2026-04 Update Breaks Domain Logins
I have an Active Directory domain that is old (from 2000!) that has been upgraded and moved to newer versions of Windows Server and Active Directory. I have domain controller VMs running Windows Server 2025 Standard Edition. Unfortunately they installed the latest 2026-04 patches which my have changed the Kerberos encryption from RC4 to AES. This has resulted in my not being able to log into any Active Directory domain accounts and the domain controllers themselves. I can only log into workstations using the local account. Suffice to say this a nightmare. Any ideas how to fix it since I can't access the usual tools like Active Directory Users and Computers, Hyper-V won't connect to the VMs, etc. Thanks. S
Procedures to raise the functional level of AD 2008 r2 to 2019
Hello everyone, Our AD has the Windows Server 2008 functional level and the servers with Windows Server 2016 OS. I intend to raise the functional level to 2019 or 2025. I would like your help with tips and documentation to decide whether 2019 or 2025 would be best, what are the risks and procedures for successful migration. I have an isolated environment to carry out rehearsals and tests before actually going into production.Hybrid Join Lifecycle Model
Microsoft Entra hybrid join is still a common reality in enterprise environments. For many organizations, it remains necessary because legacy applications still rely on Active Directory machine authentication, Group Policy is still in use, and on-premises operational dependencies have not fully been retired. At the same time, the long-term direction for endpoint identity is increasingly cloud-native. That creates an important architectural question: Should hybrid join be treated as a permanent device state, or as a lifecycle stage in a broader modernization journey? In practice, hybrid join is often discussed as a binary condition: the device is either hybrid joined or it is not. But from an operational perspective, that view is too limited. In real enterprise environments, hybrid join behaves much more like a lifecycle. A device moves through provisioning, registration, trust establishment, management attachment, steady-state operation, recovery, retirement, and eventually transition. That distinction matters because most hybrid join issues do not fail loudly. They usually appear as stale objects, pending registrations, broken trust, inconsistent management ownership, and environments that remain temporarily hybrid far longer than intended. Why a lifecycle model is useful Treating hybrid join as a lifecycle helps explain why so many organizations struggle with it even when the initial implementation appears technically correct. The challenge is usually not the first successful join. The challenge is everything that happens around it: Provisioning quality Trust validation Management ownership Drift detection Stale object cleanup Exit criteria for transition to Entra join Without that lifecycle view, hybrid join often becomes a static design decision with no clear operational model behind it. The eight phases 1. Provisioning The lifecycle starts when the device is built, imaged, or provisioned. This stage is more important than it looks. If the device is provisioned from a contaminated image, or if cloning and snapshot practices are not handled carefully, later identity issues are often inherited rather than newly created. Provisioning should be treated as an identity-controlled event, not just an OS deployment task. 2. Registration The device becomes known to Microsoft Entra. This is where many environments confuse visibility with readiness. A device object may exist in the cloud, but that does not automatically mean the hybrid identity state is healthy or operationally usable. 3. Trust Establishment This is the point where hybrid join becomes real. A device should not be considered fully onboarded until both sides of trust are present and healthy. In operational terms, this means the device is not only registered, but also capable of supporting the expected sign-in and identity flows. 4. Management Attachment Once trust exists, governance becomes the next question. Many organizations still balance Group Policy, Configuration Manager, Intune, and legacy application dependencies at the same time. That is exactly why hybrid join often persists. But if management ownership is not clearly defined, organizations end up with overlapping policy planes, inconsistent control, and unclear accountability. 5. Operational Steady State Hybrid join does not stop at successful registration. The device must remain healthy over time, and that means monitoring trust health, registration state, token health, line-of-sight to required infrastructure, and management consistency. A device that was healthy once is not necessarily healthy now. 6. Recovery Every real environment eventually encounters drift. Pending states, broken trust, orphaned records, reimaged devices, and inconsistent registration scenarios should not be treated as unusual edge cases. They should be expected and handled with formal recovery playbooks. Recovery is not an exception to the lifecycle. It is part of the lifecycle. 