Can the built-in "No account? Create one" link redirect to a custom sign-up page?
I'm using Microsoft Entra External ID with a built-in sign-in/sign-up user flow. On the Microsoft-hosted sign-in page, the "No account? Create one" link always redirects users to the default Entra sign-up page. I already have a custom registration page and would like this built-in link to redirect to my custom URL instead. Is there any supported way to customize the destination of this link in a built-in user flow? If not, could someone confirm whether this behavior is fixed by design? Thanks!
Orphaned TPM-bound Entra Workplace Join device — no tenant access, backend deletion required
I have a personal Windows device that remains stuck in a TPM-protected Workplace Join to a former Microsoft Entra ID tenant. I no longer have tenant access and am not an admin. Local remediation completed: - dsregcmd /leave executed as SYSTEM - All MS-Organization / AAD certificates removed - Device still reports WorkplaceJoined : YES Azure Support ticket creation fails with: AADSTS160021 – interaction_required Application requested a user session which does not exist. Tenant inaccessible / user not present in tenant. This is an orphaned Entra ID device object. Requesting guidance or escalation for backend deletion. Tenant ID: 99f9b903-8447-4711-a2df-c5bd1ad1adf7 Device ID: f47987f4-a20b-4c34-a5f7-40ab0f593c6c
MFA Options for Employees without Phones
Hello everbody, we're currently trying to implement MFA in our company, but approximately 1/10 of our employees have a workphone and are not allowed to use their personal phone. Since we also recently introduced Intune, the idea was to just use Windows Hello for Business, but when trying to provision it, we realized that you need to have MFA active for an account to be able to even activate it? Which kinda defeats the purpose. So my question is, is there some way to circumvent the MFA requirement for WHfB? Or what other options do we realistically have? Thanks in Advance!Migrating frontline mobile devices: Identity considerations for assigned and shared devices
By: Carol Burns - Principal Product Manager | Microsoft Intune and Sucheta Gawade, Microsoft MVP (Azure & Security / Intune) Practitioner perspective from Sucheta Gawade, Microsoft MVP (Azure & Security / Intune), with deep experience in secure frontline mobility, including regulated healthcare environments. In previous articles in this series, we focused on understanding the reality of your frontline device estate and preparing for real-world testing through stakeholder alignment. One of the most critical areas to get right during the testing phase is identity and security, particularly given the often fast-paced, shift-based nature of frontline work, where organizations must account for the distinct requirements and challenges of devices assigned to a single individual versus devices shared across multiple users or shifts. Identity decisions directly affect security posture, sign‑in experience, operational support overhead, and worker productivity. Getting them wrong is one of the most common reasons pilots stall or fail. This article explores how to think about identity on frontline devices by distinguishing between assigned and shared usage models, clarifying when individual sign-in is required, and highlighting patterns to avoid such as shared accounts and passwords. Start by distinguishing device usage models Frontline mobile devices generally fall into one of two broad categories. Assigned devices Assigned devices are issued to a specific individual, often for the duration of their role. These devices: Typically require persistent access to user‑specific data Align with user‑based identity, Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access, and audit controls. Enable greater accountability and traceability by associating activity with an individual user rather than a shared credential. Common examples include: A doctor using an individually assigned clinical tablet, where uninterrupted access to patient data and clinical systems is essential and actions must always be attributable to a named identity A field engineer assigned a single device that retains configuration, credentials, and offline content across jobs and locations An inspector or supervisor using an assigned device for approvals, reporting, and decision‑making that requires traceability Shared devices Shared devices are used by multiple people across shifts or tasks. These scenarios introduce additional identity complexity and generally fall into two distinct models. Shared devices without user sign-in (task or kiosk-based) Some frontline devices exist to perform a narrow, often repetitive task and don’t require sign in with a user account. Typical examples include: Retail price-check devices used on the shop floor to scan an item and display its current price or stock availability, with no need for access to personal or user-specific information Environmental monitoring devices used to read and record temperature or humidity in a storage area, ward, or vehicle, where the task is simple, repetitive, and not tied to an individual user identity Warehouse or facility scanning devices used for a narrow operational task such as scanning an asset, bin, or location code to confirm status, location, or completion of a step in a process In these cases: Devices are locked down to a specific task No user-specific data is stored, and access is limited to the minimum required for the task “When a device is truly task-only, removing sign-in friction is a huge win, but only if we’re aware what data the device can access. When things like patient context or personalized tasks enter the picture, identity becomes required” - Sucheta Gawade, Microsoft MVP Shared devices with individual user sign-in Organizations are increasingly digitizing and modernizing frontline workflows end-to-end. Paper processes and simple apps give way to connected systems, manual handovers are replaced with digital task lists, and workers begin to rely on mobile devices as their primary interface from completing tasks. As roles evolve, workers are expected to: Receive tasks, schedules, and updates digitally Communicate with supervisors and peers using collaboration tools such as Microsoft Teams Capture information at the point of work rather than transcribing later Interact with workflows that are increasingly automated or assisted by AI, such as guided steps, data validation, or suggested actions This shift delivers clear productivity and quality benefits, but