security
376 TopicsStep by Step: 2-Tier PKI Lab
Purpose of this blog Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the backbone of secure digital identity management, enabling encryption, digital signatures, and certificate-based authentication. However, neither setting up a PKI nor management of certificates is something most IT pros do on a regular basis and given the complexity and vastness of the subject it only makes sense to revisit the topic from time to time. What I have found works best for me is to just set up a lab and get my hands dirty with the topic that I want to revisit. One such topic that I keep coming back to is PKI - be it for creating certificate templates, enrolling clients, or flat out creating a new PKI itself. But every time I start deploying a lab or start planning a PKI setup, I end up spending too much time sifting through the documentations and trying to figure out why my issuing certificate authority won't come online! To make my life easier I decided to create a cheatsheet to deploy a simple but secure 2-tier PKI lab based on industry best practices that I thought would be beneficial for others like me, so I decided to polish it and make it into a blog. This blog walks through deploying a two-tier PKI hierarchy using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) on Windows Server: an offline Root Certification Authority (Root CA) and an online Issuing Certification Authority (Issuing CA). We’ll cover step-by-step deployment and best practices for securing the root CA, conducting key ceremonies, and maintaining Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Overview: Two-Tier PKI Architecture and Components In a two-tier PKI, the Root CA sits at the top of the trust hierarchy and issues a certificate only to the subordinate Issuing CA. The Root CA is kept offline (disconnected from networks) to protect its private key and is typically a standalone CA (not domain-joined). The Issuing CA (sometimes called a subordinate or intermediate CA) is kept online to issue certificates to end-entities (users, computers, services) and is usually an enterprise CA integrated with Active Directory for automation and certificate template support. Key components: Offline Root CA: A standalone CA, often on a workgroup server, powered on only when necessary (initial setup, subordinate CA certificate signing, or periodic CRL publishing). By staying offline, it is insulated from network threats. Its self-signed certificate serves as the trust anchor for the entire PKI. The Root CA’s private key must be rigorously protected (ideally by a Hardware Security Module) because if the root is compromised, all certificates in the hierarchy are compromised. Online Issuing CA: An enterprise subordinate CA (domain-joined) that handles day-to-day certificate issuance for the organization. It trusts the Root CA (via the root’s certificate) and is the one actually responding to certificate requests. Being online, it must also be secured, but its key is kept online for operations. Typically, the Issuing CA publishes certificates and CRLs to Active Directory and/or HTTP locations for clients to download. The following diagram shows the simplified view of this implementations: The table below summarizes the roles and differences: Aspect Offline Root CA Online Issuing CA Role Standalone Root CA (workgroup) Enterprise Subordinate CA (domain member) Network Connectivity Kept offline (powered off or disconnected when not issuing) Online (running continuously to serve requests) Usage Signs only one certificate (the subordinate CA’s cert) and CRLs Issues end-entity certificates (users, computers, services) Active Directory Not a member of AD domain; doesn’t use templates or auto-enrollment Integrated with AD DS; uses certificate templates for streamlined issuance Security Extremely high: physically secured, limited access, often protected by HSM Very High: server hardened, but accessible on network; HSM recommended for private key CRL Publication Manual. Admin must periodically connect, generate, and distribute CRL. Delta CRLs usually disabled. Automatic. Publishes CRLs to configured CDP locations (AD DS, HTTP) at scheduled intervals. Validity Period Longer (e.g. 5-10+ years for the CA certificate) to reduce frequency of renewal. Shorter (e.g. 2 years) to align with organizational policy; renewed under the root when needed. In this lab setup, we will create a Contoso Root CA (offline) and a Contoso Issuing CA (online) as an example. This mirrors real-world best practices which is to "deploy a standalone offline root CA and an online enterprise subordinate CA”. Deploying the Offline Root CA Setting up the offline Root CA involves preparing a dedicated server, installing AD CS, configuring it as a root CA, and then securing it. We’ll also configure certificate CDP/AIA (CRL Distribution Point and Authority Information Access) locations so that issued certificates will point clients to the correct locations to fetch the CA’s certificate and revocation list. Step 1: Prepare the Root CA Server (Offline) Provision an isolated server: Install a Windows Server OS (e.g., Windows Server 2022) on the machine designated to be the Root CA. Preferably on a portable enterprise grade physical server that can be stored in a safe. Do not join this server to any domain – it should function in a Workgroup to remain independent of your AD forest. System configuration: Give the server a descriptive name (e.g., ROOTCA) and assign a static IP (even though it will be offline, a static IP helps when connecting it temporarily for management). Install the latest updates and security patches while it’s still able to go online. Lock down network access: Once setup is complete, disable or unplug network connections. If the server must remain powered on for any reason, ensure all unnecessary services/ports are disabled to minimize exposure. In practice, you will keep this server shut down or physically disconnected except when performing CA maintenance. Step 2: Install the AD CS Role on the Root CA Add the Certification Authority role: On the Root CA server, open Server Manager and add the Active Directory Certificate Services role. During the wizard, select the Certification Authority role service (no need for web enrollment or others on the root). Proceed through the wizard and complete the installation. You can also install the CA role and management tools via PowerShell: Install-WindowsFeature AD-Certificate -IncludeManagementToolsThis Role Services: Choose Certification Authority. Setup Type: Select Standalone CA (since this root CA is not domain-joined). CA Type: Select Root CA. Private Key: Choose “Create a new private key.” Cryptography: If using an HSM, select the HSM’s Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) here; otherwise use default. Choose a strong key length (e.g., 2048 or 4096 bits) and a secure hash algorithm (SHA-256 or higher). CA Name: Provide a common name for the CA (e.g., “Contoso Root CA”). This name will appear in issued certificates as the Issuer. Avoid using a machine DNS name here for security – pick a name without revealing the server’s actual hostname. Validity Period: Set a long validity (e.g., 10 years) for the root CA’s self-signed certificate. A decade is common for enterprise roots, reducing how often you must touch the offline CA for renewal. Database: Specify locations for the CA database and logs (the defaults are fine for a lab). Review settings and complete the configuration. This process will generate the root CA’s key pair and self-signed certificate, establishing the Root CA.Post-install configuration: After the binary installation, click Configure Active Directory Certificate Services (a notification in Server Manager). In the configuration wizard: You can also perform this configuration via PowerShell in one line: Install-AdcsCertificationAuthority ` -CAType StandaloneRootCA ` -CryptoProviderName "YourHSMProvider" ` -HashAlgorithmName SHA256 -KeyLength 2048 ` -CACommonName "Contoso Root CA" ` -ValidityPeriod Years -ValidityPeriodUnits 10 This would set up a standalone Root CA named "Contoso Root CA" with a 2048-bit key on an HSM provider, valid for 10 years. Step 3: Integrate an HSM (Optional but Recommended) If your lab has a Hardware Security Module, use it to secure the Root CA’s keys. Using an HSM provides a dedicated, tamper-resistant storage for CA private keys and can further protect against key compromise. To integrate: Install the HSM vendor’s software and drivers on the Root CA server. Initialize the HSM and create a security world or partition as per the vendor instructions. Before or during the CA configuration (Step 2 above), ensure the HSM is ready to generate/store the key. When running the AD CS configuration, select the HSM’s CSP/KSP for the cryptographic provider so that the CA’s private key is generated on the HSM. Secure any HSM admin tokens or smartcards. For a root CA, you might employ M of N key splits – requiring multiple key custodians to collaborate to activate the HSM or key – as part of the key ceremony (discussed later). (If an HSM is not available, the root key will be stored on the server’s disk. At minimum, protect it with a strong admin passphrase when prompted, and consider enabling the option to require administrator interaction (e.g., a password) whenever the key is accessed.) Step 4: Configure CA Extensions (CDP/AIA) It’s critical to configure how the Root CA publishes its certificate and revocation list, since the root is offline and cannot use Active Directory auto-publishing. Open the Certification Authority management console (certsrv.msc), right-click the CA name > Properties, and go to the Extensions tab. We will set the CRL Distribution Points (CDP) and Authority Information Access (AIA) URLs: CRL Distribution Point (CDP): This is where certificates will tell clients to fetch the CRL for the Root CA. By default, a standalone CA might have a file:// path or no HTTP URL. Click Add and specify an HTTP URL that will be accessible to all network clients, such as: http://<IssuingCA_Server>/CertEnroll/<CaName><CRLNameSuffix><DeltaCRLAllowed>.crl For example, if your issuing CA’s server name is ISSUINGCA.contoso.local, the URL might be http://issuingca.contoso.local/CertEnroll/Contoso%20Root%20CA.crl This assumes the Issuing CA (or another web server) will host the Root CA’s CRL in the CertEnroll directory. Check the boxes for “Include in the CDP extension of issued certificates” and “Include in all CRLs. Clients use this to find Delta CRLs” (you can uncheck the delta CRL publication on the root, as we won’t use delta CRLs on an offline root). Since the root CA won’t often revoke its single issued cert (the subordinate CA), delta CRLs aren’t necessary. Note: If your Active Directory is in use and you want to publish the Root CA’s CRL to AD, you can also add an ldap:///CN=... path and check “Publish in Active Directory”. However, publishing to AD from an offline CA must be done manually using the following command when the root is temporarily connected. certutil -dspublish Many setups skip LDAP for offline roots and rely on HTTP distribution. Authority Information Access (AIA): This is where the Root CA’s certificate will be published for clients to download (to build certificate chains). Add an HTTP URL similarly, for example: http://<IssuingCA_Server>/CertEnroll/<ServerDNSName>_<CaName><CertificateName>.crt This would point to a copy of the Root CA’s certificate that will be hosted on the issuing CA web server. Check “Include in the AIA extension of issued certificates”. This way, any certificate signed by the Root CA (like your subordinate CA’s cert) contains a URL where clients can fetch the Root CA’s cert if they don’t already have it. After adding these, remove any default entries that are not applicable (e.g., LDAP if the root isn’t going to publish to AD, or file paths that won’t be used by clients). These settings ensure that certificates issued by the Root CA (in practice, just the subordinate CA’s certificate) will carry the correct URLs for chain building and revocation checking. Step 5: Back Up the Root CA and Issue the Subordinate Certificate With the Root CA configured, we need to issue a certificate for the Issuing CA (subordinate). We’ll perform that in the next section from the Issuing CA’s side via a request file. Before taking the root offline, ensure you: Back up the CA’s private key and certificate: In the Certification Authority console, or via the CA Backup wizard, export the Root CA’s key pair and CA certificate. Protect this backup (store it offline in a secure location, e.g., on encrypted removable media in a safe). This backup is crucial for disaster recovery or if the Root CA needs to be migrated or restored. Save the Root CA Certificate: You will need the Root CA’s public certificate (*.crt) to distribute to other systems. Have it exported (Base-64 or DER format) for use on the Issuing CA and for clients. Initial CRL publication: Manually publish the first CRL so that it can be distributed. Open an elevated Command Prompt on the Root CA and run: certutil -crl This generates a new CRL file (in the CA’s configured CRL folder, typically %windir%\system32\CertSrv\CertEnroll). Take that CRL file and copy it to the designated distribution point (for example, to the CertEnroll directory on the Issuing CA’s web server, as per the HTTP URL configured). If using Active Directory