windows
100 TopicsWindows 11, version 25H2 security baseline
Microsoft is pleased to announce the security baseline package for Windows 11, version 25H2! You can download the baseline package from the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit, test the recommended configurations in your environment, and customize / implement them as appropriate. Summary of changes This release includes several changes made since the Windows 11, version 24H2 security baseline to further assist in the security of enterprise customers, to include better alignment with the latest capabilities and standards. The changes include what is depicted in the table below. Security Policy Change Summary Printer: Impersonate a client after authentication Add “RESTRICTED SERVICES\PrintSpoolerService” to allow the Print Spooler’s restricted service identity to impersonate clients securely NTLM Auditing Enhancements Enable by default to improve visibility into NTLM usage within your environment MDAV: Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) Add "Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands" (d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c) with a recommended value of 2 (Audit) to improve visibility into suspicious activity MDAV: Control whether exclusions are visible to local users Move to Not Configured as it is overridden by the parent setting MDAV: Scan packed executables Remove from the baseline because the setting is no longer functional - Windows always scans packed executables by default Network: Configure NetBIOS settings Disable NetBIOS name resolution on all network adapters to reduce legacy protocol exposure Disable Internet Explorer 11 Launch Via COM Automation Disable to prevent legacy scripts and applications from programmatically launching Internet Explorer 11 using COM automation interfaces Include command line in process creation events Enable to improve visibility into how processes are executed across the system WDigest Authentication Remove from the baseline because the setting is obsolete - WDigest is disabled by default and no longer needed in modern Windows environments Printer Improving Print Security with IPPS and Certificate Validation To enhance the security of network printing, Windows introduces two new policies focused on controlling the use of IPP (Internet Printing Protocol) printers and enforcing encrypted communications. The setting, "Require IPPS for IPP printers", (Administrative Templates\Printers) determines whether printers that do not support TLS are allowed to be installed. When this policy is disabled (default), both IPP and IPPS transport printers can be installed - although IPPS is preferred when both are available. When enabled, only IPPS printers will be installed; attempts to install non-compliant printers will fail and generate an event in the Application log, indicating that installation was blocked by policy. The second policy, "Set TLS/SSL security policy for IPP printers" (same policy path) requires that printers present valid and trusted TLS/SSL certificates before connections can be established. Enabling this policy defends against spoofed or unauthorized printers, reducing the risk of credential theft or redirection of sensitive print jobs. While these policies significantly improve security posture, enabling them may introduce operational challenges in environments where IPP and self-signed or locally issued certificates are still commonly used. For this reason, neither policy is enforced in the security baseline, at this time. We recommend that you assess your printers, and if they meet the requirements, consider enabling those policies with a remediation plan to address any non-compliant printers in a controlled and predictable manner. User Rights Assignment Update: Impersonate a client after authentication We have added RESTRICTED SERVICES\PrintSpoolerService in the “Impersonate a client after authentication” User Rights Assignment policy. The baseline already includes Administrators, SERVICE, LOCAL SERVICE, and NETWORK SERVICE for this user right. Adding the restricted Print Spooler supports Microsoft’s ongoing effort to apply least privilege to system services. It enables Print Spooler to securely impersonate user tokens in modern print scenarios using a scoped, restricted service identity. Although this identity is associated with functionality introduced as part of Windows Protected Print (WPP), it is required to support proper print operations even if WPP is not currently enabled. The system manifests the identity by default, and its presence ensures forward compatibility with WPP-based printing. Note: This account may appear as a raw SID (e.g., S-1-5-99-...) in Group Policy or local policy tools before the service is fully initialized. This is expected and does not indicate a misconfiguration. Warning: Removing this entry will result in print failures in environments where WPP is enabled. We recommend retaining this entry in any custom security configuration that defines this user right. NTLM Auditing Enhancements Windows 11, version 25H2 includes enhanced NTLM auditing capabilities, enabled by default, which significantly improves visibility into NTLM usage within your environment. These enhancements provide detailed audit logs to help security teams monitor and investigate authentication activity, identify insecure practices, and