it also means access must now be tied to individual identity to protect sensitive data, support auditability, and prevent information from being carried over between users. Common scenarios include: Retail store associates rotating across shifts, moving from paper schedules and verbal handovers to digital task lists, real-time communications, and collaboration tools such as Microsoft Teams Nurses sharing mobile devices in a hospital ward, where paper notes and whiteboards are replaced with secure access to patient-linked applications, care coordination tools, and role-based alerts Logistics workers signing in to shared devices to complete role-based tasks, capture data at the point of work, and interact with AI-assisted workflows. Don’t use shared credentials, always prefer individual sign-in Shared credentials may seem like a shortcut in frontline environments, but they undermine accountability and make policy enforcement and incident response significantly harder. “Shared credentials feel ‘efficient’ until your first incident. You lose auditability, Conditional Access becomes meaningless, and investigations turn into guesswork. Individual identity is the only scalable model.” -Sucheta Gawade, Microsoft MVP If access involves corporate systems or sensitive data, each worker should use their individual credentials to sign in, even on a shared device. Identity decision checklist for frontline devices Use the checklist to validate identity choices and confirm that the overall security posture matches the way the device is used. Decision area Indicators Use individual sign-in Users access personal or role-specific data. Auditability or compliance is required. Conditional Access or multifactor authentication (MFA) must be enforced. Applications rely on user identity. Use kiosk-style or device-only identity Devices perform a single task. No user-specific or sensitive organizational data is accessed. Workflows are entirely device-centric. Speed and simplicity outweigh personalization. Avoid entirely Shared usernames or passwords. Reused local accounts across shifts. MFA exclusions that weaken security without compensating controls. Choosing the right sign‑in experience The challenge in frontline environments is balancing: Security requirements Speed of access Ease of use across shifts “Frontline setups may fail because the sign-in flow doesn’t match reality. If authentication takes 60 seconds and the worker has to do it 30 times a shift, they’ll find a workaround.” -Sucheta Gawade, Microsoft MVP Typing complex usernames and passwords repeatedly during a shift is often impractical on mobile devices. QR code authentication is one effective option for shared frontline devices, but it’s not the only supported approach. For other supported methods, see Microsoft Entra authentication methods overview. QR code authentication Microsoft Entra QR code authentication is designed for frontline workers to sign-in efficiently on shared Android and iOS/iPadOS devices without repeatedly entering usernames and passwords. Note: For individually assigned devices, phishing-resistant, passwordless authentication methods are the recommended approach, such as Passkeys. QR code authentication enables workers to sign in using a unique QR code and a personal numeric PIN. This approach: Eliminates typed usernames and passwords Preserves individual identity Works well for shared devices with frequent user turnover Integration with Microsoft Intune, Managed Home Screen and Conditional Access QR code authentication should always be: Scoped to specific users and devices Combined with Conditional Access policies Evaluated during real‑world testing to ensure the right balance of usability and security Security posture and Conditional Access for frontline devices Individual identity is a critical foundation for stronger security posture, but it’s not enough on its own. Frontline device security also depends on management, data and app protection, session handling, and access policies that reflect the actual usage model. Conditional Access is an important part of securing frontline environments, but its effectiveness depends on aligning policies to the actual device and identity model in use. To ensure that the QR code authentication method can only be used by the frontline workers it’s intended for, create a custom authentication methods policy, which you can use in a dedicated Conditional Access policy. That Conditional Access policy should then be scoped to the group of users (frontline workers) who should log on using the QR code authentication method, and have the Require authentication strength control configured, which targets the custom authentication strength for "QR Code" which was previously created. During real‑world testing: Validate that design and controls support the intended usage model Ensure policies don’t block legitimate workflows Confirm sessions, access, and user targeting behave as expected These decisions should also be validated in practice: can users sign in and out reliably across shifts, is personal data cleared between sessions, and does the chosen experience match the pace of frontline work? Summary This article walks through how identity choices shape security, usability, and day-to-day success for frontline mobile devices. It explains the difference between assigned and shared devices, when individual sign-in is needed, and why shared credentials can create risk. It also highlights QR code authentication and Conditional Access as practical ways to keep each worker’s identity protected while making sign-in simple enough for fast-paced frontline workflows. What’s next in the series In the next article, we’ll focus on Microsoft Intune enrollment models, exploring how different enrollment approaches support—or constrain—the identity and usage patterns discussed here, including their role in protecting session identity, enforcing the intended sign-in model, and preventing one user’s access or data from carrying over to the next. As always, we welcome your feedback and experience. If you’ve navigated identity decisions for shared or frontline devices, share your advice and lessons learned in the comments, or reach out to us on X @IntuneSuppTeam. For more guidance across frontline scenarios, explore our broader From the Frontlines series on frontline worker management with Microsoft Intune. Join our community! Discuss real-world scenarios, get expert guidance, connect with peers, and influence the future of Microsoft Security products. Learn more at aka.ms/JoinIntuneCommunity.
