01-28-2020 02:29 AM
01-28-2020 02:29 AM
This is a security issue that is out in the wild, though I do not think it is that so severe that it poses a risk to mention it here.
The page edge://settings/passwords allows the person in front of the computer to reveal passwords after they convince the browser about their ownership by entering their account's password, or their PIN on that device. That's cool!
The problem is, it also displays their actual lengths of the passwords without any proof of ownership! The problem here is two fold:
Just now I realized that the auto-fill somehow also enters my password in plain text to the websites, without asking any private key or sorts... I guess then being the person in front of an unlocked computer is enough to get the passwords deciphered (and entered via auto-fill). Then my question is in reverse: What is the point of keeping them censored on edge://settings/passwords at all, if we trust this person so much?
Windows in and of itself does not trust so easily: Fire up the "Credential Manager" (type that onto Start menu search). It displays the censored passwords with the dummy length of 8 or something. They are revealed only after authentication. I hope that, without authentication, it does not decipher the passwords nor give them away either. Why does a the browser give in?
Could you provide an option on edge://settings/passwords to let us choose to require authentication before auto-filling the passwords? Just like the one that pops up when you hit the "peek" button to reveal the passwords. I personally find the auto-fill as it is kind of insecure. I would rather enter my PIN every time I log in (with cookies, this doesn't happen so frequently anyway), than to have the equivalent of keeping my passwords in a passwords.txt that I hid deep in my Documents.
01-28-2020 12:54 PM - edited 02-05-2020 12:00 AM
I totally agree, Edge should make all of the passwords the same length when they are encrypted so their real length won't be known by anyone that doesn't have the correct credentials
02-05-2020 12:03 AM
If an attacker has unrestricted physical access to your computer, they can just convert the password fields to text fields or use DevTools to read them as plaintext.
One of the most frequent reports we receive is password disclosure using the Inspect Element feature (see Issue 126398 for an example). People reason that “If I can see the password, it must be a bug.” However, this is just one of the physically-local attacks described in the previous section, and all of those points apply here as well.
People sometimes report that they can compromise Chrome by installing a malicious DLL in a place where Chrome will load it, by hooking APIs (e.g. Issue 130284), or by otherwise altering the configuration of the PC.
We consider these attacks outside Chrome's threat model, because there is no way for Chrome (or any application) to defend against a malicious user who has managed to log into your computer as you, or who can run software with the privileges of your operating system user account. Such an attacker can modify executables and DLLs, change environment variables like PATH, change configuration files, read any data your user account owns, email it to themselves, and so on. Such an attacker has total control over your computer, and nothing Chrome can do would provide a serious guarantee of defense. This problem is not special to Chrome — all applications must trust the physically-local user.
There are a few things you can do to mitigate risks from people who have physical control over your computer, in certain circumstances.
There is almost nothing you can do to mitigate risks when using a public computer.
Saturday - last edited Saturday
To reiterate, Edge does not blindly trust the person sitting in front of the computer. It does ask the PIN from the user before showing the password in clear text.
However, while it doesn't fully trust the person sitting in front, it apparently trusts them "somewhat". It displays the true length of the password without PIN.
I don't see any reason for this "human-like" behavior, where the software (Microsoft Edge) doesn't fully trust or distrust the user, but trusts them "somewhat".
Hi, please see this post:
now the password length is also hidden