Azure IoT TLS: Changes are coming! (…and why you should care)

RAMIoT · ‎Feb 01 2021

[Update 5/27/2021: We have published a new blog post with more up-to-date guidance. Please read the new one here]

Microsoft is updating Azure services in a phased manner to use TLS server certificates from a different set of Certificate Authorities (CAs) beginning August 13, 2020 and concluding approximately on November 16, 2020. We expect that most Azure IoT customers that interact with IoT Hub and DPS will not be impacted; however, your application may be impacted if you explicitly specify a list of acceptable CAs (a practice known as “certificate pinning”). This change is limited to services in public Azure cloud and no sovereign cloud like Azure China.

This change is being made because the current CA certificates do not comply with one of the CA/Browser Forum Baseline requirements. This was reported on July 1, 2020 and impacts multiple popular Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) providers worldwide. Today, most of the TLS certificates used by Azure services are issued from the "Baltimore CyberTrust Root" PKI.

The following services used by Azure IoT devices will remain chained to the Baltimore CyberTrust Root*, but their TLS server certificates will be issued by new Intermediate Certificate Authorities (ICAs) starting October 5, 2020 progressing regionally on a measured deployment schedule:

Azure IoT Hub
Azure IoT Hub Device Provisioning Service (DPS)
Azure Storage Services

If any client application or device has pinned to an Intermediate CA or leaf certificate rather than the Baltimore CyberTrust Root, immediate action is required to prevent disruption of IoT device connectivity to Azure.

* Other Azure service TLS certificates may be issued by a different PKI.

Certificate Renewal Summary

The table below provides information about the certificates that are being rolled. Depending on which certificate your device or gateway clients use for establishing TLS connections, action may be needed to prevent loss of connectivity.

Certificate	Current	Post Rollover (Oct 5, 2020)	Action
Root	Thumbprint: d4de20d05e66fc53fe1a50882c78db2852cae474 Expiration: Monday, May 12, 2025, 4:59:00 PM Subject Name: CN = Baltimore CyberTrust Root OU = CyberTrust O = Baltimore C = IE	Not Changing	None
Intermediates	Thumbprints: CN = Microsoft IT TLS CA 1 Thumbprint: 417e225037fbfaa4f95761d5ae729e1aea7e3a42 ---------------------------------------------------- CN = Microsoft IT TLS CA 2 Thumbprint: 54d9d20239080c32316ed9ff980a48988f4adf2d ---------------------------------------------------- CN = Microsoft IT TLS CA 4 Thumbprint: 8a38755d0996823fe8fa3116a277ce446eac4e99 ---------------------------------------------------- CN = Microsoft IT TLS CA 5 Thumbprint: Ad898ac73df333eb60ac1f5fc6c4b2219ddb79b7 ---------------------------------------------------- Expiration: ‎Friday, ‎May ‎20, ‎2024 5:52:38 AM Subject Name: OU = Microsoft IT O = Microsoft Corporation L = Redmond S = Washington C = US	Thumbprints: CN = Microsoft RSA TLS CA 01 Thumbprint: 703d7a8f0ebf55aaa59f98eaf4a206004eb2516a ---------------------------------------------------- CN = Microsoft RSA TLS CA 02 Thumbprint: b0c2d2d13cdd56cdaa6ab6e2c04440be4a429c75 ---------------------------------------------------- Expiration: ‎Tuesday, ‎October ‎8, ‎2024 12:00:00 AM; Subject Name: O = Microsoft Corporation C = US	Required
Leaf (IoT Hub)	Thumbprint: 8b1a359705188c5577cb2dcd9a06331807c0bb97 Expiration: ‎Friday, ‎March ‎19, ‎2021 6:15:48 PM Subject Name: CN = *.azure-devices.net	Thumbprint: Varies Expiration: Varies Subject Name: CN = *.azure-devices.net	Required
Leaf (DPS)	Thumbprint: f568f692f3274ecbb479c94272d6f3344a3f0247 Expiration: ‎Friday, ‎March ‎19, ‎2021 5:58:35 PM Subject Name: CN = *.azure-devices-provisioning.net	Thumbprint: Varies Expiration: Varies Subject Name: CN = *.azure-devices-provisioning.net	Required

Note: Both the intermediate and leaf certificates are expected to change frequently. We recommend not taking dependencies on them and instead pinning the root certificate as it rolls less frequently.

