Disallow O365 access from 'outside' of the Android for Work work profile?
Is there a way to block Android for Work users to connect to Office 365 with apps that are installed outside of the work profile? For example on my Android for Work capable device I have a work profile with eg. Outlook, which I can use to read my mail. However, i'm also able to use the Outlook app in my personal space to connect to Office 365, I was kinda expecting to only be able to connect to Office 365 from my work profile (?)Unexpected button behaviour when using the prompt=create parameter in Entra External ID user flows
Hi, In a recent workload, I'm assisting a client to implement Entra External ID for streamlined authorization as well as single sign-on for associated registered external facing third-party applications for external customer users through their Entra External ID identity, as well as assisting the client with auth branding and other UI customizations, and preparing Entra ID federation custom OIDC providers and configuration for enabling SSO with organizational internal and remote work- and school accounts etc. The sign-up / create account experience is of importance to the client, as a rather substantial amount of users are expected to sign-up via self-service sign-up following having received an invite via another app. To ensure that the user lands on the create account view, in order to minimize the number of steps and actions the users need to take to get there, the prompt=create parameter is used to pre-select the sign-up/register experience in the user flows UI. Having stress-tested the user flows and experience recently, we noticed that in a specific scenario, some UI elements behave in a manner that could be described as unexpected, and even though a workaround has mitigated it to some extent, the behaviour of some elements could probably be improved a bit to ensure an even more consistent user experience in the built-in user flows. Specifically, if the user flow is invoked with the prompt parameter set, the user lands on the create account screen as expected, however, unless custom CSS modification is applied, the Back button that would typically be there, as if having arrived there from the initial sign-in screen where it’s also displayed. If pressing the Back button displayed on the Create account view when having navigated there with the prompt=create set in the /authorize request, pressing the button seemingly doesn’t have any impact or result in any action, one can click it, but nothing happens. I'd suspect it's perhaps a "remnant" from if the flow is invoked without any prompt parameter set, or with prompt=login set, but when prompt=create is set, there is no state/page history in the UI to navigate back to, as no previous page has been displayed or rendered yet and added to the history, and the Back button click thus doesn’t have any effect. In general, I think buttons that don't have any tangible action should not be displayed, also, if prompt=login is set, the Back button isn't shown then either on the very initial user flow view shown then, so it would seem the built-in user flows actually already follow such approach in fact, but not when the prompt=create has been set, thus causing some inconsistency in the UI that users could notice unless custom CSS styling is applied. The expected behaviour for our business case would be that if prompt=create is set, then, similar to the prompt=login, no Back button should be displayed, or, if shown, it should result in some navigation (perhaps something like javascript.go(-1), but that could/would be dependent on from where the user arrived, e.g., going back a step in the browser history won't work if the user clicked a link from an invite email ) and preferably not be non-actionable. Furthermore, on the topic of the Back button and its behaviour when the prompt=create parameter is set, there is another case at which we observed some unexpected button behaviour as well, that could probably benefit from some attention. At a specific second scenario, it seems that the Continue button is displayed without providing any action, and when clicking the Back button then, clicking it seemingly resets the "create account", state likely set by the prompt=create initially, and instead switches the flow back to the sign-in state, which can at least affect the display text of some subsequent buttons shown in later steps in the UI. The user arrives at a built-in Entra External ID user flow /authorize endpoint, with the prompt=create query parameter set The user triggers the OTP challenge by entering an email address to verify the email address The user receives the OTP code but enters it incorrectly, i.e., doesn't copy the full code length of eight digits, and instead enters/pastes six of the eight code digits. The UI then shows an error message that the code could not be used/validated, and the email address field is displayed again with the email address that was used for the verification attempt prefilled. If the user clicks the Continue button at this stage, nothing happens. If the user clicks the Back button instead (given that it’s not hidden), it shows the same view one more time, with the Back and Continue buttons at the bottom. However, if the user clicks the Continue button this time, it works and a new code is sent. On the next screen, where the newly sent code can be entered, instead of a button named "Continue", it will now instead show a button with the text "Sign-in" (it would seem like the create account state has gotten lost somewhere along the way at this point, perhaps when the back button in the step 5 above was pressed). If one omits the prompt=create parameter, or when using prompt=login, things seem to work fine, the above occurs when the prompt=create is set. The reason why is the prompt=create is used is due to a business requirement to try to minimize the steps, especially in conjunction with the registration/sign-up, as far a possible when signing up. We have opted for the built-in user flows, not the self-hosted native authentication UI pages, for this project, and then as I understand it, it is the prompt=create parameter that can/should be used to enable the user to land directly on the registration page without having to navigate there manually via the sign-up link, that is otherwise shown on the initial sign-in page. It would thus be great if the prompt=create parameter could have some attention (or perhaps if a dedicated sign-up user flow type could be added potentially, even though that would perhaps warrant some update to the user flow app linking as well, as my understanding is that one user flow can be linked to one app registration at a time currently) to avoid that some buttons become unresponsive when the parameter is used, or falls back to sign-in, to improve the built-in user flows further, as the prompt=create fulfils the business requirement well otherwise. If there would be any further/follow-up questions on the above, e.g., to clarify the requirement, or further explain the reproduction steps and behaviour observed, or anything else, please tell, and I'll ensure to get back as soon as possible. Also, would someone have some input on potential other/additional ways to pre-select the create account/sign-up experience, that would naturally be much appreciated as well, thanks! Regards KristofferAuthentication Context (Entra ID) Use case