for CRL distribution, you would also publish it to AD now (e.g., certutil -dspublish -f RootCA.crl on a domain-connected machine). In most lab setups, copying to an HTTP share is sufficient. With these tasks done, the Root CA is ready. At this point, disconnect or power off the Root CA and store it securely – it should remain offline except when it’s absolutely needed (like publishing a new CRL or renewing the subordinate CA’s certificate in the far future). Keeping the root CA offline maximizes its security by minimizing exposure to compromise. Best Practices for Securing the Root CA: The Root CA is the trust anchor, so apply stringent security practices: Physical security: Store the Root CA machine in a locked, secure location. If it’s a virtual machine, consider storing it on a disconnected hypervisor or a USB drive locked in a safe. Only authorized PKI team members should have access. An offline CA should be treated like crown jewels – offline CAs should be stored in secure locations. Minimal exposure: Keep the Root CA powered off and disconnected when not in use. It should not be left running or connected to any network. Routine operations (like issuing end-entity certs) should never involve the root. Admin access control: Limit administrative access on the Root CA server. Use dedicated accounts for PKI administration. Enable auditing on the CA for any changes or issuance events. No additional roles or software: Do not use the Root CA server for any other function (no web browsing, no email, etc.). Fewer installed components means fewer potential vulnerabilities. Protect the private key: Use an HSM if possible; if not, ensure the key is at least protected by a strong password and consider splitting knowledge of that password among multiple people (so no single person can activate the CA). Many organizations opt for an offline root key ceremony (see below) to generate and handle the root key with multiple witnesses and strict procedures. Keep system time and settings consistent: If the Root CA is powered off for long periods, ensure its clock is accurate whenever it is started (to avoid issuing a CRL or certificate with a wrong date). Don’t change the server name or CA name after installation (doing so invalidates issued certs). Periodic health checks: Even though offline, plan to turn on the Root CA at a secure interval (e.g., semi-annually or annually) to perform tasks like CRL publishing and system updates. Make sure to apply OS security updates during these maintenance windows, as offline does not mean immune to vulnerabilities (especially if it ever connects to a network for CRL publication or uses removable media). Deploying the Online Issuing CA Next, set up the Issuing CA server which will actually issue certificates to end entities in the lab. This server will be domain-joined (if using AD integration) and will obtain its CA certificate from the Root CA we just configured. Step 1: Prepare the Issuing CA Server Provision the server: Install Windows Server on a new machine (or VM) that will be the Issuing CA. Join this server to the Active Directory domain (e.g., Contoso.local). Being an enterprise CA, it needs domain membership to publish templates and integrate with AD security groups. Rename the server to something descriptive like ISSUINGCA for clarity. Assign a static IP and ensure it can communicate on the network. IIS for web enrollment (optional): If you plan to use the Web Enrollment or Certificate Enrollment Web Services, ensure IIS is installed. (The AD CS installation wizard can add it if you include those role services.) For this guide, we will include the Web Enrollment role so that the CertEnroll directory is set up for hosting certificate and CRL files. Step 2: Install AD CS Role on Issuing CA On the Issuing CA server, add the Active Directory Certificate Services role via Server Manager or PowerShell. This time, select both Certification Authority and Certification Authority Web Enrollment role services (Web Enrollment will set up the HTTP endpoints for certificate requests if needed). For example, using PowerShell: Install-WindowsFeature AD-Certificate, ADCS-Web-Enrollment -IncludeManagementTools After installation, launch the AD CS configuration wizard: Role Services: Choose Certification Authority (and Web Enrollment if prompted). Setup Type: Select Enterprise CA (since this CA will integrate with AD DS). CA Type: Select Subordinate CA (this indicates it will get its cert from an existing root CA). Private Key: Choose “Create a new private key” (we’ll generate a new key pair for this CA). Cryptography: If using an HSM here as well, select the HSM’s CSP/KSP for the issuing CA’s key. Otherwise, choose a strong key length (2048+ bits, SHA256 or better for hash). CA Name: Provide a name (e.g., “Contoso Issuing CA”). This name will appear as the Issuer on certificates it issues. Certificate Request: The wizard will ask how you want to get the subordinate CA’s certificate. Choose “Save a certificate request to file”. Specify a path, e.g., C:\CertRequest\issuingCA.req. The wizard will generate a request file that we need to take to the Root CA for signing. (Since our Root CA is offline, this file transfer might be via secure USB or a network share when the root is temporarily online.) CA Database: Choose locations or accept defaults for the certificate DB and logs. Finish the configuration wizard, which will complete pending because the CA doesn’t have a certificate yet. The AD CS service on this server won’t start until we import the issued cert from the root. Step 3: Integrate HSM on Issuing CA (Optional) If available, repeat the HSM setup on the Issuing CA: install HSM drivers, initialize it, and generate/secure the key for the subordinate CA on the HSM. Ensure you chose the HSM provider during the above configuration so that the issuing CA’s private key is stored in the HSM. Even though this CA is online, an HSM still greatly enhances security by protecting the private key from extraction. The issuing CA’s HSM may not require multiple custodians to activate (as it needs to run continuously), but should still be physically secured. Step 4: Obtain the Issuing CA’s Certificate from the Root CA Now we have a pending request (issuingCA.req) for the subordinate CA. To get its certificate: Transport the request to the Root CA: Copy the request file to the offline Root CA (via secure means – e.g., formatted new USB stick). Start up the Root CA (in a secure, offline setting) and open the Certification Authority console. Submit the request on Root CA: Right-click the Root CA in the CA console -> All Tasks -> Submit new request, and select the .req file. The request will appear in the Pending Requests on the root. Issue the subordinate CA certificate: Find the pending request (it will list the Issuing CA’s name). Right-click and choose All Tasks > Issue. The subordinate CA’s certificate is now issued by the Root CA. Export the issued certificate: Still on the Root CA, go to Issued Certificates, find the newly issued subordinate CA cert (you can identify it by the Request ID or by the name). Right-click it and choose Open or All Tasks > Export to get the certificate in a file form. If using the console’s built-in “Export” it might only allow binary; alternatively use the certutil command: certutil -dup <RequestID> .\ContosoIssuingCA.cer or simply open and copy to file. Save the certificate as issuingCA.cer. Also make sure you have a copy of the Root CA’s certificate (if not already done). Publish Root CA cert and CRL as needed: Before leaving the Root CA, you may also want to ensure the Root’s own certificate and latest CRL are available to the issuing CA and clients. If not already done in Step 5 of root deployment, export the Root CA cert (DER format) and copy the CRL file. You might use certutil -crl again if some time has passed since initial CRL. Now take the issuingCA.cer file (and root cert/CRL files) and move them back to the Issuing CA server. Step 5: Install the Issuing CA’s Certificate and Complete Configuration On the Issuing CA server (which is still waiting for its CA cert): Install the subordinate CA certificate: In Server Manager or the Certification Authority console on the Issuing CA, there should be an option to “Install CA Certificate” (if the AD CS configuration wizard is still open, it will prompt for the file; or otherwise, in the CA console right-click the CA name > All Tasks > Install CA Certificate). Provide the issuingCA.cer file obtained from the root. This will install the CA’s own certificate and start the CA service. The Issuing CA is now operational as a subordinate CA. Alternatively, use PowerShell: certutil -installcert C:\CertRequest\issuingCA.cer This installs the cert and associates it with the pending key. Trust the Root CA certificate: Because the Issuing CA is domain-joined, when you install the subordinate cert, it might automatically place the Root CA’s certificate in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store on that server (and possibly publish it to AD). If not, you should manually install the Root CA’s certificate into the Trusted Root CA store on the Issuing CA machine (using the Certificates MMC or certutil -addstore -f Root rootCA.cer). This step prevents any “chain not trusted” warnings on the Issuing CA and ensures it trusts its parent. In an enterprise environment, you would also distribute the root certificate to all client machines (e.g., via Group Policy) so that they trust the whole chain. Import Root CRL: Copy the Root CA’s CRL (*.crl file) to the Issuing CA’s CRL distribution point location (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\CertSrv\CertEnroll\ if that’s the directory served by the web server). This matches the HTTP URL we configured on the root. Place the CRL file there and ensure it is accessible (the Issuing CA’s IIS might need to serve static .crl files; often, if Web Enrollment is installed, the CertEnroll folder is under C:\Inetpub\wwwroot\CertEnroll). At this point, the subordinate CA and any client hitting the HTTP URL can retrieve the root’s CRL. The subordinate CA is now fully established. It holds a certificate issued by the Root CA (forming a complete chain of trust), and it’s ready to issue end-entity certificates. Step 6: Configure Issuing CA Settings and Start Services Start the Certificate Services: If the CA service (CertSvc) isn’t started automatically, start or restart it. On PowerShell: Restart-Service certsvc The CA should show as running in the CA console with the name “Contoso Issuing CA” (or your chosen name). Configure Certificate Templates: Because this is an Enterprise CA, it can utilize certificate templates stored in Active Directory to simplify issuing common cert types (user auth, computer auth, web server SSL, etc.). By default, some templates (e.g., User, Computer) are available but not issued. In the Certification Authority console under Certificate Templates, you can choose which templates to issue (e.g., right-click > New > Certificate Template to Issue, then select templates like “User” or “Computer”). This lab guide doesn’t require specific templates but know that only Enterprise CAs can use templates. Templates define the policies and settings (cryptography, enrollment permissions, etc.) for issued certificates. Ensure you enable only the templates needed and configure their permissions appropriately (e.g., allow the appropriate groups to enroll). Set CRL publishing schedule: The Issuing CA will automatically publish its own CRL (for certificates it issues) at intervals. You can adjust the CRL and Delta CRL publication interval in the CA’s Properties > CRL Period. A common practice is a small base CRL period (e.g., 1 week or 2 weeks) for issuing CAs, because they may revoke user certs more frequently; and enable Delta CRLs (published daily) for timely revocation information. Make sure the CDP/AIA for the Issuing CA itself are properly configured too (the wizard usually sets LDAP and HTTP locations, but verify in the Extensions tab). In a lab, the default settings are fine. Web Enrollment (if installed): You can verify the web enrollment by browsing to http://<IssuingCA>/certsrv. This web UI allows browser-based certificate requests. It’s a legacy interface mostly, but for testing it can be used if your clients aren’t domain-joined or if you want a manual request method. In modern use, the Certificate Enrollment Web Service/Policy roles or auto-enrollment via Group Policy are preferred for remote and automated enrollment. At this stage, your PKI is operational: the Issuing CA trusts the offline Root CA and can issue certificates. The Root CA can be kept offline with confidence that the subordinate will handle all regular work. Validation and Testing of the PKI It’s important to verify that the PKI is configured correctly: Check CA status: On the Issuing CA, open the Certification Authority console and ensure no errors. Verify that the Issuing CA’s certificate shows OK (no red X). On the Root CA (offline most of the time), you can use the Pkiview.msc snap-in (Microsoft PKI Health Tool) on a domain-connected machine to check the health of the PKI. This tool will show if the CDPs/AIA are reachable and if certificates are properly published. Trust chain on clients: On a domain-joined client PC, the Root CA certificate should be present in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store (if the Issuing CA was