Action Required

If your devices depend on the operating system certificate store for getting these roots or use the device/gateway SDKs as provided, then no action is required.
If your devices pin the Baltimore root CA among others, then no action is required related to this change.
1. If your device interacts with other Azure services (e.g. IoT Edge -> Microsoft Container Registry or Device -> Azure API Gateway), then you must pin additional roots as provided here.
If your devices use a connection stack other than the ones provided in an Azure IoT SDK, and pin any intermediary or leaf TLS certificates instead of the Baltimore root CA, then immediate action is required:
1. To continue without disruption due to this change, Microsoft recommends that client applications or devices pin the Baltimore root -
  1. Baltimore Root CA
    (Thumbprint: d4de20d05e66fc53fe1a50882c78db2852cae474)
  2. To prevent future disruption, client applications or devices should also pin the following roots:
    1. Microsoft RSA Root Certificate Authority 2017
      (Thumbprint: 73a5e64a3bff8316ff0edccc618a906e4eae4d74)
    2. Digicert Global Root G2
      (Thumbprint: df3c24f9bfd666761b268073fe06d1cc8d4f82a4)
2. To continue pinning intermediaries, replace the existing certificates with the new intermediates CAs:
  1. Microsoft RSA TLS CA 01
    (Thumbprint: 703d7a8f0ebf55aaa59f98eaf4a206004eb2516a)
  2. Microsoft RSA TLS CA 02
    (Thumbprint: b0c2d2d13cdd56cdaa6ab6e2c04440be4a429c75)
  3. To minimize future code changes, also pin the following ICAs:
    1. Microsoft Azure TLS Issuing CA 01
      (Thumbprint: 2f2877c5d778c31e0f29c7e371df5471bd673173)
    2. Microsoft Azure TLS Issuing CA 02
      (Thumbprint: e7eea674ca718e3befd90858e09f8372ad0ae2aa)
    3. Microsoft Azure TLS Issuing CA 05
      (Thumbprint: 6c3af02e7f269aa73afd0eff2a88a4a1f04ed1e5)
    4. Microsoft Azure TLS Issuing CA 06
      (Thumbprint: 30e01761ab97e59a06b41ef20af6f2de7ef4f7b0)

If your client applications, devices, or networking infrastructure (e.g. firewalls) perform any sub root validation in code, immediate action is required:
1. If you have hard coded properties like Issuer, Subject Name, Alternative DNS, or Thumbprint of any certificate other than the Baltimore Root CA, then you will need to modify this to reflect the properties of the newly pinned certificates.
2. Note: This extra validation, if done, should cover all the pinned certificates to prevent future disruptions in connectivity.

Validation

Update: The validation endpoints that were set up to facilitate testing of your devices against the new Intermediate CAs are no longer valid. If you are experiencing issues that surfaced after November 2020, please open a support request and describe the issue per the support section below.

We recommend performing some basic validation to mitigate any unintentional impact to your IoT infrastructure connecting to Azure IoT Hub and DPS. We have set up a test environment for your convenience to try out before we roll these certificates in production environments. The connection strings for this test environment are given below:

IoT Hub: Use the provided connection string in your device or simulated runtime to test TLS connectivity to IoT Hub -

Connection String: HostName=sdk-cert-test.azure-devices.net;DeviceId=InvalidDevice1;SharedAccessKey=4aWn2y3hEEmLyWmvixeVl69SFzzSwXKwzkGDHsCaSZo=

Device Provisioning Service (DPS): Use your device ID and associated credential to authenticate with DPS using the following endpoint details -

Global Service Endpoint: global-canary.azure-devices-provisioning.net
ID SCOPE: 0ne0017FD54

A successful TLS connection to the test environment indicates a positive test outcome - that your infrastructure will work as is with these changes. The test connection string for IoT Hub contains an invalid key, so once the TLS connection has been established, any run time operations performed against this test IoT Hub will fail. For DPS, since your device has not been formally enrolled in this specific DPS instance, it is expected to get an authorization error. This is by design since these resources exist solely for customers to validate their TLS connectivity. The test environment will be available until all public cloud regions have been updated.