Microsoft Entra ID has evolved rapidly over the last few years, with Microsoft continuously introducing new identity, access, and security capabilities as part of the broader Zero Trust strategy. While many organizations hold the necessary Entra ID and Microsoft 365 licenses (often through E3 or E5 bundles), a number of these advanced features remain under‑utilised or entirely unused. This is frequently due to limited awareness, overlapping capabilities or uncertainty about where and how these features provide real architectural value. One such capability which is not frequently used is Authentication Context. Although this feature is available for quite some time, it is often misunderstood or overlooked because it does not behave like traditional Conditional Access controls. Consider Authentication Context as a mobile “assurance tag” that connects a resource (or a particular access route to that resource) to one or several Conditional Access (CA) policies, allowing security measures to be enforced with resource-specific accuracy instead of broad, application-wide controls. Put simply, it permits step-up authentication only when users access sensitive information or perform critical actions, while maintaining a smooth experience for the “regular path.” When used intentionally, it enables resource‑level and scenario‑driven access control, allowing organizations to apply stronger authentication only where it is actually needed without increasing friction across the entire user experience. Not expensive Most importantly to use Authentication Context the minimum licensing requirement is Microsoft Entra ID Premium P1 which most customers already have this license. so you not need to convenience for higher license to utilize this feature. But do note Entra Premium 2 is needed if your Conditional Access policy uses advanced signals, such as: User or sign‑in risk (Identity Protection) Privileged Identity Management (PIM) protected roles Risk‑based Conditional Access policies The Workflow Architecturally, Authentication Context works when a claims request is made as part of token issuance commonly expressed via the acrs claim. When the request includes a specific context (for example c1), Entra evaluates CA policies that target that context and forces the required controls (MFA, device compliance, trusted location, etc.). The important constraint: the context must be requested/triggered by a supported workload (e.g., SharePoint) or by an application designed to request the claim; it is not an automatic “detect any action inside any app” feature. Lets look at few high level architecture reference 1. Define “assurance tiers” as contexts Create a small set of contexts (e.g., c1: Confidential Access, c2: Privileged Operations) and publish them for use by supported apps/services. 2. Bind contexts to resources Assign the context to the resource boundary you want to protect—most commonly SharePoint sites (directly or via sensitivity labels), so only those sites trigger the context. (e.g - Specific SharePoint sites like financials, agreements etc ) 3. Attach Conditional Access policies to the context Create CA policies that target the context and define enforcement requirements (Additional MFA strength, mandating device compliance, or location constraint through named locations etc.). The context is the “switch” that activates those policies at the right moment. 4. Validate runtime behavior and app compatibility Because authentication context can impact some client apps and flows, validate supported clients and known limitations (especially for SharePoint/OneDrive/Teams integrations). Some Practical Business Scenarios Scenario A — Confidential SharePoint Sites (M&A / Legal / HR) Problem: You want stronger controls for a subset of SharePoint sites without forcing those controls for all SharePoint access. Architect pattern: Tag the confidential site(s) with Authentication Context and apply a CA policy requiring stronger auth (e.g., compliant device + MFA) for that context. Pre-reqs: SharePoint Online support for authentication context; appropriate licensing and admin permissions; CA policies targeted to the context Scenario B — “Step-up” Inside a Custom Line-of-Business App Problem: Users can access the app normally, but certain operations (approval, export, privileged view) need elevated assurance. Architect pattern: Build the app on OpenID Connect/OAuth2 and explicitly request the authentication context (via acrs) when the user reaches the sensitive path; CA then enforces step-up. Pre-reqs: App integrated with Microsoft identity platform using OIDC/OAuth2; the app can trigger claims requests/handle claim challenges where applicable; CA policies defined for the context Scenario C — Granular “Resource-based” Zero Trust Without Blanket MFA Problem: Security wants strong controls on crown jewels, but business wants minimal prompts for routine work. Architect pattern: Use authentication context to enforce higher assurance only for protected resources (e.g., sensitive SharePoint sites). This provides least privilege at the resource boundary while reducing global friction. Pre-reqs: Clearly defined resource classification; authentication context configured and published; CA policies and monitoring. In a nutshell, Authentication Context allows organizations to move beyond broad, one‑size‑fits‑all Conditional Access policies and adopt a more precise, resource‑driven security model. By using it to link sensitive resources or protected access paths to stronger authentication requirements, organizations can improve security outcomes while minimizing unnecessary user friction. When applied deliberately and aligned to business‑critical assets, Authentication Context helps close the gap between licensing capability and real‑world value—turning underused Entra ID features into practical, scalable Zero Trust controls. If you find this useful, please do not forget to like and add your thoughts 🙂
Can the built-in "No account? Create one" link redirect to a custom sign-up page?
