Azure WAF custom rules for PHP2Shell mitigation
Written in collaboration with Gunjan Jain and yuvalpery As described in our earlier blog, Addressing PHP2Shell CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619: upgrade guidance and Azure WAF mitigations, we strongly recommend upgrading to a patched version of PHP as soon as possible. Upgrading PHP remains the recommended and complete remediation for these vulnerabilities. For customers who are unable to upgrade immediately, this guidance provides WAF custom rules that can help reduce exposure to selected request patterns associated with exploitation techniques for these vulnerabilities. WAF custom rules The following three custom rules can be considered based on your application configuration and traffic patterns. Because custom rules can affect legitimate application traffic, review the potential application impact and validate the rules before enabling enforcement. Restrict PHP session upload progress PHP supports session upload progress for tracking file uploads. For applications that do not depend on this functionality, customers can use a custom rule to restrict multipart form requests containing PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS. The rule checks for multipart/form-data requests whose inspected request body contains the PHP session upload progress token. Custom rule definitions: Azure Front Door WAF { "name": "BlockPhpSessionUploadProgress", "priority": 100, "enabledState": "Enabled", "ruleType": "MatchRule", "action": "Block", "matchConditions": [ { "matchVariable": "RequestHeader", "selector": "Content-Type", "operator": "Contains", "negateCondition": false, "transforms": ["Lowercase"], "matchValue": ["multipart/form-data"] }, { "matchVariable": "RequestBody", "operator": "Contains", "negateCondition": false, "matchValue": ["php_session_upload_progress"], "transforms": ["Lowercase"] } ] } Application Gateway and Application Gateway for Container (AGC) WAF { "name": "BlockPhpSessionUploadProgress", "priority": 90, "ruleType": "MatchRule", "action": "Block", "state": "Enabled", "matchConditions": [ { "matchVariables": [ { "variableName": "RequestHeaders", "selector": "Content-Type" } ], "operator": "Contains", "negationConditon": false, "matchValues": [ "multipart/form-data" ], "transforms": [ "Lowercase" ] }, { "matchVariables": [ { "variableName": "PostArgs" } ], "operator": "Contains", "negationConditon": false, "matchValues": [ "php_session_upload_progress" ], "transforms": [ "Lowercase" ] } ] } This rule reduces exposure through the PHP session-upload-progress path but does not address all exploitation paths associated with the vulnerabilities. Potential application impact: Applications that legitimately use PHP session upload progress will also match this rule. A substring match may also detect the token when it appears as harmless text or in uploaded content exposed to inspection. Limit deeply nested form parameters Customers can use a custom rule to identify unusually deep parameter nesting in application/x-www-form-urlencoded requests. The proposed rule detects request field names containing 20 or more levels of bracket nesting after URL decoding. Because the 20-level threshold is an application policy choice rather than a vulnerability-defined boundary, legitimate applications using deeply nested parameters may also match this rule. Custom rule definitions: Azure Front Door WAF: { "name": "PhpFormNesting20", "priority": 110, "enabledState": "Enabled", "ruleType": "MatchRule", "action": "Log", "matchConditions": [ { "matchVariable": "RequestHeader", "selector": "Content-Type", "operator": "BeginsWith", "negateCondition": false, "transforms": [ "Trim", "Lowercase" ], "matchValue": [ "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" ] }, { "matchVariable": "RequestBody", "operator": "RegEx", "negateCondition": false, "transforms": [ "UrlDecode" ], "matchValue": [ "(?:^|&)[^&=\\[]+(?:\\[[^&=\\]]*\\]){20}" ] } ] } Application Gateway and Application Gateway for Container (AGC) WAF { "name": "PhpFormNesting20", "priority": 91, "ruleType": "MatchRule", "action": "Log", "state": "Enabled", "matchConditions": [ { "matchVariables": [ { "variableName": "RequestHeaders", "selector": "Content-Type" } ], "operator": "BeginsWith", "negationConditon": false, "matchValues": [ "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" ], "transforms": [ "Trim", "Lowercase" ] }, { "matchVariables": [ { "variableName": "RequestBody" } ], "operator": "Regex", "negationConditon": false, "matchValues": [ "(?:^|&)[^&=\\[]+(?:\\[[^&=\\]]*\\]){20}" ], "transforms": [ "UrlDecode" ] } ] } Recommended deployment: Start with the rule in Log mode and review matches against legitimate application traffic. Consider moving the rule to Block only after validating application compatibility. Limit deeply nested multipart parameters Customers can apply a similar control to multipart/form-data requests by detecting deeply nested field names. The proposed rule detects multipart field names containing 20 or more levels of nesting where the relevant request content is available to WAF inspection. As with deeply nested URL-encoded parameters, legitimate applications may use complex multipart field structures. Custom rule definitions: Azure Front Door WAF { "name": "PhpMultipartNesting20", "priority": 111, "enabledState": "Enabled", "ruleType": "MatchRule", "action": "Log", "matchConditions": [ { "matchVariable": "RequestHeader", "selector": "Content-Type", "operator": "BeginsWith", "negateCondition": false, "transforms": [ "Trim", "Lowercase" ], "matchValue": [ "multipart/form-data" ] }, { "matchVariable": "RequestBody", "operator": "RegEx", "negateCondition": false, "matchValue": [ "(?i)(?:^|\\r?\\n)content-disposition:[ \\t]*form-data[^\\r\\n]*;[ \\t]*name[ \\t]*=[ \\t]*(?:\"(?:\\\\[\"\\\\]|[^\"\\r\\n\\[])+(?:\\[(?:\\\\[\"\\\\]|[^\"\\r\\n\\]])*\\]){20}|[^ \\t\\r\\n;\"\\[]+(?:\\[[^ \\t\\r\\n;\"\\]]*\\]){20})" ] } ] } Application Gateway and Application Gateway for Container (AGC) WAF { "name": "PhpMultipartNesting20", "priority": 92, "ruleType": "MatchRule", "action": "Log", "state": "Enabled", "matchConditions": [ { "matchVariables": [ { "variableName": "RequestHeaders", "selector": "Content-Type" } ], "operator": "BeginsWith", "negationConditon": false, "matchValues": [ "multipart/form-data" ], "transforms": [ "Trim", "Lowercase" ] }, { "matchVariables": [ { "variableName": "PostArgs" } ], "operator": "Regex", "negationConditon": false, "matchValues": [ "^[^\\[\\]]+(?:\\[[^\\]]*\\]){20}" ], "transforms": [] } ] } This rule targets deeply nested multipart field names. It does not restrict every multipart upload or provide complete mitigation for the underlying vulnerabilities. Recommended deployment: Start in Log mode, review matching traffic, and consider moving to Block only after validating the impact on your application. Deployment and validation considerations We recommend applying these custom rules only to affected PHP application domains and routes, including extensionless routes handled by PHP, rather than broadly applying them to unrelated applications. Before enabling enforcement: Review the potential impact on legitimate application traffic. Test each custom rule independently before deploying the rules together. Start applicable rules in Log mode and review legitimate matches. Verify the WAF policy scope and custom-rule precedence. After changing a rule to Block, validate both application behavior and the corresponding WAF events. Continue to prioritize upgrading PHP even when these controls are deployed. Custom rules may produce false positives, and WAF request-body inspection boundaries can affect coverage. An earlier terminal Allow rule in the WAF policy can also bypass subsequent custom-rule checks. The custom rules described above target selected request patterns associated with exploitation techniques for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. They reduce selected attack surfaces but do not provide complete protection against either vulnerability. You can find more information about Custom Rules on Azure WAF for Application Gateway here or for Azure Front Door here. Upgrading to a patched version of PHP remains the recommended and complete remediation.Addressing PHP2Shell CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619: upgrade guidance and Azure WAF mitigations
Written in collaboration with yuvalpery and Gunjan Jain Introduction Today, two critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities were disclosed in PHP. We strongly recommend that customers upgrade to a patched version of PHP as soon as possible. Upgrading is the only way to fully remediate these vulnerabilities. Read more on the PHP official website. Microsoft has been part of the coordinated industry response to these vulnerabilities, working alongside the PHP Foundation, Wiz, security researchers, and other industry partners to help protect customers. Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF) has developed mitigations against known exploitation patterns to provide an additional layer of protection while customers apply the PHP security updates. These protections are intended to complement patching and are not a replacement for it. About the vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-109618 - RCE via OOM corruption CVE-2026-109619- RCE via stale global state Both vulnerabilities can be exploited over the network without privileges or user interaction, with a high potential impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The vulnerabilities relate to PHP handling of memory when a request terminates abnormally, for example due to memory exhaustion or a fatal error. Under certain conditions, improper memory handling could allow an attacker to achieve remote code execution. Fixed versions: 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35. Refer to vendor guidancefor patching of different versions of PHP. Recommended action: upgrade PHP We recommend that customers: Upgrade all PHP deployments to a patched version, including virtual machines, containers, base images, and platform runtimes. We suggest prioritizing internet-facing workloads. Rebuild and redeploy container images that include their own PHP runtime, since updating the host does not update PHP inside an image. Migrate to a supported PHP branch if the branch currently in use no longer receives security fixes. Treat the Azure WAF mitigations below as a temporary, supplementary measure. They address a specific technique and do not remediate the