Support

If you have any technical questions on implementing these changes or help in performing validation in the test environment, please open a support request with the options below and a member from our engineering team will get back to you shortly.

Issue Type: Technical
Service: IoT SDKs
Summary: TLS Baltimore upgrade question
Problem type: Connectivity
Problem subtype: Unable to connect

Untitled picture.png

Fig 1: Sample support request

Additional Information

IoT Show: To know more about TLS certificates and PKI changes related to Azure IoT, please check out the IoT Show:
Microsoft wide communications: To broadly notify customers, Microsoft had sent a Service Health portal notification on Aug 3^rd, 2020 and released a public document that include timelines, actions that need to be taken, and details regarding the upcoming changes to our Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).

Mark Orlassino · ‎Sep 12 2020

@RAMIoT

How will these change affect Microsoft Azure Sphere and Windows IOT Core devices? Will those devices be automatically be updated with firmware/OS updates pushed out by Microsoft, assuming they have network connectivity back to the public internet?

RAMIoT · ‎Sep 14 2020

Azure Sphere utilizes the certificate provided in the Azure IoT C SDK that runs on Sphere. Since the SDK has the Baltimore root, this change should not impact default configurations of the Azure IoT C SDK on Sphere. However, if there have been intentional changes to include extra validation of ICAs or leaf certificates, some changes may be needed per the blog.

For Windows IoT, the cert store has the existing Baltimore root already. This is not changing. Of course, if there is code that performs extra validation of ICAs or leaf certificates, or if these have been pinned, then some changes may be needed.

marusyk · ‎Sep 15 2020

@RAMIoT

What if we use only self-signed certificates with device SDK without pinned the Baltimore root CA explicitly, is it required any actions?

RAMIoT · ‎Sep 17 2020

@marusyk

I believe the flow you're talking about is for device authentication by the hub - devices can be provisioned with self signed certificates whose thumbprints are uploaded to hub so that hub can authenticate them. This flow is unchanged.

What's changing is the way the device authenticates the service through TLS. The server (IoT Hub or DPS) will present a SSL certificate rooted to Baltimore with different intermediate CAs starting Oct 5th. If you are using the default C device SDK, the Baltimore root is pinned, and you should be okay. If you have performed any extra validation against any certificate that is not the Baltimore root, you may need to update that code.

Hope this helps!

rajanpatel · ‎Sep 22 2020

@RAMIoT

We are using self signed certificate to provision devices into iot hub. Our Device is provisioning to IoT Hub via Azure DPS. We had Azure Device SDK on Device which connect to DPS using global endpoint "global.azure-devices-provisioning.net", ID Scope, and device certificates X.509 (Created using Self Signed Certificate). Once Device is provisioned on Azure IoT Hub using DPS, device will start communicating to IoT hub using device certificates X.509 and Device ID. We hadn't pinned certificates on device.

Does is there any impact based on above implementation approach?

We also tried to connect to DPS using test environment provided by Azure in this blog. We used our existing device valid certificates which are chaining to self signed root certificate and try to connect with below endpoints. But we are getting error code 401002. Below is the response which we got.

{"errorCode":401002,"trackingId":"****************************","message":"Invalid certificate.","timestampUtc":"2020-09-22T16:26:59.3100404Z"}

Azure Test Environment
- Global Service Endpoint: global-canary.azure-devices-provisioning.net
- ID SCOPE: 0ne0017FD54

What steps we need to follow to prevent disconnection of devices from azure?