I'm using Microsoft Entra External ID with a built-in sign-in/sign-up user flow. On the Microsoft-hosted sign-in page, the "No account? Create one" link always redirects users to the default Entra sign-up page. I already have a custom registration page and would like this built-in link to redirect to my custom URL instead. Is there any supported way to customize the destination of this link in a built-in user flow? If not, could someone confirm whether this behavior is fixed by design? Thanks!
Windows App Application Protection Policy
I have been testing out an Intune MAM policy to restrict copy/paste and drive redirection to AVD session hosts based on the link here: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-app/require-device-security-compliance-intune?tabs=web#related-contentHowever, I've run into problems (in two separate tenants) that have halted me from being able to test. Setup Intune App Protection Policy targeting Windows Devices & Microsoft Edge\ Conditional Access Policy enforcing App Protection Policy when users access 'Azure Virtual Desktop' target resource via https://windows.cloud.microsoft.com Results First When signing into a user account targeted by the policy, they are prompted to Switch Edge Profile which signs in the user to a new Edge profile for 'Work or School Account'. The account has to sign in again. The account can access Windows App resources When launching a desktop session, this authentication page pops up for an account "local@debugonly" Second When signing into a user account targeted by the policy, they are prompted to Switch Edge Profile which signs in the user to a new Edge profile for 'Work or School Account'. The account has to sign in again. After sign in, the account loops with 'Switch Edge Profile' and gets stuck here I'm curious if anyone has gotten this to work and what was your setup? Or if Microsoft or provide some assistance or if this is in the wrong forum, any help would be appreciated.
Android Fully Managed devices treated as personal after AD password change
Hello! We have a huge problem... We have recently observed an issue in our organization affecting Android Fully Managed devices. After users change their domain password, within 1–3 days Conditional Access starts blocking access to Outlook and Teams. The system appears to treat the device as non-corporate, even though in Intune the device is still present, marked as corporate, and fully functional. It synchronizes both manually and automatically, and remote actions can be executed without any issues. However, when users open Outlook or Teams, they receive messages such as “We need to secure your device” and “Install the Intune app from Google Play,” which does not make sense because Intune is already installed on the device. When opening the Intune app, users see a “Update your password” prompt. After selecting it, they are redirected to a device registration screen. Previously, it was sometimes possible to complete this process (although we did not understand why it was required), but recently re-registration consistently fails. The user clicks “Register,” and the process spins indefinitely without completing. This issue is very difficult to troubleshoot. Device logs are not particularly helpful, and all users have Microsoft Authenticator configured. The problem appears randomly across users with no clear pattern—some devices were enrolled over a year ago, others just a month ago. The only clue we have found so far points to a potential issue with the broker authentication token, but we do not know how to verify or resolve this, nor why it is happening in the first place. We have been experiencing this issue since around January this year, but we noticed a significant increase in cases this month. In addition, there are more and more devices that can no longer be re‑registered from within the Intune app. Has anyone encountered a similar issue or can provide guidance on how to investigate or fix this?