installed as Enterprise CA, it likely published the root cert to AD automatically; you can also distribute it via Group Policy or manually). The Issuing CA’s certificate should appear in the Intermediate Certification Authorities store. This establishes the chain of trust. If not, import the root cert into the domain’s Group Policy for Trusted Roots. A quick test: on a client, run certutil -config "ISSUINGCA\\Contoso Issuing CA" -ping to see if it can contact the CA (or use the Certification Authority MMC targeting the issuing CA). Enroll a test certificate: Try to enroll for a certificate from the Issuing CA. For instance, from a domain-joined client, use the Certificates MMC (in Current User or Computer context) and initiate a certificate request for a User or Computer certificate (depending on templates issued). If auto-enrollment is configured via Group Policy for a template, you can simply log on a client and see if it automatically receives a certificate. Alternatively, use the web enrollment page or certreq command to submit a request. The request should be approved and a certificate issued by "Contoso Issuing CA". After enrollment, inspect the issued certificate: it should chain up to "Contoso Root CA" without errors. Ensure that the certificate’s CDP points to the URL we set (and try to browse that URL to see the CRL file), and that the AIA points to the root cert location. Revocation test (optional): To test CRL behavior, you could revoke a test certificate on the Issuing CA (using the CA console) and publish a new CRL. On the client, after updating the CRL, the revoked certificate should show as revoked. For the Root CA, since it shouldn’t issue end-entity certs, you wouldn’t normally revoke anything except potentially the subordinate CA’s certificate (which would be a drastic action in case of compromise). By issuing a test certificate and validating the chain and revocation, you confirm that your two-tier PKI lab is functioning correctly. Maintaining the PKI: CRLs, Key Ceremonies, and Security Procedures Deploying the PKI is only the beginning. Proper maintenance and operational procedures are crucial to ensure the PKI remains secure and reliable over time. Periodic CRL Updates for the Offline Root: The Root CA’s CRL has a defined validity period (set during configuration, often 6 or 12 months for offline roots). Before the CRL expires, the Root CA must be brought online (in a secure environment) to issue a new CRL. It’s recommended to schedule CRL updates periodically (e.g., semi-annually) to prevent the CRL from expiring. An expired CRL can cause certificate chain validation to fail, potentially disrupting services. Typically, organizations set the offline root CRL validity so that publishing 1-2 times a year is sufficient. When the time comes: Start the Root CA (ensuring the system clock is correct). Run certutil -crl to issue a fresh CRL. Distribute the new CRL: copy it to the HTTP CDP location (overwrite the old file) and, if applicable, use certutil -dspublish -f RootCA.crl to update it in Active Directory. Verify that the new CRL’s next update date is extended appropriately (e.g., another 6 months out). Clients and the Issuing CA will automatically pick up the new CRL when checking for revocation. (The Issuing CA, if configured, might cache the root CRL and need a restart or certutil -setreg ca\CRLFlags +CRLF_REVCHECK_IGNORE_OFFLINE tweak if the root CRL expires unexpectedly. Keeping the schedule prevents such issues.) Issuing CA CRL and OCSP: The Issuing CA’s CRLs are published automatically as it is online. Ensure the IIS or file share hosting the CRL is accessible. Optionally, consider setting up an Online Responder (OCSP) for real-time status checking, especially if CRLs are large or you need faster revocation information. OCSP is another AD CS role service that can be configured on the issuing CA or another server to answer certificate status queries. This might be beyond a simple lab, but it’s worth mentioning for completeness. Key Ceremonies and Documentation: For production environments (and good practice even in labs), formalize the process of handling CA keys in a Key Ceremony. A key ceremony is a carefully controlled process for activities like generating the Root CA’s key pair, installing the CA, and signing subordinate certificates. It often involves multiple people to ensure no single person has unilateral control (principle of dual control) and to witness the process. Best practices for a Root CA key ceremony include: Advance Planning: Create a step-by-step script of the ceremony tasks. Include who will do what, what materials are needed (HSMs, installation media, backup devices, etc.), and the order of operations. Multiple trusted individuals present: Roles might include a Ceremony Administrator (leads the process), a Security Officer (responsible for HSM or key material handling), an Auditor (to observe and record), etc. This prevents any one person from manipulating the process and increases trust. Secure environment: Conduct the ceremony in a secure location (e.g., a locked room) free of recording devices or unauthorized personnel. Ensure the Root CA machine is isolated (no network), and ideally that BIOS/USB access controls are in place to prevent any malware. Generate keys with proper controls: If using an HSM, initialize and generate the key with the required number of key custodians each providing part of the activation material (e.g., smartcards or passphrases). Immediately back up the HSM partition or key to secure media (requiring the same custodians to restore). Sign subordinate CA certificate: As part of the ceremony, once the root key is ready, sign the subordinate’s request. This might also be a witnessed step. Document every action: Write down each command run, each key generated, serial numbers of devices used, and have all participants sign an acknowledgment of the outcomes. Also record the fingerprints of the generated Root CA certificate and any subordinate certificate to ensure they are exactly as expected. Secure storage: After the ceremony, store the Root CA machine (if it’s a laptop or VM) and HSM tokens in a tamper-evident bag or safe. The idea is to make it evident if someone tries to access the root outside of an authorized ceremony. While a full key ceremony might be overkill for a small lab, understanding these practices is important. Even in a lab, you can simulate some aspects (for learning), like documenting the procedure of taking the root online to sign the request and then locking it away. These practices greatly increase the trust in a production PKI by ensuring transparency and accountability for critical operations. Backup and Recovery Plans: Both CAs’ data should be regularly backed up: For the Root CA: since it’s rarely online, backup after any change. Typically, you’d back up the CA’s private key and certificate once (right after setup or any renewal). Store this securely offline (separate from the server itself). Also back up the CA database if it ever issues more than one cert (for root it might not issue many). For the Issuing CA: schedule automated backups of the CA database and private key. You can use the built-in certutil -backup or Windows Server Backup (which is aware of the AD CS database). Keep backups secure and test restoration procedures. Having a documented recovery procedure for the CA is crucial for continuity. Also consider backup of templates and any scripts. Maintain spare hardware or VMs in case you need to restore the CA on new hardware (especially for the root, having a procedure to restore on a new machine if the original is destroyed). Security maintenance: Apply OS updates to the CAs carefully. For the offline root, patch it offline if possible (offline servicing or connecting it briefly to a management network). For the issuing CA, treat it as a critical infrastructure server: limit its exposure (firewall it so only required services are reachable), monitor its event logs (enable auditing for Certificate Services events, which can log each issuance and revocation), and employ anti-malware tools with caution (whitelisting the CA processes to avoid interference). Also, periodically review the CA’s configuration and certificate templates to ensure they meet current security standards (for example, deprecate any weak cryptography or adjust validity periods if needed). By following these maintenance steps and best practices, your two-tier PKI will remain secure and trustworthy over time. Remember that PKI is not “set and forget” – it requires operational diligence, but the payoff is a robust trust infrastructure for your organization’s security. Additional AD CS Features and References Active Directory Certificate Services provides more capabilities than covered in this basic lab. Depending on your needs, you might explore: Certificate Templates: We touched on templates; they are a powerful feature on Enterprise CAs to enforce standardized certificate settings. Administrators can create custom templates for various use cases (SSL, S/MIME email, code signing) and control enrollment permissions. Understanding template versions and permissions is key for enterprise deployments. (Refer to Microsoft’s documentation on Certificate template concepts in Windows Server for details on how templates work and can be customized.) Web Services for Enrollment: In scenarios with remote or non-domain clients, AD CS offers the Certificate Enrollment Web Service (CES) and Certificate Enrollment Policy Web Service (CEP) role services. These allow clients to fetch enrollment policy information and request certificates over HTTP or HTTPS, even when not connected directly to the domain. They work with the certificate templates to enable similar auto-enrollment experiences over the web. See Microsoft’s guides on the Certificate Enrollment Web Service overview and Certificate Enrollment Policy Web Service overview for when to use these. Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES): This AD CS role service implements the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) to allow devices like routers, switches, and mobile devices to obtain certificates from the CA without domain credentials. NDES acts as a proxy (Registration Authority) between devices and the CA, using one-time passwords for authentication. If you need to issue certificates to network equipment or MDM-managed mobile devices, NDES is the solution. Microsoft Docs provide a Network Device Enrollment Service(NDES) overview and even details on using a policy module with NDES for advanced scenarios (like customizing how requests are processed or integrating with custom policies). Online Responders (OCSP): As mentioned, an Online Responder can be configured to answer revocation status queries more efficiently than CRLs, especially useful if your CRLs grow large or you have high-volume certificate validation (VPNs, etc.). AD CS’s Online Responder role service can be installed on a member server and configured with the OCSP Response Signing certificate from your Issuing CA. Monitoring and Auditing: Windows Servers have options to audit CA events. Enabling auditing can log events such as certificate issuance, revocation, or changes to the CA configuration. These logs are important in enterprise PKI to track who did what (for compliance and security forensics). Also, tools like the PKI Health Tool (pkiview.msc) and PowerShell cmdlets (like Get-CertificationAuthority, Get-CertificationAuthorityCertificate) can help monitor the health and configuration of your CAs. Conclusion By following this guide, you have set up a secure two-tier PKI environment consisting of an offline Root CA and an online Issuing CA. This design, which uses an offline root, is considered a security best practice for enterprise PKI deployments because it reduces the risk of your root key being compromised. With the offline Root CA acting as a hardened trust anchor and the enterprise Issuing CA handling day-to-day certificate issuance, your lab PKI can issue certificates for various purposes (HTTPS, code signing, user authentication, etc.) in a way that models real-world deployments. As you expand this lab or move to production, always remember that PKI security is as much about process as technology. Applying strict controls to protect CA keys, keeping software up to date, and monitoring your PKI’s health are all part of the journey. For further reading and official guidance, refer to these Microsoft documentation resources: 📖 AD CS PKI Design Considerations: PKI design considerations using Active Directory Certificate Services in Windows Server helps in planning a PKI deployment (number of CAs, hierarchy depth, naming, key lengths, validity periods, etc.). This is useful to read when adapting this lab design to a production environment. It also covers configuring CDP/AIA and why offline roots usually don’t need delta CRLs. 📖 AD CS Step-by-Step Guides: Microsoft’s Test Lab Guide Test Lab Guide: Deploying an AD CS Two-Tier PKI Hierarchy walk through a similar scenario.Security as the core primitive - Securing AI agents and apps
