security
1561 TopicsSecurity baseline for Microsoft Edge version 151
We are pleased to announce the enterprise-ready release of the security baseline for Microsoft Edge version 151! We have reviewed the settings in Microsoft Edge version 151 and updated our guidance with six new recommendations. We have also identified one additional setting that organizations should consider evaluating in their environments. A new Microsoft Edge security baseline package was just released to the Download Center. You can download the new package from the Security Compliance Toolkit. Enable Process Isolation (added) We are enforcing ‘Enable Process Isolation’ to help protect Microsoft Edge from unauthorized access, modification, and tampering by other applications running on the device. This setting strengthens browser process integrity and helps safeguard sensitive data used by Microsoft Edge. Organizations that encounter compatibility issues with software that depends on browser process injection should treat such configurations as exceptions requiring explicit risk acceptance and compatibility validation. Enable renderer in app container (added) We are enforcing the default and enabling ‘Enable renderer in app container’ to strengthen Microsoft Edge’s browser isolation protections by ensuring renderer processes run within the additional restrictions provided by AppContainer. This helps reduce the impact of browser-based attacks and limits the ability of exploited renderer processes to interact with system resources. Organizations that require this setting to be disabled due to incompatible software should treat such configurations as exceptions that require explicit risk acceptance. Enable the network service sandbox (added) We are enforcing the default and enabling ‘Enable the network service sandbox’ to ensure Microsoft Edge network-facing processes operate within sandbox isolation boundaries that help reduce the impact of exploitation and limit access to system resources. Because disabling the network service sandbox weakens a core browser security protection, organizations should treat any requirement to disable this setting as an exception scenario requiring explicit risk acceptance and compatibility validation. Configure browser process code integrity guard (added) We are enabling ‘Configure browser process code integrity guard setting’ with a value of ‘Enable code integrity guard enforcement in the browser process’. The setting strengthens protections against unauthorized code injection into Microsoft Edge browser processes. Some enterprise applications, extensions, accessibility tools, or security products may still rely on legacy injection techniques and require compatibility validation. We encourage organizations to fully test this setting in their environments and work with vendors to identify or remediate incompatible software. Enable Application Bound Encryption (added) We are enabling ‘Enable Application Bound Encryption’ to strengthen protections for browser-stored credentials, authentication tokens, and other sensitive data by binding encryption more closely to the browser process. This helps reduce the risk of unauthorized access to protected browser data by malware or other untrusted software. Because disabling this setting weakens an important protection boundary, organizations should treat any requirement to disable the feature as an exception requiring explicit risk review. Enhance the security state in Microsoft Edge (added) We are enabling ‘Enhance the security state in Microsoft Edge’ and configuring the setting to Balanced to provide additional protection against modern web-based attacks while maintaining compatibility for most enterprise users. In Balanced mode, Microsoft Edge applies additional mitigations such as disabling just-in-time (JIT) JavaScript compilation and enabling added operating system protections on processes used to load sites that users do not frequently visit, helping reduce the risk of memory-related vulnerabilities. Because these protections can introduce compatibility issues for some applications or workflows, organizations should validate critical business sites and applications during their normal testing process prior to broad deployment and configure exceptions as needed. Additional details can be found here. Configure Automatic HTTPS (worth considering) We previously released a blog discussing a new feature called Automatic HTTPS. This setting can automatically switch your connections to websites from HTTP to HTTPS on sites that are highly likely to support the more secure protocol. This option helps ensure that users' network traffic is more secure and less susceptible to SSL stripping attacks. The best part, the end user doesn’t get prompted, it just works! This new feature has two configuration options: Navigations delivered over HTTP are switched to HTTPS’ (UpgradeCapableDomains) and ‘All navigation delivered over HTTP are switched to HTTPS’ (AlwaysUpgrade). There are trade-offs for each configuration: the UpgradeCapableDomains option only upgrades to HTTPS if Microsoft believes the site is likely to work over HTTPS, and this setting is unavailable if you’ve disabled the ComponentUpdatesEnabled policy. The more secure AlwaysUpgrade option unconditionally updates all HTTP requests to HTTPS, which will result in a user-visible error page if the target site does not support HTTPS. We encourage organizations to consider implementing and testing Automatic HTTPS within their environment. Collectively, these changes continue our focus on strengthening browser isolation, sandboxing, process integrity, and protection of sensitive browser data while balancing enterprise compatibility requirements. Microsoft Edge version 151 introduced 4 new computer and user settings. We have included a spreadsheet listing the new settings in the release to make it easier for you to find them. As a friendly reminder, all available settings for Microsoft Edge are documented here, and all available settings for Microsoft Edge Update are documented here. Please continue to give us feedback through the Security Baseline Community or in comments on this post.Microsoft Purview | Share block at external users
Hello community. I have an issue with Microsoft Purview DLP policies. I am trying to create a policy that prevents documents from being shared through OneDrive with external users, while allowing certain exceptions. However, when I select the option "Block Access to external domains and users" and assign a specific email address to be blocked, it does not work. The configured email address is not being blocked. I was reviewing this with Copilot, and it mentioned that if the external user you are sharing with already exists in Entra ID, the tenant may treat the user differently (not necessarily as an external user). My external user exists in Entra ID as a Guest account. The external user is registered as follows: Displayname: User Name Userprincipalname: user.name_external.domain#EXT#@company.onmicrosoft.com User Type: Guest Has anyone else experienced this issue? I am sharing evidence of the policy configuration.282Views0likes6CommentsSecurity Review for Microsoft Edge version 150
We have reviewed the new settings in Microsoft Edge version 150 and determined that there are no additional security settings that require enforcement. The Microsoft Edge version 139 security baseline continues to be our recommended configuration which can be downloaded from the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit. Microsoft Edge version 150 introduced 8 new Computer and User settings; we have included a spreadsheet listing the new settings to make it easier for you to find. As a friendly reminder, all available settings for Microsoft Edge are documented here, and all available settings for Microsoft Edge Update are documented here. Please continue to give us feedback through the Security Baselines Discussion site or this post.MCP safety & evaluation with the Agent 365 CLI & Agent Governance Toolkit