underlying vulnerabilities. Azure WAF protection If you are unable to upgrade PHP to a patched version immediately, apply the following mitigations in the interim - Azure Front Door WAF: Apply the mitigation using custom rules for request-side mitigation and enable the managed rule for response-side mitigation. Application Gateway WAF: Apply the mitigation using custom rules for request-side mitigation and enable the rewrite rule for response-side mitigation. Application Gateway for Container WAF: Apply the mitigation using custom rules for request-side mitigation. See below sections for details. Mitigation using custom rules These custom rules can help reduce exposure to selected request patterns associated with exploitation techniques for these vulnerabilities. Depending on application traffic, the rules may result in false positives and affect legitimate requests. They are intended as temporary mitigations and do not replace the need to upgrade PHP. Learn more: Azure WAF custom rules for PHP2Shell mitigation. Request-side signals alone may not be sufficient to reliably identify certain exploitation attempts. Signals in the server response can provide additional evidence that malicious activity has occurred, enabling more targeted mitigation with higher confidence and lower false positives. For this vulnerability, Azure WAF identifies known malicious patterns in the session and removes the potentially malicious elements from the response before it reaches the client. This provides an additional layer of protection for supported exploitation scenarios, while patching PHP remains necessary to fully address the underlying vulnerability. Azure Front Door WAF: managed rule A managed rule to handle potential attack vector in response is currently rolling out for Azure Front Door WAF, expected to complete October 28. Customers who are unable to patch PHP immediately and require interim protection before the rollout completes, contact Microsoft Support to expedite enablement. Once the rule is available, its details are as follows: Rule group: MS-ThreatIntel-Response-CVEs Rule ID: 99006001 Default state: disabled. Customers need to enable the rule. Supported rulesets: DRS 2.0, 2.1 and 2.2. Unlike other WAF rules, this rule does not block or challenge any traffic. When the rule identifies malicious signals in the session that provides strong evidence of exploitation, it removes the potentially malicious elements from the response while leaving the remainder of the response unchanged. Mitigation for this rule takes effect only when the rule action is set to Block on anamoly. Please note that the response side mitigation does not generate WAF log entries or hit counts. Application Gateway WAF: rewrite rule Customers can apply an interim mitigation now using the HTTP header rewrite capability of Application Gateway, which is available on v2 SKUs. A WAF managed rule for Application Gateway is expected to roll out at a later date. Until then, we recommend the following rewrite rule: 1. Create a rewrite rule in a rewrite set associated with your routing rule(s). 2. Add a condition that evaluates the Set-Cookie response header against the following regular expression: ^PHPSESSID=(?:[a-zA-Z0-9\-]|%2[Cc])*(?:[^a-zA-Z0-9\-;%]|%(?!2[Cc]))+[a-zA-Z0-9\-]*[^;]+; 3. Set the action to delete the matching Set-Cookie response header. Alternatively, the header can be set to a replacement value of your choice. Please note that setting a value overwrites the entire header, including attributes such as Path=/;. Additional considerations: The rule applies only to a Set-Cookie header that matches the pattern. Other Set-Cookie headers in the same response are not affected. We recommend validating the rule on a non-production gateway before broader deployment. For further information, see Rewrite HTTP headers and URL with Azure Application Gateway. Application Gateway for Containers (AGC): For PHP workloads behind AGC, upgrading PHP is the recommended remediation. A WAF managed rule for AGC is expected to roll out at a later date. Summary Service Available protection Recommended action Azure Front Door WAF Custom rules, managed rule 99006001 rolling out, expected to complete by 28 October 2026; mitigation using high confidence signals without blocking traffic. Upgrade PHP to a patched version. If you are unable to patch, apply custom rules and contact Microsoft support if the interim protection is needed before the managed rule reaches your profile. Application Gateway WAF Custom rules, header rewrite mitigation available now; managed rule expected to roll out later. Upgrade PHP to a patched version. If you are unable to patch, apply custom and rewrite rule in the interim. Application Gateway for Containers Custom rules, header rewrite not supported; managed rule expected to roll out later. Upgrade PHP to a patched version. If you are unable to patch, apply custom rules. Conclusion Following PHP security guidance and upgrading to a patched version is the recommended and complete remediation. Azure WAF mitigations can help reduce exposure during the upgrade period, and we encourage customers to upgrades at the earliest opportunity. Changelog 10/21/2026 7:00 PM PST – Updated with additional guidance around custom rules
Troubleshooting Microsoft Entra ID OATH Hardware Token Upload Errors
Deploying hardware OATH-TOTP tokens in Microsoft Entra ID can significantly boost your organisation's multi-factor authentication (MFA) security posture. However, administrators frequently encounter vague validation errors during the CSV file upload process. To ensure a smooth, error-free import, follow these top 3 definitive deployment tips gathered from real-world customer support scenarios. 1. Request the Correct Seed Format at the Point of Order Most administrators assume that any CSV file provided by a hardware vendor will automatically work with Microsoft Entra ID. This is a common misconception. Many vendors default to providing secret keys encoded in Hexadecimal, whereas Entra ID strictly mandates Base32 encoding for CSV uploads. • The Tip: When purchasing hardware tokens, explicitly request that the vendor send the seed data in "Entra ID MFA CSV" format. • Example: Trusted vendors like Deepnet Security offer dedicated formatting profiles at the point of ordering to ensure the secrets are delivered natively in the required Base32 string layout. 2. Use a Text Editor and Enforce Lowercase Headers Using spreadsheet software like Microsoft Excel to modify your user principal names (UPNs) is one of the fastest ways to corrupt your token seed files. • The Tip: Never open or edit your token CSV files in Excel. Excel automatically treats long token serial numbers as large integers. When saved, it converts them into destructive scientific notation (e.g., 1.23E+11) or strips essential leading zeros, breaking the alignment with the hardware device. • Execution: Use a dedicated text editor (such as Notepad++, VS Code, or TextEdit) to append user details. Additionally, ensure that the first line containing your headers uses strictly lowercase letters (upn, serialnumber, secretkey, timeinterval, manufacturer, model). Capitalised headers (like UPN or SerialNumber) will cause Entra ID syntax validation to fail. 3. Optimise for Scale: Bulk Uploads and Graph API Integration Managing bulk token rollouts manually through the Entra portal can quickly become inefficient or hit portal limitations when dealing with thousands of users. • The Tip for Large Deployments: If you are uploading a massive quantity of tokens, look into online enablement helper tools to map and chunk the data smoothly. Utilities like the Deepnet Security Token Enrollment Assistant or the SafeID Token Service make assigning UPNs and structuring large lists much easier before final tenant ingestion. • The Tip for Graph API & Advanced Encoding: If your deployment architecture requires user self-enrolment, or if your hardware vendor supplies raw Base256 encoded seeds, a standard CSV upload will not work. In these advanced scenarios, you must format the token details into a structured JSON payload and import them directly using the Microsoft Graph API. Unambiguous Base32 Reference CSV Layout When validating your file, ensure your secretkey string is entirely comprised of characters within the true Base32 alphabet (A–Z and digits 2–7). upn,serialnumber,secretkey,timeinterval,manufacturer,model email address removed for privacy reasons,1234567,ORSXG5BRGIZTINJWG44TSTST,30,VendorName,ModelA email address removed for privacy reasons,7654321,MZXW6YTBOJUW423VORSXG5BR,60,VendorName,ModelBSecure Native Access to Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) Private Clusters with Azure Bastion
Written in Collaboration with AvirupChat ShabazShaik Mohit_Kumar YuriDiogenes Introduction: As organizations move toward containerized workloads such as Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS), secure access to cluster resources becomes critical. Making the Kubernetes API server private, therefore, significantly reduces the attack surface. However, it also changes how engineers perform routine management tasks. Operations as simple as running kubectl logs, describing resources, or troubleshooting workloads require connectivity to the virtual network hosting the cluster. This challenge becomes even more apparent during day-to-day operations. An engineer may have the necessary Kubernetes credentials and Azure RBAC permissions yet still be unable to access the cluster because the API server is reachable only from within the private network. Establishing VPN connectivity, using jump hosts, or deploying dedicated management workstations often becomes part of the operational workflow, adding complexity to what should be straightforward administrative tasks. This balance between maintaining strong network isolation and enabling efficient cluster management is exactly what Azure Bastion's native client tunneling support for private AKS clusters is designed to address. Many Azure customers already use Azure Bastion to securely access virtual machines without exposing them to the public internet. Native client tunneling now brings that same secure access model to AKS private clusters. This capability is in public preview currently. Before discussing how it works, it is worth understanding the operational challenges it is designed to solve and how it's done. Bastion for Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) private clusters: At its core, Azure Bastion is designed to simplify secure access to private Azure