This week at Microsoft Ignite, we shared our vision for Microsoft security -- In the agentic era, security must be ambient and autonomous, like the AI it protects. It must be woven into and around everything we build—from silicon to OS, to agents, apps, data, platforms, and clouds—and throughout everything we do. In this blog, we are going to dive deeper into many of the new innovations we are introducing this week to secure AI agents and apps. As I spend time with our customers and partners, there are four consistent themes that have emerged as core security challenges to secure AI workloads. These are: preventing agent sprawl and access to resources, protecting against data oversharing and data leaks, defending against new AI threats and vulnerabilities, and adhering to evolving regulations. Addressing these challenges holistically requires a coordinated effort across IT, developers, and security leaders, not just within security teams and to enable this, we are introducing several new innovations: Microsoft Agent 365 for IT, Foundry Control Plane in Microsoft Foundry for developers, and the Security Dashboard for AI for security leaders. In addition, we are releasing several new purpose-built capabilities to protect and govern AI apps and agents across Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Entra, and Microsoft Purview. Observability at every layer of the stack To facilitate the organization-wide effort that it takes to secure and govern AI agents and apps – IT, developers, and security leaders need observability (security, management, and monitoring) at every level. IT teams need to enable the development and deployment of any agent in their environment. To ensure the responsible and secure deployment of agents into an organization, IT needs a unified agent registry, the ability to assign an identity to every agent, manage the agent’s access to data and resources, and manage the agent’s entire lifecycle. In addition, IT needs to be able to assign access to common productivity and collaboration tools, such as email and file storage, and be able to observe their entire agent estate for risks such as over-permissioned agents. Development teams need to build and test agents, apply security and compliance controls by default, and ensure AI models are evaluated for safety guardrails and security vulnerabilities. Post deployment, development teams must observe agents to ensure they are staying on task, accessing applications and data sources appropriately, and operating within their cost and performance expectations. Security & compliance teams must ensure overall security of their AI estate, including their AI infrastructure, platforms, data, apps, and agents. They need comprehensive visibility into all their security risks- including agent sprawl and resource access, data oversharing and leaks, AI threats and vulnerabilities, and complying with global regulations. They want to address these risks by extending their existing security investments that they are already invested in and familiar with, rather than using siloed or bolt-on tools. These teams can be most effective in delivering trustworthy AI to their organizations if security is natively integrated into the tools and platforms that they use every day, and if those tools and platforms share consistent security primitives such as agent identities from Entra; data security and compliance controls from Purview; and security posture, detections, and protections from Defender. With the new capabilities being released today, we are delivering observability at every layer of the AI stack, meeting IT, developers, and security teams where they are in the tools they already use to innovate with confidence. For IT Teams - Introducing Microsoft Agent 365, the control plane for agents, now in preview The best infrastructure for managing your agents is the one you already use to manage your users. With Agent 365, organizations can extend familiar tools and policies to confidently deploy and secure agents, without reinventing the wheel. By using the same trusted Microsoft 365 infrastructure, productivity apps, and protections, organizations can now apply consistent and familiar governance and security controls that are purpose-built to protect against agent-specific threats and risks. gement and governance of agents across organizations Microsoft Agent 365 delivers a unified agent Registry, Access Control, Visualization, Interoperability, and Security capabilities for your organization. These capabilities work together to help organizations manage agents and drive business value. The Registry powered by the Entra provides a complete and unified inventory of all the agents deployed and used in your organization including both Microsoft and third-party agents. Access Control allows you to limit the access privileges of your agents to only the resources that they need and protect their access to resources in real time. Visualization gives organizations the ability to see what matters most and gain insights through a unified dashboard, advanced analytics, and role-based reporting. Interop allows agents to access organizational data through Work IQ for added context, and to integrate with Microsoft 365 apps such as Outlook, Word, and Excel so they can create and collaborate alongside users. Security enables the proactive detection of vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, protects against common attacks such as prompt injections, prevents agents from processing or leaking sensitive data, and gives organizations the ability to audit agent interactions, assess compliance readiness and policy violations, and recommend controls for evolving regulatory requirements. Microsoft Agent 365 also includes the Agent 365 SDK, part of Microsoft Agent Framework, which empowers developers and ISVs to build agents on their own AI stack. The SDK enables agents to automatically inherit Microsoft's security and governance protections, such as identity controls, data security policies, and compliance capabilities, without the need for custom integration. For more details on Agent 365, read the blog here. For Developers - Introducing Microsoft Foundry Control Plane to observe, secure and manage agents, now in preview Developers are moving fast to bring agents into production, but operating them at scale introduces new challenges and responsibilities. Agents can access tools, take actions, and make decisions in real time, which means development teams must ensure that every agent behaves safely, securely, and consistently. Today, developers need to work across multiple disparate tools to get a holistic picture of the cybersecurity and safety risks that their agents may have. Once they understand the risk, they then need a unified and simplified way to monitor and manage their entire agent fleet and apply controls and guardrails as needed. Microsoft Foundry provides a unified platform for developers to build, evaluate and deploy AI apps and agents in a responsible way. Today we are excited to announce that Foundry Control Plane is available in preview. This enables developers to observe, secure, and manage their agent fleets with built-in security, and centralized governance controls. With this unified approach, developers can now identify risks and correlate disparate signals across their models, agents, and tools; enforce consistent policies and quality gates; and continuously monitor task adherence and runtime risks. Foundry Control Plane is deeply integrated with Microsoft’s security portfolio to provide a ‘secure by design’ foundation for developers. With Microsoft Entra, developers can ensure an agent identity (Agent ID) and access controls are built into every agent, mitigating the risk of unmanaged agents and over permissioned resources. With Microsoft Defender built in, developers gain contextualized alerts and posture recommendations for agents directly within the Foundry Control Plane. This integration proactively prevents configuration and access risks, while also defending agents from runtime threats in real time. Microsoft Purview’s native integration into Foundry Control Plane makes it easy to enable data security and compliance for every Foundry-built application or agent. This allows Purview to discover data security and compliance risks and apply policies to prevent user prompts and AI responses from safety and policy violations. In addition, agent interactions can be logged and searched for compliance and legal audits. This integration of the shared security capabilities, including identity and access, data security and compliance, and threat protection and posture ensures that security is not an afterthought; it’s embedded at every stage of the agent lifecycle, enabling you to start secure and stay secure. For more details, read the blog. For Security Teams - Introducing Security Dashboard for AI - unified risk visibility for CISOs and AI risk leaders, coming soon AI proliferation in the enterprise, combined with the emergence of AI governance committees and evolving AI regulations, leaves CISOs and AI risk leaders needing a clear view of their AI risks, such as data leaks, model vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and unethical agent actions across their entire AI estate, spanning AI platforms, apps, and agents. 90% of security professionals, including CISOs, report that their responsibilities have expanded to include data governance and AI oversight within the past year. 1 At the same time, 86% of risk managers say disconnected data and systems lead to duplicated efforts and gaps in risk coverage. 2 To address these needs, we are excited to introduce the Security Dashboard for AI. This serves as a unified dashboard that aggregates posture and real-time risk signals from Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Entra, and Microsoft Purview. This unified dashboard allows CISOs and AI risk leaders to discover agents and AI apps, track AI posture and drift, and correlate risk signals to investigate and act across their entire AI ecosystem. For example, you can see your full AI inventory and get visibility into a quarantined agent, flagged for high data risk due to oversharing sensitive information in Purview. The dashboard then correlates that signal with identity insights from Entra and threat protection alerts from Defender to provide a complete picture of exposure. From there, you can delegate tasks to the appropriate teams to enforce policies and remediate issues quickly. With the Security Dashboard for AI, CISOs and risk leaders gain a clear, consolidated view of AI risks across agents, apps, and platforms—eliminating fragmented visibility, disconnected posture insights, and governance gaps as AI adoption scales. Best of all, there’s nothing new to buy. If you’re already using Microsoft security products to secure AI, you’re already a Security Dashboard for AI customer. Figure 5: Security Dashboard for AI provides CISOs and AI risk leaders with a unified view of their AI risk by bringing together their AI inventory, AI risk, and security recommendations to strengthen overall posture Together, these innovations deliver observability and security across IT, development, and security teams, powered by Microsoft’s shared security capabilities. With Microsoft Agent 365, IT teams can manage and secure agents alongside users. Foundry Control Plane gives developers unified governance and lifecycle controls for agent fleets. Security Dashboard for AI provides CISOs and AI risk leaders with a consolidated view of AI risks across platforms, apps, and agents. Added innovation to secure and govern your AI workloads In addition to the IT, developer, and security leader-focused innovations outlined above, we continue to accelerate our pace of innovation in Microsoft Entra, Microsoft Purview, and Microsoft Defender to address the most pressing needs for securing and governing your AI workloads. These needs are: Manage agent sprawl and resource access e.g. managing agent identity, access to resources, and permissions lifecycle at scale Prevent data oversharing and leaks e.g. protecting sensitive information shared in prompts, responses, and agent interactions Defend against shadow AI, new threats, and vulnerabilities e.g. managing unsanctioned applications, preventing prompt injection attacks, and detecting AI supply chain vulnerabilities Enable AI governance for regulatory compliance e.g. ensuring AI development, operations, and usage comply with evolving global regulations and frameworks Manage agent sprawl and resource access 76% of business leaders expect employees to manage agents within the next 2–3 years. 3 Widespread adoption of agents is driving the need for visibility and control, which includes the need for a unified registry, agent identities, lifecycle governance, and secure access to resources. Today, Microsoft Entra provides robust identity protection and secure access for applications and users. However, organizations lack a unified way to manage, govern, and protect agents in the same way they manage their users. Organizations need a purpose-built identity and access framework for agents. Introducing Microsoft Entra Agent ID, now in preview Microsoft Entra Agent ID offers enterprise-grade capabilities that enable organizations to prevent agent sprawl and protect agent identities and their access to resources. These new purpose-built capabilities enable organizations to: Register and manage agents: Get a complete inventory of the agent fleet and ensure all new agents are created with an identity built-in and are automatically protected by organization policies to accelerate adoption. Govern agent identities and lifecycle: Keep the agent fleet under control with lifecycle management and IT-defined guardrails for both agents and people who create and manage them. Protect agent access to resources: Reduce risk of breaches, block risky agents, and prevent agent access to malicious resources with conditional access and traffic inspection. Agents built in Microsoft Copilot Studio, Microsoft Foundry, and Security Copilot get an Entra Agent ID built-in at creation. Developers can also adopt Entra Agent ID for agents they build through Microsoft Agent Framework, Microsoft Agent 365 SDK, or Microsoft Entra Agent ID SDK. Read the Microsoft Entra blog to learn more. Prevent data oversharing and leaks Data security is more complex than ever. Information Security Media Group (ISMG) reports that 80% of leaders cite leakage of sensitive data as their top concern. 