Entra ID Governance vs Saviynt for SAP IGA Use Cases
Hi everyone, We are currently evaluating Microsoft Entra ID Governance as a potential replacement for Saviynt for SAP-focused IGA requirements across a mixed SAP landscape, including: SAP SuccessFactors SAP Concur SAP S/4HANA Private Cloud Other SAP SaaS and enterprise applications I wanted to get insights from anyone who has implemented or worked extensively with Entra Governance in SAP-centric environments, specifically around the following areas: 1. Birthright RBAC Provisioning Can Entra Governance provision a single composite/business role (similar to Saviynt Enterprise Roles) through HR-driven JML events? For example: HR event triggers provisioning User automatically receives bundled SAP access/business roles Role assignment follows birthright/access package logic How mature/scalable is this approach in Entra compared to Saviynt? 2. SoD (Segregation of Duties) Capabilities Saviynt supports preventative SoD checks directly during request submission, including SAP-specific SoD analysis. Questions: Does Entra Governance support preventative SoD evaluation at request time? Can conflicts be surfaced before approval/provisioning? Is there native SAP SoD support or dependency on external tooling (for example SAP GRC/IAG)? Additionally, Saviynt supports granular SAP authorization object analysis down to field-level min/max values within SAP Private Cloud environments. Does Entra provide similar depth for SAP authorization analysis? 3. SAP Integrations / Connectors While Entra provides OOTB Enterprise Applications and provisioning connectors for SAP applications: What differences or limitations have you observed compared to Saviynt’s SAP connectors? How well does Entra handle SAP role imports, entitlement hierarchy, and provisioning workflows? Any known gaps for SAP Private Cloud integrations? Would appreciate any implementation experiences, architecture guidance, lessons learned, or recommendations from teams who have evaluated or deployed Entra Governance in SAP-heavy environments. Thanks in advance."Access package assignment manager" role with "Restricted access to Microsoft Entra admin center"
Hi, How can I allow a user with the "Access package assignment manager" role assigned only to a single catalog to manage access package assignments when "Restricted access to Microsoft Entra admin center" is set to Yes? I do not see any option to manage assignments through the MyAccess portal, so it seems this must be done through the Entra Admin Center. However, the user cannot access the Entra Admin Center because they do not have any Entra administrative roles. I do not have an Entra ID Governance license, so the option to use on-behalf-of access package assignment requests is not available. How can this scenario be solved? Thanks.passkeys in the Authenticator app regarding attestation
I have a question about passkeys in the Authenticator app regarding attestation in connection with QR code-based cross-device sign-in. When we register a passkey with attestation enabled in the Authenticator app, it can be used to complete the sign-in process on another device via QR code and Bluetooth Low Energy. According to Microsoft’s documentation, this shouldn’t be possible with attestation enabled, yet it works. What are we misunderstanding here? https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-enable-authenticator-passkey Thanks for your inputs. Johannes
MFA Options for Employees without Phones
Hello everbody, we're currently trying to implement MFA in our company, but approximately 1/10 of our employees have a workphone and are not allowed to use their personal phone. Since we also recently introduced Intune, the idea was to just use Windows Hello for Business, but when trying to provision it, we realized that you need to have MFA active for an account to be able to even activate it? Which kinda defeats the purpose. So my question is, is there some way to circumvent the MFA requirement for WHfB? Or what other options do we realistically have? Thanks in Advance!