resources. Since its launch, it has provided browser-based and native client RDP and SSH connectivity to Azure VMs without exposing management ports to the internet. No public IPs on your VMs. No inbound NSG rules for port 22 or 3389. Just TLS over port 443, routed through a fully managed service that Microsoft patches, scales, and secures on your behalf. When you establish a Bastion tunnel to your private AKS cluster, you are not signing in to an intermediary machine and running kubectl from there. You are opening an encrypted tunnel from your local machine, through Bastion, directly to the private API server endpoint. Your kubeconfig points to localhost on a dynamically assigned port, so local kubectl, helm, and scripts continue to work as they would against a public cluster. You get the developer experience of a public cluster with the security posture of a private one as shown in Figure 1. The high-level flow has three parts: The engineer authenticates to Azure, retrieves cluster credentials, and uses Azure Bastion to establish a managed tunnel into the private network. Local Kubernetes tools then use that tunnel to reach the private API server. This keeps the workflow familiar while removing the need for jump hosts or VPN-based access paths. However, this raises an important question - Does making access easier also make it easier for an attacker to connect? The short answer is no. In fact, Bastion tunneling strengthens the security posture in ways that are worth unpacking. First, the API server itself remains private. There is no public endpoint. There is no public IP address discoverable by scanners. The only network path to the API server runs through Azure's managed infrastructure. Authentication and authorization then depend on the AKS cluster configuration. Second, Bastion eliminates an entire class of infrastructure that itself becomes a security target. Jump box VMs, when not meticulously maintained, accumulate credentials, kubeconfig files, and browser sessions. They are machines that admins log into, which means they are machines that can be compromised. Bastion is not a machine you log into. It is an agentless, managed tunnel you pass through. And for public clusters, there is a related but distinct benefit. Many teams use API server authorized IP ranges to restrict which source IPs can reach their public API endpoint. This is a good practice, but it breaks down quickly when your team works remotely, uses dynamic IPs, or includes contractors. Adding Bastion's stable public IP to the authorized range gives you a consistent, managed access path without the operational toil of constantly updating IP allow lists. With the network path established through Bastion, the next question is how users are authenticated and authorized once they reach the AKS API server. That distinction matters: Bastion provides secure connectivity, while AKS access is governed by the authentication and authorization model configured on the cluster. Authentication and authorization options: When creating an AKS cluster, you can choose from three authentication and authorization modes, as shown in Figure below. That choice shapes everything about how access is granted, audited, and governed over the lifetime of the cluster. ⚠️Local accounts with Kubernetes RBAC is the default if you change nothing. It uses a static certificate that never expires, is shared across all administrators, and has no connection to your corporate identity provider. There is no MFA. No Conditional Access. Note: For most production environments, Microsoft recommends using Microsoft Entra ID integrated authentication rather than local accounts to enable centralized identity, MFA, and auditing. ☑️ Microsoft Entra ID with Kubernetes RBAC moves authentication to Entra ID, which means users sign in with their corporate identity, MFA is enforced, and Conditional Access policies apply. Authorization is handled through native Kubernetes Role and ClusterRole bindings, which reference Entra ID users and groups as subjects. This works well for teams that manage cluster configuration through GitOps, because RBAC manifests live alongside other cluster YAML. The limitation is that these permissions are invisible in Azure IAM — they live only inside the cluster. ✅ Microsoft Entra ID with Azure RBAC is the model we recommend for most production environments. Authentication still flows through Entra ID with full MFA and Conditional Access support. But authorization is handled by Azure RBAC role assignments on the AKS resource itself. Permissions are visible in Azure IAM, participate in access reviews, and integrate with Privileged Identity Management for just-in-time elevation. You can assign the built-in Azure Kubernetes Service RBAC Cluster Admin, Admin, Writer, or Reader roles at either cluster scope or namespace scope. A single subscription-level role assignment can grant access to every cluster in the subscription. The real value is the combination. Bastion provides the encrypted network tunnel. Entra ID provides the identity, MFA, and Conditional Access. Azure RBAC provides centralized, auditable authorization that your security team can review alongside every other Azure resource. For the exact steps to configure Entra ID authentication and Azure RBAC on your AKS cluster, see the AKS identity documentation. End-to-end flow for connectivity to AKS via Bastion: az account set --subscription <subscription ID> Retrieve credentials to your AKS private cluster using the commands below: az aks get-credentials --name <AKSClusterName> --resource-group <ResourceGroupName> Open the tunnel to your target AKS Cluster with the following command: az aks bastion --name <aksClusterName> --resource-group <aksClusterResourceGroup> --bastion <bastionResourceId> Now the default authentication method is Device code authentication i.e., this authentication method prompts the device code for the user to sign in from a browser session. If you want CLI only authentication, you can run the following command next. kubelogin convert-kubeconfig -l azurecli Then go on with your AKS connectivity: kubectl get nodes How to Try It: If you are already running private AKS clusters, getting started is straightforward. You need a Standard or Premium Azure Bastion host deployed in the same VNet as your cluster (or in a peered VNet), with native client support enabled. The aks-preview and bastion CLI extensions handle the rest. The detailed connection steps are documented on Microsoft Learn. We Want Your Feedback Write a comment in this blog or open an issue on the AKS GitHub repository or leave feedback directly on the Microsoft Learn documentation page. We read everything, and it genuinely influences what we prioritize.Azure DDoS Protection & Azure WAF: A Layered Defense for Modern DDoS Attacks
Introduction: The Need for Layered DDoS Defense Organizations today operate in an environment where Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to evolve across both network and application layers. To help organizations build resilient, internet-facing applications and services, Microsoft Azure provides a comprehensive and layered set of protections designed to address different types of DDoS threats. These capabilities range from platform-level defenses through Azure Infrastructure Protection, dedicated Layer 3/4 DDoS mitigation through Azure DDOS Protection and application-layer protections through Azure Web Application Protection (WAF). Together, these services form a defense-in-depth strategy that helps organizations strengthen availability, improve resilience, and protect critical applications from both large-scale network attacks and sophisticated application-layer threats. This blog explores how these services work together to deliver comprehensive DDoS protection across modern cloud environments. Understanding DDoS at Different Layers: Network vs. Application Not all DDoS attacks are alike. Broadly speaking, network-layer (Layer 3/4) DDoS attacks try to flood a network or transport layer with traffic – for example, overwhelming a server or network connection with a massive volume of packets (think UDP floods, SYN floods, or amplification attacks). These aim to saturate the available bandwidth or crash network devices, knocking entire services offline. On the other hand, application-layer (Layer 7) DDoS attacks strike at the application itself – typically using HTTP(S) requests that appear legitimate but are maliciously crafted. For instance, a botnet might repeatedly hit a search API or login page with valid-looking requests that each trigger expensive operations (database queries, authentication processes, etc.). In short, network-layer DDoS attacks target the plumbing of your infrastructure (bandwidth, network connectivity), whereas application-layer DDoS attacks target the brains of your application (the code and logic handling requests). Because these attack vectors are different, defending against them requires different tools and tactics. Azure’s approach to DDoS defense embraces this reality with a layered model, where each security layer specializes in stopping certain types of attacks and complements the others. Azure’s multi-layered DDoS Protection Strategy Azure provides three main layers of DDoS protection: Azure’s Infrastructure DDoS Protection (Platform Protection) Azure DDoS Protection (Network Protection for customers’ resources) Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF) (App Protection) Let’s explore each layer and how they work together. Azure DDoS Infrastructure Protection (Always-On Baseline) All of the Azure Platform and shared services, automatically benefit from Azure’s built-in DDoS infrastructure protection. Think of this as Azure’s global, always-on “baseline” DDoS defense. It continuously monitors traffic across the Azure network, and if a massive DDoS campaign tries to bring down Azure’s infrastructure or a customer’s public endpoint, Azure will detect and absorb the malicious traffic at the platform level. This baseline protection uses Azure’s global network capacity to scrub much of the unwanted traffic before it ever reaches your resources. There’s no extra cost or configuration needed for this default protection. It’s a fundamental safety net that ensures Azure services (including multi-tenant services like Azure DNS) are not easily taken offline by large-scale DDoS events. However, the platform-level protection is designed primarily to protect Azure’s overall infrastructure and does not provide fine-grained controls or visibility for individual