prepare for future NTLM restrictions. Since these auditing improvements are enabled by default, no additional configuration is required, and thus the baseline does not explicitly enforce them. For more details, see Overview of NTLM auditing enhancements in Windows 11 and Windows Server 2025. Microsoft Defender Antivirus Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) In this release, we've updated the Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to add the policy Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands (d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c) with a recommended value of 2 (Audit). By auditing this rule, you can gain essential visibility into potential privilege escalation attempts via tools such as PSExec or persistence mechanisms using WMI. This enhancement helps organizations proactively identify suspicious activities without impacting legitimate administrative workflows. Control whether exclusions are visible to local users We have removed the configuration for the policy "Control whether exclusions are visible to local users" (Windows Components\Microsoft Defender Antivirus) from the baseline in this release. This change was made because the parent policy "Control whether or not exclusions are visible to Local Admins" is already set to Enabled, which takes precedence and effectively overrides the behavior of the former setting. As a result, explicitly configuring the child policy is unnecessary. You can continue to manage exclusion visibility through the parent policy, which provides the intended control over whether local administrators can view exclusion lists. Scan packed executables The “Scan packed executables” setting (Windows Components\Microsoft Defender Antivirus\Scan) has been removed from the security baseline because it is no longer functional in modern Windows releases. Microsoft Defender Antivirus always scans packed executables by default, therefore configuring this policy has no effect on the system. Disable NetBIOS Name Resolution on All Networks In this release, we start disabling NetBIOS name resolution on all network adapters in the security baseline, including those connected to private and domain networks. The change is reflected in the policy setting “Configure NetBIOS settings” (Network\DNS Client). We are trying to eliminate the legacy name resolution protocol that is vulnerable to spoofing and credential theft. NetBIOS is no longer needed in modern environments where DNS is fully deployed and supported. To mitigate potential compatibility issues, you should ensure that all internal systems and applications use DNS for name resolution. We recommend the following; test critical workflows in a staging environment prior to deployment, monitor for any resolution failures or fallback behavior, and inform support staff of the change to assist with troubleshooting as needed. This update aligns with our broader efforts to phase out legacy protocols and improve security. Disable Internet Explorer 11 Launch Via COM Automation To enhance the security posture of enterprise environments, we recommend disabling Internet Explorer 11 Launch Via COM Automation (Windows Components\Internet Explorer) to prevent legacy scripts and applications from programmatically launching Internet Explorer 11 using COM automation interfaces such as CreateObject("InternetExplorer.Application"). Allowing such behavior poses a significant risk by exposing systems to the legacy MSHTML and ActiveX components, which are vulnerable to exploitation. Include command line in process creation events We have enabled the setting "Include command line in process creation events" (System\Audit Process Creation) in the baseline to improve visibility into how processes are executed across the system. Capturing command-line arguments allows defenders to detect and investigate malicious activity that may otherwise appear legitimate, such as abuse of scripting engines, credential theft tools, or obfuscated payloads using native binaries. This setting supports modern threat detection techniques with minimal performance overhead and is highly recommended. WDigest Authentication We removed the policy "WDigest Authentication (disabling may require KB2871997)" from the security baseline because it is no longer necessary for Windows. This policy was originally enforced to prevent WDigest from storing user’s plaintext passwords in memory, which posed a serious credential theft risk. However, starting with 24H2 update, the engineering teams deprecated this policy. As a result, there is no longer a need to explicitly enforce this setting, and the policy has been removed from the baseline to reflect the current default behavior. Since the setting does not write to the normal policies location in the registry it will not be cleaned up automatically for any existing deployments. Please let us know your thoughts by commenting on this post or through the Security Baseline Community.29KViews7likes12CommentsHow to enable HTTPS support for Microsoft Connected Cache for Enterprise and Education