4 In addition to data security and compliance risks of generative AI (GenAI) apps, agents introduces new data risks such as unsupervised data access, highlighting the need to protect all types of corporate data, whether it is accessed by employees or agents. To mitigate these risks, we are introducing new Microsoft Purview data security and compliance capabilities for Microsoft 365 Copilot and for agents and AI apps built with Copilot Studio and Microsoft Foundry, providing unified protection, visibility, and control for users, AI Apps, and Agents. New Microsoft Purview controls safeguard Microsoft 365 Copilot with real-time protection and bulk remediation of oversharing risks Microsoft Purview and Microsoft 365 Copilot deliver a fully integrated solution for protecting sensitive data in AI workflows. Based on ongoing customer feedback, we’re introducing new capabilities to deliver real-time protection for sensitive data in M365 Copilot and accelerated remediation of oversharing risks: Data risk assessments: Previously, admins could monitor oversharing risks such as SharePoint sites with unprotected sensitive data. Now, they can perform item-level investigations and bulk remediation for overshared files in SharePoint and OneDrive to quickly reduce oversharing exposure. Data Loss Prevention (DLP) for M365 Copilot: DLP previously excluded files with sensitivity labels from Copilot processing. Now in preview, DLP also prevents prompts that include sensitive data from being processed in M365 Copilot, Copilot Chat, and Copilot agents, and prevents Copilot from using sensitive data in prompts for web grounding. Priority cleanup for M365 Copilot assets: Many organizations have org-wide policies to retain or delete data. Priority cleanup, now generally available, lets admins delete assets that are frequently processed by Copilot, such as meeting transcripts and recordings, on an independent schedule from the org-wide policies while maintaining regulatory compliance. On-demand classification for meeting transcripts: Purview can now detect sensitive information in meeting transcripts on-demand. This enables data security admins to apply DLP policies and enforce Priority cleanup based on the sensitive information detected. & bulk remediation Read the full Data Security blog to learn more. Introducing new Microsoft Purview data security capabilities for agents and apps built with Copilot Studio and Microsoft Foundry, now in preview Microsoft Purview now extends the same data security and compliance for users and Copilots to agents and apps. These new capabilities are: Enhanced Data Security Posture Management: A centralized DSPM dashboard that provides observability, risk assessment, and guided remediation across users, AI apps, and agents. Insider Risk Management (IRM) for Agents: Uniquely designed for agents, using dedicated behavioral analytics, Purview dynamically assigns risk levels to agents based on their risky handing of sensitive data and enables admins to apply conditional policies based on that risk level. Sensitive data protection with Azure AI Search: Azure AI Search enables fast, AI-driven retrieval across large document collections, essential for building AI Apps. When apps or agents use Azure AI Search to index or retrieve data, Purview sensitivity labels are preserved in the search index, ensuring that any sensitive information remains protected under the organization’s data security & compliance policies. For more information on preventing data oversharing and data leaks - Learn how Purview protects and governs agents in the Data Security and Compliance for Agents blog. Defend against shadow AI, new threats, and vulnerabilities AI workloads are subject to new AI-specific threats like prompt injections attacks, model poisoning, and data exfiltration of AI generated content. Although security admins and SOC analysts have similar tasks when securing agents, the attack methods and surfaces differ significantly. To help customers defend against these novel attacks, we are introducing new capabilities in Microsoft Defender that deliver end-to-end protection, from security posture management to runtime defense. Introducing Security Posture Management for agents, now in preview As organizations adopt AI agents to automate critical workflows, they become high-value targets and potential points of compromise, creating a critical need to ensure agents are hardened, compliant, and resilient by preventing misconfigurations and safeguarding against adversarial manipulation. Security Posture Management for agents in Microsoft Defender now provides an agent inventory for security teams across Microsoft Foundry and Copilot Studio agents. Here, analysts can assess the overall security posture of an agent, easily implement security recommendations, and identify vulnerabilities such as misconfigurations and excessive permissions, all aligned to the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Additionally, the new agent attack path analysis visualizes how an agent’s weak security posture can create broader organizational risk, so you can quickly limit exposure and prevent lateral movement. Introducing Threat Protection for agents, now in preview Attack techniques and attack surfaces for agents are fundamentally different from other assets in your environment. That’s why Defender is delivering purpose-built protections and detections to help defend against them. Defender is introducing runtime protection for Copilot Studio agents that automatically block prompt injection attacks in real time. In addition, we are announcing agent-specific threat detections for Copilot Studio and Microsoft Foundry agents coming soon. Defender automatically correlates these alerts with Microsoft’s industry-leading threat intelligence and cross-domain security signals to deliver richer, contextualized alerts and security incident views for the SOC analyst. Defender’s risk and threat signals are natively integrated into the new Microsoft Foundry Control Plane, giving development teams full observability and the ability to act directly from within their familiar environment. Finally, security analysts will be able to hunt across all agent telemetry in the Advanced Hunting experience in Defender, and the new Agent 365 SDK extends Defender’s visibility and hunting capabilities to third-party agents, starting with Genspark and Kasisto, giving security teams even more coverage across their AI landscape. To learn more about how you can harden the security posture of your agents and defend against threats, read the Microsoft Defender blog. Enable AI governance for regulatory compliance Global AI regulations like the EU AI Act and NIST AI RMF are evolving rapidly; yet, according to ISMG, 55% of leaders report lacking clarity on current and future AI regulatory requirements. 5 As enterprises adopt AI, they must ensure that their AI innovation aligns with global regulations and standards to avoid costly compliance gaps. Introducing new Microsoft Purview Compliance Manager capabilities to stay ahead of evolving AI regulations, now in preview Today, Purview Compliance Manager provides over 300 pre-built assessments for common industry, regional, and global standards and regulations. However, the pace of change for new AI regulations requires controls to be continuously re-evaluated and updated so that organizations can adapt to ongoing changes in regulations and stay compliant. To address this need, Compliance Manager now includes AI-powered regulatory templates. AI-powered regulatory templates enable real-time ingestion and analysis of global regulatory documents, allowing compliance teams to quickly adapt to changes as they happen. As regulations evolve, the updated regulatory documents can be uploaded to Compliance Manager, and the new requirements are automatically mapped to applicable recommended actions to implement controls across Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Entra, Microsoft Purview, Microsoft 365, and Microsoft Foundry. Automated actions by Compliance Manager further streamline governance, reduce manual workload, and strengthen regulatory accountability. Introducing expanded Microsoft Purview compliance capabilities for agents and AI apps now in preview Microsoft Purview now extends its compliance capabilities across agent-generated interactions, ensuring responsible use and regulatory alignment as AI becomes deeply embedded across business processes. New capabilities include expanded coverage for: Audit: Surface agent interactions, lifecycle events, and data usage with Purview Audit. Unified audit logs across user and agent activities, paired with traceability for every agent using an Entra Agent ID, support investigation, anomaly detection, and regulatory reporting. Communication Compliance: Detect prompts sent to agents and agent-generated responses containing inappropriate, unethical, or risky language, including attempts to manipulate agents into bypassing policies, generating risky content, or producing noncompliant outputs. When issues arise, data security admins get full context, including the prompt, the agent’s output, and relevant metadata, so they can investigate and take corrective action Data Lifecycle Management: Apply retention and deletion policies to agent-generated content and communication flows to automate lifecycle controls and reduce regulatory risk. Read about Microsoft Purview data security for agents to learn more. Finally, we are extending our data security, threat protection, and identity access capabilities to third-party apps and agents via the network. Advancing Microsoft Entra Internet Access Secure Web + AI Gateway - extend runtime protections to the network, now in preview Microsoft Entra Internet Access, part of the Microsoft Entra Suite, has new capabilities to secure access to and usage of GenAI at the network level, marking a transition from Secure Web Gateway to Secure Web and AI Gateway. Enterprises can accelerate GenAI adoption while maintaining compliance and reducing risk, empowering employees to experiment with new AI tools safely. The new capabilities include: Prompt injection protection which blocks malicious prompts in real time by extending Azure AI Prompt Shields to the network layer. Network file filtering which extends Microsoft Purview to inspect files in transit and prevents regulated or confidential data from being uploaded to unsanctioned AI services. Shadow AI Detection that provides visibility into unsanctioned AI applications through Cloud Application Analytics and Defender for Cloud Apps risk scoring, empowering security teams to monitor usage trends, apply Conditional Access, or block high-risk apps instantly. Unsanctioned MCP server blocking prevents access to MCP servers from unauthorized agents. With these controls, you can accelerate GenAI adoption while maintaining compliance and reducing risk, so employees can experiment with new AI tools safely. Read the Microsoft Entra blog to learn more. As AI transforms the enterprise, security must evolve to meet new challenges—spanning agent sprawl, data protection, emerging threats, and regulatory compliance. Our approach is to empower IT, developers, and security leaders with purpose-built innovations like Agent 365, Foundry Control Plane, and the Security Dashboard for AI. These solutions bring observability, governance, and protection to every layer of the AI stack, leveraging familiar tools and integrated controls across Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Entra, and Microsoft Purview. The future of security is ambient, autonomous, and deeply woven into the fabric of how we build, deploy, and govern AI systems. Explore additional resources Learn more about Security for AI solutions on our webpage Learn more about Microsoft Agent 365 Learn more about Microsoft Entra Agent ID Get started with Microsoft 365 Copilot Get started with Microsoft Copilot Studio Get started with Microsoft Foundry Get started with Microsoft Defender for Cloud Get started with Microsoft Entra Get started with Microsoft Purview Get started with Microsoft Purview Compliance Manager Sign up for a free Microsoft 365 E5 Security Trial and Microsoft Purview Trial 1 Bedrock Security, 2025 Data Security Confidence Index, published Mar 17, 2025. 2 AuditBoard & Ascend2, Connected Risk Report 2024; as cited by MIT Sloan Management Review, Spring 2025. 3 KPMG AI Quarterly Pulse Survey | Q3 2025. September 2025. n= 130 U.S.-based C-suite and business leaders representing organizations with annual revenue of $1 billion or more 4 First Annual Generative AI study: Business Rewards vs. Security Risks, , Q3 2023, ISMG, N=400 5 First Annual Generative AI study: Business Rewards vs. Security Risks, Q3 2023, ISMG, N=400The Microsoft Zero Trust Assessment: Helping you operationalize the hardening of your Microsoft security products