7. Retirement Retirement is one of the weakest areas in many hybrid environments. Devices are replaced or decommissioned, but their identity records often remain behind. That leads to stale objects, inventory noise, and administrative confusion. A proper lifecycle model should include a controlled retirement sequence rather than ad hoc cleanup. 8. Transition This is the most important strategic phase. The key question is no longer whether a device can remain hybrid joined, but whether there is still a justified reason to keep it there. Hybrid join may still be necessary in many environments today, but in many cases it should be treated as transitional architecture rather than the target end state. Practical takeaway Looking at hybrid join as a lifecycle creates a more useful framework for architecture decisions, operational ownership, troubleshooting, directory hygiene, governance, and transition planning toward Microsoft Entra join. That is the real value of this model. It does not replace technical implementation guidance, but it helps organizations think more clearly about why hybrid join exists, how it should be operated, and when it should eventually be retired. Final thought Hybrid join is still relevant in many enterprise environments, but it should not automatically be treated as a default destination. In many cases, it works best when it is managed as a lifecycle-driven operating model with defined phases, controls, and exit criteria. That makes it easier to stabilize operations today, while also creating a clearer path toward a more cloud-native endpoint identity model tomorrow. Full article: https://www.modernendpoint.tech/hybrid-join-lifecycle-model
Error al agregar Windows Server 2025 a dominio existente, nivel funcional 2016
Buenas a todos, Me dirijo a esta comunidad en busca de orientación para resolver un problema que se me está presentando al intentar integrar un nuevo servidor con Windows Server 2025 Standard a mi infraestructura de Active Directory existente. Descripción del entorno: Dominio de Active Directory activo con Windows Server 2019 Standard. Nivel funcional de dominio y bosque configurado en Windows Server 2016. Controladores de dominio actuales: server-dc01.impresoratec y server-ad2019.impresoratec. El nombre de dominio interno utilizado es impresoratec (nombre NetBIOS/dominio de etiqueta única, sin sufijo DNS completo tipo .local o .com). Problema: Al intentar agregar el nuevo servidor con Windows Server 2025 al dominio, el proceso falla y se presenta el siguiente mensaje de error: "Es posible que el nombre de dominio "impresoratec" sea un nombre de dominio NetBIOS. Si este es el caso, compruebe que el nombre de dominio está registrado correctamente con WINS. [...] La consulta se refería al registro SRV para _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.impresoratec. La consulta identificó los siguientes controladores de dominio: server-dc01.impresoratec y server-ad2019.impresoratec. Sin embargo, no se pudo contactar con ningún controlador de dominio." El mensaje sugiere que los registros de host (A) o (AAAA) pueden contener direcciones IP incorrectas o que los controladores de dominio no son accesibles desde el nuevo servidor. Lo que he verificado hasta ahora: Los controladores de dominio existentes están en línea y operativos. La replicación entre los DCs actuales funciona con normalidad. El nuevo servidor con 2025 tiene conectividad de red general, pero no logra localizar los DCs al momento de unirse al dominio. Mi consulta: ¿Alguien ha experimentado este comportamiento al incorporar un servidor con Windows Server 2025 a un dominio con nivel funcional 2016 y un nombre de dominio de etiqueta única (single-label domain)? ¿Existe algún requisito previo adicional —como la actualización del esquema de AD, ajustes en DNS o en WINS— que deba cumplirse antes de agregar el nuevo DC? Agradezco de antemano cualquier orientación o experiencia que puedan compartir.Introducing the Entra Helpdesk Portal: A Zero-Trust, Dockerized ITSM Interface for Tier 1 Support
Hello everyone, If you manage identity in Microsoft Entra ID at an enterprise scale, you know the struggle: delegating day-to-day operational tasks (like password resets, session revocations, and MFA management) to Tier 1 and Tier 2 support staff is inherently risky. The native Azure/Entra portal is incredibly powerful, but it’s complex and lacks mandatory ITSM enforcement. Giving a helpdesk technician the "Helpdesk Administrator" role grants them access to a portal where a single misclick can cause a major headache. To solve this, I’ve developed the Entra Helpdesk Portal (Community Edition)—an open-source, containerized application designed to act as an isolated "airlock" between your support team and your Entra ID tenant. Why This Adds Value to Your Tenant Instead of having technicians log into the Azure portal, they log into this clean, Material Design web interface. It leverages a backend Service Principal (using MSAL