By: Aditya Middha | Product Manager 2 - Microsoft Connected Cache Starting on June 16 th , 2026, or soon after, Intune will enforce HTTPS content delivery for customers using Microsoft Connected Cache for Enterprise and Education. To continue using Microsoft Connected Cache to localize Intune Win32 app downloads and reduce the bandwidth impact on your network, you’ll need to configure HTTPS on Connected Cache nodes. Without this configuration, devices will still fetch the requested content, but they’ll fall back to the Content Delivery Network (CDN) and lose the performance and bandwidth savings that Microsoft Connected Cache provides. This guide assumes you have already deployed a standalone Microsoft Connected Cache node in your environment. If not, please see the Create and configure Microsoft Connected Cache nodes page. By the end of this walkthrough, you’ll be able to: Prepare the TLS certificate that your Connected Cache needs Enable HTTPS support on both Windows and Linux‑based Microsoft Connected Cache servers Validate that HTTPS is working end‑to‑end Diagnose the most common setup issues This guide mirrors the workflow described in Microsoft Connected Cache’s public documentation. For further explanation of what HTTPS support changes for Microsoft Connected Cache review HTTPS Support for Microsoft Connected Cache Overview, then proceed to Configure HTTPS on Windows or Configure HTTPS on Linux. Step-by-step: Enabling HTTPS support To keep this walkthrough easy to follow, the screenshots and command examples use a simple, reproducible environment that matches what most admins will see during their first HTTPS configuration. In this guide, the examples are based on: A single Connected Cache node deployment Windows 11, using a local user runtime account Public certificate authority (CA)-signed TLS certificate This baseline environment is only meant to make the screenshots and file paths predictable. Your own environment may look different, and that’s completely fine. Many customers run Microsoft Connected Cache on: Linux (Ubuntu or RHEL) Windows Server 2022 or Windows Server 2025 Networks with outbound restrictions Most of the workflow is identical across these variations. The folder structure, log locations, and command flow will look nearly the same on any Windows host. If you’re running Microsoft Connected Cache on Linux, the workflow is the same, but simpler—bash scripts are ran directly instead of being invoked through PowerShell. If your environment includes proxies, make sure all required endpoints are allowed. Before you start Before generating a certificate signing request (CSR) or importing a certificate, there are a few quick checks to make sure your Connected Cache server can enable HTTPS successfully. First, visit the “Cache Node Management” tab on Azure portal. Under the “Software Version” column, verify that your cache node is running on software version 2.0.0.2112 or higher. If not, you will need to reinstall Connected Cache. Next, confirm the hostname or IP address your client devices use to reach your Connected Cache node—this value will be configured when you generate the CSR. Also, ake sure port 443 is free on the host; Microsoft Connected Cache needs to bind to it. Finally, if your network performs TLS-inspection, ensure the required endpoints are allowed. Intercepted HTTPS traffic will cause devices to reject Microsoft Connected Cache’s TLS certificate, even if everything else is configured correctly. Once these checks are done, your node is ready for the HTTPS workflow: generate the CSR on your Connected Cache host machine, sign it with your CA, and import the resulting certificate. For more details, refer to the documentation: HTTPS on Windows Prerequisites. 1. Generate a CSR The first step in enabling HTTPS support is generating a CSR directly on your Microsoft Connected Cache node. This step cannot be skipped. Microsoft Connected Cache must create the CSR itself so it can generate and retain the private key that will later be paired with your signed certificate during TLS negotiation. When configuring the parameters for the generateCsr script, the most important values to get right are the Subject and SAN. These must match exactly how your managed client devices connect to your Connected Cache node. If the client devices use FQDN, include that FQDN; if they connect via IP, include that IP. A mismatch here won’t break CSR generation, but it’ll cause clients to bypass Microsoft Connected Cache later since they won’t trust the certificate during the TLS negotiation. For parameter configuration guidance on your specific environment, review these documented scenario-based parameter examples. After parameter configuration, you will need to locate the Installer scripts directory, the same as when you installed Microsoft Connected Cache originally. You can move directly to this path by running the following command in your terminal: Push-Location (deliveryoptimization-cli Microsoft Connected Cache-get-scripts-path) Once in the correct folder path, run the generateCsr command with your configured parameters. Running the command launches the CSR generation workflow inside the Microsoft Connected Cache-managed Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) distribution. The terminal output shows exactly what Connected Cache is doing: where it stores certificate files, where logs are written, which WSL distribution is being used, and the final location of the generated CSR. You’ll also see that Microsoft Connected Cache runs the CSR generation as a scheduled task inside WSL—this is expected and part of the normal flow. For example: This output confirms that Microsoft