Global Secure Access - Conditional Access Require GSA - Android Blocked
Hello all, I am currently working on deploying Global Secure Access client with Microsoft Forward Traffic profile and a conditional access policy to block access to M365 services unless connected through the GSA client. I have this working as I want it for Windows and mobile devices in a tenant we use for development. However, when I set this up at our live tenant, I cannot get the Android device to work. My setup is a Personally Owned Work Profile with the Defender app deployed and configured to enable GSA. I can connect to Global Secure Access and it does show some traffic tunneling to Microsoft. However, when I go to login to another app like Outlook, it blocks the sign-in. This is not the case for an iPhone I have personally enrolled and my Entra Joined laptop. Upon investigation of any differences between our development tenant (working fully) and our tenant (Android not working) I found that in the GSA section under Services, there is an extra service called “Microsoft Entra Channel Access”. This service does not show up when I am logged in our developer tenant. Even on the same phone by removing work profiles and signing in to both tenants, our live tenant shows the new channel, and the developer tenant does not have it. I did some log review with the advanced diagnostics feature and the app and noted a few things I am lead to believe that the issue is with this new Entra Channel that has been deployed to our live tenant and not to our dev tenant yet. When I go to sign-in to the Outlook application in the work profile for the developer tenant, I can see the authentication traffic being tunneled through the Microsoft 365 profile. (login.live.com, login.microsoftonline.com, and aadcdn.msftauth.net). However, in our production tenant when doing the same test I do not see those destinations being tunneled at all. I do see the traffic being collected in the “Hostname” section, but is not being tunneled. Another interesting point with this is that on an iPhone I am testing; I do see the authentication destinations being tunneled through the Entra Channel. Here are the screenshots of my findings. https://imgur.com/a/82r3HQC I have an open Microsoft support case and hoping to get the attention of a Microsoft employee or MVP who may be able to get this in front of the Entra product team to see if this is a bug.Advice required for temp / agency staff
Hi All I hope you are well. Anyway, I'm hoping someone can point me in the right direction. We have Android devices in Entra Shared Device Mode (Multi App) which any of our employees with a valid UPN can logon to. All good there. What we need is a solution for temporary or agency staff. This would be staff that could be called on at very short notice and may not stay around for long. For security and audit reasons, we'd rather not create "userless" accounts. Is there anything in Entra / Entra Shared Device Mode that can achieve this? Info greatly appreciated. SKEntra CBA Preview Bug: Issuer Scoping Policy fails group claim (AADSTS500191)
I am deploying a zero-trust, cloud-native Certificate-Based Authentication (CBA) architecture for a break-glass emergency access account in Microsoft Entra ID. I am intentionally bypassing Intune/MDM to prevent circular dependencies during an outage. The PKI is generated via OpenSSL (Offline Root CA -> Client Cert). The cryptography is flawless: - The OpenSSL chain verifies perfectly (openssl verify -CAfile...). - The Root SKI and Client AKI are a perfect 1:1 hex match. - The client cert EKU includes TLS Web Client Authentication. - The client cert SAN includes othername: UPN::[break-glass-UPN]. - The Root CA and CRL are uploaded to Entra and publicly accessible via Azure Blob Storage. The Issue: When I attempt to restrict the Root CA using the "Certificate issuer scoping policy (Preview)" targeted to a specific Security Group (e.g., sg_cba), the TLS handshake drops and Entra throws: Error: AADSTS500191: The certificate authority that issued your certificate has not been set up in the tenant. Troubleshooting Performed: 1. Group Architecture: Verified via Microsoft Graph that the user is a direct, static member of sg_cba (Security Enabled, non-dynamic, not nested). 2. Micro-Group Bypass: Created a brand-new cloud-only micro-group with only the break-glass user. Waited for replication. Same 500191 error. 3. The Control Test (Success): If I completely remove the Preview scoping policy and move the targeting to the Generally Available (GA) tenant-wide trust ("All Users"), the login succeeds immediately. (I am securing this via High-Affinity binding matching the SKI to CertificateUserIDs). The Ask: Because the tenant-wide GA policy works perfectly, it mathematically proves the certificates, CRL, and bindings are correct. The failure is entirely isolated to the Preview scoping engine failing to correlate the incoming certificate to the Security Group claim fast enough. - Has anyone successfully deployed the "Certificate issuer scoping policy (Preview)" using a targeted security group without it dropping the trust? - Are there undocumented constraints on group evaluation during the CBA TLS handshake that cause this Preview feature to fail closed?
