Making AI Apps Enterprise-Ready with Microsoft Purview and Microsoft Foundry
Building AI apps is easy. Shipping them to production is not. Microsoft Foundry lets developers bring powerful AI apps and agents to production in days. But managing safety, security, and compliance for each one quickly becomes the real bottleneck. Every enterprise AI project hits the same wall: security reviews, data classification, audit trails, DLP policies, retention requirements. Teams spend months building custom logging pipelines and governance systems that never quite keep up with the app itself. There is a faster way. Enable Purview & Ship Faster! Microsoft Foundry now includes native integration with Microsoft Purview. When you enable it, every AI interaction in your subscription flows into the same enterprise data governance infrastructure that already protects your Microsoft 365 and Azure data estate. No SDK changes. No custom middleware. No separate audit system to maintain. Here is what you get: Visibility within 24 hours. Data Security Posture Management (DSPM) shows you total interactions, sensitive data detected in prompts and responses, user activity across AI apps, and insider risk scoring. This dashboard exists the moment you flip the toggle. Automatic data classification. The same classification engine that scans your Microsoft 365 tenant now scans AI interactions. Credit card numbers, health information, SSNs, and your custom sensitive information types are all detected automatically. Audit logs you do not have to build. Every AI interaction is logged in the Purview unified audit log. Timestamps, user identity, the AI app involved, files accessed, sensitivity labels applied. When legal needs six months of AI interactions for an investigation, the data is already there. DLP policy enforcement. Configure policies that block prompts containing sensitive information before they reach the model. This uses the same DLP framework you already know. eDiscovery, retention, and communication compliance. Search AI interactions alongside email and Teams messages. Set retention policies by selecting "Enterprise AI apps" as the location. Detect harmful or unauthorized content in prompts. How to Enable Prerequisite: You need the “Azure AI Account Owner” role assigned by your Subscription Owner. Open the Microsoft Foundry portal (make sure you are in the new portal) Select Operate from the top navigation Select Compliance in the left pane Select the Security posture tab Select the Azure Subscription Enable the toggle next to Microsoft Purview Repeat the above steps for other subscriptions By enabling this toggle, data exchanged within Foundry apps and agents' starts flowing to Purview immediately. Purview reports populate within 24 hours. What shows up in Purview? Purview Data Security Admins: Go to the Microsoft Purview portal, open DSPM, and follow the recommendation to setup “Secure interactions from enterprise AI apps” . Navigate to DSPM > Discover > Apps and Agents to review and monitor the Foundry apps built in your organization Navigate to DSPM > Activity Explorer to review the activity on a given agent/application What About Cost? Enabling the integration is free. Audit Standard is included for Foundry apps. You will only be charged for data security policies you setup for governing Foundry data. A Real-World Scenario: The Internal HR Assistant Consider a healthcare company building an internal AI agent for HR questions. The Old Way: The developer team spends six weeks building a custom logging solution to strip PII/PHI from prompts to meet HIPAA requirements. They have to manually demonstrate these logs to compliance before launch. The Foundry Way: The team enables the Purview toggle. Detection: Purview automatically flags if an employee pastes a patient ID into the chat. Retention: The team selects "Enterprise AI Apps" in their retention policy, ensuring all chats are kept for the required legal period. Outcome: The app ships on schedule because Compliance trusts the controls are inherited, not bolted on. Takeaway Microsoft Purview DSPM is a gamechanger for organizations looking to adopt AI responsibly. By integrating with Microsoft Foundry, it provides a comprehensive framework to discover, protect, and govern AI interactions ensuring compliance, reducing risk, and enabling secure innovation. We built this integration because teams kept spending months on compliance controls that already exist in Microsoft's stack. The toggle is there. The capabilities are real. Your security team already trusts Purview. Your compliance team already knows the tools. Enable it. Ship your agent. Let the infrastructure do what infrastructure does best: work in the background while you focus on what your application does. Additional Resources Documentation: Use Microsoft Purview to manage data security & compliance for Microsoft Foundry | Microsoft LearnAuthenticating AWS Workloads to Azure Functions using Workload Identity Federation
Step-by-step guide to configuring Workload Identity Federation between AWS and Azure, enabling service-to-service authentication where AWS workloads can securely call Azure Functions using token-based access instead of stored credentials.Kerberos and the End of RC4: Protocol Hardening and Preparing for CVE‑2026‑20833
CVE-2026-20833 addresses the continued use of the RC4‑HMAC algorithm within the Kerberos protocol in Active Directory environments. Although RC4 has been retained for many years for compatibility with legacy systems, it is now considered cryptographically weak and unsuitable for modern authentication scenarios. As part of the security evolution of Kerberos, Microsoft has initiated a process of progressive protocol hardening, whose objective is to eliminate RC4 as an implicit fallback, establishing AES128 and AES256 as the default and recommended algorithms. This change should not be treated as optional or merely preventive. It represents a structural change in Kerberos behavior that will be progressively enforced through Windows security updates, culminating in a model where RC4 will no longer be implicitly accepted by the KDC. If Active Directory environments maintain service accounts, applications, or systems dependent on RC4, authentication failures may occur after the application of the updates planned for 2026, especially during the enforcement phases introduced starting in April and finalized in July 2026. For this reason, it is essential that organizations proactively identify and eliminate RC4 dependencies, ensuring that accounts, services, and applications are properly configured to use AES128 or AES256 before the definitive changes to Kerberos protocol behavior take effect. Official Microsoft References CVE-2026-25177 - Security Update Guide - Microsoft - Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Microsoft Support – How to manage Kerberos KDC usage of RC4 for service account ticket issuance changes related to CVE-2026-20833 (KB 5073381) Microsoft Learn – Detect and Remediate RC4 Usage in Kerberos AskDS – What is going on with RC4 in Kerberos? Beyond RC4 for Windows authentication | Microsoft Windows Server Blog So, you think you’re ready for enforcing AES for Kerberos? | Microsoft Community Hub Risk Associated with the Vulnerability When RC4 is used in Kerberos tickets, an authenticated attacker can request Service