Connected Cache: Validated the CSR request Passed the Subject (Common Name) and SAN values to the internal script Generated the private key and CSR, stored both inside the container Wrote logs to the \Certificates\logs folder Created the CSR file in the Certificates folder When the process completes, you’ll see the timestamped CSR written to the Windows-side certificates folder (…\Certificates\certs). This is the file you’ll submit to your signing CA: Troubleshooting: Every time you run generateCsr, Microsoft Connected Cache writes a full log to a directory that ends with …\Certificates\logs. The terminal output shows you the exact path, and you can always return to this folder if you need to understand what happened during CSR generation. If you do need to troubleshoot, start by opening the most recent log file. The generateCsr log provides a detailed trace of each step. The following lines are checkpoints (in order) that you can look for in the more extensive log output: “Algorithm validation passed / CSR name validation passed” - Microsoft Connected Cache accepted your inputs and is ready to generate the CSR. “Subject Components: … / SAN Components: …” - Microsoft Connected Cache will embed these values into the CSR. If these don’t match your Connected Cache server hostname or IP address, regenerate the CSR. “Attempting to call http://localhost:5000/csr” - Microsoft Connected Cache internal controller is generating the keypair and CSR inside the WSL container. “Key verification succeeded” - Microsoft Connected Cache successfully generated and validated the private key. “CSR verification successful” - OpenSSL has validated the CSR structure. “Successfully copied logs to windowsCerts location” - The logs were written to the host machine directory. “CSR generation completed successfully” - Completed end-to-end successfully. One thing to be aware of: during a successful run, you may still see messages like: mkdir: cannot create directory '/keys': Permission denied chmod: cannot access '/keys': No such file or directory These are not errors. The script checks for required folders before creating them, and if they already exist, those checks generate harmless warnings. As long as the script finishes with a success message and you see a .csr file in the certs folder, the run is successful. 2. Sign the CSR This step occurs outside of the scope of Microsoft Connected Cache. Signing your CSR will rely on the PKI that your organization has chosen to use. This may include an internal ADCS, other enterprise internal PKI, or an externally hosted PKI (DigiCert, Let’s Encrypt, etc.). Of note, Cloud PKI will not work with Connected Cache because it requires the CSR be generated via SCEP before signing. Ensure that your client devices will be able to trust the CA signature. For many customers, we recommend signing using a public CA that Windows client devices automatically trust. Please reference documentation on signing the CSR for more details. The only requirement on the Connected Cache side is that the certificate is in unencrypted .crt format. Microsoft Connected Cache cannot import password-protected certificate formats yet - including .pfx bundles - even if they contain the correct certificate. For now, make sure your signing CA gives you, or allows you to export, a plain X.509 .crt file. After your CA signs the CSR, you’ll import the resulting certificate back to Microsoft Connected Cache. With the signed certificate in hand, place it in the same certs folder where your CSR was generated. Microsoft Connected Cache expects both files to live together so it can pair the returned certificate with the private key created earlier. A successful setup in the folder directory looks like this: If the certificate exists in the Certificates folder in .crt format, you’re ready to continue. Note: The CSR and .crt certificate do not have to have the same name. 3. Import the certificate back to Microsoft Connected Cache Before importing your certificate, remember that the CSR must have been generated on the same Microsoft Connected Cache node. You cannot skip directly to importing a certificate - Microsoft Connected Cache must have created the private key during CSR generation so it can pair the signed certificate with that key. After configuring the parameters referenced in the documentation to import the signed TLS certificate, run the importCert command from the same scripts directory used during CSR generation. When you start the import, Microsoft Connected Cache runs a full verification workflow inside its managed WSL distribution. The terminal output for this step is intentionally simple—it shows only that the certificate file passed basic validation, that the internal import script was invoked, and that the import is running as a scheduled task within the WSL distribution. You’ll also see that logging is active and that Microsoft Connected Cache has begun monitoring the process: Although the terminal output is brief, the full workflow is visible in the import logs. A successful import means Microsoft Connected Cache: Found your .crt file in the expected folder Ran cryptographic verification confirming the certificate, CSR, and private key all match Copied the certificate into the container and updated Microsoft Connected Cache internal configuration Restarted the container with the new certificate Enabled HTTPS for Microsoft Connected Cache’s Intune content endpoints Once these steps are complete, Microsoft Connected Cache is fully configured to serve HTTPS content. You usually won’t see new files added to the Windows certs folder after import as the changes occur inside the Connected Cache container. The final validation that import is successful is if the script exits successfully and the logs show that Microsoft Connected Cache restarted with the new certificate in place. Troubleshooting Troubleshooting certificate import is similar to troubleshooting CSR generation: every run produces a detailed log in the ...