secure Boot update still pending on deadline day
After checking the registry keys on 2x VMs which run services for a number of important customers I found they both have: UEFICA2023Error 2147942750 Apparently this means they're pending a reboot. https://blog.mindcore.dk/2026/04/secure-boot-certificate-update-intune/ I can't reboot the VM inside working hours, can they be rebooted after the deadline or do I need to disable Secure Boot on the VMs? I'm concerned I'll have to disable Secure Boot before they're next rebooted for Windows updates.BLOG: Windows Insiders - State of vbscript deprecation June 2026
While I greatly appreciate the decision of vbscript / cscript / wscript removal, with security and hardening in mind – I would also appreciate if Microsoft could be actively using the vNext release channel, preparing for feature removal. With this blogpost, I am sharing my point of view on the state of dependencies I am seeing in this regard, focusing on a way forward towards the full removal of vbscript. My findings show, that there is a quite some action required, and this stands a bit contrary to the announcement, Microsoft intends removing the optional feature of vbscript by default with the upcoming release - anticipated by fall 2027. Given my lessons learned from Secure Boot CA2023 exchange initiative, Microsoft guidance, foremost PowerShell based scripts, tooling and dashboards have been released quite late, looking at the timeline, considering the impact and scale customers had to deal with, and consequences for their security posture if they are not ready and done, with first certificates to expire soon. Taking this learning into account and and projecting it to vbscript deprecration I come to the following conclusion: SMB customers, enterprises, Microsoft Products, see below, are required to be updated or replaced, in order of adopting this change. I believe there is quite some communication and learning curve required for users, admins, enterprises and OEMs in adopting the implicated change and including changed workflows and automation processes. Looking forward to the next Windows Insider and esp. Windows Server Insider vNext builds! Both Windows Insiders and Windows Server Insiders, also including ISV and OEMs may assist in reviewing and validating the new workflows required - assuming vbscript deprecation is in effect, as planned. Without further ado, I am sharing my observations in regard to VBScript deprecation. I will try to keep this blogpost updated as soon I am aware about public facing changes. Third-Party AMD Chipset drivers so far is one of the major non MSFT related blockers. Suggestions: Microsoft should initiate talks with AMD and other ISV and OEMs fixing their dependencies, also offering other solutions, see below. Currently AMD Chipset drivers silently using vbscript calls checking for OS and HW platform compatibility. The installer fails when vbscript optional feature is removed. OEM, ISV and Enterprise Potentially affected: expected dependencies for imaging, deployment and management workflows. Related or unrelated to Microsoft products. LOB apps custom Office Integration logon and logoff scripts setup and installers Recommendation: Please observe vbscript related events in Windows Event Viewer at scale using PowerShell, Remoting or Windows Event Subscriptions: VBScriptDeprecationAlert Event ID 4096 VBScript is scheduled for deprecation. Our telemetry indicates that your system is currently utilizing VBScript. We strongly recommend identifying and migrating away from any VBScript dependencies at the earliest. The following process has been detected as using VBScript. The associated process tree and call stack are provided below to assist in identifying the scenario in which VBScript was invoked. Microsoft Windows Server and Client OS affected: slmgr.vbs / printer management vbscripts / product activation logic and UX, setup.exe, slui.exe Office 2024 LTSC affected: slmgr.vbs / ospp.vbs / Office deployment toolkit / product activation logic Microsoft has placed a new PowerShell based script into the respective OSPP folder. This script however is rather offering on checking licensing and cannot activate the Office product at this time. Microsoft 365 Business, Enterprise, Home, Family Affected: ospp.vbs despite being subscription based will also trouble with activation once vbscript is removed Sconfig Related to product activation. no changes so far, relies on external changes. The script itself is safe to comply with the change, now it has been reworked and updated using PowerShell , starting Windows Server 2022. WinRM Affected: the whole WinRM configuration command, e.g. winrm qc Windows Server Roles and Features: KMS / ADBA Potentially affected as they rely on slmgr for adding and removing CSVLK keys. Windows Server Roles and Features: IIS legacy IIS extension management. Windows Server Roles and Features: WSUS related deployment and configuration scripts. System Center Products incl. ConfigMgr there might be depencendies for OS deployments in regard to OS imaging. ADK, esp. Windows Imaging Tools and VAMT 3 potentially affected. Need to adopt changes in regard to activation and other operations. Suggestions: Recommending all these scripts being converted using Claude or Copilot from vbscript to PowerShell. Providing a serviceable PS modules, especially for printer management, product activation, which enables enterprises to automate their activations and printers, even though Microsoft is going to remove vbscript. The modules should be improved for existing day two adminstration tasks and workflows. slmgr, in particular, had some nuances that were tedious such as identifying and removing (stale) activation keys. Existing tools like slmgr and other will not work well in remoting. They do something but their interactive parts and outputs are reserved for interactive user sessions. Example: you can use slmgr in a remote PowerShell session for installing and activating a key but therer is no result return to the shell. Combining slui.exe and slmgr.vbs into aforementioned improvements in functionality and syntax. Consider support for PowerShell 7 in WinRE and Offline Setup phase. Many thanks for your consideration! Directory: C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 98756 prncnfg.