passkeys in the Authenticator app regarding attestation
I have a question about passkeys in the Authenticator app regarding attestation in connection with QR code-based cross-device sign-in. When we register a passkey with attestation enabled in the Authenticator app, it can be used to complete the sign-in process on another device via QR code and Bluetooth Low Energy. According to Microsoft’s documentation, this shouldn’t be possible with attestation enabled, yet it works. What are we misunderstanding here? https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-enable-authenticator-passkey Thanks for your inputs. JohannesAdvice required for temp / agency staff
Hi All I hope you are well. Anyway, I'm hoping someone can point me in the right direction. We have Android devices in Entra Shared Device Mode (Multi App) which any of our employees with a valid UPN can logon to. All good there. What we need is a solution for temporary or agency staff. This would be staff that could be called on at very short notice and may not stay around for long. For security and audit reasons, we'd rather not create "userless" accounts. Is there anything in Entra / Entra Shared Device Mode that can achieve this? Info greatly appreciated. SK
ID token issued by AAD doesn't match public signing key
Hi, I've encountered an issue that ID tokens (JWT) issued by AAD do not match a public signing key. This is my JWKS url: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flogin.microsoftonline.com%2F1d063515-6cad-4195-9486-ea65df456faa%2Fdiscovery%2Fv2.0%2Fkeys&data=02%7C01%7Cyu.kuang.lu%40LEGO.com%7C83d34dcb3e744cd9498508d8294edcdf%7C1d0635156cad41959486ea65df456faa%7C1%7C0%7C637304765982427993&sdata=9WgGhPx7T%2B9ngD3RSu6zT3ePFwIfr3IwKk2m9JiNAxE%3D&reserved=0 However the ID token I receive has a unmatched kid like below { "typ": "JWT", "alg": "RS256", "kid": "ylQQc6jLgNEIt8AMAPm8jR27QCE" } It's been working fine until a couple of days ago. It is mentioned somewhere that AAD rotates public keys but it seems tokens might be persisted without knowledge that the signing key has changed. However access token match one of the keys like { "typ": "JWT", "nonce": "ExKWqBKO2TvzbusXVkALk0RQhka3YiNxEKQg69gs27Q", "alg": "RS256", "x5t": "huN95IvPfehq34GzBDZ1GXGirnM", "kid": "huN95IvPfehq34GzBDZ1GXGirnM" } Is this the expected behaviour? AAD is my IDP and AWS Cognito is the auth server in my set up. Because of this issue, Cognito is unable to verify signature of ID tokens therefore users can sign in but cannot proceed further because of this. Has anyone come across a similar issue before?
Introducing the Entra Helpdesk Portal: A Zero-Trust, Dockerized ITSM Interface for Tier 1 Support
Hello everyone, If you manage identity in Microsoft Entra ID at an enterprise scale, you know the struggle: delegating day-to-day operational tasks (like password resets, session revocations, and MFA management) to Tier 1 and Tier 2 support staff is inherently risky. The native Azure/Entra portal is incredibly powerful, but it’s complex and lacks mandatory ITSM enforcement. Giving a helpdesk technician the "Helpdesk Administrator" role grants them access to a portal where a single misclick can cause a major headache. To solve this, I’ve developed the Entra Helpdesk Portal (Community Edition)—an open-source, containerized application designed to act as an isolated "airlock" between your support team and your Entra ID tenant. Why This Adds Value to Your Tenant Instead of having technicians log into the Azure portal, they log into this clean, Material Design web interface. It leverages a backend Service Principal (using MSAL and the Graph API) to execute commands on their behalf. Strict Zero Trust: Logging in via Microsoft SSO isn’t enough. The app intercepts the token and checks the user’s UPN against a hardcoded ALLOWED_ADMINS whitelist in your Docker environment file. Mandatory ITSM Ticketing: You cannot enforce ticketing in the native Azure Portal. In this app, every write action prompts a modal requiring a valid ticket number (e.g., INC-123456). Local Audit Logging: All actions, along with the actor, timestamp, and ticket number, are written to an immutable local SQLite database (audit.db) inside the container volume. Performance: Heavy Graph API reads are cached in-memory with a Time-To-Live (TTL) and smart invalidation. Searching for users or loading Enterprise Apps takes milliseconds. What Can It Do? Identity Lifecycle: Create users, auto-generate secure 16-character passwords, revoke sign-in sessions, reset passwords, and delete specific MFA methods to force re-registration. Diagnostics: View a user's last 5 sign-in logs, translating Microsoft error codes into plain English. Group Management: Add/remove members to Security and M365 groups. App/SPN Management: Lazy-load raw requiredResourceAccess Graph API payloads to audit app permissions, and instantly rotate client secrets. Universal Restore: Paste the Object ID of any soft-deleted item into the Recycle Bin tab to instantly resurrect it. How Easy Is It to Setup? I wanted this to be universally deployable, so I compiled it as a multi-architecture Docker image (linux/amd64 and linux/arm64). It will run on a massive Windows Server or a simple Raspberry Pi. Setup takes less than 5 minutes: Create an App Registration in Entra ID and grant it the necessary Graph API Application Permissions (e.g., User.ReadWrite.All, AuditLog.Read.All). Create a docker-compose.yml file. Define your feature toggles. You can literally turn off features (like User Deletion) by setting an environment variable to false. version: '3.8' services: helpdesk-portal: image: jahmed22/entra-helpdesk:latest container_name: entra_helpdesk restart: unless-stopped ports: - "8000:8000" environment: # CORE IDENTITY - TENANT_ID=your_tenant_id_here - CLIENT_ID=your_client_id_here - CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret_here - BASE_URL=https://entradesk.jahmed.cloud - ALLOWED_ADMINS=email address removed for privacy reasons # CUSTOMIZATION & FEATURE FLAGS - APP_NAME=Entra Help Desk - ENABLE_PASSWORD_RESET=true - ENABLE_MFA_MANAGEMENT=true - ENABLE_USER_DELETION=false - ENABLE_GROUP_MANAGEMENT=true - ENABLE_APP_MANAGEMENT=true volumes: - entra_helpdesk_data:/app/static/uploads - entra_helpdesk_db:/app volumes: entra_helpdesk_data: entra_helpdesk_db: 4.Run docker compose up -d and you are done! I built this to give back to the community and help secure our Tier 1 operations. If you are interested in testing it out in your dev tenants or want to see the full architecture breakdown, you can read the complete documentation on my website here I’d love to hear your thoughts, feedback, or any feature requests you might have!