Allow Teams desktop on unmanaged Windows, but block Outlook desktop using Entra conditional access
I need to allow Teams to run on non Intuned devices but not allow Outlook desktop to be available I am looking for a solution for Windows and Mac and ideally linux as well The issue is Ig I have Office 365 Exchange Online as my resource, it blocks Microsoft Team Services as well How can I fix thisStrengthen your security posture with Microsoft Entra Conditional Access
Learn how Microsoft Entra Conditional Access, our Microsoft Zero Trust policy engine, protects access for your workforce and for agents by enforcing real‑time adaptive access policies that continuously assess risk signals and use AI‑driven automation to dynamically allow, challenge, or block access for every identity. Join Microsoft experts as they walk through real‑world scenarios and share practical guidance to help your identity team address policy sprawl, enforce consistent Conditional Access policies, and strengthen security posture across your environment. How do I participate? Registration is not required. Add this event to your calendar, then sign in to the Tech Community and select Attend to receive reminders. Post your questions in advance, or any time during the live broadcast. Note: This session was originally scheduled for June 8, 2026 and will now take place on June 24, 2026.
Why “Data in Switzerland” Is Not Enough
Moving from Residency to Control in Microsoft 365 Every conversation about data sovereignty in regulated industries tends to start the same way: “We use Multi-Geo. The data stays in Switzerland.” It’s the right starting point. Microsoft 365 Multi-Geo allows organizations to place selected workloads - SharePoint sites, OneDrive accounts, Teams data, or Exchange mailboxes - into specific regions, including Switzerland, while maintaining a single global tenant. This makes it possible to align sensitive data with regulatory or customer requirements without fragmenting the overall environment. But it only answers one question: Where is the data stored? It does not answer who accessed the data, from where, under which conditions, or what happened after access. That is where the real problem begins. A scenario that happens every day A Swiss engineering firm stores sensitive project documentation in Switzerland using Multi-Geo. An external contractor - working from an unmanaged device outside Switzerland - is granted access to review a file. The document opens. The data is now on a screen in an unknown location, on a device with no compliance posture, in a session with no restrictions. From the platform’s perspective, residency was enforced. From a sovereignty perspective, control was lost the moment access was granted without conditions. The file never left Switzerland. But sovereignty did. Residency is static. Control is not. The moment a document is opened, storage location stops being the relevant boundary. The file is no longer just “in Switzerland.” It moves instantly across endpoints and browsers, collaboration tools like Teams, external users and partners, and increasingly AI-driven contexts. The infrastructure remains unchanged. The data does not. From the platform’s perspective, everything is working as designed - access was granted, residency was enforced - and control was lost. Most “data in Switzerland” strategies fail at exactly this moment: when the data is used. The shift: from location to conditions If data sovereignty is the goal, the question must change. Not “Where is the data stored?” but: Under which conditions can data be accessed and used? This shift fundamentally changes the architecture. Control must be applied across three distinct layers - and all three must be connected. Layer 1: Access is conditional, not static Conditional Access extends control beyond authentication and turns it into continuous evaluation. Access decisions can depend on: Device compliance Location (geo-restriction) Identity and risk signals Multi-Geo ensures data is placed correctly. Conditional Access ensures it is reachable only under defined conditions. The two must work together - residency without access governance is an incomplete control. Layer 2: The session is the real risk surface Even with strict access controls, risk remains. A session is an exposure surface by design. During an active session, data is viewed, copied, shared, processed by applications, and connected to AI prompts. The gap does not appear at storage or authentication. It appears during active usage - inside the session. This is the layer most architectures do not explicitly address. Controls must extend into the session itself: limiting data transfer and replication, restricting interaction patterns, and enforcing policies in real time. Access is no longer a one-time event. It becomes continuously governed. This becomes even more critical as AI assistants consume content across SharePoint, Teams, Exchange, and other Microsoft 365 services. The