Allow Teams desktop on unmanaged Windows, but block Outlook desktop using Entra conditional access
I need to allow Teams to run on non Intuned devices but not allow Outlook desktop to be available I am looking for a solution for Windows and Mac and ideally linux as well The issue is Ig I have Office 365 Exchange Online as my resource, it blocks Microsoft Team Services as well How can I fix thisOrphaned TPM-bound Entra Workplace Join device — no tenant access, backend deletion required
I have a personal Windows device that remains stuck in a TPM-protected Workplace Join to a former Microsoft Entra ID tenant. I no longer have tenant access and am not an admin. Local remediation completed: - dsregcmd /leave executed as SYSTEM - All MS-Organization / AAD certificates removed - Device still reports WorkplaceJoined : YES Azure Support ticket creation fails with: AADSTS160021 – interaction_required Application requested a user session which does not exist. Tenant inaccessible / user not present in tenant. This is an orphaned Entra ID device object. Requesting guidance or escalation for backend deletion. Tenant ID: 99f9b903-8447-4711-a2df-c5bd1ad1adf7 Device ID: f47987f4-a20b-4c34-a5f7-40ab0f593c6c
MFA Options for Employees without Phones
Hello everbody, we're currently trying to implement MFA in our company, but approximately 1/10 of our employees have a workphone and are not allowed to use their personal phone. Since we also recently introduced Intune, the idea was to just use Windows Hello for Business, but when trying to provision it, we realized that you need to have MFA active for an account to be able to even activate it? Which kinda defeats the purpose. So my question is, is there some way to circumvent the MFA requirement for WHfB? Or what other options do we realistically have? Thanks in Advance!Migrating frontline mobile devices: Identity considerations for assigned and shared devices
By: Carol Burns - Principal Product Manager | Microsoft Intune and Sucheta Gawade, Microsoft MVP (Azure & Security / Intune) Practitioner perspective from Sucheta Gawade, Microsoft MVP (Azure & Security / Intune), with deep experience in secure frontline mobility, including regulated healthcare environments. In previous articles in this series, we focused on understanding the reality of your frontline device estate and preparing for real-world testing through stakeholder alignment. One of the most critical areas to get right during the testing phase is identity and security, particularly given the often fast-paced, shift-based nature of frontline work, where organizations must account for the distinct requirements and challenges of devices assigned to a single individual versus devices shared across multiple users or shifts. Identity decisions directly affect security posture, sign‑in experience, operational support overhead, and worker productivity. Getting them wrong is one of the most common reasons pilots stall or fail. This article explores how to think about identity on frontline devices by distinguishing between assigned and shared usage models, clarifying when individual sign-in is required, and highlighting patterns to avoid such as shared accounts and passwords. Start by distinguishing device usage models Frontline mobile devices generally fall into one of two broad categories. Assigned devices Assigned devices are issued to a specific individual, often for the duration of their role. These devices: Typically require persistent access to user‑specific data Align with user‑based identity, Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access, and audit controls. Enable greater accountability and traceability by associating activity with an individual user rather than a shared credential. Common examples include: A doctor using an individually assigned clinical tablet, where uninterrupted access to patient data and clinical systems is essential and actions must always be attributable to a named identity A field engineer assigned a single device that retains configuration, credentials, and offline content across jobs and locations An inspector or supervisor using an assigned device for approvals, reporting, and decision‑making that requires traceability Shared devices Shared devices are used by multiple people across shifts or tasks. These scenarios introduce additional identity complexity and generally fall into two distinct models. Shared devices without user sign-in (task or kiosk-based) Some frontline devices exist to perform a narrow, often repetitive task and don’t require sign in with a user account. Typical examples include: Retail price-check devices used on the shop floor to scan an item and display its current price or stock availability, with no need for access to personal or user-specific information Environmental monitoring devices used to read and record temperature or humidity in a storage area, ward, or vehicle, where the task is simple, repetitive, and not tied to an individual user identity Warehouse or facility scanning devices used for a narrow operational task such as scanning an asset, bin, or location code to confirm status, location, or completion of a step in a process In these cases: Devices are locked down to a specific task No user-specific data is stored, and access is limited to the minimum required for the task “When a device is truly task-only, removing sign-in friction is a huge win, but only if we’re aware what data the device can access. When things like patient context or personalized tasks enter the picture, identity becomes required” - Sucheta Gawade, Microsoft MVP Shared devices with individual user sign-in Organizations are increasingly digitizing and modernizing frontline workflows end-to-end. Paper processes and simple apps give way to connected systems, manual handovers are replaced with digital task lists, and workers begin to rely on mobile devices as their primary interface from completing tasks. As roles evolve, workers are expected to: Receive tasks, schedules, and updates digitally Communicate with supervisors and peers using collaboration tools such as Microsoft Teams Capture information at the point of work rather than transcribing later Interact with workflows that are increasingly automated or assisted by AI, such as guided steps, data validation, or suggested actions This shift delivers clear productivity and quality benefits, but it also means access must now be tied to individual identity to protect sensitive data, support