customers. That’s where Azure’s next layer comes in. Azure DDoS Protection: Shielding the Network (L3/L4) To safeguard your own internet-facing resources and workloads against network-layer DDoS attacks beyond the default baseline, Azure offers L3/L4 DDoS Protection (DDoS Network Protection and DDoS IP Protection) against volumetric floods. This is an opt-in service you configure for your Virtual Network or specific Public IP resources. Azure DDoS Protection is purpose-built to handle the classic L3/L4 DDoS scenarios: large volumetric floods, protocol attacks, and other network-level exploits like reflection or amplification attacks. A key benefit of Azure DDoS Protection is its adaptive tuning feature alongside the telemetry it provides. During peacetime, the service establishes a baseline of normal traffic behavior for your services and continuously updates that baseline to reflect changing patterns. When traffic deviates from that baseline and an attack is detected, mitigation is triggered automatically to block or absorb malicious traffic while minimizing false positives. Another important aspect of Azure DDoS Protection is visibility and response capabilities. The service provides detailed metrics, alerts, and attack analytics during and after an event, so your teams can understand what happened. Azure DDoS Network Protection plan also includes support from Azure’s DDoS Rapid Response (DRR) team and offers a cost protection guarantee – credits to offset any unexpected Azure scale-out costs that result from a documented DDoS attack. In short, Azure DDoS Protection is your dedicated shield at the network layer. It's worthwhile to note that Azure DDOS Protection goes beyond just blunt filtering; it employs multiple mitigation techniques like dropping illegitimate packets (for instance, filtering out spoofed source IPs or malformed packets), DDoS booters (e.g. DDoS-for-hire services), protocol compliance checks, and intelligent rate limiting as a last resort. It further employs multiple policies with varied thresholds each for UDP, TCP and TCP SYN due to the nature of attacks for these protocols. The goal is to scrub out the attack traffic while letting legitimate users continue to reach your services with minimal disruption. Azure WAF: Guarding Applications at the HTTP Layer (L7) Azure DDoS Protection defends against network-level floods and protocol exploits, but application-layer attacks like HTTP request floods require separate L7 protection which is available via Azure Web Application Firewall (WAF). Azure WAF is deployed on services like Azure Application Gateway, Azure Front Door and Azure Gateway for Containers to inspect incoming HTTP(S) requests to your web applications. WAF’s primary role is to block common web exploits (e.g., SQL injections, cross-site scripting) via managed rule sets, rate Limit traffic using its Custom Rules as well as providing protection from malicious bots using its Bot Ruleset. Now, Azure WAF also includes the HTTP DDOS Ruleset to protect against application-level DDoS attacks. HTTP DDOS Ruleset is a new adaptive ruleset (currently in public preview for Application Gateway and Front Door services) that uses machine learning to dynamically learn normal HTTP traffic patterns for your application and automatically identify unusual surges in requests. If a burst of traffic appears malicious (for example, a sudden wave of requests to an expensive API call), the WAF can selectively block offending clients by placing them in a temporary “penalty box” without manual intervention. This dynamic approach goes beyond static thresholds, adjusting to your app’s normal load profiles. Along with that, adding the existing approaches such as custom rate limiting that lets you define granular thresholds for incoming requests on specific paths or for specific clients will further enhance the protection against DDOS attacks. For instance, you might limit a single IP to a certain number of login attempts per minute or cap the request rate to an expensive search endpoint. Rate limiting ensures that even if an attacker tries to slowly overwhelm your application with a moderate stream of requests (under the radar of network DDoS detection), WAF can throttle or block them at the application entry point. JavaScript challenges and CAPTCHA-based validation can also serve as effective protection mechanisms against automated bot traffic. These techniques help distinguish legitimate users from non-human clients by requiring the requester to successfully execute browser-based checks or complete a human verification step, making them useful for reducing unwanted bot activity such as scraping, credential stuffing, and abusive request automation. Further, the Bot Protection ruleset that includes integration of Microsoft’s threat intelligence to identify known malicious bot networks automatically block bad bots. Microsoft Threat Intelligence feeds continuously update the list of dangerous bot IPs and prevents these bots from consuming your application’s resources. This is especially useful against DDoS scenarios carried out by automated botnets that have known fingerprints. Together these capabilities enable Azure WAF to act as a critical inner layer of DDoS defense in front of your applications (via an Application Gateway or Front Door). Azure WAF focuses on application-specific attacks, and it can discern whether a burst of requests to your app is likely malicious based on patterns and behavior, not just volume. Combined with network-level DDoS protection, WAF ensures that even low-bandwidth but high-impact attacks (like repeated login attempts or bot-driven scraping) are mitigated. Layered DDOS Protection: Azure’s DDoS strategy is best imagined as a series of concentric rings around your application. The outermost ring is the platform’s infrastructure DDoS protection (automatically absorbing massive network floods aimed at Azure at large). The next ring is Azure DDoS Protection for your environment, which provides dedicated L3/L4 defenses with tuning and telemetry – it will handle the heavy lifting against volumetric and protocol attacks targeted at your specific resources. The next ring inward is your Azure WAF (with its HTTP DDoS ruleset, rate limiting, and bot controls enabled) catching the application-layer anomalies that network defenses can’t see. And finally, the innermost ring might be endpoint-specific configurations or app-level controls (like strict rate limits on crucial API operations or even adaptive app logic) that protect the most sensitive parts of your application from abuse. This layered approach is essential. Each layer addresses different threat vectors and failure modes; together they fill the gaps and provide a robust, end-to-end DDoS mitigation strategy. Quick Comparison: Azure DDoS Protection vs Azure WAF Note: This comparison focuses on Azure DDoS Protection and Azure WAF because they are the paid offerings; Azure DDoS Infrastructure Protection is included by default. To crystallize the differences and synergy between these services, here’s a quick side-by-side comparison of Azure DDoS Protection (Network level) and Azure WAF (Application level) in the context of DDoS defense: Service Azure DDoS Protection (Network-Level) Azure WAF – Application (Layer 7) DDoS Protection Protection Layer Network (OSI Layers 3 & 4): Protects Internet facing resources in virtual networks. Application (OSI Layer 7): Protects web apps and APIs at the HTTP request layer. Protected Resource Internet facing resources in virtual networks. Web apps and API endpoints. Primary Purpose Shield against high-volume network floods (e.g. UDP/TCP floods, SYN floods, amplification attacks) that aim to overwhelm bandwidth or network resources. Ensures your Azure services stay reachable during massive DDoS assaults. Filter and stop malicious HTTP(S) traffic (e.g. HTTP GET/POST floods, bot-driven requests, slowloris attacks) that could exhaust your application’s compute resources. Keeps your web applications responsive even under targeted L7 attack patterns. How It Works Always-on network monitoring. Uses Azure’s global network to absorb and scrub malicious traffic before it reaches your resources. No per-app manual tuning needed – it profiles traffic and triggers mitigation when volumes exceed safe baselines. Employs adaptive techniques (drops spoofed packets, protocol checks, limits rate as last resort) to block attacks while letting legitimate traffic flow. Policy-driven rules integrated at the application edge (via Application Gateway or Front Door). Can rate-limit or block suspicious clients based on IP, behavior, or patterns. Includes managed rule sets for common web threats and a new adaptive HTTP DDoS managed ruleset that auto-learns normal behavior per app and blocks abnormal request surges (reducing need for manual emergency configuration). When to Use Ideal for any Azure resource exposed to the public internet. Especially critical for high-bandwidth endpoints (gaming servers, large websites, etc.) or anything that can’t risk downtime due to massive traffic floods. Typically enabled on Virtual Networks or specific public IP addresses. Essential for any internet-facing web application (websites, web services, REST APIs). Particularly important for applications with resource-intensive operations (e.g., login pages, search functionality) where even moderate traffic spikes can degrade service. Deployed via a WAF Policy on an Application Gateway or Front Door that fronts your app. Role in Defense-in-Depth Handles the “heavy lifting” against bulk traffic attacks at the network edge – drastically reduces attacking traffic volume before it can hit your servers. Prevents upstream network pipe saturation or crashes, ensuring your application gets a chance to handle legitimate user traffic. Provides a fine-grained, application-aware filter for attacks that get past network defenses. Targets “surgical” low-bandwidth attacks that hide within normal traffic patterns. Together with Azure DDoS Protection, WAF completes a full-stack DDoS defense, covering gaps that pure network protection would miss. Conclusion: The key takeaway is that modern DDoS defense is no longer about relying on a single control, but about applying defense-in-depth, the right protection at the right layer. With a layered approach that spans infrastructure, network, and application security, organizations are better positioned to preserve availability, protect user experience, and maintain business continuity even as DDoS attacks grow more sophisticated.
