Several months ago we added a feature to the Microsoft 365 Roadmap which generated a lot of interest. The feature was named Disable Basic Authentication in Exchange Online using Authentication Policies and as the roadmap items stated - it provided the capability for an Admin to define protocols which should allow Basic Authentication.
Why was that so interesting? Well as you probably know, Basic authentication in Exchange Online accepts a username and a password for client access requests and blocking Basic authentication can help protect your Exchange Online organization from brute force or password spray attacks. Lately there has been an increase in the occurrence of these types of attacks, and so we are accelerating our release of this feature as it helps prevent them.
If your organization has no legacy email clients or doesn’t want to allow legacy email clients, you can use these new authentication policies in Exchange Online to disable Basic authentication requests. This forces all client access requests to use modern authentication, which will stop these attacks from impacting your organization.
We are still working on some aspects of this feature, and we’ll highlight those for you here, but in response to the increase of attacks we are seeing, we want to make authentication policies available to you now, and are therefore rolling this out worldwide immediately.
There is already an excellent article describing how this feature works and we strongly suggest you read, understand and follow the article before enabling this feature.
There are three important caveats to this feature:
There is a lack of telemetry for tenant admins allowing them to report on which users are using Basic Auth (and with which protocol) and once a block is enabled, whether such traffic was blocked. In other words, we can’t really tell you how well the block is working.
A policy change can take up to 24 hours to take effect, unless the admin calls a cmdlet (such as Set-User) to ‘tickle’ each user. (Note that ‘tickling’ is a technical term, first used here). So the block might not kick in right away, and you might have to take some action if you want it to happen faster.
If a user’s identity has not been replicated to Azure AD/Exchange Online, they will not be blocked and so any request received by Exchange Online will be routed to the authoritative Security Token Service (STS) where it is likely to fail. This same behavior also means that any authentication requests for unknown users in a tenant (such as might happen during a password spray attack) will also be forwarded to the authoritative STS for the domain.
We had been holding back on moving from private to public preview primarily due the first two of these - a tenant admin could misconfigure something and not realize until it’s too late due to the lack of reporting and the delayed effect of policy change.
However, given the increasing frequency of these types of attacks we would rather give you access to the capability, knowing you will all carefully read the documentation before configuring. We’ll continue to work on improving the feature set, but you don’t need to wait for us.
We acknowledge that for large customers, tickling every user using Exchange Online PowerShell (which can be unreliable for long running scripts) is challenging, but again we feel the benefit outweighs the negatives at this stage.
It’s in all our interests to prevent these types of attacks from compromising our data and users, and we hope you find these tools useful and helpful. Use them wisely!
The Exchange Team