Evolving Threats, Adaptive Defenses: The Security Practitioner’s New Reality Cyber threats are advancing faster than ever, and the arrival of highly accessible AI tools with a low proficiency barrier has made this challenge one that most organizations cannot keep up with. According to the latest Microsoft Digital Defense Report, 28% of breaches begin with phishing, and we also see a 4.5x increase in AI automated phishing campaigns with higher click through rates. This example highlights the need for security organizations to not only prioritize hardened security policies but also automating detection of misconfigurations and deviations from the desired security posture. To help address these challenges, Microsoft launched the Secure Future Initiative (SFI) in November 2023, a multiyear effort to transform how we design, build, test, and operate our products and services, to meet the highest security standards. SFI unites every part of Microsoft to strengthen cybersecurity across our company and products. We’ve committed to transparency by sharing regular updates with customers, partners, and the security community. Today, we released our third SFI progress report, which highlights 10 actionable patterns and practices customers can adopt to reduce risk, along with additional best practices and guidance. In this report, we share updates across every engineering pillar, introduce mapping to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to help customers measure progress against a recognized industry standard, and showcase new security capabilities delivered to customers. We also provide implementation guidance aligned to Zero Trust principles, ensuring organizations have practical steps to reduce risk and strengthen resilience. Building on these learnings, we’re excited to announce the public preview of the Microsoft Zero Trust Assessment tool, designed to help you identify common security gaps starting with Identity and Device pillars with the remaining pillars of Zero Trust coming soon. This assessment is informed by our own SFI learnings and aligned with widely recognized frameworks such as CISA’s SCuBA project. Your feedback is critical as we continue to iterate and expand this tool. Our goal is for you to operationalize it in your environment and share insights as we add more pillars in the coming months. Introducing Zero Trust Assessment A deep dive into how the Microsoft Zero Trust Assessment works including report structure, prioritization logic, and implementation guidance is available below in this blog. The Microsoft Zero Trust Assessment empowers teams to make informed decisions, reduce blind spots, and prioritize remediation, turning insights into action. Once you download and run the tool (installation guide), it will assess your policy configurations and scan objects to generate a comprehensive report that not only highlights gaps and risks but also explains what was checked, why a test failed, and how your organization can implement the recommended configuration. This makes the results immediately actionable; security teams know exactly what steps to take next. The report features an overview page that presents aggregated data across your tenant, highlighting overall risk levels, patterns, and trends. This allows security teams to quickly assess their organization’s posture, identify high-impact areas, and prioritize remediation efforts. The assessment provides a detailed list of all the tests that were conducted, including those not applicable, so the results are clear and relevant. Each test includes risk level, user impact, and implementation effort, enabling teams to make informed decisions and prioritize fixes based on business impact. By combining clear guidance with prioritized recommendations, the Zero Trust Assessment turns insights into action, helping organizations reduce blind spots, strengthen security, and plan remediation effectively. Future updates will expand coverage to additional Zero Trust pillars, giving organizations even broader visibility and guidance. For each test performed, customers can see the exact policies or objects that are passing or failing the test with a direct link to where they can address it in the product, and guidance on how to remediate. The report also provides granular details of the policies evaluated and any applicable assignment groups. In addition, the tool provides clear guidance on details of the test performed and why it matters, and the steps required to resolve issues effectively. How It Works Here’s a quick summary of the steps for you to run the tool. Check our documentation for full details. First, you install the ZeroTrustAssessment PowerShell module. Install-Module ZeroTrustAssessment -Scope CurrentUser Then, you connect to Microsoft Graph and to Azure by signing into your tenant. Connect-ZtAssessment After that, you run a single command to kick off the data gathering. Depending on the size of your tenant, this might take several hours. Invoke-ZtAssessment After the assessment is complete, the tool will display the assessment results report. A sample report of the assessment can be viewed at aka.ms/zerotrust/demo. The tool uses read-only permissions to download the tenant configuration, and it runs the analysis locally on your computer. We recommend you treat the data and artifacts it creates as highly sensitive organization security data. Get Started Today Ready to strengthen your security posture? Download and run the Zero Trust Assessment to see how your tenant measures up. Review the detailed documentation for Identity and Devices to understand every test and recommended action. If you have feedback or want to help shape future releases, share your insights at aka.ms/zerotrust/feedback. If you find the assessment valuable, pass it along to your peers and help raise the bar for all our customers. To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog and Technical Community blogs to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters, including updates on this assessment. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity. What’s Next This is just the first step in the journey. We will be launching new SFI-infused assessments across the other pillars of Zero Trust in the coming months. Please stay tuned for updates. Want to go deeper? Visit the SFI webpage to explore the report, actionable patterns, NIST mapping, and best practices that can help you strengthen your security posture today.13KViews7likes5CommentsPost-Quantum Cryptography APIs Now Generally Available on Microsoft Platforms
Introduction We are excited to announce a significant leap forward in security: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms are now generally available in Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11 clients (24H2, 25H2) and .NET 10. This major milestone is part of Microsoft's ongoing commitment to help organizations stay ahead of evolving cybersecurity threats and prepare for the era of quantum computing. This announcement aligns with the broader strategy of Microsoft’s Quantum Safe Program (QSP), as highlighted in this blog post, which outlines the company’s comprehensive roadmap for PQ readiness. The general availability of PQC algorithms in Windows Server 2025, Windows 11, and .NET 10 represents a significant initial step within the ‘Foundational security components’ phase of this initiative, with further milestones and enhancements planned to bolster security in the years ahead. PQC Algorithms Now GA in Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11 Client In May this year, we brought PQC to Windows Insiders. With the November update of Windows, we’re bringing ML-KEM and ML-DSA to Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11 client via updates to Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG) libraries and Certificate functions. Developers now have access to ML-KEM for use in scenarios requiring key encapsulation or key exchange, enhancing preparedness against the "harvest now, decrypt later" threat. Additionally, developers can adopt ML-DSA for scenarios involving identity verification, integrity checks, or digital signature-based authentication. These updates represent a step towards enabling systems to safeguard sensitive data from both current and anticipated cryptographic challenges. Enhanced Security: PQC algorithms provide resilience against potential quantum-based attacks, which are expected to render many traditional cryptographic schemes obsolete. Seamless Integration: The PQC enhancements are integrated directly into the Windows cryptographic infrastructure, allowing for easy deployment and management. Enterprise-Ready: These features have been extensively tested to meet the performance and reliability needs of enterprise environments. Visit our crypto developer’s pages for ML-KEM and ML-DSA to learn more and get started. General Availability of PQC in .NET 10 In addition to Windows platform enhancements, we are thrilled to announce the general availability of PQC support in .NET 10. Developers can now build and deploy applications that utilize PQC algorithms, enabling robust data protection in the quantum era. Developer Empowerment: .NET 10 integrates PQC options within its cryptographic APIs, making it simple for developers to modernize their security posture. Cross-Platform Support: Build secure applications for Windows or Linux using the same PQC-enabled framework. Future-Proofing: Adopt the latest cryptographic standards with minimal code changes and broad compatibility. Learn more about these changes here, and check out .NET 10 to get started. Coming Soon: PQC in Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) Looking ahead, we are pleased to share that the general availability of PQC capabilities in Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) is targeted for early 2026. This forthcoming update will further strengthen the foundation of your organization’s identity and certificate management infrastructure. Comprehensive Coverage: PQC support in ADCS will enable issuance and management of certificates using PQC algorithms. Easy Migration: Detailed guidance and configuration examples will be provided to help organizations transition their PKI environments to PQC. Long-Term Security: Protect identities, devices, and communications well into the quantum era with minimal disruption. What Lies Ahead: Upcoming Developments and Challenges As cryptographic standards advance, SymCrypt will continue to incorporate additional quantum-resistant algorithms to maintain its leadership in security innovation. The development of PQC support for securing TLS is proceeding in alignment with IETF standards, aiming to provide strong protection for data in transit. In addition, Microsoft is preparing other essential domains—including firmware and software signing, identity, authentication, network security, and data protection—to be PQC-ready. Collaborating with ecosystem partners, these initiatives further extend the reach of quantum-safe security throughout the broader ecosystem. As PQC algorithms are still relatively new, it is important for organizations to consider "crypto agility," allowing systems to adapt as standards evolve. Microsoft advises customers to begin planning their transition to PQC by integrating new algorithms and adopting solutions that support both current and future cryptographic needs. In some cases, this means deploying PQC in hybrid or composite modes—combining a post-quantum algorithm with a traditional one such as RSA or ECDHE. Other situations may call for enabling pure PQC algorithms while maintaining compatibility with existing standards. Over time, as quantum technologies mature, we may see a shift towards only PQC. PQC algorithms may require increased computational resources, making ongoing optimization and hardware acceleration necessary to achieve an effective balance between security and performance. The transition to PQC includes updating cryptographic infrastructure, maintaining compatibility with legacy systems, and facilitating coordination among developers, hardware manufacturers, and service providers. Education and awareness are also important for broad adoption and compliance. Next Steps and Resources We encourage IT administrators, developers, and security professionals to begin leveraging PQC features in Windows Server 2025, Windows 11, and .NET 10, and to prepare for the upcoming enhancements in ADCS. Detailed documentation and best practices are available here: Using ML-KEM with CNG for Key Exchange Using ML-DSA with CNG for Digital Signatures What's new in .NET libraries for .NET 10 Conclusion Microsoft is committed to helping customers secure their environments against the threats of today and tomorrow. The general availability of PQC algorithms across our platforms marks a new era of cybersecurity resilience. We look forward to partnering with you on this journey and enabling a safer, quantum-ready future. Securing the present, innovating for the future Security is a shared responsibility. Through collaboration across hardware and software ecosystems, we can build more resilient systems secure by design and by default, from Windows to the cloud, enabling trust at every layer of the digital experience. The updated Windows Security book and Windows Server Security book are available to help you understand how to stay secure with Windows. Learn more about Windows 11, Windows Server, and Copilot+ PCs. To learn more about Microsoft Security Solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.5.7KViews4likes2CommentsSecure and govern AI apps and agents with Microsoft Purview