Co Author: JiteshThakur AI agents are useful because they can act. They call tools, query databases, send messages, and hand work to other agents. That same freedom creates a problem: access control can tell you which service an agent may reach, but it does not always tell you whether a particular action is sensible, safe, or permitted. MCP is how most agents now act. Two Control Points: This post examines two control points that address different parts of the MCP lifecycle. Agent 365 CLI evaluates the MCP server before an agent uses it. Agent Governance Toolkit (AGT) governs sensitive tool calls while the agent runs. One improves what the agent sees. The other governs what the agent does. The Agent 365 CLI is a cross-platform command-line tool for Agent 365 applications on Azure. Its evaluation command examines MCP tool definitions and scores their quality. AGT evaluates actions against policy and records each decision. Together, these tools support a practical model: evaluate the server first, then provide proper scaffolding for the developer to test this in a dry run. Agent 365 CLI: Score an MCP server from the command line: The Agent 365 CLI can evaluate an MCP server against research-based practices for production readiness. The result is more useful than a simple pass or fail. The evaluation gives you: A score for each tool name, description, and parameter schema; A prioritized list of improvements; An overall maturity score for the server; and Local output that you can use early in development. This report turns a vague question, "Is this MCP server ready?", into a concrete list of work. The evaluate command a365 develop-mcp evaluate --server-url <server-url> [--auth-token <auth-token>] [options] The command reads the tool schemas from the server. It then produces guidance for names, descriptions, parameters, and schema structure. A local coding-agent CLI scores the semantic checks. You can use GitHub Copilot CLI or Claude Code under your account and AI subscription. The command does not send tool-schema data to Microsoft. Prerequisites: Install the following software: Agent 365 CLI; Node.js 18 or later for GitHub Copilot CLI; and A supported coding-agent CLI for semantic scoring. For example, install GitHub Copilot CLI with this command: powershell npm install -g @github/copilot This bring-your-own-LLM model keeps the scoring step in your local development environment. It is useful when model calls must remain inside an approved deployment. How the evaluation works The command runs a five-step pipeline and logs progress as it goes. Fig 1: MCP Evaluation using Agent 365 Cli Connect to the MCP server and collect its tool schemas. Generate an evaluation checklist in the output directory. Score the semantic checks with the selected coding agent. Calculate the maturity level and action priorities. Write the JSON and HTML reports. The evaluation contains two types of checks: Deterministic checks use exact rules in the CLI. For example, a tool name cannot be empty. Semantic checks use a coding agent to score clarity and meaning. Each result includes a reason for the score. Examples Set the authentication token in an environment variable. Then evaluate an authenticated server and write the artifacts to a subfolder. powershell $env:A365_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN = "<bearer-token>" a365 develop-mcp evaluate --server-url "https://my-mcp-server.contoso.com/mcp" --output-dir "./eval" Use a specific scoring engine with the `--eval-engine` option: powershell a365 develop-mcp evaluate --server-url "http://localhost:5000/mcp" --eval-engine claude-code Scenario: Evaluate a malicious MCP server For this demonstration, we hosted a deliberately malicious MCP server at `http://127.0.0.1:8124/`. It exposes tools that demonstrate tool poisoning, credential leakage, prompt injection, schema mismatch, sandbox escape, and other attacks. The server is intentionally unsafe and is for demonstration only. Fig 2: Setting up a test MCP server for evaluation We ran the evaluation in two steps. First, we generated the checklist without automatic semantic scoring: a365 develop-mcp evaluate --server-url "http://127.0.0.1:8124/" --eval-engine none Fig 3: Agent365CLI MCP Evaluation The command wrote the checklist and a semantic-evaluation prompt to the output directory. It also displayed the next steps. Second, we gave the prompt and checklist to a coding agent. The agent completed each unscored semantic check with a Boolean score and a short reason. After we saved the completed checklist, we ran the command again to generate the report: a365 develop-mcp evaluate --server-url "http://127.0.0.1:8124/" --output-dir "C:\temp\MaliciousMCP" Fig 4: Creating the report with Agent365 CLI MCP Evaluate command Understanding the evaluation report Open `<server-name>_eval_report.html` from the output directory. The report contains: The overall score from 0 to 100; The maturity level from 0 to 4; Scores for each tool and quality category; and A prioritized action list for the next maturity level. Fig 5: MCP Evaluation Report In our demonstration, the server scored 86.0 and reached Level 3: Optimized for AI. That strong overall score did not mean that every tool was safe or clear. The report found 58 action items, including one critical item and 33 high-priority items. That contrast matters. A server can have valid schemas and consistent names while still exposing misleading or dangerous tools. Fig 6: MCP Evaluation Report - Tool-By-Tool Detail What to look for Read the per-tool results before the overall score. A single weak tool can create more risk than the server average suggests. Focus on these report sections: Tool names: Can an agent select the correct tool from its name? Tool descriptions: Does each description explain the purpose and correct use? Parameter names: Do the names identify the data that the tool requires? Parameter descriptions: Do they explain the format, type, and constraints? Schema structure: Are the schemas valid and processable? Action items: Which changes have the highest effect on tool selection and use? The command processes static tool schemas from `tools/list`. It does not process runtime payloads, end-user data, or personal data. The command keeps the `--auth-token` value in memory. It sends the value only in the HTTP `Authorization` header. It does not write the token to disk or give it to the coding agent. AGT: Put governance in the execution path: Microsoft's open-source Agent Governance Toolkit (AGT) evaluates an action before execution. It adds identity and policy context, records the decision, and can send risky work for approval. This can be used by developers during the build time for dynamic evaluation of the MCP server. AGT lets developers put part of that intent into the execution path. Remote tools still need secure implementations, sandboxes need hard boundaries, and audit records need appropriate storage and access controls. You do not need to replace your agent framework to use it. What sits in the decision path? AGT wraps the tools that an agent already uses. You can start to govern a tool with two lines of Python: python from agentmesh.governance import govern safe_tool = govern(my_tool, policy="policy.yaml") On each call, `safe_tool` evaluates the configured policy. An allowed action reaches the original tool. A denied action raises `GovernanceDenied` and creates a decision record. This wrapper model reduces the cost of adoption. Teams can add governance to an existing agent stack without rebuilding it. AGT supports Python, TypeScript, .NET, Rust, and Go. Its documented integrations include popular agent frameworks, MCP, and A2A. Teams can also adopt AGT in stages. A team can begin with policy checks and audit records. It can add identity, approvals, sandboxing, and operational controls as risk increases. Each control answers a different question: Policy: Is this action allowed? Identity and trust: Which agent made the request? Runtime controls: What limits apply to execution? Audit evidence: Why did AGT allow or deny the action? A low-risk assistant can need only a deny rule and basic logging. An agent that moves money or changes production systems needs stronger controls. Fig 7: AGT Architecture Scenario: Govern the same malicious MCP server For this scenario demonstration, we used AGT Python packages as an MCP gateway. The gateway sat between an agent and the same malicious server from the earlier evaluation. This setup let us examine both control points against one target. The Agent 365 CLI examined the server's static tool definitions. The AGT gateway examined real requests and responses for the developer during its testing. Fig 8: AGT findings at runtime In the policy interface, a developer can edit runtime limits and detection rules. The developer can also validate the policy against sample tool metadata, save a revision, and activate it with a recorded reason. Fig 9: AGT control coverage The control-coverage