\Certificates\logs folder. If import fails, these logs will show exactly which step did not complete. At this stage, SAN or hostname mismatches do not show up; those only appear later during client-side validation. The importCert script only ensures that your certificate, CSR, and private key match (stored inside container, not visible from Certificates folder) and that Microsoft Connected Cache can load them. To help interpret the log, below are the checkpoints you can reference (in order): “Certificate file validation passed” - Microsoft Connected Cache found the .crt file in the certs folder and its .crt format is valid. “Using CertName: … / CSR being used: …” - Microsoft Connected Cache matched the certificate to the CSR that generated the private key. “SUCCESS: The CSR, certificate and private key cryptographic materials all match” - Microsoft Connected Cache verified the keypair, CSR, and certificate are a correct trio. “Nginx restarted successfully with new certificates” - Microsoft Connected Cache is now configured to serve HTTPS on port 443 inside the container. “Certificate import completed successfully” - The end-to-end import succeeded with no errors. Once the importCert script succeeds, your node is ready for validation. Validating HTTPS support end-to-end Once your certificate is imported, the final step is validating that Microsoft Connected Cache is now serving content over HTTPS. Detailed test commands are all documented in the Validate HTTPS on Windows guide. Complete the tests first on the Microsoft Connected Cache server, then on a client device. This order matters - server-side validation confirms Microsoft Connected Cache is listening on port 443 with its new TLS certificate; client-side validation confirms that client devices can trust and use that certificate. On your Microsoft Connected Cache server Start validation on the Microsoft Connected Cache host server. The server side tests include HTTPS and HTTP health endpoint checks that confirm: Microsoft Connected Cache is successfully bound to port 443 The TLS certificate loaded correctly The TLS certificate, private key, and CSR all correspond Microsoft Connected Cache can return its health endpoint over HTTPS If any of the server-side validation steps fail, check the generateCsr and importCert logs in the …\Certificates\logs folder. The validation guide includes troubleshooting tests that help distinguish whether the issue is certificate-related, connectivity-related, or due to another process on the host. Only move on to client-side validation once the Microsoft Connected Cache server passes its own tests. On your client device After confirming the server is configured correctly, the next stage is validating HTTPS content delivery from a client device that is pointed to use Microsoft Connected Cache. The client-side tests contain both browser-based and command line tests that help verify: The client trusts the issuing CA DNS resolves the Microsoft Connected Cache hostname correctly The device can complete a full TLS handshake with Microsoft Connected Cache The device is retrieving HTTPS content from Microsoft Connected Cache rather than falling back to CDN Once both server-side and client side-validation steps succeed, you can be confident that your Microsoft Connected Cache node is fully configured and ready to serve Intune content securely over HTTPS. Known issues with HTTPS Support Configuration Most customers will complete the HTTPS workflow without any problems, but there are a few known issues we want to call out proactively. These issues have been fully addressed with the release of the new Windows-hosted deployment application (v1.0.26.0) for Windows host machines, the new Linux-hosted deployment package (v1.10) for Linux host machines, and the latest GA container release (v2.0.0.2124_e) for all cache nodes. ImportCert issues on Windows Server 2022/2025 using a gMSA account, and on Windows 11 using a local user runtime account If your Microsoft Connected Cache runtime account is a Group Managed Service Account (gMSA) on a Windows Server 2022 or Windows Server 2025 host machine, you may see failures when running importCert. In the importCert logs, this can show up as unsuccessful permissions access or indefinite logging. The same importCert issues can also appear on Windows 11 if you are using a local user as the runtime account. Status: RESOLVED Please download Windows-hosted deployment application v1.0.26.0 by running the following command in an elevated PowerShell window: Add-AppxPackage https://aka.ms/do-mcc-ent-windows-x64 Then you may proceed to re-deploy your Connected Cache node, which will implement the necessary changes. You can further verify that you are deploying with the correct application version. When run in