Sentinel Foundry - MCP Server (Preview) (Github Community Release)
I’ve been cooking something that a lot of people in SOC have been struggling with — especially on the engineering side of Microsoft Sentinel. Thanks to the Microsoft Security team for shaping the capabilities of Sentinel even better with Sentinel Data Lake & Modern SecOps. Today’s the day I can finally share it. Note: This is not an official Microsoft product, but it is designed to make the Sentinel Build even better (complement) with much more intelligence. 🚀 Sentinel Foundry is now in public preview with 43 tools. (Sentinel Foundry - MCP Server) It’s an MCP server built to act like the brain of a strong Sentinel engineer — helping make building, improving, and operating Sentinel far more practical, faster, and honestly more enjoyable. For a lot of teams, the challenge is not understanding what Sentinel can do. The hard part is the engineering work around it: -> Deciding what data should actually be ingested -> Building a clean, scalable Sentinel foundation -> Writing useful detections instead of noisy ones -> Balancing security value with cost -> Turning ideas into deployable engineering outputs That is exactly why I built Sentinel Foundry to help communities grow stronger. It helps with the real engineering tasks behind Sentinel — from architecture thinking to detection design, deployment planning, ingestion strategy, automation ideas, and many of the workflows outlined in the GitHub project. How does it work? Here’s one of the flagship prompts I ran with it: “Give me a complete security posture report for our workspace. Score each pillar and tell me what to prioritise.” And within seconds, it produced a structured engineering blueprint that would normally take a lot longer to pull together manually. You can see the example prompts here in what it can do: https://github.com/prabhukiranveesam/Sentinel-Foundry#what-can-it-do I want building Sentinel to feel less like repetitive engineering overhead — and more like real security engineering that is fast, creative, and enjoyable. If you work with Sentinel as a SOC L2 analyst, engineer, detection engineer, consultant, or architect, I’d genuinely love for you to try it and tell me what you think. 🔗 Public Preview: https://github.com/prabhukiranveesam/Sentinel-Foundry This is just the start of an AI era — and I’m excited to keep shaping it with more powerful features over the coming days. This is very easy to set up and will be available to all of you at no cost during this month as part of the public preview, and your feedback is extremely valuable to shape this as a powerful solution.Detecting AI agents and non-human identities in Microsoft Sentinel: the classic-agent blind spot
Build 2026 made the direction official. The industry is moving from the app era into the agent era, and Microsoft spent a real share of the keynote on securing agents across their lifecycle, from discovering what is exploitable to governing what is running in production. On the identity side the centerpiece is Microsoft Entra Agent ID, now generally available, which gives AI agents first-class identities and extends Conditional Access, Identity Protection, and full audit logging to them. That is good news for agents you build the new way. It is not the whole picture, and the gap is where most SOCs will get hurt first. Modern agents are covered. Classic agents are not. Entra Agent ID draws a hard line between two kinds of agent. Modern agents are created through the Agent ID platform, each backed by an agent identity blueprint. They carry a proper Agent ID, a full audit trail, and the complete set of governance capabilities, including Identity Protection for Agents, which establishes a baseline for an agent's normal activity and flags anomalies automatically. Classic agents are everything that came before, or that gets built outside the platform: AI agents implemented as ordinary service principals or app registrations, for example Copilot Studio agents created before Agent ID was enabled, or any home-grown automation calling Graph with client credentials. In the Entra agent registry they appear with "Has Agent ID: No," and that flag matters, because the Agent ID protections apply to identities that actually hold an Agent ID. Classic agents sit outside Identity Protection for Agents and Conditional Access for Agents. Here is the uncomfortable part. The non-human identities you already run, the service principals behind your pipelines, your integrations, your scripts, your pre-platform Copilot Studio bots, are almost all classic agents. They tend to outnumber your human accounts, they have no MFA in any meaningful sense, and a credential added to one does not show up in the Azure portal. The new platform protections do not reach them. Until you migrate them, the only place you get detection coverage on that population is your SIEM. So this is the job Sentinel does that Agent ID does not: detect risky behavior on the classic, service-principal-backed agents that the platform cannot yet protect. The telemetry you have, and the one switch people forget Three tables carry most of the signal. AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs records service principal authentications, the client-credentials sign-ins your agents and automation use. No user, no MFA, just an app proving it holds a secret or certificate. AADManagedIdentitySignInLogs does the same for managed identities. AuditLogs records directory changes, including the one that matters most for persistence: a new credential added to an application