view shows which AGT capabilities are active in the gateway. It also links each capability to package checks and end-to-end evidence. In our demonstration, we included the following controls: Tool metadata poisoning detection; Tool change and rug-pull detection; Dangerous argument blocking; Tool-response content scanning; Per-client tool-call budgets; and A redacted decision audit trail. You can build your detection & input security by reading more about it here. The gateway detected malicious content. For one blocked `tools/list` request, it recorded the findings. The important result was not only that AGT blocked the request. It also preserved the matched evidence, affected tool locations, policy modes, and request context. Fig 10: Example detection via AGT The dashboard then summarized block-mode findings, leading risk drivers, and tools that required review. This evidence can help a team prioritize policy changes and investigate repeated attacks. Fig 11: Sample AGT metrics AGT does not require this UI, gateway, or architecture. Its structured decisions can feed an admin console, SIEM, incident workflow, or approval queue. AGT also includes an Agent Compliance package with mappings for OWASP and other controls. These mappings give developers and governance teams a common record of applied controls. Teams do not need to reconstruct the agent's behavior after an incident. Check Compliance - Agent Governance Toolkit for more information. Conclusion: MCP safety needs controls before and during execution. The Agent 365 CLI improves the MCP interface before deployment. It exposes unclear tool definitions, scores server maturity, and turns quality gaps into prioritized work. While AGT is implemented at the build phase, it provides developers the ability to test policy, identity, execution context & preserve evidence for allowed or denied decisions. Neither tool replaces secure server code, strong sandbox boundaries, or protected audit storage. Instead, they make those controls easier to evaluate and explain. Start with one MCP server and one consequential tool call. Evaluate the server with the Agent 365 CLI. Then put an AGT policy around the action that carries the most risk. While these controls help secure the build phase of an agent, once agents move into production, runtime controls become essential. Agent365 provides those controls at runtime. With thanks to Ashik Kuppil for his inputs and collaboration on this post.Sensitivity Auto-labelling via Document Property
Why is this needed? Sensitivity labels are generally relevant within an organisation only. If a file is labelled within one environment and then moved to another environment, sensitivity label content markings may be visible, but by default, the applied sensitivity label will not be understood. This can lead to scenarios where information that has been generated externally is not adequately protected. My favourite analogy for these scenarios is to consider the parallels between receiving sensitive information and unpacking groceries. When unpacking groceries, you might sit your grocery bag on a counter or on the floor next to the pantry. You’ll likely then unpack each item, take a look at it and then decide where to place it. Without looking at an item to determine its correct location, you might place it in the wrong location. Porridge might be safe from the kids on the bottom shelf. If you place items that need to be protected, such as chocolate, on the bottom shelf, it’s not likely to last very long. So, I affectionately refer to information that hasn’t been evaluated as ‘porridge’, as until it has been checked, it will end up on the bottom shelf of the pantry where it is quite accessible. Label-based security controls, such as Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies using conditions of ‘content contains sensitivity label’ will not apply to these items. To ensure the security of any contained sensitive information, we should look for potential clues to its sensitivity and then utilize these clues to ensure that the contained information is adequately protected - We take a closer look at the ‘porridge’, determine whether it’s an item that needs protection and if so, move it to a higher shelf in the pantry so that it’s out of reach for the kids. Effective use of Purview revolves around the use of ‘know your data’ strategies. We should be using as many methods as possible to try to determine the sensitivity of items. This can include the use of Sensitive Information Types (SITs) containing keyword or pattern-based classifiers, trainable classifiers, Exact Data Match, Document fingerprinting, etc. Matching items via SITs present in the items content can be problematic due to false positives. Keywords like ‘Sensitive’ or ‘Protected’ may be mentioned out of context, such as when referring to a classification or an environment. When classifications have been stamped via a property, it allows us to match via context rather than content. We don’t need to guess at an item’s sensitivity if another system has already established what the item’s classification is. These methods are much less prone to false positives. Why isn’t everyone doing this? Document properties are often not considered in Purview deployments. SharePoint metadata management seems to be a dying artform and most compliance or security resources completing Purview configurations don’t have this skill set. There’s also a lack of understanding of the relevance of checking for item properties. Microsoft haven’t helped as the documentation in this space is somewhat lacking and needs to be unpicked via some aligning DLP guidance (Create a DLP policy to protect documents with FCI or other properties). Many of these configurations will also be tied to regional requirements. Document properties being used by systems where I’m from, in Australia, will likely be very different to those used in other parts of the world. In the following sections, we’ll take a look at applicable use cases and walk through how to enable these configurations. Scenarios for use Labelling via document property isn’t for everyone. If your organisation is new to classification or you don’t have external partners that you collaborate with at higher sensitivity levels, then this likely isn’t for you. For those that collaborate heavily and have a shared classification framework, as is often seen across government, this is a must! This approach will also be highly relevant to multi-tenant organisations or conglomerates where information is regularly shared between environments. The following scenarios are examples of where this configuration will be relevant: 1. Migrating from 3 rd party classification tools If an item has been previously stamped by a 3 rd party classification tool, then evaluating its applied document properties will provide a clear picture of its security classification. These properties can then be used in service-based auto-labelling policies to effectively transition items from 3 rd party tools to Microsoft Purview sensitivity labels. As labels are applied to items, they will be brought into scope of label-based controls. 2. Detecting data spill Data spill is a term that is used to define situations where information that is of a higher than permitted security classification land in an environment. Consider a Microsoft 365 tenant that is approved for the storage of Official information but Top Secret files are uploaded to it. Document properties that align with higher than permitted classifications provide us with an almost guaranteed method of identifying spilled items. Pairing this document property with an auto-labelling policy allows for the application of encryption to lock unauthorized users out of the items. Tools like Content Explorer and eDiscovery can then be used to easily perform cleanup activities. If using document properties and auto-labelling for this purpose, keep in mind that you’ll need to create sensitivity labels for higher than permitted classifications in order to catch spilled items. These labels won’t impact usability as you won’t publish them to users. You will, however, need to publish them to a single user or break glass account so that they’re not ignored by auto-labelling. 