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 66172 prndrvr.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 62698 prnjobs.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 95908 prnmngr.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 71616 prnport.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 44278 prnqctl.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 22612 pubprn.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\System32 Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 4119 CallUxxProvider.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 145712 slmgr.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 1720 SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 204072 winrm.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 98756 prncnfg.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 66172 prndrvr.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 62698 prnjobs.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 95908 prnmngr.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 71616 prnport.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 44278 prnqctl.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 22612 pubprn.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\SysWOW64 Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 145712 slmgr.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 204072 winrm.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-a..nagement-appvclient_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_none_0895f7c27f109b8a Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 1720 SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-iis-legacyscripts_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_none_ba69ed912e209e30 Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 98133 adsutil.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 41401 IIsExt.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-p..inscripts.resources_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_en-us_ 4ad0e09e0339f1ef Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 98756 prncnfg.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 66172 prndrvr.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 62698 prnjobs.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 95908 prnmngr.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 71616 prnport.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 44278 prnqctl.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 22612 pubprn.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-s..r-core-mgmtprovider_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_none_62cec50667f8da2a Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 4119 CallUxxProvider.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-security-spp-tools_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_none_81bcc6c67609fdb9 Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 145712 slmgr.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-w..for-management-core_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_none_0688f60763f16bc8 Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 204072 winrm.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_updateservices-services_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_none_bae89f3176313538 Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 8332 DynamicCompression.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 4289 SetAppPool.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 5813 SetMimeMap.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-iis-legacyscripts_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_none_c4be97e36281602b Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 41401 IIsExt.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-p..inscripts.resources_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_en-us_ 55258af0379ab3ea Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 98756 prncnfg.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 66172 prndrvr.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 62698 prnjobs.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 95908 prnmngr.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 71616 prnport.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 44278 prnqctl.vbs -a--- 4/16/2026 10:43 AM 22612 pubprn.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-security-spp-tools_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_none_8c117118aa6abfb4 Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 145712 slmgr.vbs Directory: C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-w..for-management-core_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.29574.1000_none_10dda05998522dc3 Mode LastWriteTime Length Name ---- ------------- ------ ---- -a--- 4/16/2026 9:14 AM 204072 winrm.vbs related announcements: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/Windows-ITPro-blog/vbscript-deprecation-timelines-and-next-steps/4148301Save the date: Secure Boot Q&A in July
To help, Microsoft is continuing its Q&A series with several opportunities to connect directly with Microsoft experts. Whether you're managing physical servers, virtualized workloads, or working with your hardware partners on firmware readiness, you can get answers to the questions that matter most to your environment. Learn more and add the events to your calendar: 8:00 AM PDT July 1 - Windows Server Secure Boot AMA 8:00 AM PDT July 8 - Secure Boot Office Hours for virtualized environments 7:00 AM - 7:00 PM PDT July 15 - OEM Secure Boot Office Hours If there's a question that's been holding up your rollout—or one you simply want to validate before moving forward—this is a great opportunity to ask. Feel free to post questions ahead of time or join the conversation live. We look forward to seeing you there.
Windows Server 2025 update with error 0x80073712
Hello Can I have some help? Windows Server 2025 Std, V 24H2, OS build: 26100.32522 The 2026-04 Security Update (KB5082063) (26100.32690) fails with the following error: Installation failed: Windows failed to install the following update with error 0x80073712: 2026-04 Security Update (KB5082063) (26100.32690). Thanks in advance MadUrantia