auditability, and prevent information from being carried over between users. Common scenarios include: Retail store associates rotating across shifts, moving from paper schedules and verbal handovers to digital task lists, real-time communications, and collaboration tools such as Microsoft Teams Nurses sharing mobile devices in a hospital ward, where paper notes and whiteboards are replaced with secure access to patient-linked applications, care coordination tools, and role-based alerts Logistics workers signing in to shared devices to complete role-based tasks, capture data at the point of work, and interact with AI-assisted workflows. Don’t use shared credentials, always prefer individual sign-in Shared credentials may seem like a shortcut in frontline environments, but they undermine accountability and make policy enforcement and incident response significantly harder. “Shared credentials feel ‘efficient’ until your first incident. You lose auditability, Conditional Access becomes meaningless, and investigations turn into guesswork. Individual identity is the only scalable model.” -Sucheta Gawade, Microsoft MVP If access involves corporate systems or sensitive data, each worker should use their individual credentials to sign in, even on a shared device. Identity decision checklist for frontline devices Use the checklist to validate identity choices and confirm that the overall security posture matches the way the device is used. Decision area Indicators Use individual sign-in Users access personal or role-specific data. Auditability or compliance is required. Conditional Access or multifactor authentication (MFA) must be enforced. Applications rely on user identity. Use kiosk-style or device-only identity Devices perform a single task. No user-specific or sensitive organizational data is accessed. Workflows are entirely device-centric. Speed and simplicity outweigh personalization. Avoid entirely Shared usernames or passwords. Reused local accounts across shifts. MFA exclusions that weaken security without compensating controls. Choosing the right sign‑in experience The challenge in frontline environments is balancing: Security requirements Speed of access Ease of use across shifts “Frontline setups may fail because the sign-in flow doesn’t match reality. If authentication takes 60 seconds and the worker has to do it 30 times a shift, they’ll find a workaround.” -Sucheta Gawade, Microsoft MVP Typing complex usernames and passwords repeatedly during a shift is often impractical on mobile devices. QR code authentication is one effective option for shared frontline devices, but it’s not the only supported approach. For other supported methods, see Microsoft Entra authentication methods overview. QR code authentication Microsoft Entra QR code authentication is designed for frontline workers to sign-in efficiently on shared Android and iOS/iPadOS devices without repeatedly entering usernames and passwords. Note: For individually assigned devices, phishing-resistant, passwordless authentication methods are the recommended approach, such as Passkeys. QR code authentication enables workers to sign in using a unique QR code and a personal numeric PIN. This approach: Eliminates typed usernames and passwords Preserves individual identity Works well for shared devices with frequent user turnover Integration with Microsoft Intune, Managed Home Screen and Conditional Access QR code authentication should always be: Scoped to specific users and devices Combined with Conditional Access policies Evaluated during real‑world testing to ensure the right balance of usability and security Security posture and Conditional Access for frontline devices Individual identity is a critical foundation for stronger security posture, but it’s not enough on its own. Frontline device security also depends on management, data and app protection, session handling, and access policies that reflect the actual usage model. Conditional Access is an important part of securing frontline environments, but its effectiveness depends on aligning policies to the actual device and identity model in use. To ensure that the QR code authentication method can only be used by the frontline workers it’s intended for, create a custom authentication methods policy, which you can use in a dedicated Conditional Access policy. That Conditional Access policy should then be scoped to the group of users (frontline workers) who should log on using the QR code authentication method, and have the Require authentication strength control configured, which targets the custom authentication strength for "QR Code" which was previously created. During real‑world testing: Validate that design and controls support the intended usage model Ensure policies don’t block legitimate workflows Confirm sessions, access, and user targeting behave as expected These decisions should also be validated in practice: can users sign in and out reliably across shifts, is personal data cleared between sessions, and does the chosen experience match the pace of frontline work? Summary This article walks through how identity choices shape security, usability, and day-to-day success for frontline mobile devices. It explains the difference between assigned and shared devices, when individual sign-in is needed, and why shared credentials can create risk. It also highlights QR code authentication and Conditional Access as practical ways to keep each worker’s identity protected while making sign-in simple enough for fast-paced frontline workflows. What’s next in the series In the next article, we’ll focus on Microsoft Intune enrollment models, exploring how different enrollment approaches support—or constrain—the identity and usage patterns discussed here, including their role in protecting session identity, enforcing the intended sign-in model, and preventing one user’s access or data from carrying over to the next. As always, we welcome your feedback and experience. If you’ve navigated identity decisions for shared or frontline devices, share your advice and lessons learned in the comments, or reach out to us on X @IntuneSuppTeam. For more guidance across frontline scenarios, explore our broader From the Frontlines series on frontline worker management with Microsoft Intune. Join our community! Discuss real-world scenarios, get expert guidance, connect with peers, and influence the future of Microsoft Security products. Learn more at aka.ms/JoinIntuneCommunity.