3. Blocking access by AI tools If your organization was concerned about items with certain properties applied being accessed by generative AI tools, such as Copilot, you could use Auto-labelling to apply a sensitivity label that restricts EXTRACT permissions. You can find some information on this at Microsoft 365 Copilot data protection architecture | Microsoft Learn. This should be relevant for spilled data, but might also be useful in situations where there are certain records that have been marked via properties and which should not be Copilot accessible. 4. External Microsoft Purview Configurations Sensitivity labels are relevant internally only. A label, in its raw form, is essentially a piece of metadata with an ID (or GUID) that we stamp on pieces of information. These GUIDs are understood by your tenant only. If an item marked with a GUID shows up in another Microsoft 365 tenant, the GUID won’t correspond with any of that tenant’s labels or label-based controls. The art in Microsoft Purview lies in interpreting the sensitivity of items based on content markings and other identifiers, so that data security can be maintained. Document properties applied by Purview, such as ClassificationContentMarkingHeaderText are not relevant to a specific tenant, which makes them portable. We can use these properties to help maintain classifications as items move between environments. 5. Utilizing metadata applied by Records Management solutions Some EDRMS, Records or Content Management solutions will apply properties to items. If an item has been previously managed and then stamped with properties, potentially including a security classification, via one of these systems, we could use this information to inform sensitivity label application. 6. 3 rd party classification tools used externally Even if your organisation hasn’t been using 3rd party classification tools, you should consider that partner organisations, such as other Government departments, might be. Evaluating the properties applied by external organisations to items that you receive will allow you to extend protections to these items. If classification tools like Janus or Titus are used in your geography/industry, then you may want to consider checking for their properties. Regarding the use of auto-classification tools Some organisations, particularly those in Government, will have organisational policies that prevent the use of automatic classification capabilities. These policies are intended to ensure that each item is assessed by an actual person for risk of disclosure rather than via an automated service that could be prone to error. However, when auto-labelling is used to interpret and honour existing classifications, we are lowering rather than raising the risk profile. If the item’s existing classification (applied via property) is ignored, the item will be treated as porridge and is likely to be at risk. If auto-labelling is able to identify a high-risk item and apply the relevant label, it will then be within scope of Purview’s data security controls, including label-based DLP, groups and sites data out of place alerting, and potentially even item encryption. The outcome is that, through the use of auto-labelling, we are able to significantly reduce risk of inappropriate or unintended disclosure. Configuration Process Setting up document property-based auto-labelling is fairly straightforward. We need to setup a managed property and then utilize it an auto-labelling policy. Below, I've split this process into 6 steps: Step 1 – Prepare your files In order to make use of document properties, an item with the properties applied will first need to be indexed by SharePoint. SharePoint will record the properties as ‘crawled properties’, which we’ll then need to convert into ‘managed properties’ to make them useful. If you already have items with the relevant properties stored in SharePoint, then they are likely already indexed. If not, you’ll need to upload or create an item or items with the properties applied. For testing, you’ll want to create a file with each property/value combination so that you can confirm that your auto-labelling policies are all working correctly. This could require quite a few files depending on the number of properties you’re looking for. To kick off your crawled property generation though, you could create or upload a single file with the correct properties applied. For example: In the above, I’ve created properties for ClassificationContentMarkingHeaderText and ClassificationContentMarkingFooterText, which you’ll often see applied by Purview when an item has a sensitivity label content marking applied to it. I’ve also included properties to help identify items classified via JanusSeal, Titus and Objective. Step 2 – Index the files After creating or uploading your file, we then need SharePoint to index it. This should happen fairly quickly depending on the size of your environment. I'd expect to wait sometime between 10 minutes and 24 hrs. If you're not in a hurry, then I'd recommend just checking back the next day. You'll know when this has been completed when you head into SharePoint Admin > Search > Managed Search Schema > Crawled Properties and can find your newly indexed properties: Step 3 – Configure managed properties Next, the properties need to be configured as managed properties. To do this, go to SharePoint Admin > More features > Search > Managed Search Schema > Managed Properties. Create a new managed property and give it a name. Note that there are some character restrictions in naming, but you should be able to get it close to your document property name. Set the property’s type to text, select queryable and retrievable. Under ‘mappings to crawled properties’, choose add mapping, search for and select the property indexed from the file property. Note that the crawled property will have the same name as your document property, so there’s no need to browse through all of them: Repeat this so that you have a managed property for each document property that you want to look for. Step 4 – Configure Auto-labelling policies Next up, create some auto-labelling policies. You’ll need one for each label that you want to apply, not one per property as you can check multiple properties within the one auto-labelling policy. - From within Purview, head to Information Protection > Policies > Auto-labelling policies. - Create a new policy using the custom policy template. - Give your policy an appropriate name (e.g. Label PROTECTED via property). - Select the label that you want to apply (e.g. PROTECTED). - Select SharePoint based services (SharePoint and OneDrive). - Name your auto-labelling rules appropriately (e.g. SPO – Contains PROTECTED property) - Enter your conditions as a long string with property and value separated via a colon and multiple entries separated with a comma. For example: ClassificationContentMarkingHeaderText:PROTECTED,ClassificationContentMarkingFooterText:PROTECTED,Objective-Classification:PROTECTED,PMDisplay:PROTECTED,TitusSEC:PROTECTED Note that the properties that you are referencing are the Managed Property rather than the document property. This will be relevant if your managed property ended up having a different name due to character restrictions. After pasting in your string into the UI, the resultant rule should look something like this: When done, you can either leave your policy in simulation mode or save it and then turn it on from the auto-labelling policies screen. Just be aware of any potential impacts, such as accidently locking users out by automatically deploying a label with encryption configuration. You can reduce any potential impact by targeting your auto-labelling policy at a site or set of sites initially and then expanding its scope after testing. Step 5 - Test Testing your configuration will be as easy as uploading or creating a set of files with the relevant document properties in place. Once uploaded, you’ll need to give SharePoint some time to index the items and then the auto-labelling policy some time to apply sensitivity labels to them. To confirm label application, you can head to the document library where your test files are located and enable the sensitivity column. Files that have been auto-labelled will have their label listed: You could also check for auto-labelling activity in Purview via Activity explorer: Step 6 – Expand into DLP If you’ve spent the time setting up managed properties, then you really should consider capitalizing on them in your DLP configurations. DLP policy conditions can be configured in the same manner that we configured Auto-labelling in Step 3 above. The document property also gives us an anchor for DLP conditions that is independent of an item’s sensitivity label. You may wish to consider the following: DLP policies blocking external sharing of items with certain properties applied. This might be handy for situations where auto-labelling hasn’t yet labelled an item. DLP policies blocking the external sharing of items where the applied sensitivity label doesn’t match the applied document property. This could provide an indication of risky label downgrade. You could extend such policies into Insider Risk Management (IRM) by creating IRM policies that are aligned with the above DLP policies. This will allow for document properties to be considered in user risk calculation, which can inform controls like Adaptive Protection. Here's an example of a policy from the DLP rule summary screen that shows conditions of item contains a label or one of our configured document properties: Thanks for reading and I hope this article has been of use. If you have any questions or feedback, please feel free to reach out.3.9KViews9likes9CommentsThe Microsoft AI and Agent Platform — The Platform Behind Intelligent Agents
