Security Baseline for M365 Apps for enterprise v2512
Security baseline for Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise (v2512, December 2025) Microsoft is pleased to announce the latest Security Baseline for Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise, version 2512, is now available as part of the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit. This release builds on previous baselines and introduces updated, security‑hardened recommendations aligned with modern threat landscapes and the latest Office administrative templates. As with prior releases, this baseline is intended to help enterprise administrators quickly deploy Microsoft recommended security configurations, reduce configuration drift, and ensure consistent protection across user environments. Download the updated baseline today from the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit, test the recommended configurations, and implement as appropriate. This release introduces and updates several security focused policies designed to strengthen protections in Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint, and core Microsoft 365 Apps components. These changes reflect evolving attacker techniques, partner feedback, and Microsoft’s secure by design engineering standards. The recommended settings in this security baseline correspond with the administrative templates released in version 5516. Below are the updated settings included in this baseline: Excel: File Block Includes External Link Files Policy Path: User Configuration\Administrative Templates\Microsoft Excel 2016\Excel Options\Security\Trust Center\File Block Settings\File Block includes external link files The baseline will ensure that external links to workbooks blocked by File Block will no longer refresh. Attempts to create or update links to blocked files return an error. This prevents data ingestion from untrusted or potentially malicious sources. Block Insecure Protocols Across Microsoft 365 Apps Policy Path: User Configuration\Administrative Templates\Microsoft Office 2016\Security Settings\Block Insecure Protocols The baseline will block all non‑HTTPS protocols when opening documents, eliminating downgrade paths and unsafe connections. This aligns with Microsoft’s broader effort to enforce TLS‑secure communication across productivity and cloud services. Block OLE Graph Functionality Policy Path: User Configuration\Administrative Templates\Microsoft Office 2016\Security Settings\Block OLE Graph This setting will prevent MSGraph.Application and MSGraph.Chart (classic OLE Graph components) from executing. Microsoft 365 Apps will instead render a static image, mitigating a historically risky automation interface. Block OrgChart Add‑in Policy Path: User Configuration\Administrative Templates\Microsoft Office 2016\Security Settings\Block OrgChart The legacy OrgChart add‑in is disabled, preventing execution and replacing output with an image. This reduces exposure to outdated automation frameworks while maintaining visual fidelity. Restrict FPRPC Fallback in Microsoft 365 Apps Policy Path: User Configuration\Administrative Templates\Microsoft Office 2016\Security Settings\Restrict Apps from FPRPC Fallback The baseline disables the ability for Microsoft 365 Apps to fall back to FrontPage Server Extensions RPC which is an aging protocol not designed for modern security requirements. Avoiding fallback ensures consistent use of modern, authenticated file‑access methods. PowerPoint: OLE Active Content Controls Updated Policy Path: User Configuration\Administrative Templates\Microsoft PowerPoint 2016\PowerPoint Options\Security\OLE Active Content This baseline enforces disabling interactive OLE actions, no OLE content will be activate. The recommended baseline selection ensures secure‑by‑default OLE activation, reducing risk from embedded legacy objects. Deployment options for the baseline IT Admins can apply baseline settings in different ways. Depending on the method(s) chosen, different registry keys will be written, and they will be observed in order of precedence: Office cloud policies will override ADMX/Group Policies which will override end user settings in the Trust Center. Cloud policies may be deployed with the Office cloud policy service for policies in HKCU. Cloud policies apply to a user on any device accessing files in Office apps with their AAD account. In Office cloud policy service, you can create a filter for the Area column to display the current Security Baselines, and within each policy's context pane the recommended baseline setting is set by default. Learn more about Office cloud policy service. ADMX policies may be deployed with Microsoft Intune for both HKCU and HKLM policies. These settings are written to the same place as Group Policy, but managed from the cloud. There are two methods to create and deploy policy configurations: Administrative templates or the settings catalog. Group Policy may be deployed with on premise AD DS to deploy Group Policy Objects (GPO) to users and computers. The downloadable baseline package includes importable GPOs, a script to apply the GPOs to local policy, a script to import the GPOs into Active Directory Group Policy, updated custom administrative template (SecGuide.ADMX/L) file, all the recommended settings in spreadsheet form and a Policy Analyzer rules file. GPOs included in the baseline Most organizations can implement the baseline’s recommended settings without any problems. However, there are a few settings that will cause operational issues for some organizations. We've broken out related groups of such settings into their own GPOs to make it easier for organizations to add or remove these restrictions as a set. The local-policy script (Baseline-LocalInstall.ps1) offers command-line options to control whether these GPOs are installed. "MSFT Microsoft 365 Apps v2512" GPO set includes “Computer” and “User” GPOs that represent the “core” settings that should be trouble free, and each of these potentially challenging GPOs: “DDE Block - User” is a User Configuration GPO that blocks using DDE to search for existing DDE server processes or to start new ones. “Legacy File Block - User” is a User Configuration GPO that prevents Office applications from opening or saving legacy file formats. "Legacy JScript Block - Computer" disables the legacy JScript execution for websites in the Internet Zone and Restricted Sites Zone. “Require Macro Signing - User” is a User Configuration GPO that disables unsigned macros in each of the Office applications. If you have questions or issues, please let us know via the Security Baseline Community or this post. Related: Learn about Microsoft Baseline Security ModeSecurity Review for Microsoft Edge version 144