Thanks,

Rajan

RAMIoT · ‎Sep 22 2020

Hi @rajanpatel,

The flow you're referring to is how IoT Hub authenticates devices; there are 3 methods - Symmetric Key, X.509 self signed, and X.509 CA. These flows are not impacted. The TLS Server Certificates of Hub and DPS are changing and hence impacted. This means that when establishing a TLS connection with the IoT Hub or global DPS endpoint, the device must validate the server by looking up at the root chain and validating that the root certificate (in this case 'Baltimore Cyber Trust Root') is indeed a trusted CA on the device.

The error you are receiving is because the test DPS instance does not have your device enrolled. If you'd like to test that, please open a support ticket as described in the Support section above, and our support team will be happy to enroll your device and allow you to perform an end to end test. If you're able to independently test that you're able to establish a TLS connection using wireshark then that's the only validation required. Hope this helps! :)

Leszek_W · ‎Oct 01 2020

I am using IoT DPS and IoT Hub from Linux VM + IoT Python SDK. My understanding is that I am not impacted based on input which you provided:

"If your devices depend on the operating system certificate store for getting these roots or use the device/gateway SDKs as provided, then no action is required."

In addition I did following test with curl:

[admin@node01 ~]$ curl -v https://global-canary.azure-devices-provisioning.net:8883
* About to connect() to global-canary.azure-devices-provisioning.net port 8883 (#0)
*   Trying 52.225.179.220...
* Connected to global-canary.azure-devices-provisioning.net (52.225.179.220) port 8883 (#0)
* Initializing NSS with certpath: sql:/etc/pki/nssdb
*   CAfile: /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt
  CApath: none
* NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not specified)
* SSL connection using TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
* Server certificate:
*       subject: CN=*.azure-devices-provisioning.net
*       start date: Sep 08 21:29:05 2020 GMT
*       expire date: Sep 08 21:29:05 2021 GMT
*       common name: *.azure-devices-provisioning.net
*       issuer: CN=Microsoft RSA TLS CA 01,O=Microsoft Corporation,C=US
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> User-Agent: curl/7.29.0
> Host: global-canary.azure-devices-provisioning.net:8883
> Accept: */*
>
* Empty reply from server
* Connection #0 to host global-canary.azure-devices-provisioning.net left intact
curl: (52) NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not specified)
[admin@node01 ~]$ curl -v https://sdk-cert-test.azure-devices.net:8883
* About to connect() to sdk-cert-test.azure-devices.net port 8883 (#0)
*   Trying 52.180.177.125...
* Connected to sdk-cert-test.azure-devices.net (52.180.177.125) port 8883 (#0)
* Initializing NSS with certpath: sql:/etc/pki/nssdb
*   CAfile: /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt
  CApath: none
* NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not specified)
* SSL connection using TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
* Server certificate:
*       subject: CN=*.azure-devices.net
*       start date: Sep 10 21:15:38 2020 GMT
*       expire date: Sep 10 21:15:38 2021 GMT
*       common name: *.azure-devices.net
*       issuer: CN=Microsoft RSA TLS CA 01,O=Microsoft Corporation,C=US
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> User-Agent: curl/7.29.0
> Host: sdk-cert-test.azure-devices.net:8883
> Accept: */*
>
* Empty reply from server
* Connection #0 to host sdk-cert-test.azure-devices.net left intact
curl: (52) NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not specified)
[admin@node01 ~]$

In case of issues with validation of the server certificate, curl reports it and "-k, --insecure" option is needed to skip validation of the server cert.

Does the above test confirm that I will not be impacted?

Thanks,

Leszek

RAMIoT · ‎Oct 27 2020

@Leszek_W yes, you should not be impacted. Please let us know if you face any issues! :)

norberg · ‎Jan 19 2021

@RAMIoT We have devices connected to IoT Hub using symmetric keys and the primary connection string. Our device is running the Java IoT Hub SDK and utilizes MQTT over WebSockets for connection. On some sites we are now facing an issue where the devices are no longer able to connect. After analyzing the logs, we see an exception happening when calling DeviceClient.open. The underlying error is CertPathValidatorException (Trust anchor for certification path not found). Any idea what could be the cause?

RAMIoT · ‎Jan 19 2021

@norberg could you open a support request and include when you started noticing this issue? If this was a recent issue, then it likely has nothing to do with the intermediate CA rollover. We'd have to know more to ascertain cause.