Why the platform around the model is the real enterprise differentiator Enterprise AI has reached a turning point. Beyond answering questions, it can now reason over business context, retrieve knowledge, use tools, coordinate workflows, and act across enterprise systems. This shift raises a critical question: How can organizations build agents intelligent enough to transform work while ensuring they remain trusted, governed, and ready to operate at enterprise scale? The answer is not a single model, chatbot, or orchestration framework. Foundation models are advancing quickly and increasingly becoming a commodity input — Azure AI Foundry alone provides access to more than 11,000 models. What determines enterprise value is not the model alone, but the platform around the model: the data that grounds it, the tools it can use, the experiences where people engage it, the runtime where it operates, and the enterprise foundation that gives it identity, context, governance, and operational control. The Microsoft AI and Agent platform enables organizations to build, ground, govern, and operate AI apps and agents at scale, bringing together the full agent lifecycle with open development, built-in intelligence, and consistent security, compliance, and policy controls. One ecosystem, multiple experiences, shared intelligence, flexible build paths, multiple runtime choices, and an enterprise foundation that carries security, governance, compliance, and Responsible AI across the stack. The reference mental model below expresses this as a layered platform — Users → Experiences → Agents → Intelligence → Runtime → Foundation with security, governance, compliance, and Responsible AI applied across every layer. An agent that is brilliant but ungoverned never leaves the pilot stage. An agent that is locked down but context-blind never delivers real value. Impact compounds only when both dimensions advance together, on the same platform, so that intelligence and control share one identity model, one data plane, and one control plane. Part 1 — Intelligence (this post): dives into how Microsoft's platform helps organizations build agents that understand work, reason over trusted context, and act through business systems to deliver real business value. Part 2 — Trust: will go deeper on how those agents are secured, governed, monitored, and managed across their lifecycle. Intelligence + Trust = Frontier Transformation Part 1: Intelligence Most enterprise AI programs begin with model experimentation - prompts, model comparisons, prototypes, accuracy evaluations. That is necessary but not sufficient. A model alone does not know your organization, your processes, your permissions, your systems of record, your compliance obligations, or your operating model. Experience layer: meet users where work already happens Agents deliver value only when they reach people in the flow of work. Enterprise AI adoption rarely happens through a single interface or experience. A sales leader, financial analyst, security operator, developer, field technician, and HR specialist do not need the same interface they need agents surfaced in the tools and workflows they already use. Microsoft's approach is not to force every agent into one portal. The platform supports multiple experiences over a shared foundation: Microsoft 365 Copilot for productivity and business users. Security Copilot for security operations. Azure Copilot for IT operations, cloud, and infrastructure. GitHub Copilot for developers. Dynamics 365 experiences for sales, service, finance, and supply chain workflows. Power Platform and Copilot Studio experiences for business applications and low-code extensions. Custom experiences for line-of-business apps, portals, websites, and industry-specific workflows. Regardless of where users engage, the underlying intelligence, governance, and runtime capabilities remain consistent across experiences. Agent layer: specialize by domain, tools, and autonomy Specialization with a shared substrate Generic agents often fail because enterprise work is domain specific. A security agent must understand incidents, alerts, identities, and threat intelligence. A finance agent must understand reconciliations, receivables, approvals, and controls. A developer agent must understand repositories, branches, pull requests, tests, and pipelines. Microsoft's platform supports both prebuilt domain agents and custom agents. Organizations should leverage the domain specific agents where possible and focus custom development on capabilities that create unique business value. Whether an agent is out of the box or custom, it inherits the same governance, so built-in and custom are never two different compliance islands. Agent systems form an autonomy spectrum, allowing organizations to progressively increase capability while maintaining appropriate levels of human oversight. Assistive: The agent recommends; a human decides. Example - A finance agent drafts a reconciliation for review. Supervised autonomy: the agent acts within bounded authority and escalates exceptions. Example - An SRE agent auto-remediates known alert classes and escalates novel incidents. Multi-agent orchestration: A coordinating agent decomposes a goal and delegates to specialist agents. Example - One agent retrieves data, another analyzes it, another drafts a response, and another executes an approved action. Intelligence layer: grounding as a first-class platform tier An agent is only as good as the context it can reason over. The hardest part of building a useful enterprise agent is not calling a model. It is giving the agent the right context. Without trusted context, agents produce generic answers. The IQ Platform is the intelligence fabric that separates enterprise-grade agents from generic AI assistants. A generic model can answer questions based on its training data or a narrow retrieval source. A Microsoft agent, by contrast, can be grounded in multiple dimensions of your organizational intelligence: how people work, what business data means, which knowledge is authoritative, and what external signals matter. With the right intelligence fabric, agents become role-aware, process-aware, data-aware, and policy-aware. Microsoft's IQ model treats grounding as a reusable platform capability rather than per-project plumbing. IQ layer What it gives agents Why it matters Work IQ Collaboration context: people, skills, meetings, documents, decisions, workflows, and organizational relationships. Helps agents understand how work actually happens, not just what content exists. Fabric IQ Governed business data, metrics, semantic models, and analytical context. Helps agents reason over trusted enterprise data with consistent business definitions. Foundry IQ Models, curated knowledge, retrieval assets, memory, guardrails, and AI development capabilities delivered from Microsoft Foundry with plug-and-play memory, knowledge, and tool integrations. Helps teams build reliable, purpose-built agents with governed model and knowledge choices. Web IQ Public web, current external signals, research, news, and external context. Helps agents augment internal context with timely external intelligence. In a conventional application, data access is deterministic queries against known schemas. In an agentic system, the equivalent tier must serve retrieval for reasoning, semantically matching an ambiguous natural-language intent to the right passages, records, and