Tickets (TGS) for valid SPNs, capture these tickets, and perform offline brute-force attacks, particularly Kerberoasting scenarios, with the goal of recovering service account passwords. Compared to AES, RC4 allows significantly faster cracking, especially for older accounts or accounts with weak passwords. Technical Overview of the Exploitation In simplified terms, the exploitation flow occurs as follows: The attacker requests a TGS for a valid SPN. The KDC issues the ticket using RC4, when that algorithm is still accepted. The ticket is captured and analyzed offline. The service account password is recovered. The compromised account is used for lateral movement or privilege escalation. Official Timeline Defined by Microsoft Important clarification on enforcement behavior Explicit account encryption type configurations continue to be honored even during enforcement mode. The Kerberos hardening associated with CVE‑2026‑20833 focuses on changing the default behavior of the KDC, enforcing AES-only encryption for TGS ticket issuance when no explicit configuration exists. This approach follows the same enforcement model previously applied to Kerberos session keys in earlier security updates (for example, KB5021131 related to CVE‑2022‑37966), representing another step in the progressive removal of RC4 as an implicit fallback. January 2026 – Audit Phase Starting in January 2026, Microsoft initiated the Audit Phase related to changes in RC4 usage within Kerberos, as described in the official guidance associated with CVE-2026-20833. The primary objective of this phase is to allow organizations to identify existing RC4 dependencies before enforcement changes are applied in later phases. During this phase, no functional breakage is expected, as RC4 is still permitted by the KDC. However, additional auditing mechanisms were introduced, providing greater visibility into how Kerberos tickets are issued in the environment. Analysis is primarily based on the following events recorded in the Security Log of Domain Controllers: Event ID 4768 – Kerberos Authentication Service (AS request / Ticket Granting Ticket) Event ID 4769 – Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (Ticket Granting Service – TGS) Additional events related to the KDCSVC service These events allow identification of: the account that requested authentication the requested service or SPN the source host of the request the encryption algorithm used for the ticket and session key This information is critical for detecting scenarios where RC4 is still being implicitly used, enabling operations teams to plan remediation ahead of the enforcement phase. If these events are not being logged on Domain Controllers, it is necessary to verify whether Kerberos auditing is properly enabled. For Kerberos authentication events to be recorded in the Security Log, the corresponding audit policies must be configured. The minimum recommended configuration is to enable Success auditing for the following subcategories: Kerberos Authentication Service Kerberos Service Ticket Operations Verification can be performed directly on a Domain Controller using the following commands: auditpol /get /subcategory:"Kerberos Service Ticket Operations" auditpol /get /subcategory:"Kerberos Authentication Service" In enterprise environments, the recommended approach is to apply this configuration via Group Policy, ensuring consistency across all Domain Controllers. The corresponding policy can be found at: Computer Configuration - Policies - Windows Settings - Security Settings - Advanced Audit Policy Configuration - Audit Policies - Account Logon Once enabled, these audits record events 4768 and 4769 in the Domain Controllers’ Security Log, allowing analysis tools—such as inventory scripts or SIEM/Log Analytics queries—to accurately identify where RC4 is still present in the Kerberos authentication flow. April 2026 – Enforcement with Manual Rollback With the April 2026 update, the KDC begins operating in AES-only mode (0x18) when the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute is not defined. This means RC4 is no longer accepted as an implicit fallback. During this phase, applications, accounts, or computers that still implicitly depend on RC4 may start failing. Manual rollback remains possible via explicit configuration of the attribute in Active Directory. July 2026 – Final Enforcement Starting in July 2026, audit mode and rollback options are removed. RC4 will only function if explicitly configured—a practice that is strongly discouraged. This represents the point of no return in the hardening process. Official Monitoring Approach Microsoft provides official scripts in the repository: https://github.com/microsoft/Kerberos-Crypto/tree/main/scripts The two primary scripts used in this analysis are: Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 The Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 script, provided by Microsoft in the Kerberos‑Crypto repository, is designed to identify how Kerberos tickets are issued in the environment by analyzing authentication events recorded on Domain Controllers. Data collection is primarily based on: Event ID 4768 – Kerberos Authentication Service (AS‑REQ / TGT issuance) Event ID 4769 – Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (TGS issuance) From these events, the script extracts and consolidates several relevant fields for authentication flow analysis: Time – when the authentication occurred Requestor – IP address or host that initiated the request Source – account that requested the ticket Target – requested service or SPN Type – operation type (AS or TGS) Ticket – algorithm used to encrypt the ticket SessionKey – algorithm used to protect the session key Based on these fields, it becomes possible to objectively identify which algorithms are being used in the environment, both for ticket issuance and session establishment. This visibility is essential for detecting RC4 dependencies in the Kerberos authentication flow, enabling precise identification of which clients, services, or accounts still rely on this legacy algorithm. Example usage: .\Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 -Encryption RC4 -Searchscope AllKdcs | Export-Csv -Path .\KerbUsage_RC4_All_ThisDC.csv -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8 Data Consolidation and Analysis In enterprise environments, where event volumes may be high, it is recommended to consolidate script results into analytical tools such as Power BI to facilitate visualization and investigation. The presented image illustrates an example dashboard built from collected results, enabling visibility into: Total events analyzed Number of Domain Controllers involved Number of requesting clients (Requestors) Most frequently involved services or SPNs (Targets) Temporal distribution of events RC4 usage scenarios (Ticket, SessionKey, or both) This type of visualization enables rapid identification of RC4 usage patterns, remediation prioritization, and progress tracking as dependencies are eliminated. Additionally, dashboards help answer key operational questions, such as: Which services still depend on RC4 Which clients are negotiating RC4 for sessions Which Domain Controllers are issuing these tickets Whether RC4 usage is decreasing over time This combined automated collection + analytical visualization approach is the recommended strategy to prepare environments for the Microsoft changes related to CVE‑2026‑20833 and the progressive removal of RC4 in Kerberos. Visualizing Results with Power BI To facilitate analysis and monitoring of RC4 usage in Kerberos, it is recommended to consolidate script results into a Power BI analytical dashboard. 