Designing Cloud Landing Zones by Traffic Flow: A Defence‑in‑Depth, DMZ‑First Architecture
As enterprises adopt Microsoft Azure for large‑scale and regulated workloads, security architecture must be driven by traffic trust boundaries and inspection intent, not connectivity alone. Regulatory frameworks consistently require a clear separation between Internet‑untrusted and private enterprise traffic, enforced through defence‑in‑depth controls aligned to the OSI model. This drives the adoption of a DMZ‑first landing zone architecture, where volumetric protection, application‑layer inspection, and perimeter controls are enforced at well‑defined trust boundaries. Security enforcement is prioritised before access, rather than being an afterthought of connectivity. A distributed hub architecture enables this model at scale, delivering consistent controls while improving resiliency, fault isolation, and operational clarity. Traffic Classification in an Enterprise Landing Zone Enterprise traffic flows are classified based on origin, destination, and trust level, which directly dictates inspection requirements: Internet Inbound (North–South): Traffic from the public Internet to Azure‑hosted applications Internet Outbound (South–North): Egress traffic from private workloads to the Internet East–West: Traffic between virtual networks within or across regions Hybrid Connectivity: Traffic between Azure, on‑premises, and multi‑cloud environments Each flow presents a distinct risk profile, making a uniform connectivity and inspection model unsuitable for enterprise and regulated environments. Hub‑and‑Spoke as the Foundation for Centralised Security Enterprises commonly adopt a Hub‑and‑Spoke topology using VNET peering or Azure Virtual WAN, extending hybrid connectivity via Site‑to‑Site VPN or ExpressRoute. The hub provides a centralised, datapath‑centric layer for shared networking and security services, while spoke VNETs host application workloads and remain private, typically without public IPs. Ingress and egress are handled through shared, centrally managed endpoints. This model consolidates critical controls—Azure Firewall, Azure WAF, and DDoS protection—at controlled entry and exit points, significantly reducing the attack surface. Integration with Microsoft Sentinel enables cross‑layer visibility, threat hunting, and detection of risks such as unauthorised access and data exfiltration. Why a Single Hub Is Not Sufficient Using a single hub to process all traffic types introduces operational and security challenges at scale by forcing Internet‑untrusted and private traffic through the same inspection tier. Key limitations include: Coupled Internet and private security policies Rapid firewall rule sprawl and management overhead A single blast radius across all traffic types Throughput and SNAT scalability constraints Increased difficulty meeting regulatory separation requirements These issues become more pronounced as environments scale across regions and workloads. Multi‑Hub as an Enterprise‑Grade Evolution A multi‑hub architecture resolves these challenges by separating inspection responsibilities across dedicated hubs: DMZ Hub VNET: Internet‑facing traffic and perimeter security enforcement Core Hub VNET: Outbound Internet access, East‑West, and hybrid traffic inspection This separation aligns security controls with traffic intent, reduces policy complexity, limits blast radius, and simplifies operations. In the next section, we explore multi‑hub architecture patterns and examine how each traffic flow is inspected and governed in practice. Scenario 1 – Third‑Party Firewall–Centric Multi‑Hub Design In this scenario, third‑party firewalls provide inspection for all traffic flows—Internet inbound, Internet outbound, East‑West, and hybrid connectivity—while Azure WAF and Azure DDoS Protection are used to defend against volumetric attacks, application‑layer threats, and malicious bot traffic. Architecture Overview The design uses two dedicated hub virtual networks, with spoke VNets peered to both hubs to maintain traffic separation based on trust and inspection requirements: DMZ Hub VNET (Internet Ingress Hub) Core Hub VNET (Egress, East‑West, and Hybrid Hub) DMZ Hub VNET – Internet Inbound (North–South) Traffic The DMZ hub establishes a dedicated perimeter for Internet‑facing applications. Internet traffic lands on a public Application Gateway with Azure WAF, protected by an Azure DDoS Protection Plan applied to the public frontend IP. Third‑party firewalls are deployed behind the Application Gateway to perform deep packet inspection. Firewalls operate in active‑active mode as standalone appliances, using three dedicated network interfaces (Untrust, Trust, and Management), each placed in separate subnets. Application Gateway provides load balancing and health probing, ensuring firewall availability and resiliency. Core Hub VNET – Egress, East‑West, and Hybrid Traffic The core hub handles all non‑Internet‑inbound traffic flows, including private inter‑VNET communication and hybrid connectivity. Third‑party firewalls are deployed behind an internal Azure Load Balancer, which maintains high availability using health probes. Firewalls follow the same active‑active, three‑NIC design for consistent policy enforcement and operational symmetry. Azure NAT Gateway is associated with the firewall Untrust subnet to scale outbound SNAT and simplify Internet egress with deterministic public IP. Site‑to‑site VPN or ExpressRoute terminate in this hub for on‑premises and multi‑cloud connectivity, ensuring private and regulated traffic bypasses Internet‑facing controls. Architecture Patterns - Traffic Flow 1.1 North–South (Internet Inbound) Traffic Flow This flow applies when applications hosted on Azure (VMs, VM Scale Sets, or services behind Internal Load Balancer / Internal Application Gateway) are published to the Internet. As shown in the diagram, Internet-bound client requests enter Azure through a dedicated DMZ Hub, where perimeter security controls are enforced before traffic reaches private application spokes. Inbound Request Flow (Blue Path) Client → Application Gateway (WAF) A client request (for example, app1.example.com) is resolved via DNS and lands on the public endpoint of Azure Application Gateway. Azure WAF performs Layer‑7 inspection, bot protection, and rule evaluation. Application Gateway → Firewall (DMZ Hub) Based on hostname and routing rules, Application Gateway forwards traffic to the firewalls while preserving the client’s real IP using the X‑Forwarded‑For (XFF) header. Firewall → Application (Spoke VNET) The firewall performs DNAT to the internal destination (Internal Application Gateway or Internal Load Balancer) and SNAT to its trust‑interface IP to ensure symmetric return traffic. Traffic is then routed over VNET peering to the private application workload. Response Flow (Green Path) Application → Firewall The application responds using its private IP, with the firewall trust interface as the destination. Firewall → Application Gateway The firewall forwards the response based on its session state. Application Gateway → Client Application Gateway returns the response to the Internet client. DDoS Protection Azure DDoS Protection continuously monitors the Application Gateway public IP and mitigates volumetric attacks before they reach the application stack. Key Design Considerations Application Gateway routing - Use a multi‑site listener with hostname‑based rules to steer traffic to the appropriate firewall backend. Firewall backend mapping - Register firewall VMs in a single backend pool and differentiate applications using distinct backend settings (same protocol, different ports). Application steering at firewall - Firewalls perform port‑based DNAT (or private FQDN‑based DNAT where supported) to forward traffic to the correct application private IP in spoke VNets. Traffic symmetry - Source NAT is applied on the firewall trust interface to maintain symmetric return paths. Protocol support - The same pattern applies to TCP/UDP workloads, using an External Azure Load Balancer instead of Application Gateway where WAF is not required. Client IP visibility Application Gateway enables WAF inspection using the real client IP, preserved downstream via X‑Forwarded‑For. With Azure Load Balancer, client IP is retained up to the firewall for IP‑based enforcement, with Azure DDoS Protection safeguarding the public frontend. 1.2 Hybrid Connectivity Traffic Flow Hybrid connectivity represents communication between Azure workloads and on‑premises environments using Site‑to‑Site VPN or ExpressRoute. Traffic Flow Request (Blue: 1–4): Traffic originates from applications in spoke VNETs and is forwarded via UDRs to the Internal Load Balancer, through active‑active firewalls, and then to on‑premises via VPN or ExpressRoute. Response (Green: 5–8): Return traffic follows the same path in reverse. Key Design Considerations Source and destination IP addresses remain unchanged end‑to‑end, despite firewalls operating behind an Internal Load Balancer. UDRs steer both outbound and inbound hybrid traffic to the Internal Load Balancer as the next hop. Spoke VNET subnets should be associated with custom route tables with Propagate Gateway Routes set to No, preventing gateway-learned routes from bypassing the intended security inspection path configured via UDR. However, VPN Gateway Subnet Route table should have route table with Propagate Gateway Routes set to Yes. Azure Virtual Network Manager can be used to manage and scale UDR deployment centrally across Hub and spoke networks. 1.3 East-West Traffic flow This traffic flow represents the connectivity between resources across VNETs through Firewall. Considerations remain same as “Hybrid Connectivity Traffic flow” mentioned above. 