The Microsoft Purview family is here to help you secure and govern data across third party IaaS and Saas, multi-platform data environment, while helping you meet compliance requirements you may be subject to. Purview brings simplicity with a comprehensive set of solutions built on a platform of shared capabilities, that helps keep your most important asset, data, safe. With the introduction of AI technology, Purview also expanded its data coverage to include discovering, protecting, and governing the interactions of AI apps and agents, such as Microsoft Copilots like Microsoft 365 Copilot and Security Copilot, Enterprise built AI apps like Chat GPT enterprise, and other consumer AI apps like DeepSeek, accessed through the browser. To help you view, investigate interactions with all those AI apps, and to create and manage policies to secure and govern them in one centralized place, we have launched Purview Data Security Posture Management (DSPM) for AI. You can learn more about DSPM for AI here with short video walkthroughs: Learn how Microsoft Purview Data Security Posture Management (DSPM) for AI provides data security and compliance protections for Copilots and other generative AI apps | Microsoft Learn Purview capabilities for AI apps and agents To understand our current set of capabilities within Purview to discover, protect, and govern various AI apps and agents, please refer to our Learn doc here: Microsoft Purview data security and compliance protections for Microsoft 365 Copilot and other generative AI apps | Microsoft Learn Here is a quick reference guide for the capabilities available today: Note that currently, DLP for Copilot and adhering to sensitivity label are currently designed to protect content in Microsoft 365. Thus, Security Copilot and Copilot in Fabric, along with Copilot studio custom agents that do not use Microsoft 365 as a content source, do not have these features available. Please see list of AI sites supported by Microsoft Purview DSPM for AI here Conclusion Microsoft Purview can help you discover, protect, and govern the prompts and responses from AI applications in Microsoft Copilot experiences, Enterprise AI apps, and other AI apps through its data security and data compliance solutions, while allowing you to view, investigate, and manage interactions in one centralized place in DSPM for AI. Follow up reading Check out the deployment guides for DSPM for AI How to deploy DSPM for AI - https://aka.ms/DSPMforAI/deploy How to use DSPM for AI data risk assessment to address oversharing - https://aka.ms/dspmforai/oversharing Address oversharing concerns with Microsoft 365 blueprint - aka.ms/Copilot/Oversharing Explore the Purview SDK Microsoft Purview SDK Public Preview | Microsoft Community Hub (blog) Microsoft Purview documentation - purview-sdk | Microsoft Learn Build secure and compliant AI applications with Microsoft Purview (video) References for DSPM for AI Microsoft Purview data security and compliance protections for Microsoft 365 Copilot and other generative AI apps | Microsoft Learn Considerations for deploying Microsoft Purview AI Hub and data security and compliance protections for Microsoft 365 Copilot and Microsoft Copilot | Microsoft Learn Block Users From Sharing Sensitive Information to Unmanaged AI Apps Via Edge on Managed Devices (preview) | Microsoft Learn as part of Scenario 7 of Create and deploy a data loss prevention policy | Microsoft Learn Commonly used properties in Copilot audit logs - Audit logs for Copilot and AI activities | Microsoft Learn Supported AI sites by Microsoft Purview for data security and compliance protections | Microsoft Learn Where Copilot usage data is stored and how you can audit it - Microsoft 365 Copilot data protection and auditing architecture | Microsoft Learn Downloadable whitepaper: Data Security for AI Adoption | Microsoft Explore the roadmap for DSPM for AI Public roadmap for DSPM for AI - Microsoft 365 Roadmap | Microsoft 365PMPurAnnouncing AI Entity Analyzer in Microsoft Sentinel MCP Server - Public Preview
What is the Entity Analyzer? Assessing the risk of entities is a core task for SOC teams - whether triaging incidents, investigating threats, or automating response workflows. Traditionally, this has required building complex playbooks or custom logic to gather and analyze fragmented security data from multiple sources. With Entity Analyzer, this complexity starts to fade away. The tool leverages your organization’s security data in Sentinel to deliver comprehensive, reasoned risk assessments for any entity you encounter - starting with users and urls. By providing this unified, out-of-the-box solution for entity analysis, Entity Analyzer also enables the AI agents you build to make smarter decisions and automate more tasks - without the need to manually engineer risk evaluation logic for each entity type. And for those building SOAR workflows, Entity Analyzer is natively integrated with Logic Apps, making it easy to enrich incidents and automate verdicts within your playbooks. *Entity Analyzer is rolling out in Public Preview to Sentinel MCP server and within Logic Apps starting today. Learn more here. Deep Dive: How the User Analyzer is already solving problems for security teams Problem: Drowning in identity alerts Security operations centers (SOCs) are inundated with identity-based threats and alert noise. Triaging these alerts requires analyzing numerous data sources across sign-in logs, cloud app events, identity info, behavior analytics, threat intel, and more, all in tandem with each other to reach a verdict - something very challenging to do without a human in the loop today. So, we introduced the User Analyzer, a specialized analyzer that unifies, correlates, and analyzes user activity across all these security data sources. Government of Nunavut: solving identity alert overload with User Analyzer Hear the below from Arshad Sheikh, Security Expert at Government of Nunavut, on how they're using the User Analyzer today: How it's making a difference "Before the User Analyzer, when we received identity alerts we had to check a large amount of data related to users’ activity (user agents, anomalies, IP reputation, etc.). We had to write queries, wait for them to run, and then manually reason over the results. We attempted to automate some of this, but maintaining and updating that retrieval, parsing, and reasoning automation was difficult and we didn’t have the resources to support it. With the User Analyzer, we now have a plug-and-play solution that represents a step toward the AI-driven automation of the future. It gathers all the context such as what the anomalies are and presents it to our analysts so they can make quick, confident decisions, eliminating the time previously spent manually gathering this data from portals." Solving a real problem "For example, every 24 hours we create a low severity incident of our users who successfully sign-in to our network non interactively from outside of our GEO fence. This type of activity is not high-enough fidelity to auto-disable, requiring us to manually analyze the flagged users each time. But with User Analyzer, this analysis is performed automatically. The User Analyzer has also significantly reduced the time required to determine whether identity-based incidents like these are false positives or true positives. Instead of spending around 20 minutes investigating each incident, our analysts can now reach a conclusion in about 5 minutes using the automatically generated summary." Looking ahead "Looking ahead, we see even more potential. In the future, the User Analyzer could be integrated directly with Microsoft Sentinel playbooks to take automated, definitive action such as blocking user or device access based on the analyzer’s results. This would further streamline our incident response and move us closer to fully automated security operations." Want similar benefits in your SOC? Get started with our Entity Analyzer Logic Apps template here. User Analyzer architecture: how does it work? Let’s take a look at how the User Analyzer works. The User Analyzer aggregates and correlates signals from multiple data sources to deliver a comprehensive analysis, enabling informed actions based on user activity. The diagram below gives an overview of this architecture: Step 1: Retrieve Data The analyzer starts by retrieving relevant data from the following sources: Sign-In Logs (Interactive & Non-Interactive): Tracks authentication and login activity. Security Alerts: Alerts from Microsoft Defender solutions. Behavior Analytics: Surfaces behavioral anomalies through advanced analytics. Cloud App Events: Captures activity from Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. Identity Information: Enriches user context with identity records. Microsoft Threat Intelligence: Enriches IP addresses with Microsoft Threat Intelligence. Steps 2: Correlate signals Signals are correlated using identifiers such as user IDs, IP addresses, and threat intelligence. Rather than treating each alert or behavior in isolation, the User Analyzer fuses signals to build a holistic risk profile. Step 3: AI-based reasoning In the User Analyzer, multiple AI-powered agents collaborate to evaluate the evidence and reach consensus. This architecture not only improves accuracy and reduces bias in verdicts, but also provides transparent, justifiable decisions. Leveraging AI within the User Analyzer introduces a new dimension of intelligence to threat detection. Instead of relying on static signatures or rigid regex rules, AI-based reasoning can uncover subtle anomalies that traditional detection methods and automation playbooks often miss. For example, an attacker might try to evade detection by slightly altering a user-agent string or by targeting and exfiltrating only a few files of specific types. While these changes could bypass conventional pattern matching, an AI-powered analyzer understands the semantic context and behavioral patterns behind these artifacts, allowing it to flag suspicious deviations even when the syntax looks benign. Step 4: Verdict & analysis Each user is given a verdict. The analyzer outputs any of the following verdicts based on the analysis: Compromised Suspicious activity found No evidence of compromise Based on the verdict, a corresponding recommendation is given. This helps teams make an informed decision whether action should be taken against the user. *AI-generated content from the User Analyzer may be incorrect - check it for accuracy. User Analyzer Example Output See the following example output from the user analyzer within an incident comment: *IP addresses have been redacted for this blog* &CK techniques, a list of malicious IP addresses the user signed in from (redacted for this blog), and a few suspicious user agents the user's activity originated from. Conclusion Entity Analyzer in Microsoft Sentinel MCP server represents a leap forward in alert triage & analysis. By correlating signals and harnessing AI-based reasoning, it empowers SOC teams to act on investigations with greater speed, precision, and confidence.Trusted Signing Public Preview Update
Nearly a year ago we announced the Public Preview of Trusted Signing with availability for organizations with 3 years or more of verifiable history to onboard to the service to get a fully managed code signing experience to simplify the efforts for Windows app developers. Over the past year, we’ve announced new features including the Preview support for Individual Developers, and we highlighted how the service contributes to the Windows Security story at Microsoft BUILD 2024 in the Unleash Windows App Security & Reputation with Trusted Signing session. During the Public Preview, we have obtained valuable insights on the service features from our customers, and insights into the developer experience as well as experience for Windows users. As we incorporate this feedback and learning into our General Availability (GA) release, we are limiting new customer subscriptions as part of the public preview. This approach will allow us to focus on refining the service based on the feedback and data collected during the preview phase. The limit in new customer subscriptions for Trusted Signing will take effect Wednesday, April 2, 2025, and make the service only available to US and Canada-based organizations with 3 years or more of verifiable history. Onboarding for individual developers and all other organizations will not be directly available for the remainder of the preview, and we look forward to expanding the service availability as we approach GA. Note that this announcement does not impact any existing subscribers of Trusted Signing, and the service will continue to be available for these subscribers as it has been throughout the Public Preview. For additional information about Trusted Signing please refer to Trusted Signing documentation | Microsoft Learn and Trusted Signing FAQ | Microsoft Learn.Accelerated Collaboration Forums: Join the Conversation and Drive Innovation!
