From “No” to “Now”: A 7-Layer Strategy for Enterprise AI Safety
The “block” posture on Generative AI has failed. In a global enterprise, banning these tools doesn't stop usage; it simply pushes intellectual property into unmanaged channels and creates a massive visibility gap in corporate telemetry. The priority has now shifted from stopping AI to hardening the environment so that innovation can run at velocity without compromising data sovereignty. Traditional security perimeters are ineffective against the “slow bleed” of AI leakage - where data moves through prompts, clipboards, and autonomous agents rather than bulk file transfers. To secure this environment, a 7-layer defense-in-depth model is required to treat the conversation itself as the new perimeter. 1. Identity: The Only Verifiable Perimeter Identity is the primary control plane. Access to AI services must be treated with the same rigor as administrative access to core infrastructure. The strategy centers on enforcing device-bound Conditional Access, where access is strictly contingent on device health. To solve the "Account Leak" problem, the deployment of Tenant Restrictions v2 (TRv2) is essential to prevent users from signing into personal tenants using corporate-managed devices. For enhanced coverage, Universal Tenant Restrictions (UTR) via Global Secure Access (GSA) allows for consistent enforcement at the cloud edge. While TRv2 authentication-plane is GA, data-plane protection is GA for the Microsoft 365 admin center and remains in preview for other workloads such as SharePoint and Teams. 2. Eliminating the Visibility Gap (Shadow AI) You can’t secure what you can't see. Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps (MDCA) serves to discover and govern the enterprise AI footprint, while Purview DSPM for AI (formerly AI Hub) monitors Copilot and third-party interactions. By categorizing tools using MDCA risk scores and compliance attributes, organizations can apply automated sanctioning decisions and enforce session controls for high-risk endpoints. 3. Data Hygiene: Hardening the “Work IQ” AI acts as a mirror of internal permissions. In a "flat" environment, AI acts like a search engine for your over-shared data. Hardening the foundation requires automated sensitivity labeling in Purview Information Protection. Identifying PII and proprietary code before assigning AI licenses ensures that labels travel with the data, preventing labeled content from being exfiltrated via prompts or unauthorized sharing. 4. Session Governance: Solving the “Clipboard Leak” The most common leak in 2025 is not a file upload; it’s a simple copy-paste action or a USB transfer. Deploying Conditional Access App Control (CAAC) via MDCA session policies allows sanctioned apps to function while specifically blocking cut/copy/paste. This is complemented by Endpoint DLP, which extends governance to the physical device level, preventing sensitive data from being moved to unmanaged USB storage or printers during an AI-assisted workflow. Purview Information Protection with IRM rounds this out by enforcing encryption and usage rights on the files themselves. When a user tries to print a "Do Not Print" document, Purview triggers an alert that flows into Microsoft Sentinel. This gives the SOC visibility into actual policy violations instead of them having to hunt through generic activity logs. 5. The “Agentic” Era: Agent 365 & Sharing Controls Now that we're moving from "Chat" to "Agents", Agent 365 and Entra Agent ID provide the necessary identity and control plane for autonomous entities. A quick tip: in large-scale tenants, default settings often present a governance risk. A critical first step is navigating to the Microsoft 365 admin center (Copilot > Agents) to disable the default “Anyone in organization” sharing option. Restricting agent creation and sharing to a validated security group is essential to prevent unvetted agent sprawl and ensure that only compliant agents are discoverable. 6. The Human Layer: “Safe Harbors” over Bans Security fails when it creates more friction than the risk it seeks to mitigate. Instead of an outright ban, investment in AI skilling-teaching users context minimization (redacting specifics before interacting with a model) - is the better path. Providing a sanctioned, enterprise-grade "Safe Harbor" like M365 Copilot offers a superior tool that naturally cuts down the use of Shadow AI. 7. Continuous Ops: Monitoring & Regulatory Audit Security is not a “set and forget” project, particularly with the EU AI Act on the horizon. Correlating AI interactions and DLP alerts in Microsoft Sentinel using Purview Audit (specifically the CopilotInteraction logs) data allows for real-time responses. Automated SOAR playbooks can then trigger protective actions - such as revoking an Agent ID - if an entity attempts to access sensitive HR or financial data. Final Thoughts Securing AI at scale is an architectural shift. By layering Identity, Session Governance, and Agentic Identity, AI moves from being a fragmented risk to a governed tool that actually works for the modern workplace.
Windows Hello passkeys dialog appearing and cannot remove or suppress it.