Please include these parameters:

Issue Type: Technical
Service: IoT SDKs
Summary: TLS Baltimore upgrade question
Problem type: Connectivity
Problem subtype: Unable to connect

norberg · ‎Jan 21 2021

@RAMIoT we found the issue. It was caused by Zscaler SSL Inspection tool that is replacing the Baltimore certificate with their own certificate to allow them to inspect SSL traffic. Since our device doesn't have Zscaler certificate as a trusted root, it was failing the certificate chain validation. The customer added exclusions on our devices and everything started to work fine.

PradeepKiruvalue · ‎Jan 30 2021

I have some issue registering the device with the dps over mqtt as well as REST, failed to register the device. Any help here?

Followed the procedure to load the root certificate and verified as well. Doing Group enrolment.

Thanks,

Pradeep

MQTT

mosquitto_pub -d --cafile /home/ubuntu/RND/edge/azure-connect/certs/BaltimoreCyberTrustRoot.crt.pem --cert /home/ubuntu/RND/edge/azure-connect/local/myiotdevice.crt --key /home/ubuntu/RND/edge/azure-connect/local/myiotdevice.key -d -h MyDemoDPS.azure-devices-provisioning.net -p 8883 -t $dps/registrations/PUT/iotdps-register/?$rid=1 -m "{\"registrationId\":\"myiotdevice\"}

Getting below error

Client mosq-Gd5s19yNghmGPQeBja sending CONNECT
Client mosq-Gd5s19yNghmGPQeBja received CONNACK (5)
Connection error: Connection Refused: not authorised.
Client mosq-Gd5s19yNghmGPQeBja sending DISCONNECT

Tried the same with the REST APIs, with curl

curl -v -L -i -X PUT -cert /home/ubuntu/RND/edge/azure-connect/local/myiotdevice.crt -key ./myiotdevice.key -H 'Content-Type:application/json' -H 'Content-Encoding:utf-8' -d '{"registrationId":"myiotdevice"}' https://global.azure-devices-provisioning.net/0ne00211966/registrations/myiotdevice/register?api-ver... --tlsv1.2
* Closing connection -1
curl: (3) URL using bad/illegal format or missing URL
* Could not resolve host: .
* Closing connection 0
curl: (6) Could not resolve host: .
* Trying 52.163.212.39:443...
* TCP_NODELAY set
* Connected to global.azure-devices-provisioning.net (52.163.212.39) port 443 (#1)
* ALPN, offering h2
* ALPN, offering http/1.1
* successfully set certificate verify locations:
* CAfile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
CApath: /etc/ssl/certs
* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):
* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):
* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server key exchange (12):
* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Request CERT (13):
* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server finished (14):
* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):
* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client key exchange (16):
* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):
* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
* SSL connection using TLSv1.2 / ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
* ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol
* Server certificate:
* subject: CN=*.azure-devices-provisioning.net
* start date: Oct 30 17:29:27 2020 GMT
* expire date: Oct 30 17:29:27 2021 GMT
* issuer: C=US; O=Microsoft Corporation; CN=Microsoft RSA TLS CA 01
* SSL certificate verify ok.
> PUT /0ne00211966/registrations/myiotdevice/register?api-version=2019-03-31 HTTP/1.1
> Host: global.azure-devices-provisioning.net
> User-Agent: curl/7.68.0
> Accept: */*
> Referer: y
> Content-Type:application/json
> Content-Encoding:utf-8
> Content-Length: 32
>
* upload completely sent off: 32 out of 32 bytes
* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse
< HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
< Date: Sat, 30 Jan 2021 13:22:20 GMT
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 2021 13:22:20 GMT
< Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
< Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
< x-ms-request-id: b90fa549-791f-4d41-aaa9-ba315739b546
x-ms-request-id: b90fa549-791f-4d41-aaa9-ba315739b546
< Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

<
* Connection #1 to host global.azure-devices-provisioning.net left intact
{"errorCode":401002,"trackingId":"b90fa549-791f-4d41-aaa9-ba315739b546","message":"Unauthorized","timestampUtc":"2021-01-30T13:22:21.691564Z"}

OlivierBloch · ‎Feb 01 2021

Hi @PradeepKiruvalue , I see you posted the question on StackOverflow as well and Steve proposed an answer there.