question is no longer only where the source document resides - but whether the AI interaction itself is governed by the same access and protection controls as direct access. Layer 3: The document becomes the control point The most durable control does not sit in the network or in the session. It sits in the data itself. In regulated industries, organizations often arrive at this architecture having first evaluated sovereign or national encryption solutions. The decision to rely on native Microsoft 365 Purview encryption rather than a separate layer comes down to integration: AES-256 protection operating natively at file, user, and SharePoint level - including geo-based access restrictions - without an additional system to maintain. When protection is applied directly to the document through Microsoft Purview: Sensitivity labels define classification - automatically assigned based on content Encryption enforces access - AES-256, bound to the file itself IRM controls usage - view, copy, print, share, and presentation rights DLP governs movement across services - preventing data from leaving defined boundaries Dynamic watermarking tracks exposure - applied on open, view, or print At that point, access is enforced by the file, usage restrictions travel with it, and control persists regardless of location. The document becomes the perimeter. Platform control: limiting provider access One dimension often overlooked in sovereignty discussions is platform access itself. Even a perfectly configured tenant is only as sovereign as the controls placed on the operator. Customer Lockbox ensures that even Microsoft support cannot access customer data without explicit, logged, time-bound approval. Every access request is visible, auditable, and subject to customer veto. Data control applies not only to users - but also to the platform operating the service. Enforcement requires an integrated architecture Most organizations already have the required capabilities: Multi-Geo, Conditional Access, session control, Purview (labels, encryption, DLP, IRM), and monitoring. The issue is not capability. It is fragmentation. In practice, fragmentation looks like this: residency is configured in one project, Conditional Access policies are managed by a different team, and Purview labels were applied during a compliance initiative that never connected to the access layer. The tools exist. The signals do not flow between them. When designed as a single architecture: Data is placed intentionally - residency aligned to regulatory requirements Access is governed by context - device, location, and identity evaluated continuously Usage is controlled dynamically - session-level restrictions enforced in real time Protection is embedded in the document - encryption and IRM travel with the file Signals are connected across the platform - monitoring feeds access policy, not just audit logs “Data in Switzerland” becomes not just a statement - but an enforceable system property. Closing thought Placing data in Switzerland is the right first step. Multi-Geo makes it possible, even in global environments. But residency alone is not control. Data residency answers where information is stored. Data sovereignty requires proving who can access it, under which conditions, and what controls remain in place after access is granted. In Microsoft 365, sovereignty is no longer defined by geography alone. It is defined by the ability to enforce control wherever the data travels.Passkey Sign in Method (Entra Account) missing in Security
Hi Microsoft Support we enable FIDO2 passkey in entraId. However, when we try to register the FIDO2 passkey on myaccount.microsoft.com -> Security -> Add a Sign-in Method -> Passkey is missing. Attached screenshot. For a personal account, the Passkey method is available at the same location, even though interface is slightly different than an Entra Id account. Attached screenshot for the personal account as well. Kindly guide us on where to register the passkey or if we need to enable certain settings in EntraId for the passkey to show up in sign-in methods. We have Auth Strengths enabled in EntraId for the particular user in question and this reflects in the Device Lockscreen during login on Entra Registred Device. Thanks Chandra
Fido passkeys blocked by policy
Hi all I'm helping out a customer with deploying physical passkeys and I'm running into a weird error. I've activated the sign in method and selected the two AAGuids for the Authenticator app and I've added the right AAGuid for the brand and model of passkey we are using. We can select the authentication method and enroll the security correctly but when trying to sign in using it we get the error as displayed in the attached picture. When checking the sign in logs i get this error message FIDO sign-in is disabled via policy and the error code is: 135016 I've not been able to track down any policy that would be blocking passkeys. anyone got any ideas?