or service principal. One practical warning before any of this works. Service principal and managed identity sign-in logs are not streamed by default. You have to enable those categories explicitly in the Entra diagnostic settings feeding your workspace. Plenty of teams write the detection, never check, and never notice the table is empty. Verify that first. Detection 1: a new credential on a service principal or app Adding a secret or certificate to an existing service principal is one of the cleanest persistence techniques in a Microsoft cloud. The attacker compromises a privileged user or app, drops a fresh credential on a service principal that already holds useful Graph permissions, and now has access that survives password resets and session revocation. It maps to MITRE T1098.001, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials. For a classic agent it is especially nasty, because there is no Identity Protection baseline watching it. // Detection 1: new secret or certificate added to an application or service principal // MITRE T1098.001 - Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials AuditLogs | where OperationName has_any ("Add service principal", "Certificates and secrets management") | where Result =~ "success" | extend Initiator = coalesce( tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)) | extend InitiatorIp = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress) | mv-apply Target = TargetResources on ( where Target.type =~ "Application" | extend TargetName = tostring(Target.displayName), TargetId = tostring(Target.id), KeyChanges = Target.modifiedProperties ) | mv-apply Prop = KeyChanges on ( where tostring(Prop.displayName) =~ "KeyDescription" | extend NewKeys = parse_json(tostring(Prop.newValue)), OldKeys = parse_json(tostring(Prop.oldValue)) ) | extend AddedKeys = set_difference(NewKeys, OldKeys) | where array_length(AddedKeys) > 0 | project TimeGenerated, Initiator, InitiatorIp, TargetName, TargetId, AddedKeys | order by TimeGenerated desc The operation filter catches the three shapes this event takes in the log: "Add service principal," "Add service principal credentials," and "Update application - Certificates and secrets management." The modifiedProperties parsing isolates the KeyDescription change, and set_difference confirms a key was actually added rather than removed, so rotating out an old credential does not, on its own, fire the rule. False positives come from legitimate rotation and from automation that provisions app credentials (CI/CD, infrastructure as code). The initiator is the discriminant. A credential added by your deployment pipeline's service account at the usual time is routine. The same change initiated by an interactive admin out of hours, or by an account that never normally touches app credentials, is what you want to surface. Allow-list the expected initiators, not the targets. Detection 2: a classic agent signing in from a first-seen IP A service principal that has only ever authenticated from your Azure regions and suddenly signs in from somewhere new is a strong signal that its credential has been lifted and is being used elsewhere. Service principals have stable, boring network behavior, which makes a first-seen IP a far cleaner indicator for them than it is for roaming human users. This is the behavioral baseline Identity Protection gives you for free on modern agents, rebuilt in KQL for the classic ones it ignores. MITRE T1078.004, Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts. // Detection 2: classic-agent service principal signing in from a previously unseen IP // MITRE T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts let baseline = 14d; let detection = 1d; let KnownIPs = AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs | where TimeGenerated between (ago(baseline + detection) .. ago(detection)) | where tostring(ResultType) == "0" | summarize KnownIPSet = make_set(IPAddress) by AppId; AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs | where TimeGenerated > ago(detection) | where tostring(ResultType) == "0" | lookup kind=leftouter KnownIPs on AppId | where set_has_element(KnownIPSet, IPAddress) == false | summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), Resources = make_set(ResourceDisplayName, 10) by ServicePrincipalName, AppId, IPAddress | order by FirstSeen desc The query builds a per-application baseline of source IPs over the previous two weeks, then flags any successful sign-in today from an address outside that set. Two tuning notes. Brand-new service principals have no baseline, so they surface on first use. That is usually worth seeing once, but you can exclude AppIds younger than the baseline window if it gets noisy. And if your agents egress through shifting cloud IP ranges, widen the comparison from an exact IP to the autonomous system number or a known-range allow-list, otherwise you will chase your own infrastructure. This complements Agent ID, it does not replace it! The endgame is not to run these rules forever. It is to shrink the population they apply to. Inventory your tenant for agents marked "Has Agent ID: No," prioritize the ones holding sensitive Graph permissions, and migrate them onto the Agent ID platform, where Identity Protection and Conditional Access take over the baselining you are doing here by hand. Microsoft has signaled a migration path from classic to modern agents. Treat these two detections as the coverage you need in the meantime, and as a permanent safety net for anything that never makes the move. If you do one thing this week: enable the service principal sign-in log category, deploy detection 1, and pull a list of every service principal that had a credential added in the last 90 days. That list alone tends to be more interesting than people expect. Cheers, Marcel