1. Install Power BI Desktop Download and install Power BI Desktop from the official Microsoft website 2. Execute data collection After running the Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 script, save the generated CSV file to the following directory: C:\Temp\Kerberos_KDC_usage_of_RC4_Logs\KerbEncryptionUsage_RC4.csv 3. Open the dashboard in Power BI Open the file RC4-KerbEncryptionUsage-Dashboards.pbix using Power BI Desktop. If you are interested, please leave a comment on this post with your email address, and I will be happy to share with you. 4. Update the data source If the CSV file is located in a different directory, it will be necessary to adjust the data source path in Power BI. As illustrated, the dashboard uses a parameter named CsvFilePath, which defines the path to the collected CSV file. To adjust it: Open Transform Data in Power BI. Locate the CsvFilePath parameter in the list of Queries. Update the value to the directory where the CSV file was saved. Click Refresh Preview or Refresh to update the data. Click Home → Close & Apply. This approach allows rapid identification of RC4 dependencies, prioritization of remediation actions, and tracking of progress throughout the elimination process. List-AccountKeys.ps1 This script is used to identify which long-term keys are present on user, computer, and service accounts, enabling verification of whether RC4 is still required or whether AES128/AES256 keys are already available. Interpreting Observed Scenarios Microsoft recommends analyzing RC4 usage by jointly considering two key fields present in Kerberos events: Ticket Encryption Type Session Encryption Type Each combination represents a distinct Kerberos behavior, indicating the source of the issue, risk level, and remediation point in the environment. In addition to events 4768 and 4769, updates released starting January 13, 2026, introduce new Kdcsvc events in the System Event Log that assist in identifying RC4 dependencies ahead of enforcement. These events include: Event ID 201 – RC4 usage detected because the client advertises only RC4 and the service does not have msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes defined. Event ID 202 – RC4 usage detected because the service account does not have AES keys and the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute is not defined. Event ID 203 – RC4 usage blocked (enforcement phase) because the client advertises only RC4 and the service does not have msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes defined. Event ID 204 – RC4 usage blocked (enforcement phase) because the service account does not have AES keys and msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes is not defined. Event ID 205 – Detection of explicit enablement of insecure algorithms (such as RC4) in the domain policy DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes. Event ID 206 – RC4 usage detected because the service accepts only AES, but the client does not advertise AES support. Event ID 207 – RC4 usage detected because the service is configured for AES, but the service account does not have AES keys. Event ID 208 – RC4 usage blocked (enforcement phase) because the service accepts only AES and the client does not advertise AES support. Event ID 209 – RC4 usage blocked (enforcement phase) because the service accepts only AES, but the service account does not have AES keys. https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/topic/how-to-manage-kerberos-kdc-usage-of-rc4-for-service-account-ticket-issuance-changes-related-to-cve-2026-20833-1ebcda33-720a-4da8-93c1-b0496e1910dc They indicate situations where RC4 usage will be blocked in future phases, allowing early detection of configuration issues in clients, services, or accounts. These events are logged under: Log: System Source: Kdcsvc Below are the primary scenarios observed during the analysis of Kerberos authentication behavior, highlighting how RC4 usage manifests across different ticket and session encryption combinations. Each scenario represents a distinct risk profile and indicates specific remediation actions required to ensure compliance with the upcoming enforcement phases. Scenario A – RC4 / RC4 In this scenario, both the Kerberos ticket and the session key are issued using RC4. This is the worst possible scenario from a security and compatibility perspective, as it indicates full and explicit dependence on RC4 in the authentication flow. This condition significantly increases exposure to Kerberoasting attacks, since RC4‑encrypted tickets can be subjected to offline brute-force attacks to recover service account passwords. In addition, environments remaining in this state have a high probability of authentication failure after the April 2026 updates, when RC4 will no longer be accepted as an implicit fallback by the KDC. Events Associated with This Scenario During the Audit Phase, this scenario is typically associated with: Event ID 201 – Kdcsvc Indicates that: the client advertises only RC4 the service does not have msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes defined the Domain Controller does not have DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes defined This means RC4 is being used implicitly. This event indicates that the authentication will fail during the enforcement phase. Event ID 202 – Kdcsvc Indicates that: the service account does not have AES keys the service does not have msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes defined This typically occurs when: legacy accounts have never had their passwords reset only RC4 keys exist in Active Directory Possible Causes Common causes include: the originating client (Requestor) advertises only RC4 the target service (Target) is not explicitly configured to support AES the account has only legacy RC4 keys the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute is not defined Recommended Actions To remediate this scenario: Correctly identify the object involved in the authentication flow, typically: a service account (SPN) a computer account or a Domain Controller computer object Verify whether the object has AES keys available using analysis tools or scripts such as List-AccountKeys.ps1. If AES keys are not present, reset the account password, forcing generation of modern cryptographic keys (AES128 and AES256). Explicitly define the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute to enable AES support. Recommended value for modern environments: 0x18 (AES128 + AES256) = 24 As illustrated below, this configuration can be applied directly to the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute in Active Directory. AES can also be enabled via Active Directory Users and Computers by explicitly selecting: This account supports Kerberos AES 128 bit encryption This account supports Kerberos AES 256 bit encryption These options ensure that new Kerberos tickets are issued using AES algorithms instead of RC4. Temporary RC4 Usage (Controlled Rollback) In transitional