Are you passionate about Microsoft security, compliance, and collaboration? Do you want to connect directly with product engineering teams and peers to shape the future of Microsoft solutions? If so, Accelerated Collaboration Forums (ACFs) are designed for you! What Are Accelerated Collaboration Forums (ACFs)? Accelerated Collaboration Forums (ACFs) are topic-specific discussion groups within the Microsoft Customer Connection Program (MCCP). They streamline how community members engage with Microsoft product teams and each other by organizing recurring calls focused on key topics. Instead of juggling multiple calls, you simply join the recurring call series for the ACFs that interest you. Each forum meets at the same day and time, making participation predictable and easy. Engineering PMs from the relevant product groups join every call, fostering open dialogue and direct feedback. Membership in the Microsoft Customer Connection Program (MCCP) is required—if you’re not a member yet, you can join here. Why Join an ACF? Direct access to product engineering teams Focused discussions on hot topics Predictable, recurring schedule Open community for sharing feedback and ideas Opportunity to influence Microsoft’s roadmap Available Accelerated Collaboration Forums to join Choose from a range of topics tailored to your interests: Purview DLP Authentication Copilot in Entra Copilot in Purview Developer Experiences in Security MDO Partner and Customer Connection Posture Management Security for AI Teams Protection Zero Trust How to Join Ready to participate? Membership to a MCCP is required. If you are already part of the Microsoft Customer Connection Program (MCCP), you can join an ACF here. If you are not yet a MCCP member, you can join here and from there, follow the steps to join an ACF. Join an Accelerated Collaboration Forum today and help shape the future of Microsoft security and collaboration!Security Guidance Series: CAF 4.0 Building Proactive Cyber Resilience
It’s Time To Act Microsoft's Digital Defense Report 2025 clearly describes the cyber threat landscape that this guidance is situated in, one that has become more complex, more industrialized, and increasingly democratized. Each day, Microsoft processes more than 100 trillion security signals, giving unparalleled visibility into adversarial tradecraft. Identity remains the most heavily targeted attack vector, with 97% of identity-based attacks relying on password spray, while phishing and unpatched assets continue to provide easy routes for initial compromise. Financially motivated attacks, particularly ransomware and extortion, now make up over half of global incidents, and nation-state operators continue to target critical sectors, including IT, telecommunications, and Government networks. AI is accelerating both sides of the equation: enhancing attacker capability, lowering barriers to entry through open-source models, and simultaneously powering more automated, intelligence-driven defence. Alongside this, emerging risks such as quantum computing underline the urgency of preparing today for tomorrow’s threats. Cybersecurity has therefore become a strategic imperative shaping national resilience and demanding genuine cross-sector collaboration to mitigate systemic risk. It is within this environment that UK public sector organizations are rethinking their approach to cyber resilience. As an Account Executive Apprentice in the Local Public Services team here at Microsoft, I have seen how UK public sector organizations are rethinking their approach to cyber resilience, moving beyond checklists and compliance toward a culture of continuous improvement and intelligence-led defence. When we talk about the UK public sector in this series, we are referring specifically to central government departments, local government authorities, health and care organizations (including the NHS), education institutions, and public safety services such as police, fire, and ambulance. These organizations form a deeply interconnected ecosystem delivering essential services to millions of citizens every day, making cyber resilience not just a technical requirement but a foundation of public trust. Against this backdrop, the UK public sector is entering a new era of cyber resilience with the release of CAF 4.0, the latest evolution of the National Cyber Security Centre’s Cyber Assessment Framework. This guidance has been developed in consultation with national cyber security experts, including the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and is an aggregation of knowledge and internationally recognized expertise. Building on the foundations of CAF 3.2, this update marks a decisive shift, like moving from a static map to a live radar. Instead of looking back at where threats once were, organizations can now better anticipate them and adjust their digital defences in real time. For the UK’s public sector, this transformation could not be timelier. The complexity of digital public services, combined with the growing threat of ransomware, insider threat, supply chain compromise, and threats from nation state actors, demands a faster, smarter, and more connected approach to resilience. Where CAF 3.2 focused on confirming the presence and effectiveness of security measures, CAF 4.0 places greater emphasis on developing organizational capability and improving resilience in a more dynamic threat environment. While the CAF remains an outcome-based framework, not a maturity model, it is structured around Objectives, Principles, and Contributing Outcomes, with each contributing outcome supported by Indicators of Good Practice. For simplicity, I refer to these contributing outcomes as “controls” throughout this blog and use that term to describe the practical expectations organizations are assessed against. CAF 4.0 challenges organizations not only to understand the threats they face but to anticipate, detect, and respond in a more informed and adaptive way. Two contributing outcomes exemplify this proactive mindset: A2.b Understanding Threat and C2 Threat Hunting. Together, they represent what it truly means to understand your adversaries and act before harm occurs. For the UK’s public sector, achieving these new objectives may seem daunting, but the path forward is clearer than ever. Many organizations are already beginning this journey, supported by technologies that help turn insight into action and coordination into resilience. At Microsoft, we’ve seen how tools like E3, E5, and Sentinel are already helping public sector teams to move from reactive to intelligence-driven security operations. Over the coming weeks, we’ll explore how these capabilities align to CAF 4.0’s core principles and share practical examples of how councils can strengthen their resilience journey through smarter visibility, automation, and collaboration. CAF 4.0 vs CAF 3.2 - What’s Changed and Why It Matters The move from CAF 3.2 to CAF 4.0 represents a fundamental shift in how the UK public sector builds cyber resilience. The focus is no longer on whether controls exist - it is on whether they work, adapt, and improve over time. CAF 4.0 puts maturity at the centre. It pushes organizations to evolve from compliance checklists to operational capability, adopting a threat-informed, intelligence-led, and proactive security posture, by design. CAF 4.0 raises the bar for cyber maturity across the public sector. It calls for departments and authorities to build on existing foundations and embrace live threat intelligence, behavioural analytics, and structured threat hunting to stay ahead of adversaries. By understanding how attackers might target essential services and adapting controls in real time, organizations can evolve from awareness to active defence. Today’s threat actors are agile, persistent, and increasingly well-resourced, which means reactive measures are no longer enough. CAF 4.0 positions resilience as a continuous process of learning, adapting, and improving, supported by data-driven insights and modern security operations. CAF 4.0 is reshaping how the UK’s public sector approaches security maturity. In the coming weeks, we’ll explore what this looks like in practice, starting with how to build a deeper understanding of threat (control A2.b) and elevate threat hunting (control C2) into an everyday capability, using the tools and insights that are available within existing Microsoft E3 and E5 licences to help support these objectives. Until then, how ready is your organization to turn insight into action?Catch up on Microsoft Security sessions and announcements from Ignite 2025
Ignite 2025 delivered groundbreaking innovations for securing the agentic era—where AI agents transform how we work and collaborate. If you missed the live sessions, news announcements, or want to dive deeper, here’s your quick start guide to the most important resources and actionable steps to stay informed. 1. Watch the Innovation Session: Security in the Agentic Era on demand Hear from Vasu Jakkal, CVP, Microsoft Security Business, and Charlie Bell, EVP, Microsoft Security, as they outline why digital trust is the foundation for innovation in the agentic era. With AI agents projected to reach 1.3 billion by 2028¹, organizations face new security challenges such as manipulated models to coerced agents and expanded attack surfaces. This session introduces Microsoft’s vision for ambient and autonomous security integrated across every layer of operations. You’ll learn how our AI-first security platform can help anticipate and stop attacks with AI-driven defense while helping to ensure security, governance, and compliance for your IT assets, and how it simplifies data management with a modern data lake and dynamic threat intelligence capabilities. You’ll also learn more about the just-announced Microsoft Agent 365, the control plane for AI agents that brings observability at every level of the AI stack. Through demos and customer stories, discover how identity, data, and compliance protections converge to enable secure AI innovation at scale. 2. Leverage AI agents in your workflow with Security Copilot in Microsoft 365 E5. With Security Copilot now part of Microsoft 365 E5, security teams can seamlessly bring AI-powered assistance into their daily workflows. This means faster incident response, simplified threat analysis, and natural language queries—all integrated into the tools you already use. By embedding generative AI directly into Microsoft 365, organizations can strengthen defenses and reduce complexity without adding extra licensing or overhead. Learn more. 3. Ambient and autonomous security for the agentic era Ignite 2025 introduced a bold vision for securing the agentic era. From making security ambient and autonomous across identities, data, apps, endpoints, and agents, to unveiling Agent 365 for centralized AI agent governance and embedding Security Copilot into Microsoft 365 E5, these updates show how Microsoft is transforming security for a world woven with AI. Explore this collection of insights, technical deep dives, and demos to see how Microsoft’s integrated security platform delivers unified protection and intelligent automation at scale. Explore all the security announcements from Ignite 2025. 4. Explore on-demand sessions Missed a live session or want to dive deeper into the latest security innovations? Explore the catalog of security sessions covering topics like modernizing SecOps, securing data, and protecting AI platforms and apps. Each session is packed with demos, best practices, and expert insights to help you apply what’s new in Microsoft Security. Your next steps Start with the Innovation Session (#1), then dive into the news announcements (#2, #3) and on-demand content (#4) to understand how Microsoft is securing the agentic era. ¹IDC Info Snapshot, sponsored by Microsoft, 1.3 Billion AI Agents by 2028, May 2025 #US53361825