Free Webinar: Microsoft Entra ID Break-Glass Accounts Done Right (Live Demo + Q&A)
Hi everyone, I’m hosting a free community webinar focused on one of the most common (and painful) Entra ID issues: tenant lockouts caused by break-glass account misconfiguration. This session is practical and demo-driven, and I’ll cover real-world scenarios I’ve seen involving Conditional Access and emergency access design. What we’ll cover Why every tenant should have at least two break-glass accounts Common misconfigurations that lead to lockouts Conditional Access exclusions: what works and what fails Recommended hardening approach (without blocking emergency access) Monitoring + alerting best practices Live demo + Q&A Who it’s for Microsoft 365 admins Entra ID / Conditional Access admins Security engineers MSP engineers The recording will be shared with registrants after the session. Registration link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3ameeting_MjkwYzExNzItMzY4OC00NThmLTg2ZDYtM2ExMTRiNWYwMGZl%40thread.v2/0?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%224bb6dd74-2dd1-459b-b867-f51781e1e7ed%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%2251c6a848-6393-44f9-bac5-21855d5c7c3d%22%7d Thanks! Jaspreet Singh
Orphaned TPM-bound Entra Workplace Join device — no tenant access, backend deletion required
I have a personal Windows device that remains stuck in a TPM-protected Workplace Join to a former Microsoft Entra ID tenant. I no longer have tenant access and am not an admin. Local remediation completed: - dsregcmd /leave executed as SYSTEM - All MS-Organization / AAD certificates removed - Device still reports WorkplaceJoined : YES Azure Support ticket creation fails with: AADSTS160021 – interaction_required Application requested a user session which does not exist. Tenant inaccessible / user not present in tenant. This is an orphaned Entra ID device object. Requesting guidance or escalation for backend deletion. Tenant ID: 99f9b903-8447-4711-a2df-c5bd1ad1adf7 Device ID: f47987f4-a20b-4c34-a5f7-40ab0f593c6c
Entra Enterprise apps and App registrations - Global Secure Access - Conditional Access Block
I am working on a rollout for Global Secure Access and ran into an issue with Entra Enterprise apps setup in the tenant. With Global Secure Access I have a Conditional Access Policy set to Block access to All Resources excluding some resources like Intune and Defender tap required for mobile setup. When I added an administrator account which had done some Enterprise application setup and authorization for various third-party applications, those third-party applications stopped working with failed logins indicating token access issues. Upon review I found the majority of applications to be using client secret authentication with this administrator account as the authorizer. My limited knowledge of Enterprise apps leads me to believe this client secret is an application password that the third-party uses to keep generating tokens based on the authorizing account. My questions surrounding this setup and further understanding are mainly in relation to how Enterprise apps and app registrations authenticate, as well as user authentication directly. 1. How does the token authorization work? Does the application just use the client secret to authenticate as the user who authorized it to generate an access token? Why does MFA requirements and changing passwords not affect this but specific Block policy does? 2. What are best practices in relation to authorizing third-party applications? My thoughts are a dedicated account to authorize applications when needed. 3. How will this work with applications regular users use? Say a user has a digital notebook that syncs with their OneNote or a calendar app that syncs calendars between Outlook and their website. Do these applications also use client secrets with the user's token and will break when added to the GSA setup I have? Is the only way around this to authorize with an admin account for token issuance? Thank you for your time reading this and any insight you may have for any of the questions or ideas mentioned.
Fido passkeys blocked by policy
Hi all I'm helping out a customer with deploying physical passkeys and I'm running into a weird error. I've activated the sign in method and selected the two AAGuids for the Authenticator app and I've added the right AAGuid for the brand and model of passkey we are using. We can select the authentication method and enroll the security correctly but when trying to sign in using it we get the error as displayed in the attached picture. When checking the sign in logs i get this error message FIDO sign-in is disabled via policy and the error code is: 135016 I've not been able to track down any policy that would be blocking passkeys. anyone got any ideas?How to Seamless Transition from Local Active Directory to Microsoft Intune?
Our organization currently operates with a Local Active Directory (AD) setup, using Azure AD Connect to sync directories with Azure Entra. All organizational devices are domain-joined and managed via Local AD. We are planning to transition device management to Microsoft Intune while ensuring a seamless process with no user intervention and no loss of user data. What are the industry best practices for achieving this transition?Microsoft Graph Command Line Tools Blocked by CA
Hi All I hope you are well. Anyway, I recently turned ON a Conditional Access Policy Template, "Require MDM-enrolled and compliant device to access cloud apps for all users (Preview)" this seems to work fine until our IT Admins try to use the AutoPilot script which gets blocked based on: Microsoft Graph Command Line Tools Any ideas on how to allow AutoPilot / Microsoft Graph Command Line Tools through CA? Info appreciatedGrant Just-in-Time Admin Access with Microsoft Entra PIM
In my lab, I worked with Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) to grant Just-in-Time admin access. Instead of permanent assignments, users become eligible for roles and must activate them only when needed. Steps I tested: - Configured roles as eligible rather than permanent - Required MFA and approval for role activation - Verified access automatically expired after the time window This approach reduces standing privileges and aligns with Zero Trust by securing privileged access. Curious — does your org still keep permanent Global Admins, or have you moved to JIT with PIM?