the terminal, the copied “Cache Node deployment command” given in the Azure portal will run deploymcconwsl.ps1 out of the folder path that looks like: C:\ProgramFiles\WindowsApps\Microsoft.DeliveryOptimization_1.0.26.0_neutral__8wekyb3d8bbwe\deliveryoptimization-cli ImportCert hangs on software version 2119_e (buffer bug) During the week of January 19 th , 2026, we deployed container version 2119_e to all customer cache nodes. We discovered a bug where the container’s internal buffer is not cleared during importCert, causing the import to run indefinitely. If you see this behavior and your Azure portal shows that your cache node is on version 2119_e, this is likely the cause. Status: RESOLVED: On March 3 rd , 2026, we pushed container version 2124_e to all cache nodes on the “Fast Ring” update schedule. If your cache node is on software version 2119_e today, you can change the update schedule configuration to the “Fast Ring”. Head to the 3 rd tab (“Updates”) of the Cache Node Configuration on the Azure portal and configure the update ring. Container version 2124_e will be pushed to all “Slow Ring” nodes in early April 2026. If your cache node is still not pulling down container version 2124_e after being configured on the Fast Ring, please reach out to us. The fixes for these issues have all been validated. Once ready for public release, the latest software version will be pushed to all cache nodes and the updated Windows installer will be available to download in Azure portal. Stay tuned to the Microsoft Connected Cache Release Notes for up-to-date information. Enabling HTTPS support on Linux hosts This guide walked through the setup of HTTPS using a Windows-based Microsoft Connected Cache host, since that’s what most customers deploy today. If you're running Microsoft Connected Cache on Linux, the overall steps are the same - generate a CSR on the node, sign it with your CA, and import the resulting .crt file - but a few details differ. For a Linux-hosted Microsoft Connected Cache nodes, shell scripts handle the entire process, specifically generateCsr.sh and importCert.sh. The Enable HTTPS Support on Linux guide documents these steps in detail, including the exact script parameters, file locations, and how to interpret the Linux-specific logs. The biggest differences on Linux are: You run the CSR and import scripts directly in bash (no WSL component). File paths and log locations follow the Linux directory structure (/var/mcc/...). Check port conflicts, firewall configuration, and TLS inspection using Linux tools (ss, iptables, proxy settings). Validation steps use Linux equivalents of the server side tests documented in the Windows validation guide. Maintaining your HTTPS configuration Once your Microsoft Connected Cache node is serving content over HTTPS, the next thing to plan for is ongoing certificate maintenance. TLS certificates aren’t a onetime import - certificates expire, CA chains change, and your operational process needs to keep up. Microsoft Connected Cache will soon surface certificate details both through a command line script and directly in the Azure portal, but those capabilities are not available yet. Until then, verification and rotation rely on simple checks you perform on the Microsoft Connected Cache host. Monitoring The easiest way to monitor your deployment today is to periodically check the Key Metrics chart in the Overview blade of your Microsoft Connected Cache resource in Azure. If Intune content is flowing through Microsoft Connected Cache, that’s a strong proxy signal that HTTPS is healthy. For the certificate itself, many admins perform a lightweight weekly or monthly review: ensuring the TLS certificate is still valid, not approaching expiration, and still matches the configuration you imported. Re-running the validation tests from our public documentation every so often is also a good way to catch any issues early. The updated Windows installer, as mentioned in Known Issues, will also have a PowerShell script that displays the status and expiration date of existing TLS certificates. Renewal When planning for renewal, we recommend starting at least 60 days before the certificate expires. Renewal is typically straightforward: either reuse the existing CSR (most common) or generate a new one, then have your CA resign it, convert it into .crt format, and test the renewed certificate on a test node if you have one. If your workflow doesn’t include a test Connected Cache node, you can still safely import the renewed certificate on your production node - if import fails, Microsoft Connected Cache simply keeps using the existing certificate until a valid one is applied, so you won’t break your environment. If your certificate management system has automation capabilities, you can script Microsoft Connected Cache’s certificate renewal workflow as well - for example, by using Secure Shell (SSH) to remotely to run the generateCSR or importCert scripts on the host machine. For larger or distributed environments, testing the signing and import processes on a non-production node first can help confirm SAN correctness, trust behavior, and chain completeness before touching production. We are actively working to streamline certificate monitoring and renewal inside Microsoft Connected Cache. Summary HTTPS support for Microsoft Connected Cache will soon become a requirement for