XdrLogRaider Defender XDR portal telemetry
A Microsoft Sentinel custom data connector that ingests Microsoft Defender XDR portal-only telemetry — configuration, compliance, drift, exposure, governance — that public Microsoft APIs (Graph Security, Microsoft 365 Defender, MDE) don't expose. https://github.com/akefallonitis/xdrlograider— Defender XDR portal telemetry Happy Hunting 🥳 🎉Your Sentinel AMA Logs & Queries Are Public by Default — AMPLS Architectures to Fix That
When you deploy Microsoft Sentinel, security log ingestion travels over public Azure Data Collection Endpoints by default. The connection is encrypted, and the data arrives correctly — but the endpoint is publicly reachable, and so is the workspace itself, queryable from any browser on any network. For many organisations, that trade-off is fine. For others — regulated industries, healthcare, financial services, critical infrastructure — it is the exact problem they need to solve. Azure Monitor Private Link Scope (AMPLS) is how you solve it. What AMPLS Actually Does AMPLS is a single Azure resource that wraps your monitoring pipeline and controls two settings: Where logs are allowed to go (ingestion mode: Open or PrivateOnly) Where analysts are allowed to query from (query mode: Open or PrivateOnly) Change those two settings and you fundamentally change the security posture — not as a policy recommendation, but as a hard platform enforcement. Set ingestion to PrivateOnly and the public endpoint stops working. It does not fall back gracefully. It returns an error. That is the point. It is not a firewall rule someone can bypass or a policy someone can override. Control is baked in at the infrastructure level. Three Patterns — One Spectrum There is no universally correct answer. The right architecture depends on your organisation's risk appetite, existing network infrastructure, and how much operational complexity your team can realistically manage. These three patterns cover the full range: Architecture 1 — Open / Public (Basic) No AMPLS. Logs travel to public Data Collection Endpoints over the internet. The workspace is open to queries from anywhere. This is the default — operational in minutes with zero network setup. Cloud service connectors (Microsoft 365, Defender, third-party) work immediately because they are server-side/API/Graph pulls and are unaffected by AMPLS. Azure Monitor Agents and Azure Arc agents handle ingestion from cloud or on-prem machines via public network. Simplicity: 9/10 | Security: 6/10 Good for: Dev environments, teams getting started, low-sensitivity workloads Architecture 2 — Hybrid: Private Ingestion, Open Queries (Recommended for most) AMPLS is in place. Ingestion is locked to PrivateOnly — logs from virtual machines travel through a Private Endpoint inside your own network, never touching a public route. On-premises or hybrid machines connect through Azure Arc over VPN or a dedicated circuit and feed into the same private pipeline. Query access stays open, so analysts can work from anywhere without needing a VPN/Jumpbox to reach the Sentinel portal — the investigation workflow stays flexible, but the log ingestion path is fully ring-fenced. You can also split ingestion mode per DCE if you need some sources public and some private. This is the architecture most organisations land on as their steady state. Simplicity: 6/10 | Security: 8/10 Good for: Organisations with mixed cloud and on-premises estates that need private ingestion without restricting analyst access Architecture 3 — Fully Private (Maximum Control) Infrastructure is essentially identical to Architecture 2 — AMPLS, Private Endpoints, Private DNS zones, VPN or dedicated circuit, Azure Arc for on-premises machines. The single difference: query mode is also set to PrivateOnly. Analysts can only reach Sentinel from inside the private network. VPN or Jumpbox required to access the portal. Both the pipe that carries logs in and the channel analysts use to read them are fully contained within the defined boundary. This is the right choice when your organisation needs to demonstrate — not just claim — that security data never moves outside a defined network perimeter. Simplicity: 2/10 | Security: 10/10 Good for: Organisations with strict data boundary requirements (regulated industries, audit, compliance mandates) Quick Reference — Which Pattern Fits? Scenario Architecture Getting started / low-sensitivity workloads Arch 1 — No network setup, public endpoints accepted Private log ingestion, analysts work anywhere Arch 2 — AMPLS PrivateOnly ingestion, query mode open Both ingestion and queries must be fully private Arch 3 — Same as Arch 2 + query mode set to PrivateOnly One thing all three share: Microsoft 365, Entra ID, and Defender connectors work in every pattern — they are server-side pulls by Sentinel and are not affected by your network posture. Please feel free to reach out if you have any questions regarding the information provided.
CrowdStrike API Data Connector (via Codeless Connector Framework) (Preview)
API scopes created. Added to Connector however only streams observed are from Alerts and Hosts. Detections is not logging? Anyone experiencing this issue? Github has post about it apears to be escalated for feature request. CrowdStrikeDetections. not ingested Anyone have this setup and working?