and the Graph API) to execute commands on their behalf. Strict Zero Trust: Logging in via Microsoft SSO isn’t enough. The app intercepts the token and checks the user’s UPN against a hardcoded ALLOWED_ADMINS whitelist in your Docker environment file. Mandatory ITSM Ticketing: You cannot enforce ticketing in the native Azure Portal. In this app, every write action prompts a modal requiring a valid ticket number (e.g., INC-123456). Local Audit Logging: All actions, along with the actor, timestamp, and ticket number, are written to an immutable local SQLite database (audit.db) inside the container volume. Performance: Heavy Graph API reads are cached in-memory with a Time-To-Live (TTL) and smart invalidation. Searching for users or loading Enterprise Apps takes milliseconds. What Can It Do? Identity Lifecycle: Create users, auto-generate secure 16-character passwords, revoke sign-in sessions, reset passwords, and delete specific MFA methods to force re-registration. Diagnostics: View a user's last 5 sign-in logs, translating Microsoft error codes into plain English. Group Management: Add/remove members to Security and M365 groups. App/SPN Management: Lazy-load raw requiredResourceAccess Graph API payloads to audit app permissions, and instantly rotate client secrets. Universal Restore: Paste the Object ID of any soft-deleted item into the Recycle Bin tab to instantly resurrect it. How Easy Is It to Setup? I wanted this to be universally deployable, so I compiled it as a multi-architecture Docker image (linux/amd64 and linux/arm64). It will run on a massive Windows Server or a simple Raspberry Pi. Setup takes less than 5 minutes: Create an App Registration in Entra ID and grant it the necessary Graph API Application Permissions (e.g., User.ReadWrite.All, AuditLog.Read.All). Create a docker-compose.yml file. Define your feature toggles. You can literally turn off features (like User Deletion) by setting an environment variable to false. version: '3.8' services: helpdesk-portal: image: jahmed22/entra-helpdesk:latest container_name: entra_helpdesk restart: unless-stopped ports: - "8000:8000" environment: # CORE IDENTITY - TENANT_ID=your_tenant_id_here - CLIENT_ID=your_client_id_here - CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret_here - BASE_URL=https://entradesk.jahmed.cloud - ALLOWED_ADMINS=email address removed for privacy reasons # CUSTOMIZATION & FEATURE FLAGS - APP_NAME=Entra Help Desk - ENABLE_PASSWORD_RESET=true - ENABLE_MFA_MANAGEMENT=true - ENABLE_USER_DELETION=false - ENABLE_GROUP_MANAGEMENT=true - ENABLE_APP_MANAGEMENT=true volumes: - entra_helpdesk_data:/app/static/uploads - entra_helpdesk_db:/app volumes: entra_helpdesk_data: entra_helpdesk_db: 4.Run docker compose up -d and you are done! I built this to give back to the community and help secure our Tier 1 operations. If you are interested in testing it out in your dev tenants or want to see the full architecture breakdown, you can read the complete documentation on my website here I’d love to hear your thoughts, feedback, or any feature requests you might have!
How to add a new domain controller to an existing Active Directory domain?
The specific situation is as follows: The company has one forest and domain, and two Active Directory (AD) servers. These two servers communicate and synchronize data. One server is deployed in the local data center, and the other is deployed on Azure Cloud. The forest and domain functional levels are both Windows Server 2008 R2. Both servers are running Windows Server 2016 Standard. Because there are computers running Windows XP and Windows 7 in the domain, upgrading the forest and domain functional levels is not possible. Windows Server 2008 R2 must be retained. The company now needs to add a new AD server on Huawei Cloud and join it to the company's forest and domain. The main questions are: How do I determine which operating system the new server should run? Excluding Windows Server 2016. How should I choose between Windows Server 2019, 2022, and 2025? How do I determine how to allocate CPU, memory, disk, and network resources during system deployment? How to determine which operating system is best suited for running a domain controller without conflicts or incompatibility? What preparations should be made before deploying a new server?Beyond RC4 for Windows authentication - Question regarding KB5073381
In KB5021131 MS recommends setting the value for DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes to 0x38, in the new KB 5073381 it's 0x18. This removes the setting that forces "AES Session Keys" which should be fine if Kerberos Tickets can only use AES Encryption. But what about accounts that have RC4 enabled in their msds-supportedEncryptionTypes attribute? They could still use RC4 for Kerberos ticket encryption and would then also fallback to RC4 session ticket encryption. As far as I believe the DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes was explicitly introduced to avoid this scenario. Or is there now some hard-coded mechanism that always ensures that Session Keys are AES encrypted?