metrics across unstructured collaboration content, structured business data, curated knowledge, and the live web. The four IQ sources correspond to those four retrieval modalities, and the IQ Platform gives agents a composable intelligence model. Each IQ layer adds a distinct signal, and together they allow agents to move from simple assistance to informed action. Intelligence is more than model capability. It emerges from the combination of grounding, memory, model selection, orchestration, and guardrails working together as a coordinated system. Grounding, fine-tuning, and adaptation Microsoft gives teams multiple adaptation levers within a governed environment rather than forcing every use case into one technique. Grounding is not a sidecar retrieval capability; it is an enterprise intelligence layer. Because the model layer is a platform tier rather than a single endpoint, adaptation techniques fine-tuning, distillation into smaller task models, and retrieval-augmented grounding are first-class options selected per workload. The common pattern: prefer grounding (RAG) for freshness and provenance, reserve fine-tuning for durable behavior, format, or domain-tone requirements, and distill to smaller models where latency and cost dominate. Memory In addition to retrieval and reasoning, enterprise agents increasingly rely on memory to preserve context across conversations, tasks, and workflows. Memory enables agents to maintain continuity, learn from prior interactions, and provide more personalized, adaptive, and goal-oriented experiences over time. Multi-model choice Agent workloads are not uniform. Some steps require simple classification. Others require complex reasoning, synthesis, code generation, or tool orchestration. Model choice is becoming a strategic architecture decision, balancing quality, latency, cost, sovereignty, and specialization requirements. Microsoft Foundry supports model choice as part of the platform rather than forcing all workloads through one endpoint with a curated catalog of leading foundation, open-source, and partner models spanning capabilities, performance trade-offs, and use cases so teams can move from experimentation to production confidently. Model routing Microsoft Foundry's Model Router selects the optimal LLM for each agent request per turn, not per session — a simple greeting can route to a fast, inexpensive model, while a complex tool-calling chain can route to a frontier model, all through one endpoint with zero routing logic. Model selection becomes a runtime policy, not hard-coded application logic providing automatic failover when an upstream provider is unavailable, prompt caching across models for identical inputs, and consistent tool-use semantics regardless of which underlying model handles a call. Key routing capabilities include per-request optimization, complexity-aware model selection, tool-aware routing, multi-agent support, resiliency, and cost optimization. Orchestration Orchestration transforms individual model interactions into coordinated agentic and multi-agent workflows. An LLM-driven planning layer that interprets user intent, breaks down complex requests, selects the right tools and knowledge, and executes multi-step plans and multi-agent workflows with guardrails for safety and compliance. Guardrails A guardrail is a named collection of controls; each control defines a risk to be detected, intervention points to scan the risk, and the response action to take when the risk is detected. Guardrails help ensure that agent behavior remains aligned with organizational policies, safety requirements, and business objectives. How agents are built: one continuum from no-code to pro-code Different builders. Different depth. One platform. The progression from no-code to low-code to pro-code is more than a tooling choice; it reflects increasing levels of customization, control, and organizational maturity. Different teams need different levels of control. A business user may need a simple knowledge agent. A process owner may need a workflow agent with connectors and approvals. An engineering team may need a custom multi-agent system with model routing, evaluation, tool use, and deployment automation. Organizations can start with simple productivity agents, evolve into governed workflow agents, and eventually build deeply integrated agentic systems. No-code - M365 Agent Builder: create simple agents from natural language and your organizational data. This is useful for lightweight departmental workflows, knowledge assistants, and task-specific copilots. Low-code - Copilot Studio: design, extend, and orchestrate agents with connectors, workflows, and enterprise governance. This is where business technologists and app makers can build more sophisticated agents that integrate with systems, automate processes, and enforce organizational rules. Pro-code - Microsoft Foundry: enables developers to build custom AI systems with full control over models, orchestration, infrastructure, and code. This is where organizations can build highly specialized agents with advanced reasoning patterns, custom retrieval, tool use, evaluation pipelines, and deployment strategies. The key principle is continuity; moving from no-code to low-code to pro-code should not require rethinking the architecture. Identity, grounding, governance, policy, and operational controls should carry forward including centralized identity and policy enforcement. Regardless of the development approach, the same intelligence, runtime, governance, and operational capabilities can be reused across the platform. Where agents run: one platform, multiple runtime choices Match the runtime to the requirement A mature enterprise platform must support more than one runtime pattern. Some agents need elastic cloud scale. Others need local execution because of latency, data sensitivity, offline operation, or regulated environments. Some need to interact with legacy applications that do not expose APIs. Runtime should be selected based on business, operational, and regulatory requirements rather than tooling limitations. Build path and runtime path should vary independently over a shared foundation. The ability to deploy the same agent architecture across multiple runtime environments helps organizations balance performance, compliance, and operational flexibility. Local / edge (Foundry Local, Windows AI): Local or edge execution supports scenarios where data sensitivity, latency, offline access, regulatory requirements, disconnected operation or device-specific context matter. Examples include on-device models, Windows AI capabilities, and local execution for regulated or disconnected environments. Cloud runtime (Azure / Copilot stack): supports scalable, API-driven agents with multi-agent orchestration running in Azure and Copilot with the default for enterprise workflows, multi-agent orchestration, connected systems, and data-connected scenarios that need elasticity. Cloud PC (Windows 365 agents): enables agents to operate in managed desktop environments. agents run on a Windows 365 Cloud PC using a check-out/check-in model, driving UI automation, browsers, and legacy apps as a human operator would in a managed and governed environment. This is the bridge to systems that expose no API, the agent operates the actual application UI in a governed, isolated desktop. Foundation layer: shared trust fabric The enterprise foundation for intelligence and trust The same enterprise services that secure, govern, and operate modern organizations now extend to agents, creating a shared foundation for both intelligence and trust. This inheritance model allows organizations to extend existing investments in identity, governance, security, compliance, and operations directly to agent systems rather than introducing a separate control model for AI. Key foundation services include: Microsoft Graph – Provides agents the context across users, groups, files, meetings, messages, relationships, and activity signals. It gives agents a permission-aware understanding of work, not just isolated documents. Microsoft Entra – Agents are governed using the same identity fabric that governs users, devices, apps, and resources enabling role-based and attribute-based access control plus risk-based Conditional Access policies. Microsoft Fabric - Governed data, analytics, semantic models, and business metrics. Foundry includes SharePoint and Microsoft Fabric among its built-in tools. Agents reason over trusted business