Ingest Microsoft XDR Advanced Hunting Data into Microsoft Sentinel
I had difficulty finding a guide that can query Microsoft Defender vulnerability management Advanced Hunting tables in Microsoft Sentinel for alerting and automation. As a result, I put together this guide to demonstrate how to ingest Microsoft XDR Advanced Hunting query results into Microsoft Sentinel using Azure Logic Apps and System‑Assigned Managed Identity. The solution allows you to: Run Advanced Hunting queries on a schedule Collect high‑risk vulnerability data (or other hunting results) Send the results to a Sentinel workspace as custom logs Create alerts and automation rules based on this data This approach avoids credential storage and follows least privilege and managed identity best practices. Prerequisites Before you begin, ensure you have: Microsoft Defender XDR access Microsoft Sentinel deployed Azure Logic Apps permission Application Administrator or higher in Microsoft Entra ID PowerShell with Az modules installed Contributor access to the Sentinel workspace Architecture at a Glance Logic App (Managed Identity) ↓ Microsoft XDR Advanced Hunting API ↓ Logic App ↓ Log Analytics Data Collector API ↓ Microsoft Sentinel (Custom Log) Step 1: Create a Logic App In the Azure Portal, go to Logic Apps Create a new Consumption Logic App Choose the appropriate: Subscription Resource Group Region Step 2: Enable System‑Assigned Managed Identity Open the Logic App Navigate to Settings → Identity Enable System‑assigned managed identity Click Save Note the Object ID This identity will later be granted permission to run Advanced Hunting queries. Step 3: Locate the Logic App in Entra ID Go to Microsoft Entra ID → Enterprise Applications Change filter to All Applications Search for your Logic App name Select the app to confirm it exists Step 4: Grant Advanced Hunting Permissions (PowerShell) Advanced Hunting permissions cannot be assigned via the portal and must be done using PowerShell. Required Permission AdvancedQuery.Read.All PowerShell Script # Your tenant ID (in the Azure portal, under Azure Active Directory > Overview). $TenantID=”Your TenantID” Connect-AzAccount -TenantId $TenantID # Get the ID of the managed identity for the app. $spID = “Your Managed Identity” # Get the service principal for Microsoft Graph by providing the AppID of WindowsDefender ATP $GraphServicePrincipal = Get-AzADServicePrincipal -Filter "AppId eq 'fc780465-2017-40d4-a0c5-307022471b92'" | Select-Object Id # Extract the Advanced query ID. $AppRole = $GraphServicePrincipal.AppRole | ` Where-Object {$_.Value -contains "AdvancedQuery.Read.All"} # If AppRoleID comes up with blank value, it can be replaced with 93489bf5-0fbc-4f2d-b901-33f2fe08ff05 # Now add the permission to the app to read the advanced queries New-AzADServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment -ServicePrincipalId $spID -ResourceId $GraphServicePrincipal.Id -AppRoleId $AppRole.Id # Or New-AzADServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment -ServicePrincipalId $spID -ResourceId $GraphServicePrincipal.Id -AppRoleId 93489bf5-0fbc-4f2d-b901-33f2fe08ff05 After successful execution, verify the permission under Enterprise Applications → Permissions. Step 5: Build the Logic App Workflow Open Logic App Designer and create the following flow: Trigger Recurrence (e.g., every 24 hours Run Advanced Hunting Query Connector: Microsoft Defender ATP Authentication: System‑Assigned Managed Identity Action: Run Advanced Hunting Query Sample KQL Query (High‑Risk Vulnerabilities) Send Data to Log Analytics (Sentinel) On Send Data, create a new connection and provide the workspace information where the Sentinel log exists. Obtaining the Workspace Key is not straightforward, we need to retrieve using the PowerShell command. Get-AzOperationalInsightsWorkspaceSharedKey ` -ResourceGroupName "<ResourceGroupName>" ` -Name "<WorkspaceName>" Configuration Details Workspace ID Primary key Log Type (example): XDRVulnerability_CL Request body: Results array from Advanced Hunting Step 6: Run the Logic app to return results In the logic app designer select run, If the run is successful data will be sent to sentinel workspace. Step 7: Validate Data in Microsoft Sentinel In Sentinel, run the query: XDRVulnerability_CL | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h) If data appears, ingestion is successful. Step 8: Create Alerts & Automation Rules Use Sentinel to: Create analytics rules for: CVSS > 9 Exploit available New vulnerabilities in last 24 hours Trigger: Email notifications Incident creation SOAR playbooks Conclusion By combining Logic Apps, Managed Identities, Microsoft XDR, and Microsoft Sentinel, you can create a powerful, secure, and scalable pipeline for ingesting hunting intelligence and triggering proactive detections.
Defender Entity Page w/ Sentinel Events Tab
One device is displaying the Sentinel Events Tab, while the other is not. The only difference observed is that one device is Azure AD (AAD) joined and the other is Domain Joined. Could this difference account for the missing Sentinel events data? Any insight would be appreciated!
Microsoft Application Protection Incidents
Hi, Seeing a small number of incidents within Sentinel with the Alert product name of 'Microsoft Application Protection'. Can view them in Sentinel but when clicking on the hyper link to be taken to the defender portal I can't access them? Two things, which Defender suite are these alerts coming from? Which roles/permissions are required to view them within the Defender/Unified portal?