delivering Intune Win32 apps, and every Microsoft Connected Cache node must be configured for HTTPS by June 16, 2026. After the deadline, Intune Win32 apps will only be delivered via HTTPS. However, all other content – Windows updates, Office apps, etc – will continue to be served via HTTP after the June 16 th enforcement date. This guide walked through the essentials: generating a CSR on your Microsoft Connected Cache node, submitting it to your CA, importing the signed certificate, and validating HTTPS from both the server and client devices. Along the way, you saw how to interpret the logs, verify Connected Cache is using your certificate correctly, and ensure that Teams and/or Intune content is flowing over HTTPS instead of falling back to CDN. As you move forward, keep your workflow consistent - regenerate or reuse CSRs the same way each cycle, validate regularly, and renew certificates well before expiration. Even though improvements are coming soon, completing this setup now ensures your environment is ready long before Intune HTTPS enforcement begins. With your certificate in place, HTTPS validated, and a simple renewal process in hand, your Microsoft Connected Cache deployment is prepared for the June 16 th , 2026 deadline and ready to deliver Intune content securely. FAQs Do I really need HTTPS Support, and by when? Yes. All Microsoft Connected Cache nodes serving Intune Win32 apps must deliver over HTTPS by June 16, 2026. If HTTPS isn’t configured, devices will fall back to CDN when requesting Intune win32 apps —content delivery still works, but you’ll lose caching benefits. Why do I have to generate the CSR on the Connected Cache node? Since Microsoft Connected Cache must generate and retain the private key itself. Certificates signed from any other machine, keypair, or CSR cannot be imported. The CSR you generate on the node produces the only key that Microsoft Connected Cache will accept. Can I reuse an existing certificate? Only if it was originally issued from the CSR generated on the same Microsoft Connected Cache node. If the certificate was created elsewhere (different machine, tooling, or CSR), Microsoft Connected Cache won’t accept it. Can I reuse my CSR when renewing the certificate? Yes. Many customers reuse the same CSR each cycle as long as the CA resigns it. Reusing the old certificate output is not supported. Can I “bring my own certificate”? Not yet. Microsoft Connected Cache only supports certificates created from its own CSR. Support for bringing an external certificate is coming soon; stay up to date by viewing the latest Microsoft Connected Cache Release Notes Can I use a wildcard certificate? Microsoft Connected Cache does not officially support them and they’re not recommended. Wildcards often involve shared private keys across systems, which creates operational and security risks. What certificate formats does Microsoft Connected Cache support? Microsoft Connected Cache only supports unencrypted .crt files today. Password protected .pfx or .p12 formats cannot be imported. What happens if I redeploy Microsoft Connected Cache or the hostname changes? If the hostname or connection path changes, you must request a new certificate that matches the new SAN parameters. If the hostname stays the same and the certificate came from the Connected Cache-generated CSR, you can continue using it. If you have any questions, leave a comment below or reach out to us on X @IntuneSuppTeam! Post Updates: 04/08/26: Updated the “Known issues with HTTPS Support Configuration” section to reflect that previously identified issues have been fully resolved in the latest deployment application and container releases, along with updated guidance for affected cache nodes.4.5KViews0likes5CommentsHands-on Session: From idea to interactive lesson with Microsoft Learning Zone
Join us on Tuesday, May 12th at 8:00 AM Pacific for a hands-on professional development session introducing Learning Zone - a new app that helps you create interactive, classroom-ready lessons in minutes. In this 45-minute webinar, the Product Management team will guide you through core capabilities and the latest updates. You can follow along using your own Microsoft 365 Education account. Also, you will be able to get Professional Development credit with this session and we will offer a Credly badge at the end. What we will cover: ✅ Getting started with Learning Zone: Access Learning Zone and get set up ✅ Experience as a student: Join a session and see how it works from the student perspective ✅ Building your first interactive lesson: Create your first interactive lesson (in minutes!) ✅ Assigning to your class: Send lessons via link, short code, Teams Assignments, or your LMS ✅ Exploring the ready-to-learn library: Bring immediate value to your students through a variety of lessons by trusted of partners. Important note: Lesson generation is currently available only on Copilot+ PCs with any Microsoft 365 Education license (supported in English and Spanish). No Copilot+ PC? No problem. You’ll still get to try out the student experience, learn how to use the lesson library, assign interactive lessons, review insights, and integrate Learning Zone into your existing workflows. 📅 Date: Tuesday, May 12th ⏰ Time: 8:00 AM Pacific Register: https://aka.ms/LZwebinarMay26 We look forward to having you attend the event!178Views0likes0Comments