definitions instead of disconnected raw tables. Microsoft Purview - Data protection, sensitivity labeling, DLP, compliance, and governance. Agent 365 uses Microsoft Purview for data protection and compliance controls on agent activity and data, complementing Microsoft Defender for threat detection and behavior monitoring. Agent interactions inherit enterprise compliance expectations. Azure - Provides enterprise-grade cloud infrastructure and operational maturity. Foundry emphasizes centralized observability, traces, evaluated runs, and production performance monitoring with full traceability for enterprise-scale security, audit, and compliance requirements. Microsoft 365 - Brings agents into the tools where employees already work. Agents can be surfaced in the productivity tools users already leverage. Dynamics 365 - Business application context for sales, service, finance, supply chain, and operations. Grounds agents in business processes and systems of record. Power Platform - Low-code apps, automation, connectors, and business process integration — reachable via Foundry through Azure Logic Apps integration with more than 1,400 connectors. Business technologists can extend agent workflows without building everything in code. GitHub - Developer workflows, repositories, pull requests, code context, and DevOps integration. Extends agentic assistance into software development lifecycle. Windows & Windows 365 - Endpoint and Cloud PC environments for local, desktop, and legacy app scenarios. Extends agent reach beyond APIs into managed desktop execution patterns. Alongside these services, Agent 365 and the Foundry Control Plane provide the trust layer for enterprise agents, combining security, governance, compliance, and Responsible AI with centralized visibility, policy enforcement, lifecycle management, and secure AI operations from development through production. End-to-end request journey: how the layers work together The true value of the platform emerges when all the layers work together as a coordinated system. Intelligence emerges from the combined effect of experience, domain specialization, grounding, memory, models, orchestration, runtime, and foundation. An example request, from a user - “Reconcile last month's receivables and flag anomalies for my region." Experience - The user asks from Microsoft 365 Copilot or a finance workflow surface, the agent is reached through the same stable endpoint used across Microsoft 365 and Teams. Identity context - The platform attaches user identity, and, for the agent, its Microsoft Entra Agent ID assigned in Foundry. Agent selection - A finance agent interprets the goal. If the request spans domains, Copilot Studio generative orchestration decomposes it into a plan, choosing tools, topics, knowledge sources, or connected agents. Grounding - Fabric IQ provides receivables data and metric definitions; Work IQ provides relevant approvals and prior decisions; Foundry IQ provides reconciliation rules and policy knowledge; Web IQ can add external signals when needed. Model routing - The Foundry Model Router selects the model per turn. A simple classification step goes to a nano-tier model; anomaly reasoning routes to a mid-tier model; multi-document synthesis routes to a frontier model, all through one endpoint with zero routing logic. Guardrails - Foundry guardrails scan user input, tool calls, tool responses, and final output for defined risks and take the configured action (annotate or annotate-and-block). Tool use - The agent queries systems, invokes reconciliation logic, runs anomaly detection, or calls another specialist agent via Copilot Studio connected agents or Foundry's MCP integration. Runtime execution - The workflow runs in cloud, local, or Windows 365 Cloud PC environments depending on system access, data sensitivity, latency, and legacy application constraints. Response - The agent returns a reconciled view, flagged anomalies, rationale, and recommended next steps — with citations pulled from the knowledge layer for transparency. Bridge to Trust - Every action generated by the agent remains observable, governable, and auditable through the platform's trust capabilities, which are explored further in Part 2. Conclusion The hard problem in enterprise AI was never obtaining a capable model; it was grounding that model in governed enterprise context, enabling it to act through governed tools, and doing so within the security, compliance, and operational controls organizations already rely on. Microsoft's answer is a platform approach: a dedicated grounding tier through the IQ Platform, a flexible intelligence layer spanning models, memory, routing, orchestration, and guardrails, specialized agent families aligned to business domains, a build-to-run continuum spanning no-code to pro-code, and a shared trust foundation that every agent inherits. Integrate once with this fabric, and the payoff compounds: one identity model, one grounding tier, and one governance spine become reusable across every persona surface, every agent family, every build-and-run target. Coming next — Part 2: Trust Intelligence is only half the equation. In Part 2 we turn to the other axis: how Microsoft secures and governs every component of an agent - models, tools, MCP connectors, memory, and orchestration across the full lifecycle.1.3KViews5likes2CommentsFeature Request: Extend Security Copilot inclusion (M365 E5) to M365 A5 Education tenants
Background At Ignite 2025, Microsoft announced that Security Copilot is included for all Microsoft 365 E5 customers, with a phased rollout starting November 18, 2025. This is a significant step forward for security operations. The gap Microsoft 365 A5 for Education is the academic equivalent of E5 — it includes the same core security stack: Microsoft Defender, Entra, Intune, and Purview. However, the Security Copilot inclusion explicitly covers only commercial E5 customers. There is no public roadmap or timeline for extending this benefit to A5 education tenants. Why this matters Education institutions face the same cybersecurity threats as commercial organizations — often with fewer dedicated security resources. The A5 license was positioned as the premium security offering for education. Excluding it from Security Copilot inclusion creates an inequity between commercial and education customers holding functionally equivalent license tiers. Request We would like Microsoft to: Confirm whether Security Copilot inclusion will be extended to M365 A5 Education tenants If yes, provide an indicative timeline If no, clarify the rationale and what alternative paths exist for education customers Are other EDU admins in the same situation? Would appreciate any upvotes or comments to help raise visibility with the product team.794Views13likes3CommentsSecuring AI Agents at Runtime: Real-Time Protection and Threat Detection for Microsoft Agent 365
Organizations are rapidly adopting AI agents to automate workflows, access enterprise data, invoke tools, and take actions on behalf of users. This autonomy creates a fundamentally new security challenge. Unlike traditional AI applications, agents operate across dynamic execution flows, interacting with external content, calling tools, and accessing sensitive resources. These interactions create new attack paths that traditional security controls were not designed to address. Today, we're announcing two major milestones for Security for AI in Microsoft Defender for Microsoft Agent 365: Threat detection for Microsoft Agent 365 agents — now in public preview. Real-time protection for Microsoft Agent 365 tooling servers — now generally available. Together, these capabilities help security teams detect, investigate, and block attacks targeting AI agents, extending Microsoft Defender's threat protection capabilities into the agent runtime. Threat detection for Microsoft Agent 365 Agents (Public Preview) Threat detection provides SOC teams with detailed visibility into attacks and suspicious activity targeting AI agents. By analyzing runtime signals across agent interactions, tool usage, and execution patterns, Microsoft Defender identifies suspicious and malicious behavior throughout the agent execution lifecycle and surfaces actionable security alerts for SOC teams. Threat detection supports cloud agent types that emit observability logs to Microsoft Agent 365, including: Microsoft Copilot Studio Microsoft Foundry Microsoft 365 Copilot Agent Builder Agents integrated through the Microsoft