scenarios—during migration or troubleshooting—it may be acceptable to temporarily use: 0x1C (RC4 + AES) = 28 This configuration allows the object to accept both RC4 and AES simultaneously, functioning as a controlled rollback while legacy dependencies are identified and corrected. However, the final objective must be to fully eliminate RC4 before the final enforcement phase in July 2026, ensuring the environment operates exclusively with AES128 and AES256. Scenario B – AES / RC4 In this case, the ticket is protected with AES, but the session is still negotiated using RC4. This typically indicates a client limitation, legacy configuration, or restricted advertisement of supported algorithms. Events Associated with This Scenario During the Audit Phase, this scenario may generate: Event ID 206 Indicates that: the service accepts only AES the client does not advertise AES in the Advertised Etypes In this case, the client is the issue. Recommended Action Investigate the Requestor Validate operating system, client type, and advertised algorithms Review legacy GPOs, hardening configurations, or settings that still force RC4 For Linux clients or third‑party applications, review krb5.conf, keytabs, and Kerberos libraries Scenario C – RC4 / AES Here, the session already uses AES, but the ticket is still issued using RC4. This indicates an implicit RC4 dependency on the Target or KDC side, and the environment may fail once enforcement begins. Events Associated with This Scenario This scenario may generate: Event ID 205 Indicates that the domain has explicit insecure algorithm configuration in: DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes This means RC4 is explicitly allowed at the domain level. Recommended Action Correct the Target object Explicitly define msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes with 0x18 = 24 Revalidate new ticket issuance to confirm full migration to AES / AES Conclusion CVE‑2026‑20833 represents a structural change in Kerberos behavior within Active Directory environments. Proper monitoring is essential before April 2026, and the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute becomes the primary control point for service accounts, computer accounts, and Domain Controllers. July 2026 represents the final enforcement point, after which there will be no implicit rollback to RC4.
Microsoft Leads a New Era of Software Supply Chain Transparency
Today, Microsoft announces the general availability of Microsoft’s Signing Transparency (MST) – a first-of-its-kind capability that brings unprecedented visibility and trust to our software supply chain. With this release, Microsoft is leading the industry by recording the build of critical cloud services into a publicly readable and verifiable SCITT standard (Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust) compliant blockchain ledger. This means every production software build for in scope services like Azure Attestation and Azure Managed HSM (Hardware Security Module), Azure confidential ledger, Microsoft Signing Transparency itself (and others over time) – is now logged in an immutable, tamper-evident record. Only builds that are in the MST ledger are deployed to production; this gives customers confidence that the supply chain for these critical services can be audited at anytime. Notably, the MST ledger is fully open source and built to align with the emerging IETF SCITT standard. By embracing SCITT’s principles and open protocols, Microsoft ensures that MST not only secures our own ecosystem but also contributes to a broader industry movement toward standardized supply chain transparency. The open-source MST ledger serves as a verifiable trust anchor that any organization or researcher can inspect, audit, or even integrate with their own tooling. MST itself meets the highest levels of transparency, backed by a tamper-proof confidential ledger, open-source, and independently verified. Specifically, we are making the foundation of our trust model transparent and accessible to everyone – reinforcing that trust must be earned through proof, not just promises. This launch marks a major milestone in our commitment to Zero Trust principles, extending “never trust, always verify” all the way into the build itself. Building on a public preview introduced late last year, MST’s general availability delivers verifiable transparency at the software level. It transforms traditional code signing with an additive trust layer that is accessible via an open verification model. Every new software update is accompanied by a publicly auditable proof of integrity, enabling security teams to proactively confirm that each update is authentic and unaltered. To help organizations get the most out of this capability, we are also introducing a free tool to explore the contents – Ledger Explorer – an offline tool that allows security teams to examine MST ledger entries, verify cryptographic proofs, and even validate the ledger’s integrity independently. This tool, combined with MST’s open design, ensures that every Microsoft customer – and the broader community – can hold us accountable in real time for the software we run on their behalf. Key Benefits of Microsoft’s Signing Transparency (MST) Verified Code Integrity – Every software release is cryptographically logged in MST’s ledgers. This makes each build tamper-evident and traceable. If an attacker attempts to inject malicious code or sign an unauthorized update, it will be evident through the well-defined validation step built into the SCITT standard. Organizations gain the assurance that code integrity can be independently confirmed at any time. Independent Verification & Zero Trust – MST enables customers and auditors to verify software authenticity on their own, without having to solely rely on vendor attestations. For each update, Microsoft provides a transparency “receipt” (proof of logging) that you can use to prove the update was officially published and unaltered. This fosters a “don’t just trust, verify” approach, empowering security teams to double-check everything running in their environment aligns with what Microsoft intended. Audit-Trail & Compliance – The transparency ledger creates a permanent, auditable timeline of code deployments. Every entry is a record of what was released and when, backed by cryptographic proofs. This simplifies compliance reporting and accelerates forensic analysis. In the event of an incident, you can quickly audit the ledger to see if any unexpected code was introduced. For highly regulated industries, MST offers concrete evidence of software integrity and policy compliance over time. Leadership & Open Standards – We are delivering real transparency now, encouraging a future where all critical software is released with verifiable integrity. MST’s open source implementation and SCITT-compliant design exemplify our commitment to openness and collaboration. We believe widespread adoption of these standards will strengthen supply chain security for everyone, making trust verification a universal practice. Next Steps Microsoft’s Signing Transparency is more than a new security feature and shapes the advances in trust technology. As threats grow more sophisticated, we must evolve the way we assure our customers about the software they depend on. With MST now generally available, we are leading by example: proving that it is possible to open up the traditionally opaque process of software deployment and turn it into a source of strength and trust, i.e., empowering each person with verifiable transparency. We invite the industry to join us on this journey and get started by reading the documentation and exploring Ledger Explorer today! Together, by embracing transparency and open standards, we can turn “trust but verify” from a slogan into an everyday reality for digital infrastructure.Level up your Azure Network Security Skills with our Upcoming Webinar Series