1.4 Egress/Outbound Connectivity Traffic flow This traffic flow represents the connectivity from the resources hosted inside VNETs to Internet through Firewalls deployed behind Internal Load Balancer in Core Hub VNET. Egress/Outbound Connectivity Traffic flow Key Considerations: A default route (0.0.0.0/0) UDR directs Internet-bound traffic to the Internal Load Balancer for firewall inspection. Firewall performs SNAT to its untrusted interface, after which Azure NAT Gateway translates traffic to a fixed public IP. Alternatively, a public IP can be assigned to the firewall untrusted interface to perform SNAT directly, removing the need for NAT Gateway and reducing cost. Spoke VNET subnets should be associated with custom route tables with Propagate Gateway Routes set to No, preventing gateway-learned routes from bypassing the intended security inspection path configured via UDR. However, VPN Gateway Subnet Route table should have route table with Propagate Gateway Routes set to Yes. However, with horizontal firewall scaling, outbound public IPs become non-deterministic. Scenario 2: Third‑Party Firewalls for Ingress, Azure Firewall for Private Flows In this scenario, third‑party firewalls secure Internet‑facing traffic, while Azure Firewall handles Egress, East–West, and Hybrid flows. This separation enables organisations to retain existing perimeter security investments while adopting a fully managed, cloud‑native control and data plane for internal traffic flows. As private traffic patterns scale, particularly for chatty East–West communication, Azure Firewall helps simplify operations and improves scalability by offloading traffic inspection to a managed service. This approach reduces operational overhead and provides consistent policy enforcement across internal and hybrid flows. Setup DMZ Hub design remains unchanged from Scenario 1. Core Hub VNET use Azure Firewall for better scalability, built‑in resilience, and simplified operations. Azure Firewall eliminates the need for load balancers and reduces complexity for chatty east‑west traffic. It requires a single subnet (unless force tunnelling is enabled), optimising IP consumption. Outbound traffic is SNATed by Azure Firewall and further translated via Azure NAT Gateway. Firewall‑based SNAT to public IP can be used to avoid NAT Gateway costs when deterministic egress IPs or higher SNAT scale are not required. Traffic Flow North–South (Internet Inbound) Traffic Flow represented with Numbers. Request flow represented with Blue: 1–3 Response flow represented with Brown: 4–6 Egress/Outbound Connectivity Traffic flow represented with alphabets. Request flow represented with Green: A–C Response flow represented with Blue: D–F Hybrid flow represented with purple Architecture Diagram: Third‑Party Firewalls for Ingress, Azure Firewall for Private Flows Further if you want to use Azure Firewall for the Internet Ingress flow, you can use it as well. Below is the architecture diagram explaining the same pattern. Azure Firewalls for Ingress and Private Flows Key Considerations: Application Gateway behaviour remains the same as Scenario 1; however, backend pools use IP‑based targets. Internal applications should be exposed via internal Application Gateway or internal load balancer to provide stable backend IPs. To optimise traffic flow and avoid unnecessary network address translation, the private IP address of the Application Gateway or internal Load Balancer should be configured in the backend pool of External Load Balancer in DMZ Hub VNET. This design does not need Azure Firewall to perform both source NAT (SNAT) and destination NAT (DNAT) operations. Further, implementing User Defined Routes (UDRs) in the Application Gateway subnet—specifically for spoke VNet CIDR ranges steers traffic routing through the Firewall. For non-web (TCP/UDP) workloads, applications can be directly exposed through the firewall public IP, with Azure DDoS Protection applied to mitigate volumetric attacks. Spoke VNET subnets should be associated with custom route tables with Propagate Gateway Routes set to No, preventing gateway-learned routes from bypassing the intended security inspection path configured via UDR. However, VPN Gateway Subnet Route table should have route table with Propagate Gateway Routes set to Yes. Scenario 3 - Overcoming Peering Complexity at Scale with Azure Virtual WAN In environments where each application is hosted in its own dedicated VNET for isolation and stronger security, a traditional hub‑and‑spoke model quickly becomes complex. With a single hub, "N" spoke VNETs require "N" peering's; introducing multiple hubs increases this to "2N", significantly amplifying operational overhead—especially across multiple regions. Azure Virtual WAN addresses this challenge by eliminating the need for extensive VNET peering. As a global, managed service, it simplifies large‑scale and multi‑region architectures while providing built‑in scalability and operational consistency. Setup DMZ Hub design and components remain unchanged from Scenario 1 keeping defense in depth principles intact for Internet Inbound or North-South traffic. Core Hub VNET is replaced with Azure Virtual WAN Secure Hub which has Azure Firewall inside the managed Secure Hub VNETs. This further eliminates the need for creating Azure Firewall Subnet, Azure NAT Gateway resources for East-West, Egress and Hybrid connectivity and provides same level of security protection as mentioned in Scenario 2. Secure Hub design using Virtual WAN removes the routing and inspection complexity which was unless required in Scenario 2 by removing UDR configurations in Spoke VNETs, Gateway Subnet and Azure Firewall Subnet. This provides simplified design and operations with built-in resiliency by leveraging the managed platform. Azure Firewall eliminates the need for load balancers and reduces complexity for chatty east‑west traffic. East-West, Egress, and Hybrid connectivity happens via VPN Gateway and Express Route Gateway present in Virtual Hub. All private and Internet Egress traffic is inspected by Azure Firewall present in secure Hub. Outbound traffic is SNATed to Public IP by Azure Firewall thus avoiding the need of Azure NAT Gateway. Firewall‑based SNAT to public IP can be used to avoid NAT Gateway costs when deterministic egress IPs or higher SNAT scale are not required. Traffic Flow North–South (Internet Inbound) Traffic Flow represented with Numbers. Request flow represented with Blue: 1–5 Response flow represented with Green: 6–10 Egress/Outbound Connectivity Traffic flow represented with Red Hybrid flow represented with Green East-West connectivity flow represented with black Architecture Diagram: Key Considerations Virtual WAN has additional cost Refer to architecture diagram above for different traffic flows. The DMZ VNET components consideration remains same as per scenario 1 You can use your own managed public IP on Azure Firewall for applying standard IP/Network DDoS protection plan. Benefits of multi-Hub approach over single Hub You can use this table as decision matrix to choose the best option for your application requirements. Dimensions Multi-Hub Design Resiliency · Independent scaling of DMZ and Core firewalls · Failure in Internet inspection does not impact East‑West traffic · Easier multi‑region active‑active designs Security & Compliance Clear trust boundaries Auditable inspection points Easier alignment with Zero Trust & regulatory frameworks Operational Simplicity Smaller, purpose‑built firewall policies Clear ownership (Perimeter vs Core team) Faster troubleshooting due to deterministic flows Cost Optimisation Avoids over‑inspection of East‑West traffic by DMZ firewalls Smaller firewall SKUs per hub Better scale‑unit consumption Performance Efficiency Reduced latency for private traffic No unnecessary hair‑pinning Optimised SNAT and connection tracking Key Takeaways Security‑first landing zones should not be designed as one‑size‑fits‑all networks. By designing hubs based on traffic trust level and inspection intent, rather than convenience, organisations gain: o Stronger security boundaries and better fault isolation o Predictable operations at scale o Lower long‑term cost and complexity o Design for traffic flows, not just connectivity o Use DMZ hubs exclusively for Internet‑untrusted traffic o Use Core hubs for East‑West, outbound, and hybrid connectivity o Map security controls to OSI layers o Avoid single‑hub designs for large, regulated, or multi‑region environments This distributed hub‑and‑DMZ landing zone provides a clean, scalable, and secure foundation for enterprise workloads in any Hyperscaler. For regulated, internet‑exposed, or multi‑region environments, a distributed hub with a dedicated DMZ is no longer optional — it is a foundational architecture decision.A deep dive into Azure Bastion session recording
