Event details
How can we ensure that
- UEFI updates
- Reset of Secure Boot keys
- changing mainboard in case of events (like BMC defect or mainboard defect)
can be compensated?
In these cases I could imagine that the root of trust (PCR / TPM) are invalidated and in result this might prevent VMs from booting.
Lately I had a similar "lesson", without confidential VM, just vTPM enabled on the Hyper-V VMs and they refused booting after an UEFI update which fussed around with my Secure Boot so I had to delete the keys and redeploy them. Can you follow me?
Understood that's is a double-edged sword and trade-offs between confidentially and unexpected things that can happen.
I suppose that CVM are likely used in areas where confidentially comes along with high costs for outages. Thanks for sharing your thoughts!