As network and application-layer threats continue to evolve, security and infrastructure teams need more than product knowledge. They need practical, scenario-driven guidance they can apply to real workloads. To support that, the Azure Network Security team is hosting a series of upcoming technical webinars covering the capabilities our customers rely on every day: Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF), Azure Firewall, Azure DDoS Protection and Azure Bastion. Each session is focused on demos, the latest enhancements, and the design and operational decisions you face when securing modern Azure environments. Whether you are protecting customer-facing web applications, hardening east-west and egress traffic, or securing remote administrative access at scale, there is a session in this lineup for you. These webinars are ideal for Security Architects and Engineers, Network and Infrastructure teams, SOC Analysts, Cloud Platform Owners, Partner Technical Consultants, and any practitioner responsible for the security posture of workloads running on Azure. Below is the schedule of the upcoming live deliveries. Upcoming Events Azure WAF Layer 7 DDoS defense in practice Date and time: Thursday, June 18, 2026, at 8am PST View event details and join As web applications become primary targets for sophisticated application-layer attacks, Azure Web Application Firewall continues to evolve to meet the needs of modern application security teams facing volumetric and targeted application-layer threats. In this webinar, we will explore how Azure WAF enables a layered, adaptive approach to application-layer DDoS mitigation, helping organizations detect and block malicious request patterns through intelligent inspection, control traffic flow to prevent resource exhaustion from abusive sources, progressively challenge suspicious clients to verify legitimacy without disrupting real users, and combine multiple defense mechanisms into a cohesive mitigation strategy that adapts to evolving attack techniques. Whether you're securing customer-facing web apps or business-critical services, this session will equip you with practical approaches to building resilient application-layer defenses on Azure. Azure Firewall IDPS Detections and Sentinel Integration Date and time: Thursday, July 9, 2026, at 8am PST View event details and join As network threats grow in complexity, organizations need visibility that extends beyond simple traffic filtering into intelligent detection and unified investigation workflows. Azure Firewall's Intrusion Detection and Prevention capabilities continue to evolve to meet the needs of modern security operations teams facing advanced lateral movement, exploitation attempts, and command-and-control activity. In this webinar, we will explore how Azure Firewall identifies malicious network patterns in real time, how detection signals flow seamlessly into Microsoft Sentinel to enrich the broader security narrative, and how security teams can correlate firewall intelligence with other data sources to accelerate threat hunting, streamline incident response, and build a more connected and actionable view of their network security posture. What's New in Azure Bastion Date and time: Thursday, July 23, 2026, at 8am PST View event details and join Secure remote access to cloud workloads remains a critical requirement as organizations scale their Azure environments and adapt to evolving operational demands. Azure Bastion continues to evolve to meet the needs of modern infrastructure teams seeking seamless, browser-based connectivity without exposing virtual machines to the public internet. In this webinar, we'll explore the latest enhancements to Azure Bastion covering new capabilities that improve connectivity options, streamline the administrative experience, expand protocol and session support, and strengthen the overall security posture of remote access workflows. Whether you're managing a handful of VMs or operating at enterprise scale, this session will bring you up to speed on what's new and how these improvements can simplify and secure your day-to-day operations. What's New in Azure Firewall Date and time: Thursday, August 6, 2026, at 8am PST View event details and join As network architectures grow more distributed and threat landscapes more dynamic, organizations need a cloud-native firewall that keeps pace with both modern workload patterns and adversary techniques. Azure Firewall continues to evolve to meet the needs of network and security teams managing hybrid environments, multi-region deployments, and increasingly complex east-west and north-south traffic flows. In this webinar, we will explore the latest enhancements to Azure Firewall covering new policy and rule management capabilities, improvements that expand protocol and traffic inspection coverage, and deeper integrations across the Azure security ecosystem to streamline operations. Whether you are standardizing perimeter protection across a global Azure footprint or modernizing segmentation for business-critical workloads, this session will bring you up to speed on what is new and how these improvements can simplify and strengthen your day-to-day network security operations. What's New in Azure Web Application Firewall Date and time: Thursday, August 27, 2026, at 8am PST View event details and join Web applications remain primary entry points for attackers, and organizations need a Web Application Firewall that adapts as quickly as the threats targeting their workloads. Azure Web Application Firewall continues to evolve to meet the needs of modern application security teams defending against an expanding mix of OWASP-class attacks, automated abuse, and business logic threats across diverse hosting models. In this webinar, we will explore the latest enhancements to Azure WAF. We will cover new detection and rule capabilities that improve protection accuracy, tuning and exclusion improvements that reduce false positives without weakening coverage, and expanded visibility and analytics that accelerate investigation. Whether you are securing customer-facing web apps or managing WAF policies at scale, this session will bring you up to speed on what's new and how these improvements can simplify and strengthen your application protection strategy Past Recordings: View additional past webinars from Azure Network Security on Microsoft Security Community YouTube. Stay connected with the Azure Network Security community Influence product feedback and join the Threat Protection Advisors Program Stay up-to-date and follow the Azure Network Security Blog | Microsoft Community Hub Engage with peers, ask and answer questions in the Azure Network Security discussion board --- Learn and Engage with the Microsoft Security Community Log in and follow this Microsoft Security Community Blog and post/ interact in the Microsoft Security Community discussion spaces. Follow = Click the heart in the upper right when you're logged in 🤍 Join the Microsoft Security Community and be notified of upcoming events, product feedback surveys, and more. Get early access to Microsoft Security products and provide feedback to engineers by joining the Microsoft Security Advisors.. Learn about the Microsoft MVP Program. Join the Microsoft Security Community LinkedIn and the Microsoft Entra Community LinkedInSentinel Foundry - MCP Server (Preview) (Github Community Release)