Hi everyone, I’m dealing with a persistent Windows Hello and passkey issue in Chrome and Brave and yes this is relevant as they're the only browsers having this issue whilst Edge for example is fine, and at this point I’m trying to understand whether this is expected behavior, a bug, or a design oversight. PS. Yes, I'm in contact with related browser support teams but since they seem utterly hopeless i'm asking here, since its at least partially Windows Hello issue. Problem description Even with: Password managers disabled in browser settings, Windows Hello disabled in Chrome/Brave settings, Windows Hello PIN enabled only for device login, Passkeys still stored under chrome://settings/passkeys (which I cannot delete since its used for logging on the device), The devices are connected to Entra ID but this is not required to reproduce the issue although a buisness account configuration creates a Passkey with Windows Hello afaik. Observed behavior When I attempt to sign in on office.com, Windows Hello automatically triggers a dialog offering authentication via passkeys, even though: I don’t want passkeys used for browser logins, passkeys are turned off everywhere they can be, Windows Hello is intended only for local device authentication. The dialog cannot be suppressed, disabled, or hidden(trust me, i tried for weeks). It effectively forces the Windows Hello prompt as a primary option, which causes problems both personally and in business contexts (wrong credential signaling, misleading users that are supposed to use a dedicated password manager solution insted of browser password managers, enforcing an unwanted authentication flow, etc.). What I already verified Many, many, (too many) Windows registry workarounds that never worked. Dug through almost all flags on those browsers. Chrome/Brave → Password Manager: disabled Chrome/Brave → Windows Hello toggle: off Looked through what feels like almost every related option in Windows Settings. Tried gpedit.msc local rules System up to date Windows Hello configured to use PIN, but stores "passkeys used to log on to this device" Why this is a problem Windows Hello automatically assumes that the device-level Windows Hello credentials should always be available as a WebAuthn authenticator. This feels like a big security and UX issue due to: unexpected authentication dialogs, Inability to controll where and how passkey credential are shared to applications, inability to turn the feature off, no administrative or local option to disable Hello for WebAuthn separately from device login. Buisness users either having issues with keeping passwords in order (our buissnes uses a dedicated Password Manager but this behaviour covers its dialog option) or not having PIN to their devices (when I disable windows hello entierly, since when there is no passkeys the option doesn't appear) Questions Is there any supported way to disable Windows Hello as a WebAuthn/passkey option in browsers, while keeping Hello enabled for local device login? Is this expected behavior from the Windows Hello, or is it considered a bug? Are there registry/policy settings (documented or upcoming) that allow disabling the Windows platform authenticator specifically for browsers like Chrome and Brave? Is Microsoft aware of this issue? If so, is it tracked anywhere? Additional notes This issue replicates 100% across (as long as there are passkeys configured): Windows 11 devices i've managed to get my hands on, Chrome and Brave (latest versions), multiple Microsoft accounts and tenants, multiple clean installations. Any guidance or clarification from the Windows security or identity teams would be greatly appreciated. And honestly if there is any more info i could possibly provide PLEASE ask away.
Add Privacy Scrub Service to Microsoft Defender?
Microsoft Defender protects accounts against phishing and malware, but attackers increasingly exploit nuisance data broker sites that publish personal information (names, emails, addresses). These sites are scraped to personalize phishing campaigns, making them harder to detect. I propose a premium Defender add‑on that automatically files opt‑out requests with major data brokers (similar to DeleteMe).Blocking Personal Outlook and Gmail Accounts on Corporate Device
Hello Community, In my organization, we use the Microsoft 365 environment. We have a hybrid infrastructure, but we aim to deploy as many policies as possible through Microsoft 365 (Intune, Purview, Defender, etc.). One of our goals is to limit the use of corporate devices for personal purposes. We use Outlook as our corporate email service, and we would like to block employees from signing into their personal email accounts (either via web or desktop application). Additionally, we would like to block access to other email services, such as Gmail, both via web and desktop apps. Could you provide guidance on how to achieve this? I would greatly appreciate any help or suggestions. Thank you very much! Juan RojasHow to Solution Prevent User Downgrade Sensitivity Label is changed
Hi Everyone , Now I use Microsoft 365 E3 + Microsoft 365 E5 Information Protection and Governance. I am looking for a way to prevent User Downgrade Sensitivity Label from High to Low. I understand that before they change the label, they have to comment and they can change it. Is there any solution that can block this or notify from the log?Anomalies with Conditional Access Policy "Terms of Use" Failures