If you’ve worked with Azure Bastion’s Premium SKU, you’ve likely encountered one of its most powerful security features: graphical session recording. Capturing RDP and SSH sessions end to end strengthens compliance, supports forensic investigations, and improves operational accountability. How you configure session recording can make a significant difference. It determines whether you must manage manual tokens and expiry settings or benefit from a low-maintenance experience. With the recently announced Public Preview: Managed Identity support for graphical session recording, managing Bastion authentication credentials to store session recordings to a designated storage account is simpler and reduces manual work. In this blog, we’ll explain the Azure Bastion session recording feature, show how to set it up, compare SAS URL and Managed Identity options for storage authentication, and outline why Managed Identity is a great choice for production and enterprise environments. What Is Azure Bastion session recording? Azure Bastion is Microsoft’s fully managed, browser-based RDP/SSH gateway that removes the need for a public IP on your VMs. With the Premium SKU, you get access to session recording, which records graphical activity for every RDP and SSH session and uploads it as a browser playable video within the Bastion resource → Session recordings blade. This gives security teams: An audit trail of admin and user interactions Forensic evidence for incident response Visibility into privileged access across your environment Prerequisites Before you can enable session recording, you need: Requirement Detail Azure Bastion SKU Premium (Developer, Basic, and Standard do not support this feature) Storage Account General Purpose v2, same Azure region as Bastion Permissions Owner or Contributor on the Bastion resource and Blob Data Reader permission on the storage account for users to access the recordings The two configuration options When you enable session recording, Azure Bastion needs a way to authenticate to your Storage Account to upload the recorded sessions. There are two options: SAS URL Managed Identity Let’s look at how to set up each authentication option. Option 1: SAS URL How it works A Shared Access Signature (SAS) is a URI that grants restricted, time-limited access to Azure Storage resources. When using this option for session recording: You navigate to your Storage Account and generate a SAS URL token scoped to your container with at minimum Read, Create, Write, and List permissions. You paste the resulting SAS URL into the Bastion session recording blade. Bastion uses that URL to authenticate and write recordings to a storage container for every session. Prerequisites If you have not configured a storage account container for session recordings, visit Configure storage account container. Ensure you have Session recording and SAS URL selected in Azure Bastion configuration settings. Setup steps Go to your Storage Account. In the left pane, expand Settings, then select Resource sharing (CORS). Create a new policy under Blob service with the following values and save your changes at the top of the page. Next go to your Storage Account → Data Storage → Containers → Choose your container → Select Shared access tokens under Settings Under permissions drop down, select Read, Create, Write, and List. This is the minimum set of privileges required for session recording. Define a start and expiry date and select generate the SAS token and URL. Copy the Blob service SAS URL provided. In your Bastion resource → Session recording → paste the SAS URL and select Upload. New Azure Bastion sessions will now be recorded and available with the option for immediate playback. The challenges of using SAS URLs at scale 🔴 Token expiry overhead: SAS tokens expire after a set period. Once a token expires, Bastion can no longer write recordings, which can silently interrupt your audit trail until someone detects the issue and generates a new token. 🔴 Token access risk: If a SAS URL is accidentally logged or shared, it grants write access to your storage account for anyone who has access to it. 🔴 No Entra ID identity: Because SAS tokens provide preauthorized access for a limited time, they bypass Entra RBAC capabilities entirely. This means they don’t benefit from Conditional Access policies restriction capabilities. 🔴 Manual rotation: Unlike secrets stored in Key Vault with automated rotation, SAS tokens require a human or a custom automation pipeline to regenerate and update the Bastion configuration on a regular cadence. Option 2: Managed Identity How it works Azure Managed Identity is a feature of Microsoft Entra ID that provides Azure services with an automatically managed identity—no passwords, secrets, or tokens required. When Bastion is configured with a Managed Identity for session recording: Bastion’s system-assigned (or user-assigned) managed identity authenticates to the Storage Account via Microsoft Entra ID tokens issued by the Entra ID platform. RBAC controls what that identity can do. Specifically, it requires the Storage Blob Data Contributor role on the storage account. Token issuance, refresh, and lifecycle are all handled automatically by Azure. Setup Steps Go to your Storage Account. In the left pane, expand Settings, then select Resource sharing (CORS). Create a new policy under Blob service with the following values and save your changes at the top of the page. Next navigate to Identity (Preview). In our example, we are using a System Assigned Managed Identity, so we toggle Status to On to enable the Managed Identity to be used by Bastion for session recordings. An object (principal) ID will be generated, which is the unique identifier of the managed identity resources that is registered with Microsoft Entra ID for authentication purposes. Ensure you have Session recording and either System Assigned or User Assigned Managed Identity is selected in Azure Bastion configuration settings. Select the container you would like to store session recordings to and validate Blob Container URI is correctly noted in the configuration and click Apply to perform the configuration changes on the Bastion host. Now we need to allow RBAC permissions for the Managed Identity to store session recordings in our configured Storage Account and Container. Under Permissions select Azure role assignments. Select Add role assignment (Preview) and a new blade will appear. Here, will choose our scope which is Storage, we select our subscription, and target our Storage Account under Resource category, and for Role we will need to choose Storage Blob Data Contributor for the role assignment. Proceed to click Save to see our new role assignment listed. The setup and configuration is complete and Azure Bastion will now use the configured system-assigned managed identity to store session recordings on our Storage Container. Recordings can be found after a session in the Session recordings option under Settings. Benefits of a Managed Identity 🔴 No credentials to manage: No need to worry about credentials leaking or needing rotation. 🔴 No risks of silent failures: SAS tokens can expire and stop recordings without warning. Managed Identity handles tokens automatically, so recording continues without issues. 🔴 Better security visibility: It’s part of Entra ID, so you can see it in access reviews and control it with proper permissions. 🔴 Compliance improvements: It uses a real identity that can be tracked and audited, which aligns better with security and compliance requirements. Conclusion Azure Bastion session recording is essential for organizations that need to monitor privileged access. Using Managed Identity for authentication helps protect against credential leaks and requires no ongoing maintenance after setup, compared to the SAS URL configuration option. References Public Preview: Managed Identity support for graphical session recording | Microsoft Community Hub Azure Bastion: Enterprise-grade secure access made simple | Microsoft Community Hub Managed Identity Support for Azure Bastion - Azure Network Security in the Field #1 Record Bastion sessions - Azure Bastion | Microsoft LearnHow Azure network security can help you meet NIS2 compliance
With the adoption of the NIS2 Directive EU 2022 2555, cybersecurity obligations for both public and private sector organizations have become more strict and far reaching. NIS2 aims to establish a higher common level of cybersecurity across the European Union by enforcing stronger requirements on risk management, incident reporting, supply chain protection, and governance. If your organization runs on Microsoft Azure, you already have powerful services to support your NIS2 journey. In particular Azure network security products such as Azure Firewall, Azure Web Application Firewall WAF, and Azure DDoS Protection provide foundational controls. The key is to configure and operate them in a way that aligns with the directive’s expectations. Important note This article is a technical guide based on the NIS2 Directive EU 2022 2555 and Microsoft product documentation. It is not legal advice. For formal interpretations, consult your legal or regulatory experts. What is NIS2? NIS2 replaces the original NIS Directive 2016 and entered into force on 16 January 2023. Member states must transpose it into national law by 17 October 2024. Its goals are to: Expand the scope of covered entities essential and important entities Harmonize cybersecurity standards across member states Introduce stricter supervisory and enforcement measures Strengthen supply chain security and reporting obligations Key provisions include: Article 20 management responsibility and governance Article 21 cybersecurity risk management measures Article 23 incident notification obligations These articles require organizations to implement technical, operational, and organizational measures to manage risks, respond to incidents, and ensure leadership accountability. Where Azure network security fits The table below maps common NIS2 focus areas to Azure network security capabilities and how they support compliance outcomes. NIS2 focus area Azure services and capabilities How this supports compliance Incident handling and detection Azure Firewall Premium IDPS and TLS inspection, Threat Intelligence mode, Azure WAF managed rule sets and custom rules, Azure DDoS Protection, Azure Bastion diagnostic logs Detect, block, and log threats across layers three to seven. Provide telemetry for triage