We have reviewed the new settings in Microsoft Edge version 144 and determined that there are no additional security settings that require enforcement. The Microsoft Edge version 139 security baseline continues to be our recommended configuration which can be downloaded from the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit. Microsoft Edge version 144 introduced 2 new Computer and User settings; we have included a spreadsheet listing the new settings to make it easier for you to find. As a friendly reminder, all available settings for Microsoft Edge are documented here, and all available settings for Microsoft Edge Update are documented here. Please continue to give us feedback through the Security Baselines Discussion site or this post.Security Review for Microsoft Edge version 143
We have reviewed the new settings in Microsoft Edge version 143 and determined that there are no additional security settings that require enforcement. The Microsoft Edge version 139 security baseline continues to be our recommended configuration which can be downloaded from the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit. Microsoft Edge version 143 introduced 3 new Computer and User settings; we have included a spreadsheet listing the new settings to make it easier for you to find. As a friendly reminder, all available settings for Microsoft Edge are documented here, and all available settings for Microsoft Edge Update are documented here. Please continue to give us feedback through the Security Baselines Discussion site or this post.Security Review for Microsoft Edge version 142
We have reviewed the new settings in Microsoft Edge version 142 and determined that there are no additional security settings that require enforcement. The Microsoft Edge version 139 security baseline continues to be our recommended configuration which can be downloaded from the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit. Microsoft Edge version 142 introduced 5 new Computer and User settings; we have included a spreadsheet listing the new settings to make it easier for you to find. As a friendly reminder, all available settings for Microsoft Edge are documented here, and all available settings for Microsoft Edge Update are documented here. Please continue to give us feedback through the Security Baselines Discussion site or this post.Security Review for Microsoft Edge version 141
We have reviewed the new settings in Microsoft Edge version 141 and determined that there are no additional security settings that require enforcement. The Microsoft Edge version 139 security baseline continues to be our recommended configuration which can be downloaded from the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit. Microsoft Edge version 141 introduced 6 new Computer and User settings; we have included a spreadsheet listing the new settings to make it easier for you to find. As a friendly reminder, all available settings for Microsoft Edge are documented here, and all available settings for Microsoft Edge Update are documented here. Please continue to give us feedback through the Security Baselines Discussion site or this post.Windows 11, version 25H2 security baseline
Microsoft is pleased to announce the security baseline package for Windows 11, version 25H2! You can download the baseline package from the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit, test the recommended configurations in your environment, and customize / implement them as appropriate. Summary of changes This release includes several changes made since the Windows 11, version 24H2 security baseline to further assist in the security of enterprise customers, to include better alignment with the latest capabilities and standards. The changes include what is depicted in the table below. Security Policy Change Summary Printer: Impersonate a client after authentication Add “RESTRICTED SERVICES\PrintSpoolerService” to allow the Print Spooler’s restricted service identity to impersonate clients securely NTLM Auditing Enhancements Enable by default to improve visibility into NTLM usage within your environment MDAV: Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) Add "Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands" (d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c) with a recommended value of 2 (Audit) to improve visibility into suspicious activity MDAV: Control whether exclusions are visible to local users Move to Not Configured as it is overridden by the parent setting MDAV: Scan packed executables Remove from the baseline because the setting is no longer functional - Windows always scans packed executables by default Network: Configure NetBIOS settings Disable NetBIOS name resolution on all network adapters to reduce legacy protocol exposure Disable Internet Explorer 11 Launch Via COM Automation Disable to prevent legacy scripts and applications from programmatically launching Internet Explorer 11 using COM automation interfaces Include command line in process creation events Enable to improve visibility into how processes are executed across the system WDigest Authentication Remove from the baseline because the setting is obsolete - WDigest is disabled by default and no longer needed in modern Windows environments Printer Improving Print Security with IPPS and Certificate Validation To enhance the security of network printing, Windows introduces two new policies focused on controlling the use of IPP (Internet Printing Protocol) printers and enforcing encrypted communications. The setting, "Require IPPS for IPP printers", (Administrative Templates\Printers) determines whether printers that do not support TLS are allowed to be installed. When this policy is disabled (default), both IPP and IPPS transport printers can be installed - although IPPS is preferred when both are available. When enabled, only IPPS printers will be installed; attempts to install non-compliant printers will fail and generate an event in the Application log, indicating that installation was blocked by policy. The second policy, "Set TLS/SSL security policy for IPP printers" (same policy path) requires that printers present valid and trusted TLS/SSL certificates before connections can be established. Enabling this policy defends against spoofed or unauthorized printers, reducing the risk of credential theft or redirection of sensitive print jobs. While these policies significantly improve security posture, enabling them may introduce operational challenges in environments where IPP and self-signed or locally issued certificates are still commonly used. For this reason, neither policy is enforced in the security baseline, at this time. We recommend that you assess your printers, and if they meet the requirements, consider enabling those policies with a remediation plan to address any non-compliant printers in a controlled and predictable manner. User Rights Assignment Update: Impersonate a client after authentication We have added RESTRICTED SERVICES\PrintSpoolerService in the “Impersonate a client after authentication” User Rights Assignment policy. The baseline already includes Administrators, SERVICE, LOCAL SERVICE, and NETWORK SERVICE for this user right. Adding the restricted Print Spooler supports Microsoft’s ongoing effort to apply least privilege to system services. It enables Print Spooler to securely impersonate user tokens in modern print scenarios using a scoped, restricted service identity. Although this identity is associated with functionality introduced as part of Windows Protected Print (WPP), it is required to support proper print operations even if WPP is not currently enabled. The system manifests the identity by default, and its presence ensures forward compatibility with WPP-based printing. Note: This account may appear as a raw SID (e.g., S-1-5-99-...) in Group Policy or local policy tools before the service is fully initialized. This is expected and does not indicate a misconfiguration. Warning: Removing this entry will result in print failures in environments where WPP is enabled. We recommend retaining this entry in any custom security configuration that defines this user right. NTLM Auditing Enhancements Windows 11, version 25H2 includes enhanced NTLM auditing capabilities, enabled by default, which significantly improves visibility into NTLM usage within your environment. These enhancements provide detailed audit logs to help security teams monitor and investigate authentication activity, identify insecure practices, and prepare for future NTLM restrictions. Since these auditing improvements are enabled by default, no additional configuration is required, and thus the baseline does not explicitly enforce them. For more details, see Overview of NTLM auditing enhancements in Windows 11 and Windows Server 2025. Microsoft Defender Antivirus Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) In this release, we've updated the Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to add the policy Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands (d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c) with a recommended value of 2 (Audit). By auditing this rule, you can gain essential visibility into potential privilege escalation attempts via tools such as PSExec or persistence mechanisms using WMI. This enhancement helps organizations proactively identify suspicious activities without impacting legitimate administrative workflows. Control whether exclusions are visible to local users We have removed the configuration for the policy "Control whether exclusions are visible to local users" (Windows Components\Microsoft Defender Antivirus) from the baseline in this release. This change was made because the parent policy "Control whether or not exclusions are visible to Local Admins" is already set to Enabled, which takes precedence and effectively overrides the behavior of the former setting. As a result, explicitly configuring the child policy is unnecessary. You can continue to manage exclusion visibility through the parent policy, which provides the intended control over whether local administrators can view exclusion lists. Scan packed executables The “Scan packed executables” setting (Windows Components\Microsoft Defender Antivirus\Scan) has been removed from the security baseline because it is no longer functional in modern Windows releases. Microsoft Defender Antivirus always scans packed executables by default, therefore configuring this policy has no effect on the system. Disable NetBIOS Name Resolution on All Networks In this release, we start disabling NetBIOS name resolution on all network adapters in the security baseline, including those connected to private and domain networks. The change is reflected in the policy setting “Configure NetBIOS settings” (Network\DNS Client). We are trying to eliminate the legacy name resolution protocol that is vulnerable to spoofing and credential theft. NetBIOS is no longer needed in modern environments where DNS is fully deployed and supported. To mitigate potential compatibility issues, you should ensure that all internal systems and applications use DNS for name resolution. We recommend the following; test critical workflows in a staging environment prior to deployment, monitor for any resolution failures or fallback behavior, and inform support staff of the change to assist with troubleshooting as needed. This update aligns with our broader efforts to phase out legacy protocols and improve security. Disable Internet Explorer 11 Launch Via COM Automation To enhance the security posture of enterprise environments, we recommend disabling Internet Explorer 11 Launch Via COM Automation (Windows Components\Internet Explorer) to prevent legacy scripts and applications from programmatically launching Internet Explorer 11 using COM automation interfaces such as CreateObject("InternetExplorer.Application"). Allowing such behavior poses a significant risk by exposing systems to the legacy MSHTML and ActiveX components, which are vulnerable to exploitation. Include