Challenges with custom data provided resource reviews
I was thrilled to see the ability to review disconnected applications in Entra, and even more thrilled to see that the permission and its description are available to the reviewer, which addresses a significant gap present in group-based reviews. However, the current decision-tracking approach does not adequately replicate the closed-loop remediation model typically found in traditional IGA access reviews for integrated applications. Requiring reviewers to upload confirmation that revocations have been completed is problematic. This approach does not mitigate the core risk: access may remain in place due to fulfillment errors or be incorrectly retained, and the reviewer may unknowingly validate an inaccurate state. This can lead to a compliance incident or audit finding. A more effective solution would allow reviewers to upload a current export of access data, enabling the review system to reconcile intended revocations against the actual state. Any discrepancies could then be flagged for remediation where revocations were missed or have failed, or for validation where access was revoked and immediately reinstated (e.g., due to reviewer misjudgement), ideally supported by corresponding ticketing or justification. There are currently a lot of gaps in Entra ID access reviews, and while this new feature arguably resolved the worst one, I think it's headed down the wrong path. I am curious about other people's thoughts.Entra ID Object Drift – Are We Measuring Tenant Health Correctly?
In many enterprise environments: Secure Score is green. Compliance dashboards look healthy. Yet directory object inconsistency silently accumulates. Stale devices. Hybrid join remnants. Intune orphan records. Over time, this becomes governance debt. In large tenants this often leads to inaccurate compliance reporting and Conditional Access targeting issues. I recently wrote a breakdown of: • Entra ID drift patterns • Hybrid join inconsistencies • Intune orphan objects • Lifecycle-based cleanup architecture Curious how others approach object hygiene at scale. Full article: https://www.modernendpoint.tech/entra-id-cleanup-patterns/?utm_source=techcommunity&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=entra_cleanup_launch&utm_content=discussion One pattern I keep seeing is duplicate device identities after re-enrollment or Autopilot reset. Curious how others handle lifecycle cleanup in large Entra ID environments.
Can External ID (CIAM) federate to an Azure AD/Entra ID tenant using SAML?
What I'm trying to achieve I'm setting up SAML federation FROM my External ID tenant (CIAM) TO a partner's Entra ID tenant (regular organizational tenant) for a hybrid CIAM/B2B setup where: Business users authenticate via their corporate accounts (OIDC or SAML) Individual customers use username/password or social providers (OIDC) Tenant details / Terminology: CIAM tenant: External ID tenant for customer-facing applications IdP tenant: Example Partner's organizational Entra ID tenant with business accounts Custom domain: mycustomdomain.com (example domain for the IdP tenant) Configuration steps taken Step 1: IdP Tenant (Entra ID) - Created SAML App Set up Enterprise App with SAML SSO Entity ID: https://login.microsoftonline.com/<CIAM_TENANT_ID>/ Reply URL: https://<CIAM_TENANT_ID>.ciamlogin.com/login.srf NameID: Persistent format Claim mapping: emailaddress → user.mail Step 2: CIAM Tenant (External ID) - Added SAML IdP (Initially imported from the SAML metadata URL from the above setup) Federating domain: mycustomdomain.com Issuer URI: https://sts.windows.net/<IDP_TENANT_ID>/ Passive endpoint: https://login.microsoftonline.com/mycustomdomain.com/saml2 DNS TXT record added: DirectFedAuthUrl=https://login.microsoftonline.com/mycustomdomain.com/saml2 Step 3: Attached to User Flow Added SAML IdP to user flow under "Other identity providers" Saved configuration and waited for propagation The problem It doesn't work. When testing via "Run user flow": No SAML button appears (should display "Sign in with mycustomdomain") Entering email address removed for privacy reasons doesn't trigger federation The SAML provider appears configured but never shows up in the actual flow Also tried using the tenant GUID in the passive endpoint instead of the domain - same result My question Is SAML federation from External ID to regular Entra ID tenants actually possible? I know OIDC federation to Microsoft tenants is (currently, august 2025) explicitly blocked (microsoftonline.com domains are rejected). Is SAML similarly restricted? The portal lets me configure everything without throwing any errors, but it never actually works. Am I missing something in my configuration? The documentation for this use case is limited and I've had to piece together the setup from various sources. Or is this a fundamental limitation where External ID simply can't federate to ANY Microsoft tenant regardless of the protocol used?Display On-prem Password Policy on SSPR Page
Hi All We are beginning to rollout SSPR with on-prem writeback. So far so good. Is there a way we can display our on-prem password policy requirements on the SSPR screen? I have seen the MS docs, but can't really make any sense of them so any help would be greatly appreciated. SK