Hello Microsoft Community, I'm reaching out with a bit of a puzzle regarding our "Terms of Use" Conditional Access policy, and I'm eager to tap into the collective wisdom here for some insights. In our Entra ID User Sign-In logs, we've identified intermittent "failure" entries associated with the "Terms of Use" Conditional Access policy. Interestingly, even for users who had previously accepted the "Terms of Use". There appears to be no discernible impact, and they continue their tasks without interruption. This observation became apparent during the troubleshooting of unrelated Surface Hub and Edge Sync issues at some client sites. What adds to the complexity of the situation is that for the same users, both before and after these "failure" entries, the Conditional Access policy is marked as "success". Hence, it doesn't seem to be a straightforward case of the policy erroneously detecting non-acceptance of the "Terms of Use". The mystery lies in understanding why these intermittent "failure" entries occur for users who have already accepted the terms, especially when the policy consistently reports "success" for the same users. Furthermore, the Insights for the "Terms of Use" Conditional Access policy show around 1.48k successes and 1.43k failures in the last 90 days, yet there's no discernible impact on user functionality. Observations: "Failure" entries in Sign-In logs don't seem to disrupt users' day-to-day activities. The ratio of successes to failures is balanced, yet users experience no noticeable problems. The issue complicates troubleshooting efforts but doesn't significantly affect the user experience. I'm turning to the community for guidance on interpreting and resolving this discrepancy between "failure" entries in the Conditional Access policy logs and the seemingly unaffected user experience. Any insights into why these failures occur without user impact would be greatly appreciated. For additional context, I've attached screenshots of a user's Sign-In log entry and the insight chart from the Conditional Access policy. Sign-In log of a user (failure): Sign-In log of same user (success): Current Conditional Access insights: Thank you in advance for your time and assistance. I look forward to any guidance or solutions you can provide. Best regards, Leon TüpkerNew Blog | Introducing Lineage Tracking for Azure Databricks Unity Catalog in Microsoft Purview
By Karan Shah We’re thrilled to announce the release of a highly anticipated feature in Microsoft Purview: lineage tracking for Azure Databricks Unity Catalog. This marks a significant milestone in our ongoing efforts to enhance data governance and visibility across cloud environments. By leveraging this new functionality, users can now track data flow across their Azure Databricks notebooks, improving the ability to audit, monitor, and manage data movement. With data increasingly flowing through complex, cloud-native platforms like Azure Databricks, having clear, end-to-end visibility is crucial for compliance, troubleshooting, and operational excellence. Read the full post here: Introducing Lineage Tracking for Azure Databricks Unity Catalog in Microsoft PurviewNew Blog | Security mitigation for the Common Log Filesystem (CLFS)
By bjackson2115 Microsoft will soon be releasing a new security mitigation for the Common Log File System (CLFS) to the Windows Insiders Canary channel. In the past five years, 24 CVEs impacting CLFS have been identified and mitigated, making it one of the largest targets for vulnerability research in Windows. Rather than continuing to address single issues as they are discovered, the Microsoft Offensive Research & Security Engineering (MORSE) team has worked to add a new verification step to parsing CLFS logfiles, which aims to address a class of vulnerabilities all at once. This work will help protect our customers across the Windows ecosystem before they are impacted by potential security issues. CLFS Overview CLFS is a general-purpose logging service that can be used by software clients running in user-mode or kernel-mode. This service provides the transaction functionality for the Kernel Transaction Manager of the Windows kernel, which Transactional Registry (TxR) and Transactional NTFS (TxF) are built upon. While used in multiple places in the Windows kernel, a public user-mode API is also offered and can be utilized for any application wanting to store log records on the file system. CLFS stores all log information and log records in a set of files, referred to as a “logfile”, which persists at a user-defined location on the file system. While the logfile is comprised of multiple files, the CLFS driver manages them as a single unit by creating a file handle for the whole set. The logfile is made up of one “Base Log File” (BLF), which holds the necessary metadata for the log, and two or more “container files”, which is where user-supplied log records are stored. Read the full post here: Security mitigation for the Common Log Filesystem (CLFS)New Blog | Learn how to customize Copilot for Security with the Data Security plugin
By Jon Nordström This is a step-by-step guided walkthrough of how to use the custom Copilot for Security pack for Microsoft Data Security and how it can empower your organization to understand the cyber security risks in a context that allows them to achieve more. By focusing on the information and organizational context to reflect the real impact/value of investments and incidents in cyber. We are working to add this to our native toolset as well, we will update once ready. Prerequisites License requirements for Microsoft Purview Information Protection depend on the scenarios and features you use. To understand your licensing requirements and options for Microsoft Purview Information Protection, see the Information Protection sections from Microsoft 365 guidance for security & compliance and the related PDF download for feature-level licensing requirements. You also need to be licensed for Microsoft Copilot for Security, more information here. Consider setting up Azure AI Search to ingest policy documents, so that they can be part of the process. Read the full post here: Learn how to customize and optimize Copilot for Security with the custom Data Security plugin