command line in process creation events We have enabled the setting "Include command line in process creation events" (System\Audit Process Creation) in the baseline to improve visibility into how processes are executed across the system. Capturing command-line arguments allows defenders to detect and investigate malicious activity that may otherwise appear legitimate, such as abuse of scripting engines, credential theft tools, or obfuscated payloads using native binaries. This setting supports modern threat detection techniques with minimal performance overhead and is highly recommended. WDigest Authentication We removed the policy "WDigest Authentication (disabling may require KB2871997)" from the security baseline because it is no longer necessary for Windows. This policy was originally enforced to prevent WDigest from storing user’s plaintext passwords in memory, which posed a serious credential theft risk. However, starting with 24H2 update, the engineering teams deprecated this policy. As a result, there is no longer a need to explicitly enforce this setting, and the policy has been removed from the baseline to reflect the current default behavior. Since the setting does not write to the normal policies location in the registry it will not be cleaned up automatically for any existing deployments. Please let us know your thoughts by commenting on this post or through the Security Baseline Community.Security Review for Microsoft Edge version 140
We have reviewed the new settings in Microsoft Edge version 140 and determined that there are no additional security settings that require enforcement. The Microsoft Edge version 139 security baseline continues to be our recommended configuration which can be downloaded from the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit. Microsoft Edge version 140 introduced 7 new Computer and 6 new User settings, we have included a spreadsheet listing the new settings to make it easier for you to find. As a friendly reminder, all available settings for Microsoft Edge are documented here, and all available settings for Microsoft Edge Update are documented here. Please continue to give us feedback through the Security Baselines Discussion site or this post.Security baseline for Microsoft Edge version 139
We have reviewed the settings in Microsoft Edge version 139 and updated our guidance with the addition of one setting and the removal of one setting. A new Microsoft Edge security baseline package was just released to the Download Center. You can download the new package from the Security Compliance Toolkit. Allow software WebGL fallback using SwiftShader (Added) The EnableUnsafeSwiftShaderpolicy controls whether SwiftShader is used as a fallback for WebGL when hardware GPU acceleration is disabled or unavailable. SwiftShader, a software-based renderer, was used to enable WebGL support in environments lacking GPU acceleration, such as virtual machines. However, its continued use poses potential risks, whereby malicious web content could exploit vulnerabilities in the renderer. Due to the potential risks, we have decided to enforce the default and disable this setting. Edge for Business Connectors (Worth Mentioning) The new Edge for Business security connectors feature introduces a powerful framework that integrates the browser directly with your organization’s existing security stack covering authentication, data loss prevention (DLP), and reporting. By enabling real-time device trust validation, seamless DLP enforcement, and unified browser-based telemetry, these connectors help close critical gaps in enterprise security while extending the value of your current investments. Additional information can be found on the landing page. The following settings have been removed due to deprecation: Microsoft Edge/Private Network Request Settings/Specifies whether to allow websites to make requests to any network endpoint in an insecure manner. Microsoft Edge version 139 introduces 6 new computer settings and 6 new user settings. We have included a spreadsheet listing the new settings in the release to make it easier for you to find them. As a friendly reminder, all available settings for Microsoft Edge are documented here, and all available settings for Microsoft Edge Update are documented here. Please continue to give us feedback through the Security Baseline Community or in comments on this post.Security Review for Microsoft Edge version 138
We have reviewed the new settings in Microsoft Edge version 138 and determined that there are no additional security settings that require enforcement. The Microsoft Edge version 128 security baseline, which can be downloaded from the Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit, continues to be our recommended configuration. Microsoft Edge version 138 introduces 6 new Computer and User settings and we have included a spreadsheet listing the new settings. There are two settings we would like to highlight for consideration as they enabling previewing behavior that will be enabled by default in a future release. Control whether TLS 1.3 Early Data is enabled in Microsoft Edge This setting allows enterprises to control whether the browser uses TLS 1.3 Early Data, a performance feature that sends HTTPS requests in parallel with the TLS handshake. This setting allows for faster use of secure connections. Enterprise customers are encouraged to test to identify any compatibility issues prior to the enablement. Specifies whether to block requests from public websites to devices on a user's local network This setting helps prevent malicious websites from probing or interacting with internal resources (i.e. printers, routers, or internal APIs), reducing the risk of lateral movement or data exposure. Enterprise customers are encouraged to test for any intentional requests from public to local devices. One thing to note on this policy setting is you may see a deprecation claim in the setting title. This was in error and will be corrected in a subsequent release. As a friendly reminder, all available settings for Microsoft Edge are documented here, and all available settings for Microsoft Edge Update are documented here. Please continue to give us feedback through the Security Baselines Discussion site or this post.
