Missing activity names from Audit Log documentation
We all know that the documentation team is A-tier and amazing at what they do and isn't just copy and pasting marketing materials. But I've noticed that some really obscure functionalities like 'user registered a device' or 'user joined a device' or about half the other things a user can do, are not documented on this list of activity names. The ironically named 'friendly' list doesn't work. So I actually can't audit the unfamiliar devices under our tenants? It appears that this KB is actually locked down, so more can't be added when they are discovered. How are we supposed to use the tool Microsoft has forced everyone towards, when the Documentation team is too bad to document anything, so they outsource it to the community (Microsoft victims), but then they lock down contributions (presumably, because they have some metric that keeps them from being useful - atleast based on my interactions with them). Documentation seems to be a massive fail on Microsoft's part. How did it get this way? Is there a reliable way of finding the activity name - one that ISN'T some preview Graph endpoint that I can't teach my techs to use, because I'm not teaching my techs to program?
Onboarding Devices to Purview
I am not clear on how can I onboard devices to MDE so that I can enforce EDLP policies. We have CrowdStrike as Primary AV and other policies. Devices are managed through Intune for Bitlocker encryption and all the other settings except they don't have Defender. These devices are not showing up in Purview nor under "Endpoint detection and response" location under Endpoint Security. If we create an EDR onboarding policy and deploy to devices, then it shows the devices and says that AMRUnningMode is Passive, but Antivirus is true. Which I feel like Defender is taking over CrowdStrike? or am I wrong. My goal is to make sure CrowdStrike still primary AV and devices should be onboarded to MDE and then to Purview so that we can scope EDLP policies properly. Can anyone help me to understand or provide right steps?
Confusion around Purview Definitions and Risk Scoring
In the early days of implementation and we've done our 'Quick setup' of Insider Risk Management which created our Adaptive Protection Policy for IRM, two IRM DLP policies (Endpoint & Teams/Exchange) and the Conditional Access policy. My question is around 'Triggering events', Indicators and Insider Risk Levels. To my understanding, a triggering event is the event that decides when the policy will start assigning risk scores to user activity which will then allow us to then give users risk levels. We have the option to either set this triggering event to either the DLP policies, or when a user performs an exfiltration activity/ sequence. The DLP policies only match activity when a user has a defined risk level and attempts to perform a specific activity i.e. sharing M365 with people outside the organisation. I'm not sure if I'm thinking about this backwards, but if I set my Adaptive protection policy to only start assigning risk scores to user activity when they match a DLP policy, how can they trigger a DLP policy if they wont be assigned a risk level until that scoring begins to happen? Should I be setting my triggering events to be "User performs an Exfiltration Activity" instead of "User Matches a DLP policy"?
Anthropic Claude Purview Data Connector showing all users as Guests..
It appears this connector is not mapping fields properly causing internal users to be mapped as "guests", and since prompts/data isn't maintained for guest users the connector is effectively not gathering anything but noise. Unlike the other data connectors, one cannot create field mappings. Also the app being named using the guid of Microsoft's own "dataassessments" service principal I don't think is intended either. Has anybody else experienced this? See below for an example.
