Event details
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What is the path for a Vmware environment in an air gapped server environment?
How can I easily check which devices got the updates and which not? Is it clear that newer hardware gets the update and older hardware don't get the updates?
There are PowerShell scripts posted here to check the UEFI variables, or you can check for the event ids mentioned in the webinar.
It does not need to be older hardware that does not get the updates. It depends on how well the UEFI has been programmed by the vendor and how closely they worked with Microsoft to submit the new KEK updates.
And for the confidence buckets in the LCU it depends on how common your device is and if anyone using it has telemetry enabled.
On the other hand,, everything that is Logo certified for Windows 11 25H2 should already include the certificates.
Considering the high volume of interest in this subject, I see I'm not alone in being concerned as to what will happen after June. Is there a possibility the time line will have to be pushed off further considering the confusion and the issues related to existing hardware still in use prior to the release of the new Cert? the documentation has not been as clear and straight forward as one would hope (have to still read through these last two) Hopefully some better clarification will be forthcoming as to what to do, what will and won't be supported, etc...
Is updating BIOS / UEFI a prerequisite before updating the certificates?
Is there a list of “High Confidence” devices Microsoft can provide?
Outside Intune, what does Microsoft suggest as the most reliable method?
What about the WinCS / AvailableUpdates=5944) vs Option 2 (Managed Opt-in)?
Telemetry / Events – how do we monitor success?
BitLocker – do we need to suspend it?
Teams room devices are impacted ?About the "High Confidence" devices: You can have a look at BucketConfidenceData.json inside C:\Windows\System32\SecureBootUpdates\BucketConfidenceData.cab which will contains a list of model bucket hashes grouped by OEM name. As these are hashes, you cannot deduce the model names from them (and probably even Microsoft cannot if they only keep the hashes in their telemetry data). Also, as of January 2026 update, there are almost a million hashes in there.
Here is a list grouped by vendor (as you see, some vendors are unsure how to write themselves):
- Generic OEM (877734 models)
- Acer (10690 models)
- ASUS (2017 models)
- ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC. (1385 models)
- ASUSTeK Computer Inc. (18 models)
- ASUSTeK Computer INC. (1 model)
- Dell (5 models)
- Dell Inc. (411 models)
- Dynabook Inc. (565 models)
- Hewlett-Packard (5 models)
- HONOR (95 models)
- HP (1001 models)
- LENOVO (50008 models)
- LG Electronics (2668 models)
- LG Electronics Inc. (2 models)
- Micro-Star International Co., Ltd (229 models)
- Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. (5605 models)
- Microsoft (3 models)
- Microsoft Corporation (35 models)
- MSI (129 models)
- Panasonic Connect Co., Ltd. (7 models)
- Panasonic Corporation (22 models)
- SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. (4081 models)
- TOSHIBA (326 models)
- Toshiba (8 models)
As nobody knows which vendor don't give themselves a name in the data sourced by Microsoft, you cannot even tell if your vendor is included ☹️
I assume the hashes are generated on the devices before sending the telemetry, so it should be easy to get the hash of given a device locally and compare it to the list, to know if its part of "High Confidence" or not. Using that as Intune proactive remediation would give us an overview, which device to take care of ourselves (the ones not in HighConfidence Bucket), and to proove the HighConfidence devices got updated, as expected.
- Pearl-Angeles
Community Manager
Thanks for your participation! Panelists covered your question about Intune at 42:14 during the live AMA.
The Intune report “Secure Boot status” shows 1980 up-to-date, 2272 not up-to-date and 57 n/a.
This report shows my device is up-to-date, which tallies with the UEFICA2023Status reg key showing as “updated”, but Get-UEFICertificate -Type KEK still shows it expires 24/06/2026, even after multiple reboots.
We raised a Microsoft Premier Support ticket with the Intune team who advised Intune is working and we need to open a another ticket with the Windows team to investigate the expiry date still showing 2026 despite the reg key showing "Updated".
Is this expected behaviour and we should ignore the 2026 expiry date or is the reg key not reporting correctly please?Get-UEFICertificate -Type KEK shows 2 Microsoft KEKs:-
CN=Microsoft Corporation KEK 2K CA 2023 = expiry date 2038CN=Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 = expiry date 2026
Do we just ignore the 2011 KEK?The 2011 KEK can be ignored, it has no impact on security (assuming Microsoft does not get breached and leaks the private key to it :-D). Same applies to additional (expired) KEKs from your OEM, if present.
We have verified that all of our end user systems have the required BIOS updates. All of our end user systems receive their updates from Windows Update for Business (via Intune). We have also verified that none of our systems are getting the required Secure Boot updates. Will our systems get the required updates via Windows Update for Business automatically before the June expiration date?
- Arden_White
Microsoft
For client devices, the High Confidence updates began rolling out in January and will continue over the coming months. We expect that most client devices will receive the new Secure Boot certificates through this process. If you have opted in to Microsoft Update Managed updates and have enabled diagnostic data, those updates are also rolling out over the coming months.
It is important to monitor the status of devices in your environment to ensure they are receiving updates. Pay close attention to Event 1801, which may indicate that a device needs attention.
Server devices and other non‑client devices such as IoT systems require customer‑managed deployment. For guidance on how to update these devices, see Secure Boot Certificate updates:
Secure Boot Certificate updates: Guidance for IT professionals and organizations.
Arden - Microsoft
When stating "Microsoft will push the new certificates through Windows Update", what does that mean specifically in the secure boot pipeline? You are pushing 2023 into the DB? You are signing the Boot Manager in the EFI partition with the 2023 certificate? you are pushing 2011 into the DBX? What happens when a machine is reimaged with a factory or custom image?
- Pearl-Angeles
We appreciate your participation in this AMA! Panelists covered this topic at 29:34.
Hello. What about dual boot devices ? Either 2 windows or Linux + windows etc
- Pearl-Angeles
Panelists covered this topic at around 36:51 during the live AMA.
Was partly answered in the event. The most critical situation here is full-disk encryption with TPM against PCR7. If whatever OS does not initially install the certificates is using such full-disk-encryption, they won't be able to reseal TPM and need a recovery key on next boot.
As TPM based full disk encryption is is quite exotic on Linux, you most probably get into that issue if you configure fwupd on Linux to push a new Microsoft KEK (which latest fwupd has an option for) while dual-booting Windows with BitLocker (and not having booted Windows for a while so that one did not push it first).
Still, common scenarios with no TPM full-disk-encryption on Linux side and not trying fwupd with exotic options on Linux either should not run into any issues. Also, I guess most dual boot setups won't even use full-disk-encryption on Windows side either as it makes data transfers between the systems harder than needed.
In the Registry Entry HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot
What does an "AvailableUpdates" value of 400 (0x00000400) indicate?
It will push updates to the SBAT variable. This variable is used by Non-Windows bootloaders (mostly Linux distributions) by blocking boot of systems that contain boot-related software with known vulnerabilities.
When you never use Linux (including Linux-based recovery tools), you can safely push it. If you use them, check to have the latest version of those media.
Also, when you have a dual-boot scenario, Linux will take care of keeping your SBAT up to date, so you do not need to push it from Windows.
Does every certificate in the rollout need to be applied successfully? Specifically, the 'Microsoft Option ROM UEFI CA 2023' certificate fails to apply on some devices — is this expected/acceptable, or does it indicate a problem that needs resolving before we can safely enable enforcement?"
It does not affect installing the new boot loader or anything Windows related. It may affect Secure Boot working if you add new hardware like RAID controllers that have an Option ROM signed with the new certificate.