Conflict status after having 2 Local user group membership Policy
Hello, I have an issue with applying two "Local User Group Membership" policies on a PC. The Intune policy report shows a conflict between having two "Local User Group Membership" policies despite having different configurations. For example, one is a Global Policy, which applies an admin privilege to all PCs, and the other one is more specific to a certain group, and it is just about giving remote access to the PCs on this group. So, my question is, why does Intune mark these two policies as a conflict of each other? If it is not possible to have two "Local User Group Membership" policies applying to the PC. Is there a way to have a global policy for admin users on the PC and one more private policy for remote user access using "Local User Group Membership"?
From “No” to “Now”: A 7-Layer Strategy for Enterprise AI Safety
The “block” posture on Generative AI has failed. In a global enterprise, banning these tools doesn't stop usage; it simply pushes intellectual property into unmanaged channels and creates a massive visibility gap in corporate telemetry. The priority has now shifted from stopping AI to hardening the environment so that innovation can run at velocity without compromising data sovereignty. Traditional security perimeters are ineffective against the “slow bleed” of AI leakage - where data moves through prompts, clipboards, and autonomous agents rather than bulk file transfers. To secure this environment, a 7-layer defense-in-depth model is required to treat the conversation itself as the new perimeter. 1. Identity: The Only Verifiable Perimeter Identity is the primary control plane. Access to AI services must be treated with the same rigor as administrative access to core infrastructure. The strategy centers on enforcing device-bound Conditional Access, where access is strictly contingent on device health. To solve the "Account Leak" problem, the deployment of Tenant Restrictions v2 (TRv2) is essential to prevent users from signing into personal tenants using corporate-managed devices. For enhanced coverage, Universal Tenant Restrictions (UTR) via Global Secure Access (GSA) allows for consistent enforcement at the cloud edge. While TRv2 authentication-plane is GA, data-plane protection is GA for the Microsoft 365 admin center and remains in preview for other workloads such as SharePoint and Teams. 2. Eliminating the Visibility Gap (Shadow AI) You can’t secure what you can't see. Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps (MDCA) serves to discover and govern the enterprise AI footprint, while Purview DSPM for AI (formerly AI Hub) monitors Copilot and third-party interactions. By categorizing tools using MDCA risk scores and compliance attributes, organizations can apply automated sanctioning decisions and enforce session controls for high-risk endpoints. 3. Data Hygiene: Hardening the “Work IQ” AI acts as a mirror of internal permissions. In a "flat" environment, AI acts like a search engine for your over-shared data. Hardening the foundation requires automated sensitivity labeling in Purview Information Protection. Identifying PII and proprietary code before assigning AI licenses ensures that labels travel with the data, preventing labeled content from being exfiltrated via prompts or unauthorized sharing. 4. Session Governance: Solving the “Clipboard Leak” The most common leak in 2025 is not a file upload; it’s a simple copy-paste action or a USB transfer. Deploying Conditional Access App Control (CAAC) via MDCA session policies allows sanctioned apps to function while specifically blocking cut/copy/paste. This is complemented by Endpoint DLP, which extends governance to the physical device level, preventing sensitive data from being moved to unmanaged USB storage or printers during an AI-assisted workflow. Purview Information Protection with IRM rounds this out by enforcing encryption and usage rights on the files themselves. When a user tries to print a "Do Not Print" document, Purview triggers an alert that flows into Microsoft Sentinel. This gives the SOC visibility into actual policy violations instead of them having to hunt through generic activity logs. 5. The “Agentic” Era: Agent 365 & Sharing Controls Now that we're moving from "Chat" to "Agents", Agent 365 and Entra Agent ID provide the necessary identity and control plane for autonomous entities. A quick tip: in large-scale tenants, default settings often present a governance risk. A critical first step is navigating to the Microsoft 365 admin center (Copilot > Agents) to disable the default “Anyone in organization” sharing option. Restricting agent creation and sharing to a validated security group is essential to prevent unvetted agent sprawl and ensure that only compliant agents are discoverable. 6. The Human Layer: “Safe Harbors” over Bans Security fails when it creates more friction than the risk it seeks to mitigate. Instead of an outright ban, investment in AI skilling-teaching users context minimization (redacting specifics before interacting with a model) - is the better path. Providing a sanctioned, enterprise-grade "Safe Harbor" like M365 Copilot offers a superior tool that naturally cuts down the use of Shadow AI. 7. Continuous Ops: Monitoring & Regulatory Audit Security is not a “set and forget” project, particularly with the EU AI Act on the horizon. Correlating AI interactions and DLP alerts in Microsoft Sentinel using Purview Audit (specifically the CopilotInteraction logs) data allows for real-time responses. Automated SOAR playbooks can then trigger protective actions - such as revoking an Agent ID - if an entity attempts to access sensitive HR or financial data. Final Thoughts Securing AI at scale is an architectural shift. By layering Identity, Session Governance, and Agentic Identity, AI moves from being a fragmented risk to a governed tool that actually works for the modern workplace.