and enable response workflows that are auditable. Business continuity and resilience Azure Firewall availability zones and autoscale, Azure Front Door or Application Gateway WAF with zone redundant deployments, Azure Monitor with Log Analytics, Traffic Manager or Front Door for failover Improve service availability and provide data for resilience reviews and disaster recovery scenarios. Access control and segmentation Azure Firewall policy with DNAT, network, and application rules, NSGs and ASGs, Azure Bastion for browser based RDP SSH without public IPs, Private Link Enforce segmentation and isolation of critical assets. Support Zero Trust and least privilege for inbound and egress. Vulnerability and misconfiguration defense Azure WAF Microsoft managed rule set based on OWASP CRS. Azure Firewall Premium IDPS signatures Reduce exposure to common web exploits and misconfigurations for public facing apps and APIs. Encryption and secure communications TLS policy: Application Gateway SSL policy; Front Door TLS policy; App Service/PaaS minimum TLS. Inspection: Azure Firewall Premium TLS inspection Inspect and enforce encrypted communication policies and block traffic that violates TLS requirements. Inspect decrypted traffic for threats. Incident reporting and evidence Azure Network Security diagnostics, Log Analytics, Microsoft Sentinel incidents, workbooks, and playbooks Capture and retain telemetry. Correlate events, create incident timelines, and export reports to meet regulator timelines. NIS2 articles in practice Article 21 cybersecurity risk management measures Azure network controls contribute to several required measures: Prevention and detection. Azure Firewall blocks unauthorized access and inspects traffic with IDPS. Azure DDoS Protection mitigates volumetric and protocol attacks. Azure WAF prevents common web exploits based on OWASP guidance. Logging and monitoring. Azure Firewall, WAF, DDoS, and Bastion resources produce detailed resource logs and metrics in Azure Monitor. Ingest these into Microsoft Sentinel for correlation, analytics rules, and automation. Control of encrypted communications. Azure Firewall Premium provides TLS inspection to reveal malicious payloads inside encrypted sessions. Supply chain and service provider management. Use Azure Policy and Defender for Cloud to continuously assess configuration and require approved network security baselines across subscriptions and landing zones. Article 23 incident notification Build an evidence friendly workflow with Sentinel: Early warning within twenty four hours. Use Sentinel analytics rules on Firewall, WAF, DDoS, and Bastion logs to generate incidents and trigger playbooks that assemble an initial advisory. Incident notification within seventy two hours. Enrich the incident with additional context such as mitigation actions from DDoS, Firewall and WAF. Final report within one month. Produce a summary that includes root cause, impact, and corrective actions. Use Workbooks to export charts and tables that back up your narrative. Article 20 governance and accountability Management accountability. Track policy compliance with Azure Policy initiatives for Firewall, DDoS and WAF. Use exemptions rarely and record justification. Centralized visibility. Defender for Cloud’s network security posture views and recommendations give executives and owners a quick view of exposure and misconfigurations. Change control and drift prevention. Manage Firewall, WAF, and DDoS through Network Security Hub and Infrastructure as Code with Bicep or Terraform. Require pull requests and approvals to enforce four eyes on changes. Network security baseline Use this blueprint as a starting point. Adapt to your landing zone architecture and regulator guidance. Topology and control plane Hub and spoke architecture with a centralized Azure Firewall Premium in the hub. Enable availability zones. Deploy Azure Bastion Premium in the hub or a dedicated management VNet; peer to spokes. Remove public IPs from management NICs and disable public RDP SSH on VMs. Use Network Security Hub for at-scale management. Require Infrastructure as Code for all network security resources. Web application protection Protect public apps with Azure Front Door Premium WAF where edge inspection is required. Use Application Gateway WAF v2 for regional scenarios. Enable the Microsoft managed rule set and the latest version. Add custom rules for geo based allow or deny and bot management. enable rate limiting when appropriate. DDoS strategy Enable DDoS Network Protection on virtual networks that contain internet facing resources. Use IP Protection for single public IP scenarios. Configure DDoS diagnostics and alerts. Stream to Sentinel. Define runbooks for escalation and service team engagement. Firewall policy Enable IDPS in alert and then in alert and deny for high confidence signatures. Enable TLS inspection for outbound and inbound where supported. Enforce FQDN and URL filtering for egress. Require explicit allow lists for critical segments. Deny inbound RDP SSH from the internet. Allow management traffic only from Bastion subnets or approved management jump segments. Logging, retention, and access Turn on diagnostic settings for Firewall, WAF, DDoS, and Application Gateway or Front Door. Send to Log Analytics and an archive storage account for long term retention. Set retention per national law and internal policy. Azure Monitor Log Analytics supports table-level retention and archive for up to 12 years, many teams keep a shorter interactive window and multi-year archive for audits. Restrict access with Azure RBAC and Customer Managed Keys where applicable. Automation and playbooks Build Sentinel playbooks for regulator notifications, ticket creation, and evidence collection. Maintain dry run versions for exercises. Add analytics for Bastion session starts to sensitive VMs, excessive failed connection attempts, and out of hours access. Conclusion Azure network security services provide the technical controls most organizations need in order to align with NIS2. When combined with policy enforcement, centralized logging, and automated detection and response, they create a defensible and auditable posture. Focus on layered protection, secure connectivity, and real time response so that you can reduce exposure to evolving threats, accelerate incident response, and meet NIS2 obligations with confidence. References NIS2 primary source Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj/eng Azure Firewall Premium features (TLS inspection, IDPS, URL filtering). https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/premium-features Deploy & configure Azure Firewall Premium. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/premium-deploy IDPS signature categories reference. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/idps-signature-categories Monitoring & diagnostic logs reference. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/monitor-firewall-reference Web Application Firewall WAF on Azure Front Door overview & features. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/frontdoor/web-application-firewall WAF on Application Gateway overview. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/web-application-firewall/overview Examine WAF logs with Log Analytics. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/application-gateway/log-analytics Rate limiting with Front Door WAF. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/web-application-firewall/afds/waf-front-door-rate-limit Azure DDoS Protection Service overview & SKUs (Network Protection, IP Protection). https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ddos-protection/ddos-protection-overview Quickstart: Enable DDoS IP Protection. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ddos-protection/manage-ddos-ip-protection-portal View DDoS diagnostic logs (Notifications, Mitigation Reports/Flows). https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ddos-protection/ddos-view-diagnostic-logs Azure Bastion Azure Bastion overview and SKUs. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/bastion/bastion-overview Deploy and configure Azure Bastion. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/bastion/tutorial-create-host-portal Disable public RDP and SSH on Azure VMs. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/security-baseline Azure Bastion diagnostic logs and metrics. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/bastion/bastion-diagnostic-logs Microsoft Sentinel Sentinel documentation (onboard, analytics, automation). https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/ Azure Firewall solution for Microsoft Sentinel. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall/firewall-sentinel-overview Use Microsoft Sentinel with Azure WAF. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/web-application-firewall/waf-sentinel Architecture & routing Hub‑spoke network topology (reference). https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/networking/architecture/hub-spoke Azure Firewall Manager & secured virtual hub. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/firewall-manager/secured-virtual-hubAzure WAF Tuning for Web Applications
False positives occur when a Web Application Firewall (WAF) erroneously detects legitimate web traffic as malicious and subsequently denies access. For instance, an HTTP request that poses no threat may trigger WAF to classify it as an SQL injection attack due to how characters are passed through the request body, thereby causing the request to be rejected and denying access to the user. Find out in this post some examples to help reduce false positives in your Azure WAF environment.