I’ve been cooking something that a lot of people in SOC have been struggling with — especially on the engineering side of Microsoft Sentinel. Thanks to the Microsoft Security team for shaping the capabilities of Sentinel even better with Sentinel Data Lake & Modern SecOps. Today’s the day I can finally share it. Note: This is not an official Microsoft product, but it is designed to make the Sentinel Build even better (complement) with much more intelligence. 🚀 Sentinel Foundry is now in public preview with 43 tools. (Sentinel Foundry - MCP Server) It’s an MCP server built to act like the brain of a strong Sentinel engineer — helping make building, improving, and operating Sentinel far more practical, faster, and honestly more enjoyable. For a lot of teams, the challenge is not understanding what Sentinel can do. The hard part is the engineering work around it: -> Deciding what data should actually be ingested -> Building a clean, scalable Sentinel foundation -> Writing useful detections instead of noisy ones -> Balancing security value with cost -> Turning ideas into deployable engineering outputs That is exactly why I built Sentinel Foundry to help communities grow stronger. It helps with the real engineering tasks behind Sentinel — from architecture thinking to detection design, deployment planning, ingestion strategy, automation ideas, and many of the workflows outlined in the GitHub project. How does it work? Here’s one of the flagship prompts I ran with it: “Give me a complete security posture report for our workspace. Score each pillar and tell me what to prioritise.” And within seconds, it produced a structured engineering blueprint that would normally take a lot longer to pull together manually. You can see the example prompts here in what it can do: https://github.com/prabhukiranveesam/Sentinel-Foundry#what-can-it-do I want building Sentinel to feel less like repetitive engineering overhead — and more like real security engineering that is fast, creative, and enjoyable. If you work with Sentinel as a SOC L2 analyst, engineer, detection engineer, consultant, or architect, I’d genuinely love for you to try it and tell me what you think. 🔗 Public Preview: https://github.com/prabhukiranveesam/Sentinel-Foundry This is just the start of an AI era — and I’m excited to keep shaping it with more powerful features over the coming days. This is very easy to set up and will be available to all of you at no cost during this month as part of the public preview, and your feedback is extremely valuable to shape this as a powerful solution.Detecting AI agents and non-human identities in Microsoft Sentinel: the classic-agent blind spot
Build 2026 made the direction official. The industry is moving from the app era into the agent era, and Microsoft spent a real share of the keynote on securing agents across their lifecycle, from discovering what is exploitable to governing what is running in production. On the identity side the centerpiece is Microsoft Entra Agent ID, now generally available, which gives AI agents first-class identities and extends Conditional Access, Identity Protection, and full audit logging to them. That is good news for agents you build the new way. It is not the whole picture, and the gap is where most SOCs will get hurt first. Modern agents are covered. Classic agents are not. Entra Agent ID draws a hard line between two kinds of agent. Modern agents are created through the Agent ID platform, each backed by an agent identity blueprint. They carry a proper Agent ID, a full audit trail, and the complete set of governance capabilities, including Identity Protection for Agents, which establishes a baseline for an agent's normal activity and flags anomalies automatically. Classic agents are everything that came before, or that gets built outside the platform: AI agents implemented as ordinary service principals or app registrations, for example Copilot Studio agents created before Agent ID was enabled, or any home-grown automation calling Graph with client credentials. In the Entra agent registry they appear with "Has Agent ID: No," and that flag matters, because the Agent ID protections apply to identities that actually hold an Agent ID. Classic agents sit outside Identity Protection for Agents and Conditional Access for Agents. Here is the uncomfortable part. The non-human identities you already run, the service principals behind your pipelines, your integrations, your scripts, your pre-platform Copilot Studio bots, are almost all classic agents. They tend to outnumber your human accounts, they have no MFA in any meaningful sense, and a credential added to one does not show up in the Azure portal. The new platform protections do not reach them. Until you migrate them, the only place you get detection coverage on that population is your SIEM. So this is the job Sentinel does that Agent ID does not: detect risky behavior on the classic, service-principal-backed agents that the platform cannot yet protect. The telemetry you have, and the one switch people forget Three tables carry most of the signal. AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs records service principal authentications, the client-credentials sign-ins your agents and automation use. No user, no MFA, just an app proving it holds a secret or certificate. AADManagedIdentitySignInLogs does the same for managed identities. AuditLogs records directory changes, including the one that matters most for persistence: a new credential added to an application or service principal. One practical warning before any of this works. Service principal and managed identity sign-in logs are not streamed by default. You have to enable those categories explicitly in the Entra diagnostic settings feeding your workspace. Plenty of teams write the detection, never check, and never notice the table is empty. Verify that first. Detection 1: a new credential on a service principal or app Adding a secret or certificate to an existing service principal is one of the cleanest persistence techniques in a Microsoft cloud. The attacker compromises a privileged user or app, drops a fresh credential on a service principal that already holds useful Graph permissions, and now has access that survives password resets and session revocation. It maps to MITRE T1098.001, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials. For a classic agent it is especially nasty, because there is no Identity Protection baseline watching it. // Detection 1: new secret or certificate added to an application or service principal // MITRE T1098.001 - Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials AuditLogs | where OperationName has_any ("Add service principal", "Certificates and