Co Authoring with Sensitivity Labels
Hello, I am working with sensitivity labels with my organization. We currently have Standard, Confidential, and Highly Confidential which all are encrypted. I have Co-Authoring turned on but I have some trouble with. We a lot of documents being collaborated on. Standard: Co-Authoring functions normal and Auto-Save is toggled on. Highly Confidential: Custom Permission in Sensitivity Label (View, Edit, Reply, Forward) I asked copilot and it stated even though my permissions are selected custom I have "Edit" on their for my internal users it is reading it as Co authoring; Co-Authoring is on and functioning but internal end users Auto-Save is toggled off and they are being asked to save a copy of the document or excel sheet then upload it again to SharePoint. Why isn't "Auto-Save" toggled on for "Highly Confidential" label? Can it be adjusted so it can be on? Do I have to make adjustments to my permissions in the Sensitivity label? Any help is appreciated. Thank you!Purview DLP Behaviours in Outlook Desktop
We are currently testing Microsoft Purview DLP policies for user awareness, where sensitive information shared externally triggers a policy tip, with override allowed (justification options enabled) and no blocking action configured. We are observing the following behaviours in Outlook Desktop: Inconsistent policy tip display (across Outlook Desktop Windows clients) – For some users, the policy tip renders correctly, while for others it appears with duplicated/stacked lines of text. This is occurring across users with similar configurations. Override without justification – Users are able to click “Send Anyway/Confirm and send” without selecting any justification option (e.g. business justification, manager approval, etc.), which bypasses the intended control. New Outlook: Classic Outlook: This has been observed on Outlook Desktop (Microsoft 365 Apps), including: Version 2602 (Build 19725.20170 Click-to-Run) Version 2602 (Build 16.0.19725.20126 MSO) Has anyone experienced similar behaviour with DLP policy tips or override enforcement in Outlook Desktop? Keen to understand if this is a known issue or if there are any recommended fixes or workarounds.I just want to secure AI. DLP vs Info Protection vs DSPM vs Governance vs...
I'm with an MSP, and I've avoided Purview like the plague, because it seems to be suffering from the same 'made by marketing teams' 'strategy' the 365 documentation is. However, it's my understanding Purview policies are needed for Data control of Copilot. Here's my issue: all of these different 'solutions' sound like the exact same thing, but are pitched as if they are something different. i'm going to post a couple of descriptions for these 'solutions' to illustrate this. 'discover, label, and protect sensitive and business-critical info' 'make sure your organization can identify, monitor, and protect sensitive info across the expanding Microsoft 365 landscape' 'discover and secure all your sensitive data across Microsoft 365 and non-365 data sources' 'Discover, label, and protect sensitive and business-critical info across your multicloud data estate.' I genuinely do not have time to figure out what each of these 'solutions' are, then figure out their policies, then their giant library of settings (below)... It's not even clear to me what's active NOW, considering we never licensed Purview - but somehow have been roped into it. It SEEMS like these are all variations of marketing terms, which all point to 3-4 actual technical implementations in obscure ways. Can someone advise on the ACTUAL technical policies we want to target and enable? Or just give some clarity? I've never felt so overwhelmed or disconnected from Microsoft's environment. We just want to secure our tenant's AI usage.Purview Data Map scanning Microsoft Fabric and no classifications applied or scan rule sets
Microsoft Purview cannot currently apply built-in or custom classifications (including sensitive information types) to metadata discovered from Microsoft Fabric workspace scans. While Purview can register Fabric workspaces and extract structural metadata (workspaces, Lakehouses, Warehouses, tables, columns, and limited lineage), classification rules are not executed against Fabric assets in the same way they are for supported sources such as Azure SQL, ADLS Gen2, or on-prem databases. This results in classification gaps across a core enterprise analytics platform. Why This Is a Significant Service Omission 1. Breaks the Core Value Proposition of Purview 2. Undermines Regulatory and Risk Management Controls 3. Creates an Inconsistent Governance Experience 4. Blocks Downstream Purview Capabilities 5. Forces Anti-Patterns and Workarounds The lack of automated classification support for Microsoft Fabric workspace data represents a material service omission in Microsoft Purview, significantly limiting its effectiveness as a unified data governance platform and introducing avoidable compliance, operational, and assurance risks—particularly in regulated environments. Are there plans to improve this and if so what are the timescales?Activity explorer scoping to AU
I remember that Activity Explorer can be fully scoped to Admin Units, and that the Restricted admin can see activity explorer and DLP matching events for the scoped AU only, is that correct? Cause I was checking and I found the Restricted admin can see the activities also for the users out of the scoped AU. Does that make sense?
