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Azure Confidential Computing Blog
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C-ACI: Security Practices for Healthcare and Financial Services

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SyedHaider
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Nov 18, 2026

Healthcare and financial services organizations need to put sensitive data to work, whether analyzing patient records, detecting fraud, or running AI applications. Protecting that data means more than encrypting it in storage and during transmission. It also means limiting who and what can access it while an application is processing it. This post explores how confidential containers on Azure Container Instances (C-ACI) help address that challenge, using healthcare and financial services examples to explain security practices, architecture choices, and operational considerations.

While this post focuses on healthcare and financial services, the same patterns extend to any industry or application that works with sensitive data or proprietary code, such as government, defense, and manufacturing. As AI companies and enterprises build agents that act autonomously and run code and workflows against sensitive data, confidential computing will be critical to keeping that data, and the code that processes it, protected and verifiable. For Linux workloads that run code they didn't write, such as AI-generated scripts, plug-ins, or third-party tools, enclaves for confidential containers on ACI (preview) let the main application hand that code to a separate confidential environment with no network access of its own.

What are confidential containers on Azure Container Instances?

C-ACI runs Linux and Windows (preview) containers in a hardware-protected environment without requiring customers to manage the underlying servers. This environment, called a trusted execution environment (TEE), helps protect application code and sensitive data during processing. For customers, this means reducing reliance on the underlying infrastructure and its administrators to keep that data confidential. Execution policies control permitted operations, while attestation provides verifiable evidence before granting access to sensitive information.

How confidential containers achieve isolation

Traditional containers rely on the host operating system and its administrators for isolation. C-ACI adds a hardware-backed boundary around the container group, reducing reliance on that infrastructure. Three capabilities work together:

  1. Hardware-backed isolation. The container group runs in a protected virtual machine using AMD SEV-SNP. This hardware technology encrypts memory and helps prevent the host and hypervisor from inspecting or changing it. Containers in the group share this security boundary.
  2. Execution-policy enforcement. A policy defines which container images, commands, and settings may run. Software inside the protected environment enforces these rules. Policies are generated with the Azure CLI confcom extension using az confcom acipolicygen and reviewed against the application’s security requirements. Permissive or debug policies weaken the protection.
  3. Attestation before access. Attestation provides hardware-signed evidence of the environment and its execution policy. Microsoft Azure Attestation (MAA) validates this evidence and issues a signed token. For Secure Key Release (SKR), Azure Key Vault Premium or Azure Key Vault Managed HSM checks the workload’s token against the key’s release rules and verifies authorization before releasing the key. Key Vault Standard does not support SKR.

In short, hardware protects the environment, policy controls what may run, and attestation provides evidence of its trustworthiness. Attestation-based key release must be configured; it is not automatic in every deployment.

Two ways to deploy confidential containers

This security foundation supports two deployment paths: direct deployment through Azure Container Instances or integration with existing AKS workflows.

For workloads already managed in AKS, virtual nodes preserve the existing orchestration workflow. For workloads that do not require Kubernetes, direct C-ACI deployment provides a simpler starting point.

Direct deployment with C-ACI

Direct C-ACI deployment provides serverless execution without operating a Kubernetes cluster. The following diagram shows the protected container group, execution-policy enforcement, and how attestation supports access to keys and sensitive data.

Protect sensitive data during processing without managing servers or a Kubernetes cluster.

AKS with confidential ACI execution

For applications managed through Kubernetes, virtual nodes deploy AKS pods as confidential container groups running on ACI. AKS provides the orchestration workflow, while C-ACI provides the protected execution environment. The AKS control plane sits outside the TEE, and the enforced execution policy prevents cluster administrators from running images, commands, or settings that the policy does not allow inside the protected environment. The following diagram shows how these responsibilities fit together.

C-ACI protects data during processing while AKS retains deployment and orchestration responsibilities.

Applying these security practices in healthcare and financial services

Secure workload design depends on which data needs protection, which software may process it, and what evidence is required before granting access. The following illustrative healthcare and financial services examples connect these choices to business value, security controls, and day-to-day operations. Each uses C-ACI directly for simplicity; the same pattern can also be deployed through AKS virtual nodes. Enclave support, mentioned in two of the examples, is currently available only with direct C-ACI deployment.