Agent 365 SDK This provides consistent threat visibility across supported Microsoft Agent 365 agent experiences, regardless of how the agent was built. Fig. 1. Microsoft Security for AI alerts in Microsoft Defender XDR (Preview) Microsoft Defender identifies a broad range of AI-specific threats, including: Indirect prompt injection (XPIA) — malicious instructions embedded in external content designed to manipulate agent behavior. Evasion techniques — attempts to bypass agent instructions or security controls. Malicious content propagation — attempts to use agents to generate or distribute malicious content. Secret leakage — exposure of credentials, API keys, or other sensitive information through agent interactions. LLM reconnaissance — attempts to probe agent capabilities, instructions, or security boundaries. Suspicious IP access — agent access originating from anonymized or suspicious IP addresses. Alerts are surfaced directly in Microsoft Defender, enabling SOC analysts to investigate and respond using familiar workflows, Advanced Hunting queries, and the Defender XDR investigation experience. Real-time protection for WorkIQ and Custom MCP servers (General Availability) Real-time protection moves beyond detection by blocking threats inline when AI agents interact with WorkIQ and custom MCP servers (see Microsoft Agent 365 tooling servers). When an agent invokes a registered tool or receives a tool response, Defender evaluates the interaction against configured security policies and determines whether to allow or block it directly within the agent's execution flow. This helps prevent malicious actions and data leakage in real time, without requiring agent developers to implement custom security logic. Fig. 2. Microsoft Security for AI Real-Time Protection policy in Defender Real-time protection currently guards against high-impact threats, including: Evasion techniques — attempts to bypass agent guardrails or security controls. Malicious content propagation — preventing agents from spreading malicious content through tool actions. Secret leakage — blocking agents from inadvertently exposing credentials or sensitive data through tool calls. Communication with untrusted domains — preventing agents from sending email or data to high-risk or untrusted email domains. Better Together: Detection and Protection Threat detection and real-time protection address complementary parts of the agent security lifecycle. Real-time protection provides inline enforcement to block malicious interactions during execution, while threat detection gives SOC teams the visibility and investigation context needed to identify attack patterns, assess impact, and respond to suspicious activity. Together, they provide a defense-in-depth approach that combines runtime enforcement with SOC-driven detection and investigation, purpose-built for AI agents. Getting Started Both capabilities are available through Microsoft Defender, using a dedicated Security for AI workload experience that brings together AI threat detections, investigations, and runtime protection policies. To learn more: Enable security for AI agents using Microsoft Defender Detect and investigate threats to AI agents using Microsoft Defender (Preview) Protect AI agents in real time using Microsoft Defender As AI agents become more autonomous and gain access to enterprise data and tools, securing their runtime behavior becomes critical. With Threat Detection and Real-Time Protection, Microsoft Defender helps organizations adopt AI agents with security controls designed for how agents actually operate—detecting attacks, enabling SOC investigation, and blocking malicious interactions at runtime.1.2KViews1like0CommentsHow Nationwide stays ahead of attackers with Project Perception
Nationwide, the world’s largest building society, is among the first organizations to put Microsoft’s new agentic security system to work. Facing adversaries who now regularly weaponize AI, the society is using Project Perception’s coordinated multi-agent defense—red, blue, and green agents working alongside its analysts—to find and remediate threats faster, while its security experts stay firmly in command. Their team has already seen work that once took weeks compressed into hours. Defending against AI-driven threats Nationwide Building Society is a member-owned mutual serving 19 million members across the UK, and that responsibility is becoming increasingly complex as AI reshapes the threat landscape. Attackers can now scale campaigns faster and automate more of their operations. "AI is giving attackers a real advantage over defenders in terms of pace and scale," says David Boda, Chief Security and Resilience Officer. For its security teams, the mission is clear: protect the customers who trust the organization with some of the most important aspects of their lives. "The things that matter most are protecting their money, protecting their livelihoods." says Tim Russell, Cybersecurity Director. For Nationwide Building Society, keeping pace means human-led, agent-driven defense that helps its team act faster, together and stay ahead. Coordinated multi-agent defense, built on Microsoft Security Nationwide Building Society’s response is to get ahead of the change in the threat landscape—identifying potential risks faster and accelerating response across its environment. Building on Microsoft Defender, which its teams have run for years, the society adopted Project Perception to bring coordinated multi-agent defense into its existing operations. "This solution for multi-agent defense allows us to move to a more proactive way of working," says Boda. The system puts specialized agents to work as a team. "Red agents are offensive cyber agents used to explore the vulnerabilities and the attack paths in our environment. Blue agents are the defensive agents and reflect the work that a security operation center analyst might do," Boda explains, while green agents remediate and harden—with people in command throughout. "The power of the solution is it brings those agents together to achieve a better cybersecurity posture." For analysts, that coordination removes long-standing friction. "We're able to use agentic workflows to identify threats and then track them through into remediation, which previously we would've had to have engaged with a number of different tools to achieve," says Russell. Human-led, agent-driven defense The impact is already tangible. "My team came to me and said, look, we've just taken four weeks of threat intelligence analysis and collapsed that down into four hours—and for me, that was the moment that really brought this to life," Boda recalls. Just as important to Nationwide Building Society is what the technology does for its people. "This technology helps to amplify their skill sets, not to replace them," says Russell. For Nationwide Building Society, the future is humans and agents working as one. "Agents can work twenty-four-seven, but as humans, we can't do that. So, by harnessing humans and agents operating together, we can achieve so much more collectively," says Boda. And the ambition reaches further than the society itself: "Being able to develop this solution together with Microsoft allows us not just to protect Nationwide Building Society, but also to protect wider society—and that feels really positive."2.4KViews2likes0CommentsSecure the age of AI: Redefining trust, data and access
There is no question that AI is transforming the enterprise: changing how data moves, how decisions are made, and how risk takes shape. As agents access, interpret, and act on sensitive data, unmanaged AI use expands and traditional boundaries blur. Kicking off our series on Securing Data and Access in the Era of AI, Microsoft Entra VP of Product Sinead O’Donovan and Microsoft Purview GM of Product Maithili Dandige explain why legacy security models fall short in the age of AI—and why you need a strategy that brings together identity, access, and data protection. Want to adopt and enable AI innovation with greater control and confidence? Join us to learn how leading organizations are securing access, protecting data, and establishing trust for the next generation of AI-powered work. This session is part of Securing data and access in the era of AI with Microsoft Entra and Microsoft Purview. View the full series for more insights to help you move from experimenting with AI to deploying it at scale, securing sensitive data, access, and AI usage.1.8KViews2likes8Comments