secrets management") | where Result =~ "success" | extend Initiator = coalesce( tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)) | extend InitiatorIp = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress) | mv-apply Target = TargetResources on ( where Target.type =~ "Application" | extend TargetName = tostring(Target.displayName), TargetId = tostring(Target.id), KeyChanges = Target.modifiedProperties ) | mv-apply Prop = KeyChanges on ( where tostring(Prop.displayName) =~ "KeyDescription" | extend NewKeys = parse_json(tostring(Prop.newValue)), OldKeys = parse_json(tostring(Prop.oldValue)) ) | extend AddedKeys = set_difference(NewKeys, OldKeys) | where array_length(AddedKeys) > 0 | project TimeGenerated, Initiator, InitiatorIp, TargetName, TargetId, AddedKeys | order by TimeGenerated desc The operation filter catches the three shapes this event takes in the log: "Add service principal," "Add service principal credentials," and "Update application - Certificates and secrets management." The modifiedProperties parsing isolates the KeyDescription change, and set_difference confirms a key was actually added rather than removed, so rotating out an old credential does not, on its own, fire the rule. False positives come from legitimate rotation and from automation that provisions app credentials (CI/CD, infrastructure as code). The initiator is the discriminant. A credential added by your deployment pipeline's service account at the usual time is routine. The same change initiated by an interactive admin out of hours, or by an account that never normally touches app credentials, is what you want to surface. Allow-list the expected initiators, not the targets. Detection 2: a classic agent signing in from a first-seen IP A service principal that has only ever authenticated from your Azure regions and suddenly signs in from somewhere new is a strong signal that its credential has been lifted and is being used elsewhere. Service principals have stable, boring network behavior, which makes a first-seen IP a far cleaner indicator for them than it is for roaming human users. This is the behavioral baseline Identity Protection gives you for free on modern agents, rebuilt in KQL for the classic ones it ignores. MITRE T1078.004, Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts. // Detection 2: classic-agent service principal signing in from a previously unseen IP // MITRE T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts let baseline = 14d; let detection = 1d; let KnownIPs = AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs | where TimeGenerated between (ago(baseline + detection) .. ago(detection)) | where tostring(ResultType) == "0" | summarize KnownIPSet = make_set(IPAddress) by AppId; AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs | where TimeGenerated > ago(detection) | where tostring(ResultType) == "0" | lookup kind=leftouter KnownIPs on AppId | where set_has_element(KnownIPSet, IPAddress) == false | summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), Resources = make_set(ResourceDisplayName, 10) by ServicePrincipalName, AppId, IPAddress | order by FirstSeen desc The query builds a per-application baseline of source IPs over the previous two weeks, then flags any successful sign-in today from an address outside that set. Two tuning notes. Brand-new service principals have no baseline, so they surface on first use. That is usually worth seeing once, but you can exclude AppIds younger than the baseline window if it gets noisy. And if your agents egress through shifting cloud IP ranges, widen the comparison from an exact IP to the autonomous system number or a known-range allow-list, otherwise you will chase your own infrastructure. This complements Agent ID, it does not replace it! The endgame is not to run these rules forever. It is to shrink the population they apply to. Inventory your tenant for agents marked "Has Agent ID: No," prioritize the ones holding sensitive Graph permissions, and migrate them onto the Agent ID platform, where Identity Protection and Conditional Access take over the baselining you are doing here by hand. Microsoft has signaled a migration path from classic to modern agents. Treat these two detections as the coverage you need in the meantime, and as a permanent safety net for anything that never makes the move. If you do one thing this week: enable the service principal sign-in log category, deploy detection 1, and pull a list of every service principal that had a credential added in the last 90 days. That list alone tends to be more interesting than people expect. Cheers, Marcel
Simplifying Code Signing for Windows Apps: Artifact Signing (GA)
Trusted Signing is now Artifact Signing—and it’s officially Generally Available! Artifact Signing is a fully managed, end-to-end code signing service that makes it easier than ever for Windows application developers to sign their apps securely and efficiently. As Artifact Signing rebrands, customers will see changes over the next weeks. Please refer to our Learn docs for the most updated information. What is Artifact Signing? Code signing has traditionally been a complex and manual process. Managing certificates, securing keys, and integrating signing into build pipelines can slow teams down and introduce risk. Artifact Signing changes that by offering a fully managed, end-to-end solution that automates certificate management, enforces strong security controls, and integrates seamlessly with your existing developer tools. With zero-touch certificate management, verified identity, role-based access control, and support for multiple trust models, Artifact Signing makes it easier than ever to build and distribute secure Windows applications. Whether you're shipping consumer apps or internal tools, Artifact Signing helps you deliver software that’s secure. Security Made Simple Zero-Touch Certificate Management No more manual certificate handling. The service provides “zero-touch” certificate management, meaning it handles the creation, protection, and even automatic rotation of code signing certificates on your behalf. These certificates are short-lived and auto renewed behind the scenes, giving you tighter control, faster revocation when needed, and eliminating the risks associated with long-lived certs. Your signing reputation isn’t tied to a single certificate. Instead, it’s anchored to your verified identity in Azure, and every signature reflects that verified identity. Verified Identity Identity validation with Artifact Signing ensures your app’s digital signature displays accurate and verified publisher information. Once validated, your identity details, such as your individual or organization name, are included in the certificate. This means your signed apps will show a verified publisher name, not the dreaded “Unknown Publisher” warning. The entire validation process happens in the Azure portal. You simply submit your individual or organization details, and in some cases, upload supporting documents like business registration papers. Most validations are completed within a few business days, and once approved, you’re ready to start signing your apps immediately. organization validation page Secure and Controlled Signing (RBAC) Artifact Signing enforces Azure’s Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to secure signing activities. You can