Introducing the Entra Helpdesk Portal: A Zero-Trust, Dockerized ITSM Interface for Tier 1 Support
Hello everyone, If you manage identity in Microsoft Entra ID at an enterprise scale, you know the struggle: delegating day-to-day operational tasks (like password resets, session revocations, and MFA management) to Tier 1 and Tier 2 support staff is inherently risky. The native Azure/Entra portal is incredibly powerful, but it’s complex and lacks mandatory ITSM enforcement. Giving a helpdesk technician the "Helpdesk Administrator" role grants them access to a portal where a single misclick can cause a major headache. To solve this, I’ve developed the Entra Helpdesk Portal (Community Edition)—an open-source, containerized application designed to act as an isolated "airlock" between your support team and your Entra ID tenant. Why This Adds Value to Your Tenant Instead of having technicians log into the Azure portal, they log into this clean, Material Design web interface. It leverages a backend Service Principal (using MSAL and the Graph API) to execute commands on their behalf. Strict Zero Trust: Logging in via Microsoft SSO isn’t enough. The app intercepts the token and checks the user’s UPN against a hardcoded ALLOWED_ADMINS whitelist in your Docker environment file. Mandatory ITSM Ticketing: You cannot enforce ticketing in the native Azure Portal. In this app, every write action prompts a modal requiring a valid ticket number (e.g., INC-123456). Local Audit Logging: All actions, along with the actor, timestamp, and ticket number, are written to an immutable local SQLite database (audit.db) inside the container volume. Performance: Heavy Graph API reads are cached in-memory with a Time-To-Live (TTL) and smart invalidation. Searching for users or loading Enterprise Apps takes milliseconds. What Can It Do? Identity Lifecycle: Create users, auto-generate secure 16-character passwords, revoke sign-in sessions, reset passwords, and delete specific MFA methods to force re-registration. Diagnostics: View a user's last 5 sign-in logs, translating Microsoft error codes into plain English. Group Management: Add/remove members to Security and M365 groups. App/SPN Management: Lazy-load raw requiredResourceAccess Graph API payloads to audit app permissions, and instantly rotate client secrets. Universal Restore: Paste the Object ID of any soft-deleted item into the Recycle Bin tab to instantly resurrect it. How Easy Is It to Setup? I wanted this to be universally deployable, so I compiled it as a multi-architecture Docker image (linux/amd64 and linux/arm64). It will run on a massive Windows Server or a simple Raspberry Pi. Setup takes less than 5 minutes: Create an App Registration in Entra ID and grant it the necessary Graph API Application Permissions (e.g., User.ReadWrite.All, AuditLog.Read.All). Create a docker-compose.yml file. Define your feature toggles. You can literally turn off features (like User Deletion) by setting an environment variable to false. version: '3.8' services: helpdesk-portal: image: jahmed22/entra-helpdesk:latest container_name: entra_helpdesk restart: unless-stopped ports: - "8000:8000" environment: # CORE IDENTITY - TENANT_ID=your_tenant_id_here - CLIENT_ID=your_client_id_here - CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret_here - BASE_URL=https://entradesk.jahmed.cloud - ALLOWED_ADMINS=email address removed for privacy reasons # CUSTOMIZATION & FEATURE FLAGS - APP_NAME=Entra Help Desk - ENABLE_PASSWORD_RESET=true - ENABLE_MFA_MANAGEMENT=true - ENABLE_USER_DELETION=false - ENABLE_GROUP_MANAGEMENT=true - ENABLE_APP_MANAGEMENT=true volumes: - entra_helpdesk_data:/app/static/uploads - entra_helpdesk_db:/app volumes: entra_helpdesk_data: entra_helpdesk_db: 4.Run docker compose up -d and you are done! I built this to give back to the community and help secure our Tier 1 operations. If you are interested in testing it out in your dev tenants or want to see the full architecture breakdown, you can read the complete documentation on my website here I’d love to hear your thoughts, feedback, or any feature requests you might have!
Entra ID Private Access - data flow
Hello, I am successfully testing Entra Private Access. From outside, I can easily access my shared permissions. However, I have one more question. What happens if I my device on the internal network? If I access the shares directly, I get about 1GB/s. What happens if the "Global Secure Access" client is active? Do all the data go through the Entra portal, or just the authentication? If all the data go through the Entra portal, there could be challenges with the internet connection (all data in and out). Thank you for your support Stefan
