"Security Operations Admin User" Predefined Critical Asset classification

Lucaraheller​ Would you please stop flooding this forum with AI slop?  I've received three notifications today about posts that were old and no longer relevant, and the answers were not helpful.

Hi SKadish​ 

What Microsoft has publicly indicated so far is that these newer Critical Asset classifications are based on a combination of privilege signals, behavioral telemetry, and exposure context, rather than one simple static rule.

So for the Security Operations Admin User classification, it is not necessarily limited to users who currently hold a named Entra admin role. It can also include accounts that Defender identifies as having operational security influence or frequent privileged security activity.

This may include users who:

• Regularly perform security operations tasks
  • Access Defender, Sentinel, Purview, or Intune administrative functions
  • Frequently investigate alerts or execute remediation actions
  • Administer protected endpoints or security tooling
  • Have strong relationships to other critical assets

For Security Operations Admin Devices, the same principle appears to apply.

A device may be classified because it is:

• Frequently used by privileged users
  • Used for security administration tasks
  • Used to access sensitive consoles or workloads
  • Operationally linked to high criticality identities

That would explain why some non-privileged users appear in the classification. Even without formal admin roles, they may have inherited criticality through device usage patterns, repeated activity, or association with other sensitive assets.

Important note:

These classifications are not always the same as RBAC assignments or Entra role membership. They are part of Microsoft Security Exposure Management logic, which uses broader context than directory roles alone.

What I would review:

• Sign-in history of those users
  • Primary devices they use
  • Shared admin workstations or jump boxes
  • Defender / Intune / admin portal usage
  • Temporary privileged activity in the past
  • Devices used by IT staff for support

It is also possible Microsoft recalculates these relationships periodically, so group membership may change over time.

Short answer:

This is most likely relationship-based behavioral classification, not a simple “is admin = yes/no” model.

I agree more transparency from Microsoft on the exact signals would be very valuable for customers trying to validate why users or devices were included.

Thanks - I asked this a year ago, so I haven't taken a look at this classification recently to see if this is still an issue.  However, this definitely was not a result of manual tagging, or of devices frequently used by high criticality users.

Admins can manually tag additional accounts as sensitive in the Defender portal, based on business context (executives, service accounts, SecOps personnel). 

Additionally, devices frequently used by high criticality uses such as Domain Admins will also be classified as high critical assets. For additional details on this classification, refer to -Criticality Levels for Classifications - Microsoft Security Exposure Management | Microsoft Learn