PradeepKiruvalue · ‎Feb 01 2021

Thats right Olivier, Still the issue dint get resolved. Any suggestion will be helpful here.

OlivierBloch · ‎Feb 08 2021

It seems it is resolved on SO now, right?

ammy12cool · ‎Apr 06 2021

Hi, Do we need to do any action on the Azure service sdk? I'm using nodejs stack.

Is it something we need to use a particular update version of the sdk which supports the new root certs or are we good wit any azure service sdk version to be used?

rameshkhot · ‎Apr 28 2021

Hi,

We are using Azure IoT Hub service on our IoT device with self signed device certificate(even though this is irrelevant) and we are not using the Azure IoT SDK, we have our own trustore, not using the OS provided trustore, in our trustore we have Baltimore CyberTrust Root having Thumbprint: d4de20d05e66fc53fe1a50882c78db2852cae474 and Expiration: Monday, May 12, 2025, 4:59:00 PM, we are not using any intermediate certificate for the TLS communication.

As I can understand there is no impact currently but my worry is, what happens once the Baltimore CyberTrust Root get expired on Monday, May 12, 2025, 4:59:00 PM? what is the future plan? which will be the new ROOT CA?.

As mentioned/recommended in the post, we have to use additional below mentioned ROOT CA's in IoT devices

Microsoft RSA Root Certificate Authority 2017
(Thumbprint: 73a5e64a3bff8316ff0edccc618a906e4eae4d74)
Digicert Global Root G2
(Thumbprint: df3c24f9bfd666761b268073fe06d1cc8d4f82a4)

What is the guarantee that post Baltimore CyberTrust Root expiration, new server certificate issued on Azure IoT Hub is either one from above mentioned ROOT CA's.

Our IoT devices are expected to be operational beyond 2025 and we can not replace or add new ROOT CA's in our device by physically or remotely. Post Baltimore CyberTrust Root expiration in case IoT Hub server certificate is issued by some other ROOT CA then our device will become non operational.

Kindly suggest the best way to address this issue.

Currently do we have any provision to use the server certificate issued by our own private KMS/self signed on the Azure IoT Hub service?

Thank you!

bochen · ‎May 07 2021

@RAMIoT I am trying to test the new certificates with IoT Hub you listed, but failed to resolve the host name "sdk-cert-test.azure-devices.net", could you check if this iot hub still works? Thanks.

Connection String: HostName=sdk-cert-test.azure-devices.net;DeviceId=InvalidDevice1;SharedAccessKey=4aWn2y3hEEmLyWmvixeVl69SFzzSwXKwzkGDHsCaSZo=

Arty29 · ‎Apr 29 2022

Hello @RAMIoT ,

Will these certificate changes require changing to a new IoT Hub instance or can our devices continue using the same hub? I have equipped our new devices with the recommended certificates but have not (yet) implemented a DPS client on the devices so they cannot be assigned to a new hub once they are out in the field.

Thank you for your assistance.

RAMIoT · ‎May 02 2022

@Arty29 No you will not need a new hub. Your existing Hub will begin serving a certificate that is rooted to the new root (DigiCert Global G2 Root) after the migration.

@rameshkhot The new root will be DigiCert Global G2, after which Microsoft may decide to migration to a native MSFT root as mentioned. There is no 'guarantee' per se since the world of public PKIs is mired with compliance, regulatory, and security related issues that can mandate sudden change. The only way to be future proofed in a public PKI world is to have a robust update mechanism. IoT Hub is indeed working on a feature that will allow you to use your own custom endpoint protected with whatever cert/chain you wish, but that is not going to land in time for you to take advantage of for this specific migration. Please don't hesitate in opening a support request if you need additional help.

@all, please review the new and updated blog for this migration with the latest updates here.

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Azure IoT TLS: Changes are coming! (…and why you should care)

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