Healthcare: putting sensitive data to work with controlled access

The following examples show how C-ACI can support sensitive healthcare workloads.

Validate clinical AI without handing over patient records or proprietary models

A hospital wants to evaluate a third-party clinical AI model against its patient population while protecting patient records and the developer’s model intellectual property. The hospital and developer each retain control of their own encryption key and key-release policy, and both agree on the container image and execution policy. Their encrypted data and model are processed together in C-ACI, with each key released only when its owner’s attestation and release-policy requirements are met. Evaluation scripts and analysis tools, whether supplied by the developer or generated by AI, run in an enclave (preview), a separate confidential environment with its own execution policy and no network access. The main application keeps the data connections, and everything those tools return passes back through it. The hospital receives approved evaluation results, not unrestricted access to the model; the developer does not gain unrestricted access to patient records.

This approach supports evaluation of third-party clinical AI while protecting patient records and model intellectual property. The essential controls are approved code, restricted connectivity, carefully reviewed outputs, and audit records that exclude sensitive payloads. C-ACI protects patient data from the infrastructure, and the enclave limits what third-party code can do with it.

Analyze genomic data with controlled access to patient information

A precision-medicine team needs to analyze genomic records alongside clinical histories without unnecessarily exposing patient information. In this C-ACI design, encrypted inputs are processed inside a confidential container group, with decryption keys released only when configured attestation requirements are met. The data provider supplies study identifiers instead of direct patient identifiers wherever possible and maintains the identity mapping under restricted access. The application controls which research results leave the environment, while access restrictions and logging practices help limit further exposure.

For technology and security leaders, the value is enabling sensitive analysis with a clearer trust boundary, while recognizing that study identifiers alone do not make genomic data anonymous.

Financial services: protecting transaction processing and payment data

The following examples show how C-ACI can support sensitive transaction analysis and payment processing.

Investigate suspicious transactions without broadening access to raw records

A bank wants to investigate suspicious transactions without broadening access to raw account histories and customer information. Authorized analysts submit requests to an approved analysis container running in C-ACI, which returns a bounded set of risk indicators and supporting evidence rather than unrestricted access to the underlying records. When an AI agent writes queries or analysis code for an investigation, that code runs in an enclave (preview) with no network access, while the agent and the bank’s data connections stay in the main application.

This approach expands analytical capability within a more explicit trust boundary. Engineering teams must still enforce least-privilege data access, restrict outbound connections, protect logs, and validate results. If an AI agent assists the investigation, its generated code should not automatically receive access to raw records or decryption keys. The enclave turns that principal into a boundary: generated code works on the data it is given but no network path of its own.

Keep payment tokenization separate from the wider application

A payment provider wants business applications and analytics to use tokens rather than raw card numbers. In this C-ACI design, a dedicated tokenization service processes encrypted payment data inside a confidential container group, with decryption keys released only when configured attestation requirements are met. The application returns tokens to downstream systems, while retrieval of original card details requires separate authorization and auditing.

This approach limits how widely sensitive payment data flows. The operational priorities are least-privilege access, protected token mappings, restricted connectivity, and logs that exclude card details. Confidential processing does not by itself remove systems from Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) scope or replace its requirements; any scope reduction depends on the tokenization design and validated controls. See the PCI SSC tokenization guidance.

Production readiness also requires testing end-to-end latency and sustained throughput under expected payment volumes, and validating high availability and failover across the tokenization service, token mappings, and key-release dependencies.

 

To summarize all four scenarios follow the same pattern: encrypted data enters a protected environment, keys are released only when the environment and execution policy meet configured verification requirements, and only application-approved results leave it. The data and authorized recipients vary by workload. Workloads with these requirements are candidates for confidential containers. When part of a workload runs code you don't fully trust, such as AI-generated code, plug-ins, or analyst scripts, consider enclaves (preview) to give that code its own confidential execution boundary.

Get started

A practical starting point is a single sensitive workload, with clear requirements for permitted code, data access, and key release. Direct C-ACI deployment offers serverless execution, while AKS virtual nodes retain existing Kubernetes orchestration.

The documentation for confidential containers on Azure Container Instances and Virtual Nodes v2 (preview), delivered as an AKS cluster extension, provides guidance for planning an initial deployment.

Updated Nov 18, 2026
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