assign specific Azure roles to accounts or CI agents that use your Artifact Signing resource, ensuring only authorized developers or build pipelines can initiate signing operations. This tight access control helps prevent unauthorized or rogue signatures. Full Telemetry and Audit Logs Every signing request is tracked. You can see what was signed, when, and by whom in the Azure portal. This logging not only helps with compliance and auditing needs but also enables fast remediation if an issue arises. For example, if you discover a particular signing certificate was used in error or compromised, you can quickly revoke it directly from the portal. The short-lived nature of certificates in Artifact Signing further limits the window of any potential misuse. Artifact Signing gives you enterprise-grade security controls out of the box: strong protection of keys, fine-grained access control, and visibility. For developers and companies concerned about supply chain security, this dramatically reduces risk compared to handling signing keys manually. Built for Developers Artifact Signing was built to slot directly into developers’ existing workflows. You don’t need to overhaul how you build or release software, just plug Artifact Signing into your toolchain: GitHub Actions & Azure DevOps: The service includes first-class support for modern CI/CD. An official GitHub Action is available for easy integration into your workflow YAML, and Azure DevOps has tasks for pipelines. With these tools, every Windows app build can automatically sign binaries or installers—no manual steps required. Since signing credentials are managed in Azure, you avoid storing secrets in your repository. Visual Studio & MSBuild: Use the Artifact Signing client with SignTool to integrate signing into publish profiles or post-build steps. Once the Artifact Signing client is installed, Visual Studio or MSBuild can invoke SignTool as usual, with signatures routed through the Artifact Signing service. SignTool / CLI: Developers using scripts or custom build systems can continue using the familiar signtool.exe command. After a one-time setup, your existing SignTool commands will sign via the cloud service. The actual file signing on your build machine uses a digest signing approach: SignTool computes a hash of your file and sends that to the Artifact Signing service, which returns a signature. The file itself isn’t uploaded, preserving confidentiality and speed. This way, integrating Artifact Signing can be as simple as adding a couple of lines to your build script to point SignTool at Azure. PowerShell & SDK: For advanced automation or custom scenarios, Artifact Signing supports PowerShell modules and an SDK. These tools allow you to script signing operations, bulk-sign files, or integrate signing into specialized build systems. The Right Trust for the Right Audience Artifact Signing has support for multiple trust models to suit different distribution scenarios. You can choose between Public Trust and Private Trust for your code signing, depending on your app’s audience: Public Trust: This is the standard model for software intended to go to consumers. When you use Public Trust signing, the certificates come from a Microsoft CA that’s part of the Microsoft Trusted Root Program. Apps signed under Public Trust are recognized by Windows as coming from a known publisher, enabling a smooth installation experience when security features such as Smart App Control and SmartScreen are enabled. Private Trust: This model is for internal or enterprise apps. These certificates aren’t publicly trusted but are instead meant to work with Windows Defender Application Control (App Control for Business) policies. This is ideal for line-of-business applications, internal tools, or scenarios where you want to tightly control who trusts the app. Artifact Signing ’s Private Trust model is the modern, expanded evolution of Microsoft’s older Device Guard Signing Service (DGSS) -- delivering the same ability to sign internal apps but with ease of access and expanded capabilities. Test Signing: Useful for development and testing. These certificates mimic real signatures but aren’t publicly trusted, allowing you to validate your signing setup in non-production environments before releasing your app. Note on Expanded Scenario Support: Artifact Signing supports additional certificate profiles, including those for VBS enclaves and Private Trust CI Policies. In addition, there is a new preview feature for signing container images using the Notary v2 standard from the CNCF Notary project. This enables developers to sign Docker/OCI container images stored in Azure Container Registry using tools like the notation CLI, backed by Artifact Signing. Having all trust models in one service means you can manage all your signing needs in one place. Whether your code is destined for the world or just your organization, Artifact Signing makes it easy to ensure it is signed with an appropriate level of trust. Misuse and Abuse Management Artifact Signing is engineered with robust safeguards to counter certificate misuse and abuse. The signing platform employs active threat intelligence monitoring to continuously detect suspicious signing activity in real time. The service also emphasizes prevention: certificates are short-lived (renewed daily and valid for only 72 hours), which means any certificate used maliciously can be swiftly revoked without impacting software signed outside its brief lifetime. When misuse is confirmed, Artifact Signing quickly revokes the certificate and suspends the subscriber’s account, removing trust from the malicious code’s signature and stopping further abuse. These measures adhere to strict industry standards for responsible certificate governance. By combining real-time threat detection, built-in preventive controls, and rapid response policies, Artifact Signing gives Windows app developers confidence that any attempt to abuse the platform will be quickly identified and contained, helping protect the broader software ecosystem from emerging threats. Availability and What’s Next Check out the upcoming “What’s New” section in the Artifact Signing Learn Docs for updates on supported file types, new region availability, and more. Microsoft will continue evolving the service to meet developer needs. Conclusion: Enhancing Trust and Security for All Windows Apps Artifact Signing empowers Windows developers to sign their applications with ease and confidence. It integrates effortlessly into your development tools, automates the heavy lifting of certificate management, and ensures every app carries a verified digital signature backed by Microsoft’s Certificate Authorities. For users, it means peace of mind. For developers and organizations, it means fewer headaches, stronger protection against supply chain threats, and complete control over who signs what and when. Now that Artifact Signing is generally available, it’s a must-have for building trustworthy Windows software. It reflects Microsoft’s commitment to a secure, inclusive ecosystem and brings modern security features like Smart App Control and App Control for Business within reach, simply by signing your code. Whether you're shipping consumer apps or internal tools, Artifact Signing helps you deliver software that’s both easy to install and tough to compromise.
